THE RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND SPAIN 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



BY 

FRENCH ENSOR CHADWICK 

REAK-ADMIRAL U. 8. NAVT (RETIRED) 
AUTHOR OF " CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR " 



VOL. I 

WITH MAPS 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
1911 



CL4 - 



Copyright, 1911, bt 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



Published September, 1911 






.^ 



^ 




©CI. A 1^07025 



TO THE MEMORY OF 

WILLIAM THOMAS SAMPSON 

1840-1902 

REAR-ADMIRAL UNITED STATES NAVY 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET 

DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN 



PREFACE 

This work is intended in the main as a documentary history. 
An endeavor has been made to give all important orders, tele- 
grams, and reports. It is not to be understood that these, or 
any considerable portion of them, are for the first time before the 
public. All of any real importance have already appeared in 
government publications or with governmental approval. The 
interior history of no war or other great event has ever before 
been so fully exposed as in the many volumes published by the 
American government and in the documents set forth with the 
authority of the government of Spain. These are given in detail 
in the bibliography. 

Using the words of the Messenger in Antigone, the writer can 
say, in part, "I saw"; and in whole: 

... I will speak and hold back 

No syllable of the truth. Why should we soothe 

Your ears with stories, only to appear 

Liars thereafter? Truth is always right. 

This is the writer's view of history: neither to magnify our 
own exploits nor to depreciate those of the foe. We were com- 
paratively strong in the material of war; he was weak; we had 
the initiative of the Anglo-Saxon, he the spirit of passive sacrifice 
which, as shown through history, has made the Spaniard strong 
in defence. Spain defeated was not Spain dishonored. The 
sortie of Cervera at Santiago, the action of Montojo at Cavite, 
and the defence of El Caney must ever stand as notable examples 

vii 



viii PREFACE 

of the high spirit and sacrificing courage which are such great 
qualities of the Spanish race. The days of May 1, July 1, and 
July 3, in 189S, are dates of honor which both nations may well 
hold in lasting and proud remembrance. 

Newport, Rhode Island, 
17 January, 1911. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Naval Movements and Preparations 3 

II. The Forces 28 

III. Strategy 55 

IV. Spanish Views 94 

V. The Beginning of Hostilities 127 

VI. The Battle of Manila 154 

VII. Sampson's INIove Eastward, the Attack on San 

Juan, and Cervera's Arrival in the Caribbean 214 

VIII. Cervera's Voyage 250 

IX. The Moves to Intercept Cervera 262 

X. Cienfuegos 286 

XL The Movements of the Flying Squadron . . . 297 

XII. The Situation in Santiago 308 

XIII. Sampson Leaves for Santiago; Schley Begins 

Blockade 321 

XIV. The Blockade AND THE Sinking of THE "Merrimac" 334 

XV. The Blockade of Santiago 348 

ix 



X CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 

^,^-^ PAGE 

A VI. The Blockade of Santiago: the Army Movement 368 

Appendix A 397 

Appendix B 4Q3 

Appendix C 4Q9 



MAPS 

FAOB 

Island of Cuba, 1898 56 

The Havana batteries, showing the extreme train of the guns . 82 

Part of the Western Paeific 155 

Manila and its approaches, showing course of American 

Squadron 159 

Manila Bay 176 

Positions of Spanish ships at beginning and at end of action, 

May 1, 1898 189 

Cable chart of West Indies (1898) 218 

Port San Juan 231 

Distances in the North Atlantic and daily positions of Spanish 

Squadron under Admiral Cervera 251 

Santiago Harbor 259 

Cienfuegos Bay 267 

Positions of the Squadrons of Sampson, Schley, and Cervera 

from May 15 to July 3 Facing page 333 

Harbor entrance, Santiago, Cuba 342 

Guantdnamo 355 

Table of Distances Facing page 1 



TABLE OF DISTANCES 



ATLANTIC 



Key West to Havana 

Key West to Cienfuegos 

Key West to Tampa 

Key West to Santiago de Cuba via Cape Maysi 

via Cape Antonio 

Key West to San Juan, P. R 

Cape Verde Islands to Martinique 

Cape Verde Islands to San Juan, P. R. . . . 

Martinique to San Juan 

Martinique to Cura9ao 

Cura9ao to Santiago de Cuba 

Curasao to Cienfuegos 

Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba 

Santiago de Cuba to Guantanamo 

Santiago to Mole S. Nicolas, Haiti 

Santiago to Gonaives, Haiti 

Santiago to San Juan, P. R 

Windward Passage to San Juan 

New York to Cape Verde Islands 

New York to Havana 

New York to San Juan, P. R 

Sandy Hook to Capes of Virginia 

Capes of Virginia to Havana 

Santiago to El Caney 

Siboney to Las Guasimas 

Siboney to El Pozo 

Siboney to San Juan Hill 

Siboney to Santiago 

Guantdnamo to Santiago by land (about) . . 



NAUTICAL 
MILES 



90 

520 

220 

610 

790 

972 

2,070 

2,350 

380 

500 

625 

900 

315 

40 

122 

185 

580 

450 

2,919 

1,215 

1,411 

240 

938 



STATUTE 
MILES 



104 

598 

253 

702 

910 

1,119 

2,385 

2,707 

438 

576 

720 

1,036 

364 

46 

140 

213 

668 

519 

3,361 

1,398 

1,626 

276 

1,078 

4 



7 
Si 
9| 
75 



PACIFIC 



Hong-Kong to Manila 

Subig Bay to Manila 

Manila to Sangley Point 

San Francisco to Honolulu 

Honolulu to Guam 

Guam to Manila 

San Francisco to Manila via Honolulu and Guam 
Suez to Manila via Singapore 



NAUTICAL 

MILES 



628 
55 
6^ 
2,110 
3,337 
1,742 
7,189 
6,358 



STATUTE 

MILES 



723 
63 

7^ 
2,325 
3,842 
2,006 
8,275 
7,321 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



r.- 



CHAPTER I 
NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 

The middle of January, 1898, found four of the armored ships 
of the North Atlantic squadron in Hampton Roads, and a fifth, the 
Texas, expected from New York. All had undergone the usual 
autumn overhauling, and had been collected at Hampton Roads 
with a view to going south to the winter drill-grounds off the 
west coast of Florida, a region selected for its genial winter climate, 
facility of supply, and a general shoalness of water, which, while 
having sufficient depth close to the land, was such as enabled ships 
to anchor as much, at some points, as a hundred miles from shore. 

The recognition by the American government of the seriousness 
of the situation in Cuba is shown by the telegrams of the navy de- 
partment at this time to the commanders-in-chief abroad. These 
telegrams directed the retention, as the law allowed, of men whose 
enlistment had expired; that to Admiral Selfridge, commander-in- 
chief in Europe, being dated January 11, and to Commodore 
Dewey, then at Yokohama, January 27. A telegram sent January 
17 to Captain C. M. Chester, in command of the ships in the South 
Atlantic, announced that "affairs are very disturbed in Cuba; it is 
considered advisable to change the disposition of ships ; announce 
unofficially your intention to proceed with the Cincinnati and 
Castine on cruise to northward for exercise and drill and to visit 
the most northern part of the South Atlantic station ; as soon after 
as possible, without thereby causing comment, proceed to Par^, 
Brazil, at discretion, and there await further orders." 

A telegram of the same date stopped the Wilmington, Com- 
mander C. C. Todd, on her way to the South Atlantic, and ordered 
her "about February 14 to proceed to La Guayra and await further 
orders." On the same day the Helena, Commander W. T. Swin- 
burne, was stopped on her way to China and ordered to Lisbon. 

3 



4 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

On January 26 Rear-Admiral Thomas Selfridge, in command of 
the small force in the Mediterranean, the flag-ship of which was the 
San Francisco, was ordered to go to Lisbon after February 2, and 
remain there/ 

But these facts should not fix sinister design upon those charged 
with the movement of the North Atlantic squadron to Florida 
waters. It was to a great degree a squadron of exercise; it had 
been held north already two winters in a bleak winter climate to 
the detriment of its morale and efficiency, though the drill-ground, 
to which throughout this period it was desired to send these ships, 
was in our own waters, eminently suited for the purposes, and, 
indeed, the only place available so long as a West Indian cruise 
appeared undesirable on account of the Cuban situation. The fact 
that for two years the United States government had been willing 
at a marked sacrifice to its naval well-being and efficiency to forego 
the advantages offered by the waters of Florida is in itself proof 
of its general good intentions. In any case the difference in dis- 
tance between Hampton Roads and the Florida Gulf from Ha- 
vana is a negligible quantity. It is but two and a half days at 
twelve knots. It was thus thought that the much-desired change 
to our Southern waters could be made without trespassing too 
much upon the good understanding existing between the Spanish 
and United States governments. The former had, in December, 
expressed some concern on account of the proposed movement, 
but Senor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister, was assured that 
there was no unfriendly intent.^ 

The four armored ships of the squadron then together (the 
armored cruiser New York, Captain Chadwick, in which was the 
flag of Rear-Admiral jNIontgomery Sicard, commander-in-chief, 
and the first-class battle-ships Iowa, Captain Sampson, Massa- 

' Shortly after his arrival there the services of this valuable and experienced 
officer were lost to the service through his retirement under the law which 
retires all officers of sixty-two years who have not received the thanks of Con- 
gress. Admiral Selfridge was relieved by Commodore John C. Howell. The 
presence of the few ships of this command in peninsular waters gave great 
concern to the Spanish government, notwithstanding the fact that it was not a 
serious fighting force. (See Spanish Diplom., Cor. and Docs., 1896-1900, 80.) 

' Chadwick, Rcl. of United States and Spain. Diplomacy, 532. 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 5 

chusettSy Captain Higginson, and Indiana, Captain Taylor *), left 
Hampton Roads for Key West, January 16, 1898. The second- 
class battle-ship Texas, Captain Philip, left New York the day 
before and joined the flag just before the arrival of the squadron, 
after a slow passage, at Key West, Sunday, January 23. Ships 
of such deep draft must anchor outside the coral reef, which 
skirts the shore at this point at a distance of about five miles. 
This anchorage is thus in the open sea, in a depth of from six- 
teen to twenty fathoms, exposed to such seas as may be raised 
by the usual trade winds, but protected from the effects of the 
northers, the only gales which blow in winter, from the fact that 
the trend of the coast and reef is here in an east-and-west direction. 

The admiral Avas at once joined on his arrival at the outside an- 
chorage by the second-class battle-ship Maine and the cruisers 
Montgomery, Commander Converse, and Detroit, Commander 
Dayton, which were then lying at Key West, which had been used as 
head-quarters while these ships were employed in the suppression 
of filibustering.^ The torpedo-boats dishing. Lieutenant Gleaves, 
Dupont, Lieutenant S. S. Wood, and Ericsson, Lieutenant Usher, 
which had been employed on the same service, were in the harbor, 
six miles distant. 

It had been the intention of the admiral to leave the next day 
with the whole of the eight ships with the flag for the harbor of 
Dry Tortugas, sixty miles west of Key West, and which from its 
situation with reference to the drill-ground, had been selected as 
the base for coal supply. The small steamer Fern, Lieutenant- 
Commander W. S. Cowles, was to be used as a general supply- 
vessel between Key West and Tortugas. 

While there was grave concern as to the Cuban situation, and 
while it was the duty of the American government to be prepared 
for the worst, the fact that no immediate danger was feared is 
shown by the fact that the admiral's orders directed him to be 
in Hampton Roads again not later than April 1. 

* Lieutenant-Commander John A. Rodgers (now rear-admiral) was in 
temporary command during Captain Taylor's absence through illness. 

2 The Maine had, on request of Consul-General Lee, been assigned to this 
duty in order to have a ship of force at hand in case of an outbreak in Havana, 
which might render the presence of a ship necessary. 



6 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The Maine had been held at Key West since December 15 in 
telegraphic communication with the consul-general at Havana, 
and with orders to go there should he so request. The very serious 
disturbances of the 12th of January, when both officers and soldiers 
of the Spanish army joined in attacking the offices of the autono- 
mist newspapers, the Diario de la Marina, Discusion, and the 
Reconcentrado, had produced such a state of alarm among the 
foreign residents that the consul-general telegraphed the next day 
to the department of state at Washington: 

Uncertainty exists whether he (Blanco) can control situation. If 
demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and keep the 
peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must 
be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly. 

This dispatch was, of course, merely anticipatory, and there was 
nothing in the situation to prevent the Maine accompanying the 
squadron the 24th of January to the harbor of the Dry Tortugas, 
where the squadron anchored the afternoon of that day. At 9 
o'clock in the evening the torpedo-boat Dupont arrived from Key 
West, directing the Maine to proceed to Havana. The consul- 
general had telegraphed Washington the same day: "Advise visit 
to be postponed six or seven days to give last excitement more time 
to disappear," but the secretary of state answered that the Maine 
had been ordered, and at 11 p. m. she proceeded upon her fateful 
visit, which, however it may have been regarded by the Spanish, 
whether in Havana or in Madrid, had nothing in it of an unfriendly 
character. The United States government would have been remiss 
in its duty to its many citizens then resident in Havana had it not 
given them some refuge such as the Maine afforded against the 
violence which seemed at the time so imminent. 

That the United States government did not desire to be offensive 
in action is shown by the proposed withdrawal of the Maine but a 
few days after her arrival at Havana on the score of health. A 
telegram was sent February 4 from the department of state to 
General Lee: 

Secretary of the navy thinks not prudent for a vessel to remain long 
in Havana; sanitary reasons. Should some vessel be kept there all 
the time? If another sent what have you to suggest as to kind of 
ship ? Telegraph your views. 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 7 

General Lee answered the same day: 

Do not think slightest sanitary danger to officers or crew until April 
or even May. Ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. 
We should not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, 
or conditions would be worse than if vessel had never been sent. 
Americans would depart with their families if no vessel in harbor on 
account of distrust of preservation of order by authorities. If another 
riot occurs will be against governor-general and autonomy, but might 
include anti-American demonstration also. First-class battle-ship 
should replace one if relieved as object-lesson, and to counteract 
Spanish opinion of our navy, and should have a torpedo-boat with 
it to preserve communication with admiral. 

The torpedo-boat Cushing was then at Key West, and Lieu- 
tenant Gleaves, the excellent and capable young officer in com- 
mand, was ordered to take over the duty (previously the Maine's) 
of keeping open the telegraphic communication between Havana 
and Key West. Says Lieutenant (now Captain) Gleaves: 

It was arranged that telegrams should be exchanged daily between 
Consul-General Lee and myself, and in case of any serious outbreak 
in Havana, or any other occasion arising demanding the presence 
of a war-ship, a preconcerted cipher was to be sent by the consul- 
general to the Cushing, and in the event of anything of great impor- 
tance I was to inform the senior officer afloat, and also Admiral Sicard, 
the commander-in-chief, who was with the fleet at Dry Tortugas. 

After the departure of the Maine this programme was carried out 
for a few days, when I received a letter from General Lee, expressing 
the opinion that further communication of this kind would be unneces- 
sary, as everything was quiet in Havana. 

On February 11 the department ordered the Cushing to Havana on 
special duty to communicate with Captain Sigsbee, of the Maine, 
and then to return immediately to Key West. . . . 

The Cushing sailed at 7.30 k. m., FelDruary 11, and did not arrive at 
Havana until 3 p. m., having encountered a severe gale in the straits 
and a heavy sea. It was on this passage that Ensign Joseph Cabell 
Breckinridge [a valuable young officer whose loss was much regretted] 
was washed overboard and drowned. He was the first victim of our 
trouble with Spain. 

The detachment of the Maine interfered, of course, in no wise 
with the works of the squadron except that it removed one of the 
units of a fo.'ce already smaller than wished for the evolutionary 



8 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

drills which it was desired to carry out, and which were at once 
begun. These drills, the coaling in Tortugas harbor, and the 
general duties of the squadron were soon fairly in train. 

Excepting for the presence of the squadron, nothing could be less 
warlike than the appearance of the harbor, which was formed by a 
series of low-lying sand keys and by coral banks lying just short of 
the water surface. On the largest of the keys is Fort Jefferson, an 
extensive casemated fortification of granite and brick of the same 
general character as were many constructed from 1840 to 1860, and 
of which the better-known Fort Sumter, at Charleston, was a type. 
The fort, however, was entirely dismantled, the wooden portions 
of the gun-carriages rotten and the guns on the parapet sunk 
in the uncut grass, the whole the picture of a peace apparently not to 
be broken. The only application of the fort at the period was as a 
quarantine station for yellow-fever patients from ships bound to 
United States ports in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Squadron drills and exercises had at once begun, the squadron 
leaving Tortugas harbor and occasionally anchoring elsewhere, the 
whole of the waters on the west coast of Florida being, as men- 
tioned, one vast anchoring ground rarely disturbed in winter by 
rough weather. These exercises were somewhat broken in upon by 
coaling and the grounding, though happily without injury, of two 
of the battle-ships on coral lumps in the harbor, which had not been 
found by any of the surveys. The admiral, who had been ill from 
a long-standing malarial trouble, had left on a short leave, intend- 
ing to be absent at Tampa for a couple of weeks, but finding a 
hotel less comfortable than his ship's quarters, returned after a 
few days. When he left it was thought scarcely possible that he 
could return, and the writer, in command of the New York, finds 
himself stating in a letter home that "Sampson of course will be in 
command while the admiral is away. If there is to be a change, 
I wish it would be he who would be appointed." This, it may 
be mentioned, was the general feeling of the squadron. 

The Marhlchead, Commander McCalla, joined February 7, only 
to be sent to New Orleans to lend eclat to the Mardi Gras festivi- 
ties, and the Nashville, Commander Maynard, also newly arrived, 
was ordered with the Texas to Galveston for a like purpose. The 
Montgomery on January 31 was ordered on a cruise to the eastward, 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 9 

taking in Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba, with a special view 
to inquire into the suffering reported to exist. 

About 4 A. M. of the 16th of February the torpedo-boat Ericsson 
arrived from Key West with a despatch from the commandant 
of that station, enclosing a telegram which he had received from 
Havana, stating that the Maine had been destroyed by an ex- 
plosion in Havana harbor.^ The admiral, shordy after 7 o'clock, 
called a council of the captains, the consensus of which was that 
the flag-ship should return at once to Key West, to be in direct 
telegraphic communication with Washington. The New York 
thus found herself on the afternoon of the 16th again at anchor 
off the reef. The Massachusetts and Indiana were left for the 
time at Dry Tortugas, but the loiva was ordered to Key West on 
the 19th, her captain, Sampson, being ordered as senior member 
of a court of inquiry upon the destruction of the Maine, of which 
the other members were Captain Chadwick and Lieutenant- 

* The reception of this telegram is described by Captain Gleaves: 
"On the night of the 15th of February, about 10 p. m., the quartermaster in- 
formed me that there was a gentleman on deck who wished to see me on a 
very important matter. I went on deck immediately, and found our secret 
agent. He told me that he had just received a telegram from his representa- 
tive in Havana stating, 'that the Maine had been blown up by her powder 
magazine,' and adding, 'that it was a curious sight to see a man-of-war sink- 
ing in the harbor.' I expressed doubt as to the truth of this report, as rumors 
were circulated in Key West every day of either the destruction of the con- 
sulate in Havana or the assassination of General Lee. The agent, however, 
was so thoroughly satisfied himself, that I decided, in accordance with my 
orders, to confer with the senior officer afloat, Lieut.-Commander W. S. 
Cowles, commanding the Fern. I suggested to Captain Cowles that we 
three go to the cable office, and there await further news, which would be 
Bure to come by the preconcerted message if the report was true. In the 
cable office at the time Captain Sigsbee's despatch was received were the 
operator. Captain Cowles, the secret agent of the government, and myself. 
We sat in silence in the operating-room and waited for some time. Finally, 
about 11 o'clock, the instruments began to click, and the operator wrote out the 
message as it came in. When it was about half through, the operator ex- 
changed a glance with the secret agent, who himself was an operator, and had 
been reading the message. It was quite evident to me then that the report was 
true. When the message was finished, the operator handed it to the agent, and 
after reading it he passed it to Captain Cowles, who handed it to me. It was 
the telegram addressed to the secretary of the navy by Captain Sigsbee an- 
nouncing the destruction of the Maine, and suggesting that public opinion be 
suspended until further reports. There was no one else present when this 
telegram was received." (Notes of Captain Gleaves to author.) 



10 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Commander Potter, with Lieutenant-Commander Marix, ordered 
from Washington, as judge-advocate. 

This court left for Havana on the evening of February 20, in the 
Hght-house tender Mangrove, aboard which, while at Havana, the 
court remained and had its sittings. The tender Fern, the coast- 
survey steamer Bache, and, on March 8, the cruiser Montgomery, 
were ordered to Havana to assist the court in various ways, more 
particularly in looking after the personnel sent from the squadron 
to aid in examining the wreck.^ The sittings of the court, which 
were carried on with great deliberation and with no hint of direc- 
tion or hurry from any one, were not completed until March 21, 
1898. 

The most elementary sense of precaution had now demanded an 
extension of the cautionary orders already given to our naval com- 
manders. The loss of the Maine had, of course, already greatly 
added to the tension in the United States, already sufficiently great 
over the situation in Cuba, where Spanish effort to establish au- 
tonomy now seemed completely unsuccessful, and the suffering 
and terrible mortality of the people on the increase.^ Thus on 
February 17 the Cincinnati, Captain Chester, and Castine, Com- 
mander R. M. Berry, were directed to such port north of Pard as 
the senior officer might select. On the 25th the ships at Lisbon 
were ordered to keep full of coal, and on the same date Commodore 
Dewey was telegraphed: 

Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except Monocacy, 
to Hong-Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war 
[with] Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does 
not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine 
Islands. Keep Olympia^ until further orders. 

On February 26 the Wilmington was ordered to report to Captain 

' For the personal views of the writer in the subject of the destruction of the 
Maine, see the previous vohime, Diplomacy, 559-563 (note). 

* See Consul-General Lee's testimony in regard to Cuban conditions. Sen. 
Doc, 230, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 534 et seq.; also his report of December 13, 1897. 
{Ibid., 544), giving the opinion that there was no possibility of terminating 
the war by arms, autonomy or "by purchasing the insurgent leaders as recently 
attempted or, as far as I can see, in any other way." Also the consular reports. 
Ubid., 552-563.) 

* The Olympia had orders to return to the United States. 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 11 

Chester, who had gone from Pard to Barbados. On the same day 
telegrams were sent to all commanders-in-chief to "keep full of 
coal the best that can be had." 

On March 3 the Columbia and Minnea'polis, laid up at Phila- 
delphia, were ordered to be got ready for sea, and enlistments or- 
dered for them which were in excess of quota authorized by law, 
and on the same day the old wooden corvette Mohican was ordered 
to take on board the ammunition at the Mare Island Navy Yard 
which had been sent there for the ships in Asia, and to go at 
once to Honolulu, two thousand miles distant, and transfer it 
to the Baltimore, Captain Dyer, the flag-ship of the Pacific station. 
Rear-Admiral J. N, Miller, who was in command of that station, 
was ordered, as soon as the ammunition should be shifted, to 
send the Baltimore to Hong-Kong to report to Commodore Dewey. 
He himself was directed to proceed with his staff to San Francisco. 
The Mohican arrived at Honolulu March 19, and the Baltimore 
left Honolulu the 2oth, carrying what was, in the conditions, a 
priceless cargo, Commodore Dewey being telegraphed on March 
21 of her expected departure. 

On March 7, in contemplation of the organization of the flying 
squadron, to the command of which Commodore W. S. Schley 
was ordered, the Brooklyn, Captain F. A. Cook, then at La Guayra, 
Venezuela, was telegraphed : 

The situation is getting worse. Proceed without delay to Hampton 
Roads. 



At this time there was evidently some anxiety as to the ammuni- 
tion supply, for on March 9 Admiral Sicard was directed not to 
expend any until further orders. 

On March 12 Commodore Howell, at Lisbon, was directed to 
send at once the Bancrojt to Norfolk and the Helena to Key West. 
Two days later he was telegraphed : 



Proceed at once to Newcastle-upon-the-Tyne. Upon arrival com- 
municate immediately with the United States naval attach^ at London. 
Hoist United States flag upon Amazonas and Abreu. Appoint to the 
command of former Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Nazro and sufficient 



12 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

oflBcers and crew of the San Francisco. Proceed to New York. San 
Francisco to convoy. Utilize your staff watch duty.' 

On March 15, Captain Chester, at Barbados, with what had 
been the South Atlantic squadron, was ordered to Port Antonio, 
Jamaica. He was informed that the Anna'polis, Commander 
Hunker, on a practice cruise with a crew of apprentices, had 
left Cura9ao the day before, to arrive at Key West not later 
than March 31. Trouble must at the moment have appeared 
imminent, as the telegram added, " He does not know the altered 
situation. Try to intercept and direct to proceed to Hampton 
Roads," the purpose being to give her a crew of men and other- 
wise prepare her for active service. 

On March 1 the Oregon, which had been docked at Bremerton, 
in the state of Washington, was directed to go to San Francisco as 
soon as possible and fill w^ith ammunition. She arrived March 
9, and on the 12th was ordered to proceed and reach Callao as soon 
as practicable. Captain Charles E. Clark took command March 
17, relieving Captain McCormick, who had been condemned by 
medical survey. The ship left San Francisco March 19, and arrived 
at Callao April 4, making on the passage an average speed of 10,7 
knots. The gun-boat Marietta, Commander Symonds, then at 
Panama, had been ordered, March 22, to Callao, to arrange for 
coaling the Oregon at once on her arrival, and then proceed to 
Valparaiso with a view of taking charge, in case the negotiations 
for purchase from Chile of the armored cruiser O'Higgins should 
be successful. 

* Commander Brownson had been sent to England on the passage, March 
9, of the appropriation of $50,000,000 for national defence with reference 
to the purchase of ships, but the purchase of these two had already been 
arranged by Lieutenant Colwell, then naval attach^ at London. The only 
other vessels purchased were a small torpedo-boat in Germany (renamed the 
Somers), the Diogenes, a gun-boat (renamed the Topeka), and, in Brazil, the 
Nictheroy, a sister ship to the Yankee (renamed the Buffalo) . The San Fran- 
cisco anchored at Gravesend on March 18 and reached New York with the 
Amazonas (renamed the New Orleans) on April 13. Captain W. M. Folger 
was ordered to command the latter, and in seventeen days she was ready for 
eea. She arrived at Newport May 2, for her torpedo outfit, and joined the 
flying squadron at Hampton Roads on May 8. The Abreu (renamed the 
Albany) was far from completion, and thus could not be delivered until after 
the war. 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 13 

The Marietta contracted for the Oregon's coal and had it ready 
for her in Hghters; she then left, March 31, for Valparaiso. The 
Oregon arrived at Callao April 4, took on board eleven hundred tons 
of coal, of which one hundred tons were in bags on deck, and left 
the evening of April 7 for the Straits of Magellan. 

Before leaving Callao Captain Clark telegraphed the navy de-» 
partment April 6 : 

On account of navigation of Magellan Strait, and reported move- 
ments Spanish torpedo-vessel near Montevideo, I should recommend 
Marietta to accompany this vessel. If required, I could touch Talca- 
huano, Chile, for orders six days after my sailing. 

The department replied the same date: 

Proceed at once to Montevideo or Rio Janeiro. The Spanish tor- 
pedo-boat Temerario is in Montevideo. Marietta has been ordered to 
proceed to Sandy Point, Patagonia, to arrange for coal. How many 
tons of coal will you require? The Marietta and Oregon to proceed 
together. Keep secret your destination. Keep secret this message. 

and telegraphed the Marietta: 

Oregon leaves to-day from Callao for Sandy Point, Patagonia. Go 
ahead and secure 600 tons of coal for her and accompany her to the 
north. The United States consulates in Cuba have closed. United 
States consul-general is coming home. 

The Oregon reached the entrance to the Straits at 3.30 p. m., 
April 16, a severe gale of wind breaking before an anchorage could 
be reached. Only seamen who have experienced such conditions 
in the western entrance of the Straits of Magellan can understand 
the trying situation of the ship. A gale with rain so dense that the 
great cliffs bordering the narrow and tortuous channel way could 
not be seen, night falling with pitchy darkness, no soundings ob- 
tainable, fierce gusts beating down the glacial openings of the 
mountainous shore, make a trying moment for a captain, and par- 
ticularly for one who so fully appreciated the momentous nature of 
his charge. Captain Clark reports that "just before dark the an- 
chors were let go on a rocky shelf fringed by islets and reefs in 
thirty-eight and fifty-two fathoms of water, and they fortunately 



14 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

held through some of the most violent gusts I have ever experi- 
enced." The writer can well believe, from a like experience, 
though he has never known Captain Clark to so express himself, 
that the war, which was about to begin, held for him no more 
anxious moments than those he passed during the night in these 
narrow passes of gloomy and Dantesque grandeur. 

The ship arrived at Sandy Point the next evening (April 17), hav- 
ing made an average speed from Callao of 11.75 knots. The 
Marietta arrived a few hours later. The hulk from which was to 
be taken the coal contracted for by Captain Symonds, of the 
Marietta, was loaded with wool over the coal, a condition which 
would have given much labor and a delay had not the Chilean offi- 
cials kindly permitted government coal to be taken. Both ships 
left Sandy Point April 21, and on account of the Marietta's low 
speed, made still lower by the head winds and sea north of La 
Plata River, did not reach Rio de Janeiro until April 30. A cau- 
tious, though needless, watch was kept for the torpedo-boat de- 
stroyer Temerario, which, as it turned out, was in no condition to 
move. 

On his arrival at Rio, Captain Clark received a telegram from 
the navy department, dated April 30: 

War has been declared between the United States and Spain from 
April 21. Temerario has left Montevideo, probably for Rio Janeiro. 
Await orders. 

and on the next day (May 1): 

Four Spanish armored cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo-boat 
destroyers, sailed April 29 from Cape Verdes to the west, destination 
unknown. Beware of and study carefully the situation. Must be 
left to your discretion entirely to avoid this fleet and to reach the United 
States by West Indies. You can go when and where you desire. 
Niciheroy ' and the Marietta subject to the orders of yourself. 

On May 2: 

Do not sail from Rio Janeiro until further orders. 

This last was, however, countermanded the same day, and the 
Oregon was directed to carry out the instructions sent May 1. 

' Purchased in Brazil. 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 15 

On May 3 Captain Clark was informed by the navy department 
of Dewey's victory at Manila, and next day he left for Bahia. 
During his stay in Rio precautions were taken in case of the arrival 
of the expected Temerario. The Brazilian authorities were in- 
formed that if she entered the harbor and approached the Oregon 
she would be destroyed. Word was sent, however, that the 
Temerario in case of her appearance would be escorted by a man- 
of-war to an anchorage well up the bay, and a cruiser was stationed, 
which, 'with her search-lights aiding those of Fort Santa Cruz, 
effectively watched the harbor entrance, thus giving concrete 
evidence of Brazilian good-will. 

The Oregon and Marietta left Rio de Janeiro the morning of May 
4, followed in the evening by the Nidheroy, which, however, did not 
join until the evening of May 5, off Cape Frio. It was so evident 
that the Oregon would be greatly hampered by the two smaller 
vessels, that Captain Clark ordered Captain Symonds to proceed 
home independently with the Marietta and Nictheroy, running 
ashore if necessary to avoid capture, in case he should encounter 
the Spanish squadron. The Oregon arrived at Bahia May 8; 
communicated with the navy department; was ordered to proceed 
to the West Indies without further stop in Brazil, and left the 
next evening for Barbados, being informed that there was no au- 
thentic news of the Spanish fleet.* She arrived at Barbados at 

* Naval War Board, Washington, May 12, 1898. 

" The board discussed fully the question of the advisability of despatching 
assistance to the Oregon, in view of the possibility of that vessel being waylaid 
by the Cape de Verde squadron. After fully considering the matter it was 
concluded that, under conditions as they now exist, it was inexpedient to 
detail either the flying squadron or vessels from Admiral Sampson's fleet to 
assist her, as the danger of her meeting the Spanish squadron was now thought 
to be less than formerly, and it was undesirable to disturb Admiral Sampson's 
operation around Puerto Rico, or to leave the northern coast without its chief 
defence." 

The able authority, Mr. H. W. Wilson, regards an attack upon the Oregon 
as the wisest thing to have done. The writer cannot agree with him. The 
chances, with a small number of ships, of discovering a single ship at sea are 
almost infinitesimal. Discovery at night, with no lights showing, is practically 
impossible. Even if the Spanish squadron and the Oregon had come in 
contact, the advantage in a running fight would have been with the latter 
on account of her much longer range and heavier (13-inch) guns, and her 
very complete heavy gun protection. She was, in fact, capable of meeting 
the whole of Cervera's squadron in such a chase. It would have been a 



16 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

3.20 A. M., May 18, after a run from Bahia of 2,500 miles, at an 
average speed of 11.73 knots, but was not permitted to telegraph 
her arrival to the navy department. She was allowed to take on 
board four hundred tons of coal, left the same evening, and going 
well to the eastward of all the West India islands and to the east 
and north of the Bahamas, arrived at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, on 
May 24. 

After communicating her arrival and readiness for service to 
the navy department, she left for Key West, where she arrived May 
26, sixty-eight days from San Francisco, having performed a jour- 
ney from the navy yard in Puget Sound, which she left March 7, 
of 14,700 knots. Her average speed was 11.6 knots, her highest 
14.6, the lowest 10.1. She burned 4,100 tons of coal, and arrived 
at Key West in a thoroughly efficient condition. Her perform- 
ance was one unprecedented in battle-ship history, and was one 
which will probably long preserve its unique distinction. 

The Marietta convoyed the Nictheroy to the Pard River, where 
the latter had to be left to repair her machinery. The Marietta 
took from her one hundred and seventeen tons of coal, and directed 
her captain to proceed alone to the United States. Commander 
Symonds parted company with her May 21, and reached Key West 
June 4. The Nictheroy arrived some time after at Newport 
News, where as the Bujjalo she was fitted for service.^ 

The Texas and Massachusetts had been ordered, March 17, to 
Hampton Roads as part of the proposed flying squadron, the 

futile effort with no result but an expenditure of coal which would probably 
have left the squadron practically helpless. 

Cervera was, however, in total ignorance of the departure of the Oregon 
from the Pacific. (See Concas, p. 49.) 

' Prayers had been said for the Oregon's safe journey in many of the churches, 
80 intense were the excitement and interest in her cruise, and the rejoicing was 
great throughout the country on her reaching Key West. The little Marietta 
seems to have been omitted from these, though needing them in a much greater 
degree. Her performance which, as a voyage, was equally meritorious with 
that of the Oregon, naturally did not loom so high in the mind of the frightened 
public. 

Mention may be made here also of the very slight recognition of the voyage 
of the monitors Monterey and Monadnock across tlie Pacific, which, as well 
said by a distinguished ex-naval officer, Professor Hollis, of Harvard, were 
equally notable performances under more difficult conditions. 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 17 

Texas leaving the harbor of Dry Tortugas March 21, the Massa- 
chusetts the next day. These two ships had remained with the In- 
diana and Iowa at Tortugas since the departure of the commander- 
in-chief in the New York, February 16, for Key West. They, 
as also the New York, had since the destruction of the Maine kept 
steam ready for movement at a moment's notice, not with the view 
to any military movement on the part of our government, but 
as precautionary against any attempts against the ships by sudden 
attack of any kind; the destruction of the Maine justifying, in the 
mind of the admiral, this apprehension. Sub-calibre practice was 
begun and thenceforward until hostilities began (with a short 
interval due to the telegram of March 9, mentioned above, which 
was soon revoked), was kept up the greater part of each day. 
Almost every one aboard ship took his turn at firing, and a vast 
amount of ammunition was thus expended, but to good purpose.^ 

All our ships within call were gradually brought together at Key 
West, and the place itself began to assume the character of a war 
base. Coal was forwarded in large quantities, and the small naval 
depot was taxed beyond its capacity in the reception and distribu- 
tion of stores and ammunition. The machine shop, long almost 
disused, was enlarged to a fair working capacity, and a distilling 
plant of large capacity for the supply of fresh water for ship's 
boilers was laid down. 

The place was in no sense a stronghold except from the fact of 
the difficulty of navigation from the reef to the town. Its distance 
from the sea precluded any danger from attack from outside the 
reef by such a fleet as that of Spain, and the mere removal of the 
buoys would have made the port perfectly secure from the entrance 
of even the lighter of the heavy ships. A raid by lighter vessels 
other than torpedo-boats would have been perfectly ineffective in 

' Sub-calibre. This term is applied to an arrangement by which a musket 
or other barrel of small calibre is fixed in the axis of the larger guns so that 
these can be used in aiming and firing while only expending the small calibre 
ammunition. In eight-inch guns and above, a one-pounder barrel is generally 
used; it would be impossible to carry on such continuous practice with full- 
sized ammunition, not only on account of the tremendous expense, but of the 
deterioration which would result to the guns. As an example of the quantity 
of ammunition expended, the following is noted in the New York's log: Ex- 
pended 2,840 rounds, .45 calibre, using three targets, February 23; 2,200, 
February 24; 3,160, February 25. 



18 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

face of the presence of a number of our own ships, and even of the 
moderate preparations made for defence ashore. Fort Taylor, a 
smaller work of the same character as Fort Jefferson at Tortusras, 
was practically dismantled. It was not until the beginning of May, 
1898, that two 4.7-inch guns were mounted, and about May 18 
one 8-inch B. L.^ rifle; a number of mines were, however, laid by 
the army engineers, and a powerful search-light and an Ardois 
signal apparatus installed in the fort. Notwithstanding the 
meagre defence ashore, there never was a time, to the mind of the 
writer, when we needed to have felt the slightest anxiety regarding 
the safety of this port. It is true that the Spanish minister of 
marine had his views about it, as will be mentioned later, but they 
were as vague and valueless as the rest of his schemes of naval 
campaign. 

Admiral Sicard, on account of the distance of the flag-ship from 
Key West harbor and the consequent difficulty of communication, 
had transferred his head-quarters to the town. His health, how- 
ever, as previously mentioned, had been for some time unequal to 
the strain of command, and as the much greater strain of war 
preparation came, he was obliged to yield to the force majeure of 
serious illness. He was examined by a board of medical survey, 
and upon its decision gave up the command. However much he 
desired to retain it (and the wrench to leave under the circum- 
stances was such as can come to but few), he felt that patriotic 
duty demanded the sacrifice, and at 3.10 p. m., March 26, his flag 
was hauled down, and he left the fleet with the warmest good 
wishes of officers and men, who honored and esteemed his ability 
and upright character. 

Captain Sampson, of the Iowa, was ordered by telegram of the 
same date to the post vacated by Admiral Sicard. His promotion 
to the grade of commodore was soon due, when in any case he 
would, by the practice which had long obtained in our service, be 
eligible for such command, nearly all our squadrons for some 
years having gone to ofiicers of this rank. Looking to the event- 
uality of war, it was the strong desire of the officers present that 
he should be selected, and when the appointment came to him 
there was general congratulation in the fleet. On March 26, he 

' Breech-loading. 



NAVAL INIOVEIMENTS AND PREPARATION 19 

took over the command/ being relieved in command of the Iowa 
by Captain Robley D. Evans. 

As forcibly said by a distinguished writer on naval affairs, "the 
selection of the admiral to command in war is a matter of the ex- 
tremest moment." ^ The president was thus, in appointing Samp- 
son to this most important command in anticipation of war, and in 
making him a rear-admiral on its outbreak, not only acting within 
the strict letter of the law, but under the burden of the duty of 
selecting for such a post the officer he regarded as best fitted. 
Under such a responsibility questions of mere hierarchical status 
are naught. The law wisely enables the president, in time of war, 
to select any one of or above the rank of commander to command 
a squadron or fleet, so that Sampson's appointment as rear-ad- 
miral on April 21 and Dewey's, which came May 7, were as sound 
and valid as that of any officer in the service. That of Admiral 
Porter in the civil war was of like character; he was junior to sev- 
eral, who served under him loyally and made no objection to his 
advancement over them to the highest grade of the navy when 
awards came to be made. The president in such case was much 
in the position of Lord St. Vincent, when he chose for the leader 
of the force which was charged with the pursuit of the great expe- 
dition fitted out at Toulon, and destined for Egypt, the youngest 
flag-officer of his command. "Bitter reclamations were made by 
the admirals senior to Nelson, but St. Vincent had one simple 
sufficient reply: 'Those who are responsible for measures must 
have the choice of the men to execute them.'" ^ 

This subject is dealt with at this length on account of the great 
misconception in the minds of many regarding the president's 
action, but it has been the misconception of ignorance both of the 

* The following officers were appointed on his staff, Captain Chadwick re- 
taining also command of the flag-ship: Personal staff. — Captain F. E. Chad- 
wick, chief of staff; Lieutenant Sydney A. Staunton, assistant chief of staff; 
Lieutenant Charles C. Marsh, flag secretary; Ensign E. L. Bennett, flag 
lieutenant. Fleet staff. — Chief Engineer Charles J. McConnell, engineer of 
the fleet; Pay Inspector Arthur Burtis, paymaster of the fleet; Medical In- 
spector Michael C. Drennan, surgeon of the fleet. 

2 H. W. Wilson, Downfall of Spain, 98. 

' Mahan, Types of Naval Officers, 380. 



20 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

law and of the high duty which the executive owes the country of 
selecting the best instruments to meet a great emergency. The 
law was made to meet a situation precisely of this sort, and it 
would have been stultification in the president not to have applied 
it. He is placed where he is to administer the government, and 
there is no conceivable responsibility greater than the handling 
of fleets and armies in war. To hamper his action by confining 
him in his choice of commander would be a policy of national 
suicide; he must act upon his judgment or fail in his duty. 

This is not to say that there were none among the officers higher 
on the list who would probably not have done well the duty per- 
formed by Admirals Dewey and Sampson; Dewey was ranked by 
seven other oflBcers, Sampson by seventeen; both were given the 
rank of rear-admiral under the same law. Only one could be 
chosen for the supreme command in each case; both were present 
with their squadrons when war became imminent, Dewey having 
relieved Commodore McNair as commander-in-chief so late as 
the preceding January (the 3d), and Sampson ordered to the like 
duty in the North Atlantic upon the withdrawal through ill health 
of Rear-Admiral Sicard. The choice fell upon these officers in the 
natural course of events, and it was justified to the full in both 
cases. However much some outside the navy may criticise passing 
over the higher in grade to select a lower (the criticism is not with- 
in the service), they should understand that the navy fully appreci- 
ates that it does not exist for its individual members, but for the 
country, and no individual in it, however sorely he may feel being 
passed over and however highly he may put his own merits, has a 
right to complain of the lawful action of the chief executive when 
the latter is faced by such a duty. 

The writer knows of his own knowledge how great a surprise to 
Sampson the appointment was. He had no elation in it; he felt 
too deeply the great responsibility to which he had been elected. 
Says Mr. John D. Long, at this time secretary of the navy: 

The moment required a man of splendid judgment, quick decision, 
possessing intimate knowledge of the characteristics of the vessels he 
would have to use, and the officers and men manning them, and 
enjoying the esteem and confidence of his subordinates. The consensus 
of naval opinion was that Sampson had these qualifications. He had 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 21 

graduated number one in his class at the Naval Academy, and this 
without social prestige. He had maintained this superiority through- 
out his naval career. He had been a dominant voice in important 
boards which had considered the development of the materiel and 
personnel of the new navy. He was the senior captain of the North 
Atlantic squadron, and in command of it during Sicard's incapacity. 
He enjoyed the full confidence not only of the officers and men of his 
own ship, but of the officers and men of the entire navy. 

There was no political demand for Sampson. He had no friends 
in Congress to speak for him, nor did he directly or indirectly indicate 
to the department that he desired to succeed Rear-Admiral Sicard. 
For his selection the department is alone responsible; and it was 
made advisable by the interests of the country, to which the eye of the 
department was single. The president gave his cordial approval to 
the choice, and Sampson, though there were worthy and efficient offi- 
cers his seniors, was to give ample evidence that the assignment was 
right.* 

In these fine and appreciative words, Mr. Long does but justice 
to one of the greatest characters of our navy, and one of the finest 
of our country. Sampson was the hero by nature, for nature made 
him great. Without thought of self; of incomparable simplicity 
and truthfulness; quiet and reserved, though most kindly; with 
never a harsh word; with absolute courage both physical and 
moral; with unbending purpose when once his decision was made, 
and with a judgment which seemed unswerving, he was fitly the 
hero to officers and men, and to none more than to those who 
were closest to him. 

Both of the new commanders-in-chief, convinced of the early 
advent of war, as was also the government, as will now appear, 
proceeded with preparations with the utmost energy. 

On March 27 the following Squadron General Order No. 2 was 
issued by Sampson : 

1. The attention of commanding officers is called to the depart- 
ment's letter of March 24, 1898, and memorandum for the commander- 
in-chief, which are issued for their information and guidance. 

2. Attention is particularly called to that part of the memorandum 
which states what the department expects of the officers in command 
of the scouts, picket-boats, and torpedo-boats. 

'Long, The New American Navy, 1, 211. 



22 THE SPANISH-A:MERICAN WAR 

The forwarding letter and the memorandum were both em- 
bodied in the order. 

Navy Department, 
Washington, March 24, 1898. 

Sir: There is forwarded herewith a memorandum containing cer- 
tain suggestions, in regard to the manner of carrying on a blockade 
of the island of Cuba, should one be established. This memorandum 
is based largely on certain suggestions made by Captain Mahan. In 
case of a blockade, the department expects you to follow out only 
such details as in your judgment you deem proper. 

The department desires that you make public in the squadron 
the tenor of that part of the memorandum which refers to what the 
department expects of the officers in command of the scouts, picket- 
boats, and torpedo-boats. 

Very respectfully, 

John D. Long, Secretary. 
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, 
North Atlantic Station. 

In time of war the commander-in-chief must, to a very great extent, 
control his own vessels and act on his own responsibility; but the depart- 
ment deems it worth while to lay before him certain suggestions for his 
consideration in connection with the probable uses to which the fleet 
will be put in the event of war with Spain. 

Until it is possible to concentrate the fleet and strike a telling blow at 
the Spanish fleet, it is probable that much of its work will be in block- 
ading Cuba. The department will endeavor to furnish the com- 
mander-in-chief with a sufficient number of vessels to establish a strict 
blockade, particularly of the western half of the island, and of the 
ports of Havana and IMatanzas in especial. Off much of the coast, 
and off the small harbors, a single vessel cruising to and fro may be 
all that is needed; this vessel of course keeping touch with the rest of 
the fleet when possible. Off an important port, and notably off the 
port of Havana, in the event of torpedo-vessels being within it, there 
should probably be three lines of blockade. The inner line should 
consist of small, fast vessels, either torpedo-boats or revenue cutters, 
tugs, and the like, improvised to act as torpedo-boat destroyers and 
scouts, whose station shall be close to the mouth of the harbor. These 
vessels would of course stop blockade-runners; but the prime object 
of their being would be to prevent the egress of torpedo-boats. They 
should not only watch the latter, but should unhesitatingly attack 
them, no matter what the odds may be at the moment. Even if sunk 
they will have achieved a most useful end if they cripple a torpedo- 
boat. They should fire upon and chase any hostile craft leaving 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 23 

port, and the vessels not engaged should at once steam to the firing. 
The departi ;nt will give ample recognition to gallantry and efficiency 
displayed Iby the commanders of these craft, and the men in command 
of them will be expected to run risks and take chances. Their duty 
is at all hazards to prevent the possibility of an attack by the enemy's 
torpedo-boats upon the battle-ships and squadron. 

The secon- line will be placed two or three miles outside of this inner 
one, and will consist, so far as is possible, of vessels like the Cincinnati 
or Detroit, which in case of need could promptly go to the first line of 
blockade. Outside of this second line will cruise the squadron of 
battle-ships, which in the discretion of the commander-in-chief may 
lie at a considerable distance from the port, and may change position 
after nightfall. Of course, no definite rule can be laid down as to the 
position of this squadron, for the commander-in-chief must be guided 
by circumstances as they arise; but it is worth calling his attention 
to the fact that the battle fleet must keep the sea, so as to make 
the blockade technically valid. The efficiency of the blockade does 
not depend upon the immediate presence of the fleet itself, but upon 
the fact that its support is always at hand, to support the inshore 
squadron, and prevent the latter from being driven off by the enemy 
in port. A distance of twenty-five miles may be near enough, and if 
the position of the battle fleet can always be changed after nightfall, 
the chance of successful assault by the enemy's torpedo-boats will be 
minimized. The department would again repeat, however, that the 
captains in the inshore squadrons must understand that their duty 
is, at any hazard, to prevent hostile torpedo-boats getting by them, 
to detect, and, more than that, to immediately grapple with and fight 
them under any circumstances. The torpedo-boats, and even the 
torpedo-boat destroyers, lose nine-tenths of their menace when de- 
tected; and, moreover, they are fragile and easily destroyed. 

Each man engaged in the work of the inshore squadron should have 
in him the stuff out of which to make a possible Gushing; and if the 
man wins, the recognition given him shall be as great as that given 
to Gushing, so far as the department can bring this about. 

Ships were ordered the same day to exchange their brilliant 
white for the lead-color used during the civil war, so much less 
visible at sea, and now, at all times, in general use. 

On March 28 the fleet had still further intimation of the immi- 
nency of war by orders to land at Key West all skylights and all 
movable articles, including boats, which could be dispensed with 
and which might be a hindrance in action. An order of the same 
character was telegraphed on April 7 by the navy department to 
Commodore Dewey at Hong-Kong. 



24 THE SPANISH-AJNIERICAN WAR 

The following telegram from the navy department was received 
by Sampson on April 1 : 

Authorized to waive age limits on enlistments for all ratings at 
discretion, but use careful judgment in so doing. Authorized to enlist 
well-(iualified men for one year, unless sooner discharged, noting on 
enlistment records department will grant discharge, if requested, be- 
fore expiration of enlistment, provided exigencies of service permit. 
What progress have you made in enlistments ? 

On the same day the following order was issued in the fleet 
at Key West: 

A cruiser and two torpedo-boats will be detailed nightly to proceed 
on picket duty, about ten miles to the southward of the flag-ship. 

The torpedo-boats will be assigned stations, one to the eastward and 
one to the westward of the cruiser, at a distance of about five miles 
from her. The boats will move to and fro from the cruiser toward 
the reef, covering a distance of about ten miles from her and sighting 
her frequently. 

The cruiser will keep her running lights, but the torpedo-boats will 
mask theirs. 

In case a suspicious vessel is seen standing northward, a torpedo- 
boat will approach the flag-ship sufficiently to enable rockets to be 
seen, and two will be fired simultaneously. The boat will then run 
in for the squadron at full speed and communicate, using her private 
signal as she approaches the squadron. 

All will return to their anchorage in the inner harbor at early day- 
light. 

The Cincinnati will take this duty April 1, her commanding officer 
arranging with the commanding officer of the torpedo-boat flotilla as 
to the detail of torpedo-boats. 

This duty will, in general, be taken successively by the cruisers in 
the order of the rank of their commanding officers. 

The senior officer at the inner anchorage is hereby charged with 
the execution of this order. 

The order shows the apprehension existing three weeks before 
actual hostilities, of covert attack by the Spanish from Havana, 
where were several small vessels carrying torpedoes. It is almost 
needless to say that in reality the apprehension was groundless. 
The anxiety of Spain to avoid a war is now well known, nor, indeed, 
is it in accord with the Spanish character to have given official 
countenance to any effort of the sort, apart from bringing on a con- 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 25 

flict necessarily so detrimental to their cause in Cuba. One can 
see this in the cooler light of to-day; at the moment no precaution 
was thought excessive. Night exercises were also carried out by 
simulated attacks of torpedo-boats, of which by the end of March 
there were six in Key West harbor. In each case the attack was 
ruled to have failed.* 

Everything now seemed tending to war. The Spanish torpedo- 
boat destroyers Terror, Furor, and Pluton, and the torpedo-boats 
Rayo, Ariete, and Azor, had left Cadiz on March 13, under convoy 
of the Transatlantic Company's steamer the Civdad de Cadiz, for 
the Canaries, where they arrived on the 17th. At Havana were 
the Vizcaya and Almirante Oquendo. The former had come by 
way of New York, where she had arrived February 20. Her visit 
there was intended as an evidence of the acceptance by the Spanish 
government of the declared good intent of the American govern- 
ment in the sending of the Maine to Havana. She left New York 
on the 25th, taking only sufficient coal supply to reach Havana, 
the captain having a strong fear of explosives in the coal. She 
arrived at Havana March 1, and was joined there a few days later 
by the Almirante Oqiiendo. Both ships left April 1 for a rendez- 
vous with this flotilla in latitude 18° 30' N., and longitude 59° 42' 
W. (Spanish 53° 30'), a point about 300 miles east of St. Thomas. 

The object of the ships' departure and the rendezvous were 
known by Sampson. He was of the opinion that if the torpedo- 
boats should continue their journey to this side of the Atlantic, it 
would justify immediate warlike action, and he urged this view 
upon the navy department. As affairs turned, however, the torpedo- 
boats did not come. They had left the Canaries for the rendezvous 
on March 22, but, following many break-downs and difficulties in 

* The question of information as to what was doing in Havana was an 
important one, and in this connection should be mentioned the names of four 
men, Mr. Sylvester Scovel, the correspondent of the New York World, Mr. 
Charles H. Thrall, Mr. George H. Hyatt (the last a Cuban born of an Amer- 
ican father and Cuban mother), and Mr. Joseph H. Hare, a photographer 
for Collier's Weekly. Information of a varied and valuable character was 
obtained by these with not inconsiderable risk and with much exposure. 
Among other things Mr. Scovel assisted in the observation of the Spanish 
target-practice which occurred twice at Havana, and with Mr. Hare in the 
World tug Triton verified the supposition that none of the Spanish guns bore 
upon the coast-line to the south-west in the direction of Marianao. 



26 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

supplying coal from the larger ships, the flotilla, after four days, 
turned and went to the nearest harbor, the Cape Verdes. Informed 
of this, the Vizcaija and Oquendo left San Juan, Puerto Rico, on 
April 8, and arrived eleven days later at St. Vincent (Cape Verdes), 
where they found Admiral Cervera, who, leaving Cadiz on April 8, 
had reached the same point with the Infanta Maria Teresa and 
Cristobal Colon, on the 14th. 
On April 4 the navy department telegraphed Sampson: 

Be ready on receipt of order to take possession of Key West cable 
and telegraph office, and to place an officer in charge. He will not 
permit the transmission to Cuba of any telegram relating to the action 
of the president or Congress. Will be further instructed. The business 
of the company not to be interfered with any more than is necessary. 
The officer assigned upon this duty must be one discreet and judicious. 

On the same day Dewey, anticipating a telegram of inquiry from 
the navy department of the same date, telegraphed: 

I have chartered the British steamer Nanshan, having over three 
thousand tons of coal now on board. Before the outbreak of hostilities 
can and would purchase this steamer. I request the earliest informa- 
tion in order to conclude arrangements. Cannot be made after 
outbreak of hostilities. 

A prompt reply was sent, April 6, approving the purchase and 
directing the vessel to be armed if possible. There was added in 
this telegram: "War may be declared; situation very critical," 
and in another of the same day: " Expedite delivery. April 6 may 
be the last opportunity." On this last date Dewey telegraphed 
that he had purchased the Nanshan and engaged her crew; also 
that he had ordered three officers and fifty men from the Monoc- 
acy to fill vacancies. He hoped to get another steamer, which he 
confirmed April 9 with the news that he had purchased the Brit- 
ish steamer Zafiro for £18,000, which he would immediately man, 
arm, and equip. 

On April 7 Sampson was informed by telegram from Washington 
that a double row of torpedoes had been placed across the entrance 
to Havana. On the 9th the JFern, Lieutenant-Commander W. S. 
Cowles, was informed that all United States vessels were to leave 



NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION 27 

Havana when the consul-general should leave. Cowles replied the 
same day, that all vessels had sailed but two schooners; one could 
leave Monday noon; for the other, still unloading, he hoped satis- 
factory arrangements could be made. He sent a second telegram 
the same date: 

Fern, the consul-general, and Baclie [coast-survey vessel] leave to-day 
for Key West. 

The remaining twelve days of peace were passed by the squad- 
rons, both at Key West and at Hong-Kong, in energetic prepara- 
tions of the ships for what was now regarded as an inevitable 
struggle. Among these preparations at Key West was the fitting 
of the light-house steamer Mangrove with such apparatus as was 
available at Key W^est for lifting and cutting cables, and requesting 
that additional material, to make good the existing shortage, be 
sent from New York. If any cables were to be cut, and Sampson 
favored and looked forward to isolating Cuba telegraphically, 
much more complete arrangements were necessary than any he 
was ever able to command. The vast depths to be met at Santiago 
particularly, almost at once on leaving the shore line, made such 
work one of immense difficulty. There was no thought of dis- 
turbing the Havana cable, as its only sea connection was with 
American lines. All others were on the south coast, Santiago, 
Guantanamo, and Cienfuegos being the chief points of departure, 
the two first being the only ones connected with points exterior to 
Cuba. It was Sampson's intention, if. the government would agree, 
to send the Mangrove thither for this purpose. He thus detailed 
the Indiana, Marblehead, and Detroit as a covering squadron. 
Little or nothing was known of the state of the Santiago defences, 
and a battle-ship was thought necessary for eventualities. In 
Captain Taylor of the Indiana, who, as senior officer, would com- 
mand the proposed expedition, was one in whose discretion and 
ability the commander-in-chief had fullest confidence. 



CHAPTER II 
THE FORCES 

Neither Spain nor the United States had a fleet fitted, as far as 
material strength was concerned, to meet that of even a second- 
class naval power. The United States had only just put afloat the 
nucleus of its splendid fleet of to-day. It had in commission 
what were, for the period, four first-class battle-ships, heavily ar- 
mored, of fair speed and excellent armament, the Indiana, Massa- 
chusetts, Oregon, and Iowa. There was one second-class battle- 
ship, the Texas, of about equal speed with the others, but with little 
more than half their power in gun-fire. The highest sustained 
speed of these ships may be taken as 14 knots, but the Indiana 
during the war fell far below this on account of the failure of the 
navy department to keep the machinery at the high-water mark of 
repair ^ — an evidence not so much that this department had no 
great belief in the imminency of war, as of its defective system of 
departmental administration. 

The Indiana, Massachusetts, and Oregon, sister ships, had 
18-inch steel belts for about three-fifths their length, a two and 
three-quarter inch flat protective deck, four 13-inch guns in two 
15-inch turrets, and eight 8-inch in four 6-inch turrets. Each 
carried, also, four 6-inch, twenty 6-pounders, six 1-pounders, 
two Colt machine-guns, and three Whitehead torpedo-tubes. They 
were of 10,288 tons displacement, and could carry 1,600 tons of 
coal. 

The Iowa had a 14-inch belt, four 12-inch guns in 15-inch tur- 
rets, and eight 8-inch in 8-inch turrets. She carried besides six 

•The Indiana had to have her boilers retubed at Key West; this being done 
shortly after the destruction of the Maine. 

For full details of all the American ships of the period, see tabulations, 
Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1898, Report of the Bureau of Con- 
struction and Repair. 

28 



THE FORCES 29 

4-inch, twenty 6-pounders, four 1-pounders, four Colts, and four 
Howell torpedoes. Her displacement was 11,340 tons, her coal 
capacity 1,795 tons. 

The Texas had a 12-inch belt, two 12-inch guns in two 12-inch 
turrets, six 6-inch, twelve 6-pounders, six 1-pounders, four 37- 
mm. Hotchkiss revolvers, two Colts, and two Whitehead tor- 
pedo-tubes. She displaced 6,315 tons and could carry 850 tons of 
coal. 

The remaining armored vessels fit for sea service were six 
double-turreted monitors, the Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, Monad- 
nock,^ Monterey,^ Puritan, and Terror. They were all powerful 
ships, but of doubtful value except in smooth water on account of 
their rapid oscillation in a rough sea. The Monterey carried two 
12-inch and two 10-inch and the Puritan four 12-inch guns: each of 
the other four carried four 10-inch with (except the Terror and 
Miantonomoh) two 4-inch (the Puritan six 4-inch), and from ten to 
twelve 6-pounders and smaller rapid-fire guns. All but the Puritan 
(of 6,090) displaced about 4,000 tons. Each carried 250 tons of 
coal except the Puritan, which carried 317. 

Thirteen ancient single-turret monitors of the civil-war period 
were brought into service as part of the auxiliary fleet, to do duty 
at various ports. All but the Comanche (at Mare Island) were in 
the Atlantic. They carried only muzzle-loading, smooth-bore 
guns, and were worthless except for protection of harbors. 

The armored cruisers New York and Brooklyn, the former of 
8,200 tons displacement and 21 knots trial speed, the other 9,215 
tons and 21.9 knots, were, for the time, particularly fine ships of 
their class. The New York had a water-line belt of 4 inches; 
the Brooklyn of 3; but both ships had protective decks of 6 inches 
on the slope and 3 inches on the flat, a powerful protection for 
ships of the type. The New York carried four 8-inch guns in a 
turret of 5.5 inches armor with a barbette of 10 inches. She also 
carried two 8-inch in broadside protected by heavy shields. Be- 
sides these she had twelve 4-inch rapid-fire, eight 6-pounders, two 
1-pounders, two Colts, and two Whitehead torpedo-tubes. The 
Brooklyn carried eight 8-inch in 5.5-inch turrets with barbettes 
of 8 and 4 inches. She had, besides, twelve 6-pounders, four 

' In the Pacific. 



30 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

1-pounders, four Colts, and four Whitehead torpedo-tubes. The 
bunker capacity of the New York was 1,290 tons; that of the 
Brooklyn, 1,461. 

The Olympia, of 5,870 tons and 21.68 knots trial speed, was the 
best of the protected cruisers. She carried four 8-inch guns in 
3.5-inch turrets, ten 5-inch rapid-fire, fourteen 6-pounders, seven 
1-pounders, two Colts, and six Whitehead torpedo-tubes. She had a 
protective deck of 4.75 inches on the slope and 2 inches on the flat. 
Her coal capacity was 1,169 tons. The Baltimore, of 4,413 tons 
and 20 knots trial speed and 490 tons coal capacity, carried four 
8-inch, six 6-inch, six 6-pounders, four 1-pounders, and two Colts. 
She had a protective deck of 4 inches on the slope and 2h on the 
flat. The Philadelphia may be classed with the Baltimore in 
size, speed, and protection; she carried only 6-inch guns in her 
main battery, of which there were twelve, eight 6-pounders, four 
1-pounders, and two Colts; she had no torpedoes. She had the 
large coal capacity, for her class, of 1,085 tons. The San Francisco 
and Newark were alike. They were of 4,098 tons, 19.5 and 19 
knots trial speed, and 628 and 809 tons coal capacity, respectively. 
Each had a 3-inch protective deck. Their armament was practi- 
cally the same as that of the Philadelphia, except that each carried 
three Wliitehead torpedo-tubes. The Charleston, of 3,730 tons, 18 
knots, 757 tons coal supply, and a 3-inch protective deck, had two 
8-inch and six 6-inch guns in the main battery; the Cincinnati and 
Raleigh, each of 3,213 tons, supposedly of 19 knots (but very much 
lower) with but 460 tons coal and a 2.5-inch protective deck, had 
ten 5-inch rapid-fire, one 6-inch, and two Whitehead torpedo-tubes. 
The Charleston had twelve rapid-fire guns from 6- to 1-pounders, 
and two Colts. 

The Columbia and Minneapolis were of a special class, of 7,375 
tons, of about 23 knots trial speed, the one of 1,670, the other 
1,891 tons coal capacity.* They had protective decks of 4 inches 
on the slope and 2.5 on the flat. They were built as "commerce- 
destroyers," and had, for their size, the light armament of one 
8-inch, two 6-inch, and eight 4-inch guns, with twelve 6-pound- 

' The Columbia had crossed the Atlantic from Plymouth to New York at 
an average speed of 18.5 knots, the best showing of the kind by a man-of-war 
at this period. 



THE FORCES 31 

ers, two 1-pounders, two Colts, and four Whitehead torpedo-tubes 
each. They were admirably fitted for scouts.* 

The Detroit, Marhlchead, and Monigomenj, of 2,089 tons, of 
from 18.44 to 19.05 knots trial speed (which fell to very much less 
in practice), carried but 340 tons of coal, and, as were the Raleigh 
and Cincinnati, for the same reason, unfitted to be at any consider- 
able distance from a collier. They carried ten 5-inch rapid-fire 
guns, with six 6-pounders, two 1-pounders, two Colts, and two 
Whitehead torpedo-tubes. 

Added to these, by purchase, as mentioned, from Brazil, was the 
New Orleans, of 3,427 tons, 21 knots trial speed, and 800 tons coal 
capacity. She was admirably armed with six 6-inch rapid-fire, 
four 4.7-inch, ten 6-pounders, 8 machine-guns of smaller calibre, 
and three Whitehead torpedo-tubes. She had a protective deck 3 
inches on the slope and 1.5 on the flat. She and her sister ship, 
the Albany, not, as already stated, sufficiently advanced to leave 
Elswick before the war began, were excellent ships of their type. 

None of the protected cruisers were in any sense fitted to take 
part in action against battle-ships. They are now a disappearing 
type, as, excepting scouts, no navy should be cumbered with ships 
not built to meet the demands of actual conflict. They served a 
good purpose in 1898 only because of Spain's want of a real navy. 

There were eighteen small vessels of from 839 to 1,710 tons, 
rated as gun-boats, but actually small cruisers, the Bancroft, Ben- 
nington,^ Castine, Concord,"^ Machias, Petrel,^ Topeka,^ York- 
town,^ Helena, Nashville, Wilmington, Annapolis, Marietta, New- 
port, Princeton, Vicksburg, Wheeling, and Dolphin. These were, 
of course, only of value against vessels of their own class, or as tak- 
ing part in the blockade of ports which required nothing more 
than the presence of armed vessels of any class whatever to pre- 
serve the efficiency of the blockade. 

The dynamite cruiser Vesuvius and ten torpedo-boats, the Gush- 
ing, Dupont, Ericsson, Fooie, Gwiyi,* McKee,* Porter, Rodgers, 

' The machinery of the Minneapolis was in bad condition, and though she 
did good service at the beginning of the war, had to spend from June 11 to 
August 17 under repair at Newport News. 

* In the Pacific. 

^ Purchased in England from the Thames Shipbuilding Company. 

* Of no actual value. 



32 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

Talbot, and Winslow, completed the list of strictly naval vessels 
available for war service. 

Thirteen revenue cutters with officers and crews were transferred 
temporarily to the navy department for naval duty. Eight of these, 
carrying forty-three light guns, were assigned to the North Atlantic 
command: the Manning, Morrill, Hamilton, Windom, Woodbury, 
Hudson, Calumet, and McLane. The McCulloch was assigned to 
the Asiatic squadron. Four, the Rush, Grant, Corwin, and Perry, 
were on the Pacific coast. 

Under the act of March 9, 1899, appropriating $50,000,000 for the 
national defence, a number of vessels were bought or chartered. 
The St. Paul, St. Louis, New York, and Paris, of the American line 
between Southampton and New York, were chartered under the 
terms of their subsidy, which made them subject to government use 
in case of war. For the period of their naval service the New York 
became the Harvard and the Paris the Yale. They were ships 
of from 13,000 to 15,000 tons displacement, 22 knots speed, and 
2,700 tons coal capacity. At more moderate speed they could 
easily keep the sea three weeks. They were armed at first only 
with 6- and 3-pounders, but an effective armament of from four to 
eight 5-inch guns was later given them, sufficient to meet light 
cruisers or torpedo-vessels. They were in no wise, however, fitted 
for fighting, as they were a mass of combustible material, the burst- 
ing of a heavy shell in which would probably have assured their de- 
struction. They were admirably fitted for the r61e of scouts and 
for that of transports, to which latter, later in the war, they were 
applied. 

Seven merchant-ships of from about 4,000 to 7,000 tons and 
from 13 to 16 knots speed, with the service names of Badger, 
Buffalo, Dixie, Panther, Prairie, Yankee, and Yosemiie, were 
bought and armed with 5-inch and 6-inch guns, as auxiliary 
cruisers. 

Twenty-eight yachts were armed,^ of which the Mayflower, of 
2,690 tons and 16 knots, the Gloucester, Scorpion, Eagle, Hawk, 
Wasp, and Vixen, were the most notable. 

In all 123 vessels which had not belonged to the navy were used 

' One, the Free Lance, was given by Mr. Augustus Schermerhorn, of New 
York. 



THE FORCES 33 

during the war, 9 of which were revenue cutters, 11 fast auxiliary 
cruisers, 28 armed yachts, 27 armed tugs, 19 colHers, 1 hospital 
ship, 5 supply and 1 repair ship, 4 light-house tenders, and 2 
steamers of the Fish Commission.^ 

The armored Spanish ships supposedly ready were the battle- 
ship Pelayo, the armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa, Almi- 
rante Oquendo, Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, Carlos V, and Numancia. 
Both the Pelayo and Carlos V appeared in the Spanish navy list as 
"armored ships of the first class" {Acorazados de P), a species of 
self-deception which ran throughout the list, the others just men- 
tioned being "armored ships of the second class." Small ships 
of 1,000 tons were in the navy list as second-class cruisers, and 
craft of 550 tons as cruisers of the third class. 

The Pelayo had been built at La Seyne, near Toulon, in 1885. 
She was of 9,917 tons, 16.2 knots trial speed, and carried 630 tons of 
coal. She was undergoing refitting at La Seyne at the outbreak of 
the war, and was not ready until the middle of May, and then not 
completely so. She had an armor belt of 16.5 inches, and carried 
two 12.5-inch guns in two 18-inch barbettes, two 11-inch (one on 
each beam), with similar protection, nine 5.5-inch rapid-fire, 
twenty smaller guns of 57 mm. and less, and seven torpedo tubes. 
"She was," says Wilson, "as a unit decidedly superior to the 
Texas, and as decidedly inferior to the Indiana class, which was 
just about as fast and infinitely better armed and protected," ^ and, 
he might have added, able, through much greater coal capacity, to 
keep the sea much longer. 

The Carlos V was of 9,215 tons, of 20 knots speed, and could 
carry 1,800 tons of coal. She had but 2 inches of side armor with a 
protective deck of from 6 to 2 inches. She carried two 11-inch 
guns in 10-inch barbettes, eight 5.5-inch rapid-fire, four 3.9-inch, 
twelve smaller guns of from 57 to 11 mm., and six torpedo tubes. 
To call her a first-class armored ship was a travesty of nomen- 
clature. She was a fair offset to the New York or Brooklyn. 
Though declared by the minister of marine in his correspondence 
with Admiral Cervera as ready, with the Pelayo, to form part of 

' For full lists of vessels commissioned (with names of commanding offi- 
cers), also of those purchased or chartered, see Appendix A. 
* Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, 59. 



34 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the latter's squadron, she also was not so until the middle 
of May. 

The Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya were patterned after 
five British ships of the period, known as the Aurora class. They 
were of 7,000 tons, 20.25 knots speed, and carried 1,050 tons of coal. 
They had armor belts for 216 feet of their length, 12 to 10 inches 
in thickness and 5.5 feet broad. Each carried two 11-inch guns, 
one in each of their 10-inch barbettes, which had domed hoods, 
covering the whole turret, 3 inches thick. On the same deck were 
ten 5.5-inch rapid-fire, protected by shields. Each carried also 
twenty-two smaller guns of from 57 (2.25-inch) to 7 mm. (.27-inch), 
and eight torpedo-tubes. The protective deck was of 3 and 2 
inches steel. "These three vessels differed little from protected 
cruisers; their big guns were too heavy for use against anything 
but a hostile battle-ship, yet their want [small width] of side armor 
rendered them incapable of encountering such an enemy." ^ 

The Princesa de Asturias, a ship of the same type as the Maria 
Teresa, had been launched in 1896, but was still far from com- 
pletion. Two others of the class, the Cardinal Cisneros and Cata- 
luna, had not yet been launched. 

In the Cristobal Colon, however, Spain had an armored cruiser 
of very exceptional quality. She had just been built at Sestri 
Ponente (a suburb of Genoa), and had, on nearing completion, been 
purchased by the Spanish government. She was of 6,840 tons, 
20.25 knots speed on trial, and carried 1,200 tons of coal. She had 
a complete nickel steel belt 8.25 feet broad and 6 inches thick amid- 
ships, tapering to 2 inches at the ends. Amidships was a citadel 
of 6-inch steel, 150 feet long with bulkheads of the same thickness 
which protected the bases of the two 5-inch turrets, intended to 
carry 10-inch Armstrong guns. In this citadel was a battery of ten 
5.2-inch rapid-fire guns, the ports of which had an admirable 
shield protection. On the upper deck were six 4.7-inch rapid- 
fire, protected by shields only. She carried twenty machine-guns, 
of which ten w^ere 57-mm. (2.25-inch) Nordenfelt, the others of 
37 mm. (1.46 inch), and had five torpedo-tubes. 

"The Americans had no cruiser to compare with the Colon. By 
the admission of American officers themselves, the Brooklyn, though 

' Wilson, 63. 



TPIE FORCES 35 

more than 2,000 tons larger, was no match for her, and it is diffi- 
cult to say what she might not have accomplished with compe- 
tent seamen and good gunners. Virtually she was a small battle- 
ship of exceptionally powerful type." * The author from whom 
we quote should have added, "had she had her heavy guns." 

The Numancia was an ancient iron-clad, launched in 1863, but 
refitted and rearmed. She was of 7,035 tons, nominally of 12 
knots speed, and carried 1,050 tons of coal. She was plated with 
iron 4,7 inches thick, and carried four 6.3-inch, eight 5.5-inch 
rapid-fire, three 4.7-inch rapid-fire, and thirteen machine-guns. 
She was of no use except for coast service. 

There appeared upon the Spanish navy list two "first-class 
protected cruisers," the Alfonso XIII and the Lepanto, of 4,820 
tons, 20.5 knots and 1,285 (!) tons coal capacity. They appeared 
in the navy list as having 4^ inches of deck protection, with bat- 
teries of four 7.9-inch guns, six 4.7-inch rapid-fire, and thirteen 
machine-guns. Altogether in speed, coal capacity and armament, 
they combined on paper qualities which were very improbable 
on such a displacement. Though the former was launched in 
1891 and the latter in 1893, neither was completed. 

Four non-protected cruisers appeared, the Alfonso XII, the 
Reina Cristina, the Reina Mercedes, and the Aragon, of 3,900, 
3,520, 3,090, and 3,342 tons displacement, respectively. Each 
carried six 6.3-inch guns and some fifteen machine-guns, but all 
were useless as cruisers. The Alfonso XII was the flag-ship at 
Havana, but could not move; the Reina Mercedes in like condition 
at Santiago de Cuba; the Reina Cristina was flag-ship in the Phil- 
ippines, and the Aragon laid up at Carraca, the ship-building yard 
on Cadiz bay. 

There were three small cruisers, the Marques de la Ensenada, the 
Isla de Cuba,"^ and the Isla de Luzon,' of about 1,050 tons, 14 knots, 
and with 200 tons coal capacity. They had protective decks of 
2.4 inches, carried four 4.7-inch rapid-fire, two 57-mm. (2.25-inch), 
three 37-mm. (1.46-inch, one 11-mm., and three torpedo-tubes. 
Within their limited radius they were good ships of such type, 
but, as were those about to be mentioned, of small fighting power. 

There were nine small vessels of from 823 to 1,196 tons, carrying 

» Wilson, 62. ^ In the Philippines. 



36 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

four 4.7-inch, some ten machine-guns, and with two torpedo-tubes, 
which could only rank as gun-boats in American designation. 
The Don Juan de Austria and Don Antonio de Ulloa, both in the 
Philippines, were among the larger of these. There were five 
small vessels of 560 tons and less, of which the Marqu£S del Duero, 
of 500 tons, with 10 knots speed and carrying 90 tons of coal, may 
be taken as a type. She carried one 6.3-inch and two 4.7-inch 
guns, and one machine-gun. Thirty small craft from 100 to 300 
tons, and forty still smaller, which could not rank as more than 
armed launches, were (as were nearly all the smaller ships men- 
tioned) scattered about Cuba and in the Philippines. 

Spain had, however, in her torpedo gun-boats and torpedo-boat 
destroyers, nominally thirteen in number, a force of which the 
United States had none afloat, though there were sixteen building. 
In addition Spain had four torpedo-boats of some 120 tons each. 

The ships of the Compania Trasatlantica were largely taken 
over as cruisers and transports. The total ships available were 
the following: 

TONS KNOTS 

Magallanes 6,932 17 

Montserrat 6,932 17 

Alfonso XIII 4,831 16 

Reina Cristina 4,831 16 

Santo Domingo 5,400 14 

Alfonso XII 5,063 15 

Leon XIII ....... 5,186 15 

Principe de Satrustegui .... 4,713 15 

Montevideo 5,096 14^ 

Buenos Aires 5,311 14 

Ciudad de Cadiz 3,084 13^ 

Mindanao 4,195 13^ 

Isla de Panay 3,636 13^ 

Isla de Luzon 4,252 13 

To these, when the prospect of war became such as to demand 
the use of every resource by Spain, were added by purchase 
the large German merchant-steamers Normannia, of 10,500 
tons, the Columbia, of 9,500, and Havel, of 6,963, all of 19 knots. 
These were renamed in their order the Patriota, Rapido, and 
Meteor, and were fitted each with four 6.4-inch, four 4.7-inch, 



THE FORCES 



37 



two 3.2-inch, and four machine-guns. They were not ready, 
however, before the middle of May. 

The regular naval forces of the two powers actually available 
may be tabulated as follows: 

United States Spain 

battle-ships 

First Class 
10,288 tons Pelayo 9,917 tons 



Indiana . 
Massachusetts 
Oregon^ 
Iowa . 



Texas 



Brooklyn . 
New York 



Amphitrite . 
Moyiadnock' . 
Miantonomoh 
Monterey^ 
Puritan . 
Terror 



11,340 " 

Second Class 
6,315 tons Cristobal Colon 

ARMORED CRUISERS 



9,215 tons 
8,200 " 



Infanta Maria Teresa 
Almirante Oquendo . 
Vizcaya 



6,840 tons 



7,000 tons 



MONITORS 

3,990 tons None 



4,084 
6,060 
3,990 



PROTECTED CRUISERS 



'Baltimore'^ 
Charleston^ 
Columbia 
Minneapolis 

•"Olympiad 
Newark . 
San Francisco 
New Orleans 
Cincinnati 
Raleigh' . 
Boston' 



4,313 tons 

3,730 " 

7,375 " 

(( (( 

5,870 " 

4,098 " 

It << 

3,437 " 

3,213 " 

(( (( 

3,000 " 



' On her way from the Pacific. 
' In the Philippines. 



Marques de la Ensenada 1,064 tons 
Isla de Cuba' . . . 1,045 " 
Isla de Luzon' . . 



" In the Pacific. 



38 



THE SPANISH-AJMERICAN WAR 



UNPROTECTED CRUISERS AND GUN-BOATS 



Detroit 


2,089 tons Reina Cristina' . 


. 3,520 tons 


Marblehead . 


(< ( 


' Velasco^ 


1,600 " 


Montgomery . 


(( ( 


' Infanta Isabel 


1,196 " 


Bennington^ . 


. 1,710 ' 


' Isabel II . . . 


1,152 " 


^oncord^ . 


(( < 


' Conde del Venadito 


1,189 " 


Yorktoum ' 


(< ( 


' Don J van de Austrii 


1,159 " 


Topeka . 


1,700 ' 


' Don Antonio de UlU 


1,160 " 


Dolphin . 


. 1,486 ' 


' Magallanes 


527 " 


Wilmington . 


1,392 ' 


' General Concha . 


548 " 


Nashville 


1,371 ' 


' Elcano' . . . 


560 " 


Castine . 


1,177 ' 


' General Lezd* . 


520 " 


Machias . 


" ' 


' Marquis del Duero' 


500 " 


Annapolis 


1,000 ' 






Vicksburg 








Wheeling 




' Also thirty small gun-boats from 


Marietta 




300 to 100 tons and forty under 100 


Newport 




' tons, of which 38 were in Cuba and 


Princeton 




' 21 in the Philippines. 




.Petrel' . . 


892 ' 






Bancroft . 


839 ' 








DYNAMITE VESSEL 




Vesuvius . 


929 to 


ns None 






TORPEDO GUN-BOATS 




None 




Filipinas . 


750 tons 






Nueva Esparia 


630 " 






Martin Alonso 


571 " 






Vicente Yanez 


571 " 






Galicia 


541 " 






Marques de Molins 


571 " 




TORPEI 


)0-B0AT DESTROYERS 




None 




Destructor . 


368 tons 






Terror .... 


380 " 






Furor .... 








Pluton .... 








Audaz .... 








Osado .... 








Proserpina 




* In the Pacific. 




' In the Philippines 







THE 


FORCES 


39 




TORPEDO-BOATS 




Cushing . 
Ericsson . 
Foote . . , 
Rodgers 
Winslow . .. 
Porter . \. 


105 tons 
120 " 
142 " 

a (( 
<< <( 

165 " 


Halcon 

Azor 
Ariete . 
Rayo . 


. . 128 tons 
. . 127 " 
. . 120 " 
. . 120 " 


Dwpont 
Morris 


103 " 







Note. — All the torpedo-vessels were in the Atlantic. 

It needs but a short analysis of what precedes to recognize 
the great superiority of the American force both in gun-fire, 
armor-protection, and in number of fighting-ships. The fact 
that on one side there were afloat twelve 13-inch, twelve 12-inch, 
eighteen 10-inch, and fifty-six 8-inch, and on the other but two 
12.5-inch and ten 11-inch guns, or (leaving aside even the 8-inch) 
a disparity in heavy armament of three to one, was to give food 
for thought, had the Spanish authorities but thought at all. 
Spain had nothing to meet such forces. Her only hope was 
in her small and presumably fast squadron under Admiral 
Cervera, homogeneous in speed and coal endurance, and in her 
torpedo-vessels. 

Notwithstanding these facts, European opinion, and largely, 
American, gave the Spanish the superior force. The London 
Engineer, for example, after giving an elaborate analysis of the 
two fleets said: 

It is difficult to see where the usefulness of these heavily-armed 
floating citadels [the U. S. battle-ships] comes in except to capture 
and sink the Pelayo. . . . There is small chance of them even catch- 
ing a glimpse of the swift and handy armored cruisers of the Vizcaya 
type, and still less chance of their getting an effective shot at them. . . . 
We fear that the United States may find that their obstinate determi- 
nation to arm their new vessels with guns which are the creation of 
their own genius [as against those of Elswick] has landed them in a 
dilemma at this juncture. ... A great deal, too, depends upon the 
man behind the gun. The 3,000 Swedish sailors [I] who are to form 
part of the complement of the United States vessels might be excellent 
material if fighting in defence of their own hearths and homes; but 



40 THE SPANISH-AJMERICAN WAR 

naval warfare of to-day is no pastime — it is a grim and ghastly reality, 
swiftly executed, and no hirelings of an alien state are likely to come 
well out of such a terrible ordeal. In point of fact we do not believe 
that the Yankees thoroughly understand the spirit of mischief that 
they seem so determined to evoke.* 

The French press was even more sure of a Spanish victory. 
Great stress, in their ignorance of the real conditions, was laid 
upon the character of the personnel, that of the American navy 
being spoken of as made up almost altogether of " foreign mer- 
cenaries." The mention of "3,000 Swedish sailors" by the 
sapient writer in the Engineer, is an example of the general 
ignorance in Europe on the subject.^ 

The remarkable illusions as to the character of the American 
personnel are perhaps best shown by a report April 6, 1898, in 
the Heraldo, a leading paper of Madrid (of which, it may be 
mentioned in passing, the chief owner was the captain of the 
Cristobal Colon). It said: 

We had an opportunity to-day of talking for a long time with 
General Beranger, the last secretary of the navy under the conserva- 
tive cabinet. To the questions which we directed to him concerning 
the conflict pending with the United States, he was kind enough to 
inform us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval 
forces. . . . We shall conquer on the sea and I am now going to give 
you my reasons. The first is the remarkable discipline that prevails 
on our warships; the second is, as soon as fire is opened the crews 
of the American ships will commence to desert, since we all know that 
among them are people of all nationalities. Ship against ship, there- 
fore, a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadron de- 
tained at the Cape Verdes, and particularly the destroyers, should 
have, and could have, continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have 
nothing to fear from the American fleet.' 

On June 30, 1898, there were in service in the regular navy 
of the United States, 1,751 oflficers of all ranks and professions. 
Of these 913 were line officers,^ 209 engineer oflficers, 161 sur- 

» The Engineer, London, February 15, 1898, p. 359. 

2 The whole was an excellent reminder of Lowell's wise dictiun, "Never 
prophesy unless you know." 

' Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, Appendix, 27. 

* Of the line officers 118 were cadets who had not yet completed their course 
at the Naval Academy, but were sent to do duty in the ships off Cuba instead 



THE FORCES 41 

geons, 111 pay oflBcers, 72 marine officers, and 198 warrant 
officers. 

Immediately at the outbreak of the war 188 retired officers 
were placed on active duty; the number rising during the war 
to 225, and 856 appointments for temporary service were made 
during the war from civil life, 456 of these were in the line, 205 
in the engineer force, and 43 in the marine corps.^ 

The government on the outbreak of war had in service 13,750 
enlisted men, including apprentices. This force during the war 
was practically doubled, there being at its end in August 24,- 
123. The first immediate resource was in the naval militia 
of the several states, many officers of which were ex-officers 
of the navy and who by resignation from the militia became 
immediately available for duty in the regular service, on ac- 
ceptance by the navy department of their offers of service. On 
the rolls of the several states on January 1, 1898, there were 
4,445 petty officers and enlisted men, of whom about 2,600 
were mustered into the regular service and 1,800 into the auxil- 

of to the usual summer practice-ships. All were under orders to return to 

the Naval Academy not later than September 30, 1898. 

» The number of officers appointed for temporary service were, in detail, 

as follows: 

Commanders 3 

Lieutenant-commanders 3 

Lieutenants 112 

Lieutenants (jimior grade) 114 

Ensigns 209 

Naval cadets (line) 15 

Total line officers 456 

Medical officers 64 

Pay officers 64 

Engineer officers 185 

Warrant machinists 20 

Chaplains 2 

Boatswains 1 

Carpenters 3 

Mates 18 

Marines (second lieutenants) 43 

Total 856 

One hundred and ninety-four candidates who passed the required examina- 
tions were not appointed by reason of their services not being required. They 
were: Line, 31; engineers, 92; pay officers, 71. 



42 THE SPANISH-AIVIERICAN WAR 

iary coast defence and coast signal service. Says the report of 
the secretary of the navy: 

Without waiting for special legislation, the department called 
upon the state naval militias, in the latter part of JNIarch, to furnish 
officers and crews for the single-turret monitors (which had seen 
service in the war of the rebelHon and were then laid up at League 
Island Navy- Yard), and had arranged with the governors of the various 
states that either leaves of absence or discharges should be granted to 
such officers and men as should volunteer for this duty. The re- 
sponses were prompt and satisfactory, and showed the patriotic spirit 
of the naval militia, eight monitors being rapidly put in commission, 
each under command of a naval officer, all the other officers and the 
entire crews being furnished by the naval mihtias of the various 
states. 

The department also called upon the states of New York, Massa- 
chusetts, Michigan, and Maryland to furnish officers and men for the 
merchant steamers purchased for the war, and renamed the Yankee, 
Prairie, Yosemite, and Dixie. This was in accordance with the 
suggestion that some of the older organizations of naval militia were 
competent to furnish officers and men for sea-going vessels. This 
call was one which taxed to the utmost the resources of the naval 
militia organizations, coming closely, as it did, upon that for volun- 
teers to man the monitors, but it was responded to with most gratify- 
ing alacrity. To fill the complement of these vessels each organiza- 
tion called upon contributed about 250 men. 

As examples of the promptness with which the call was met, the 
contingent from the First Naval Battalion, New York, reported uni- 
formed, armed, equipped, and ready for duty in six hours after re- 
ceiving notice; and the contingent from the Massachusetts Naval 
Brigade, which was notified at 1 o'clock on a Saturday afternoon, 
arrived at the New York Navy- Yard, fully prepared for service on 
the Prairie, at 9 o'clock the next morning.' 

The largest number of men from the naval militia of any one 
state, serving in Cuban waters, was from Illinois, which fur- 
nished 19 officers and 709 men, distributed in 58 vessels; of the 
34 officers and 373 men from New Jersey, 20 officers and 261 
men were in the Badger and Resolute; 11 oflScers and 270 men 
from Michigan were in the Yosemite, and of the 38 officers and 
384 men from Massachusetts, 7 officers and 138 men were in the 
Prairie; of the 49 officers and 805 men from New York, 8 officers 

* Annual Report of Navy Department, 1898, p. 109. 



THE FORCES 43 

and 274 men were in the Yankee, and of the 24 officers and 425 
men from Maryland, 10 officers and 267 men were in the Dixie. 

Some 1,600 of the naval militia not assigned to the fleet did 
duty in the old monitors (carrying 15-inch smooth-bores) which 
were got into efficient condition and stationed at various ports 
from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico; they manned the forty-one 
yachts and tugs which patrolled the mine fields, and provided 
the personnel of the coast signal service, the coast being divided 
for such purposes into districts practically commensurate with 
the existing light-house districts. 

As early as March 15, 1898, steps were taken to organize a 
coast signal service by directing Captain Goodrich, then presi- 
dent of the Naval War College, to report a preliminary plan, 
based upon earlier correspondence looking to such an establish- 
ment. The outcome was the immediate manning, upon the 
outbreak of the war, of thirty-six signal stations officered and 
manned from the naval militia. At each station quarters were 
built for the five to six men attached and a ninety-foot flagstaff 
with a yard put up. In some cases a signal tower was built, 
and telegraph and telephone apparatus supplied. Before the 
end of the war the light-house, life-saving, and weather bureau 
services were brought into use, and the entire coast efficiently 
guarded. The work reflected great credit upon all concerned.' 

There was practically no limit to the number of men who 
might have been supplied. The material, though much of 
it was raw, was strong in brawn, muscle, zeal, and intelligence. 
Men of the best classes were ready to take any position, how- 
ever humble, rather than not to go at all. It came within the 
writer's own experience to be pulled in the captain's gig by 
young men whom he met after the war in the New York clubs, 
and he knew at least one owner of a yacht who enlisted as a 
coal-passer rather than be left behind. A spirit such as this is 
of the sort to conquer. 

While Spain had a reserve to call upon, in her conscriptive 
system, it did not compare in effectiveness with the large num- 

* For full details regarding the service of the naval militia, see the Annual 
Report of the Navy Department, 1898, p. 105 et seq. 



44 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

bers available in the United States due to a population with sea- 
going tendencies and affiliation. 

Before the outbreak of the war the personnel of the Spanish 
navy was as follows: 

Line officers (active list) 830 

" (reserve list) 127 

Engineer officers 90 

Pay officers 252 

Medical officers 127 

Warrant officers and seamen nominally . 14,000 * 

There were some 2,200 men in Cuba, and about 1,500 in the 
Philippines, which would have left available some 10,000 sea- 
men in Spain. " Yet," says Wilson, " we know that Cervera's 
squadron of four armored cruisers and three destroyers were 
not properly manned, so far as the engine-room complements 
were concerned, and that the utmost difficulty was experienced 
in finding crews for the Pelayo, Carlos V , and the vessels which 
in June were despatched on the aimless voyage to Manila. It 
would therefore appear that the effective strength of the Spanish 
personnel was very much below the proper strength. In the 
American navy on the other hand the effective strength was 
considerably above the nominal strength, as at the prospect 
of war men were recruited vigorously." 

Mr. Wilson continues: "In training, discipline, education, 
and seamanship there was no comparison between the two 
forces. They were thus contrasted in August, 1898, by a Madrid 
periodical: 'The Americans have for a year been preparing 
for war, and for three months there was not a day when they 
did not fire all their guns. W^e have had but one target practice 
and that was over a year ago. This was limited to expending 
the least possible amount of ammunition. Half our vessels had 
not cleaned their bottoms for a year, and all had been anchored 
in Cuban waters for about two months. The Americans are 
constantly making voyages in all seas with their vessels so that 

' There was a corps of marine infantry of 451 officers and 8>500 men, but, 
as with the like body in France, this was for service in the insular posses- 
sions and not aboard ship. 



THE FORCES 45 

they have a trained personnel for the machinery. We have 
the greatest scarcity of engineers and hardly any stokers at all.' 

"The American naval officer has a world-wide reputation 
for professional knowledge and capacity. The American sea- 
man — though not always recruited on the long-service system 
as in England — is intelligent, brave, and resourceful. Coming 
from a nation of engineers, the engineering staff on board the 
war-ships was of remarkable efficiency, and as a consequence 
breakdowns were very few and far between, whilst such per- 
formances as the fast steaming of the Oregon and Texas at 
Santiago indicated the trustworthiness of American machinery 
in skilled hands." ^ 

Mr. Wilson touched accurately the particularly sore spots of 
the Spanish service: want of practice and want of mechanical 
efficiency. The latter is not in the blood, and no education 
could put it there. We cannot educe what is not in us to be 
drawn out, a natural fact, be it said, which educationists are 
expending vast sums in vainly attempting to disprove. 

The Spanish, in fact, labored under the limitations which 
nature has herself set; it is not a race which loves the sea. "Es- 
sentially," says Wilson, " the Spanish navy in 1898 stood where 
it had been in 1779, in 1796, and 1804, when British seamen 
regarded it with humorous contempt." The distinguished 
author might have gone far back of the dates he quotes to the 
days of the Armada and of Lepanto; in this great and decisive 
batde, so often claimed as a Spanish victory, but thirteen of the 
two hundred and fourteen galleys were from Spain itself and 
the young commander was very far from being of true Spanish 
breed. The courage, the self-sacrificing character of the Spanish 
race are beyond praise, but on the ocean these are largely nulli- 
fied by an inadaptability to the sea life, shown through all its 
history, and it has been still further handicapped in later years 
by the advent of the machinery which took the place of masts 
and sails as the means of movement, and to which they are as 
little inclined as to the sea. 

As one who saw and appreciates the noble heroism of Cervera's 
exit from Santiago, the writer would deprecate any false con- 

» Wilson, 67, 68. 



46 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

struction being placed upon the words just written. It is but to 
recognize what is and has been; it is but to read history as set 
before us through generations. The want of preparation in 
1898 was but a repetition of the same failure in 1805, when Spain 
with a noble array of ships/ but with scant and untrained crews, 
went gallantly to a like sacrifice at Trafalgar. Desperately poor 
then, she was equally so in 1898. Though she had a fair number 
of ships in 1898 as in 1805, they were equally unprepared in 
both crises. As will be seen in the tragic letters of Cervera, 
Spain was without the primal necessities of a fleet: without guns, 
without ammunition, without engineers, without coal, and even 
with the ships short of bread. 

THE ARMIES 

The strength of the American army on April 1, 1898, dis- 
tributed from Maine to Alaska, was as follows: 

OFFICERS MEN 

General officers and staff corps . . 532 2,026 

Cavalry 437 6,047 

Artillery 288 4,486 

Infantry 886 12,828 

Miscellaneous 653 

Total 2,143 26,040 

An act of Congress, approved April 22, 1898, constituted 
the regular army one of the two branches of the army of the 
United States in time of war, the second branch being designated 
the volunteer army. On April 26, 1898, Congress prescribed 
a peace organization of the regular army in which the infantry 
regiment was to consist of two battalions of four companies each 
and two unmanned companies, and authorized the president in 
case of war to establish, in these, a third battalion of four com- 
panies each. The enlisted strength of the infantry company 
was increased to 106; of the cavalry to 100, of the battery of 
heavy artillery to 200, of the light artillery to 173, and the com- 

' These were mostly built at Havana; the Spanish flag-ship at Trafalgar, 
the Santissima Trinulad, of four decks, and perhaps the largest of her day, 
was built there in 17G9. 



THE FORCES 47 

pany of engineers to 150; the signal corps was also to be increased 
by 150. Under this law the enlisted force of the regular army 
became in May, 41,934, and by August, 56,365/ By reason 
of the skeleton organization which had obtained, and which 
was in a way a cadre of officers without an army, the increase of 
officers was but ISO. 

Under the act of April 22, the president called next day 
for 125,000 volunteers, to serve for two years unless sooner dis- 
charged. In view of the imminence of war and in anticipation 
of the action of Congress and of the call of the president for 
volunteers, regulations governing the distribution of quotas 
to the states, territories, and District of Columbia, and giving 
details of organization, had already been prepared. This first 
apportionment, which under the law was made according to 
population, was made up of 119 regiments and 10 battalions 
of infantry, 5 regiments and 17 troops of cavalry, 16 batteries of 
light artillery, and 1 regiment and 7 battalions of heavy artillery. 
This first call was follov/ed, on May 25, by another for an 
additional 75,000 men, comprising 22 regiments, 10 battalions, 
and 46 companies of infantry, 16 batteries of light and 3 battalions 
of heavy artillery.^ 

The act of April 22 authorized also the recruiting of 3,000 
men possessing special qualifications, and under this were created 
three cavalry regiments, of which that later known as the Rough 
Riders was one. An Act of May 11, 1898, authorized the recruit- 
ment of a volunteer brigade of engineers of not more than 3,500 
men, and the organization of a force, not exceeding 10,000, of 
men supposed immune from tropical diseases, a faddish ex- 
periment which by no means gave the results expected. 

The following list gives the totals furnished by the several 
states under the first and second calls, of whom 136,000 did not 
leave the United States. 

OFFICERS MEN 

General officers and staff . . . .1,010 1,329 

Alabama 141 3,061 

Arkansas * . 91 1,934 

CaUfomia 186 4,441 

^ Report of the adjutant-general, 1898, 5, 6. 
* Ibid., 10. 



48 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

OFFICERS MEN 

Colorado 49 1,076 

Connecticut 100 2,436 

Delaware 47 969 

District of Columbia 49 922 

Florida 48 956 

Georgia 142 3,389 

Idaho 32 644 

Illinois 489 10,453 

Indiana 260 5,564 

Iowa 206 3,354 

Kansas 167 3,735 

Kentucky 186 4,559 

Louisiana 101 2,255 

Maine 61 1,444 

Maryland 91 1,979 

Massachusetts 277 5,515 

Michigan 233 5,185 

Minnesota 196 4,222 

Mississippi 108 2,512 

Missouri 271 6,234 

Montana 48 976 

Nebraska 137 3,232 

Nevada 15 481 

New Hampshire 47 952 

New Jersey 184 4,163 

New York 705 15,924 

North Carolina 145 2,840 

North Dakota 27 658 

Ohio 485 9,557 

Oregon 56 1,182 

Pennsylvania 619 11,696 

Rhode Island 54 1,170 

South Carolina 90 2,060 

South Dakota 46 983 

Tennessee 187 4,148 

Texas 231 5,054 

Utah 15 429 

Vermont 48 980 

Virginia 164 3,709 

Washington 60 1,379 

West Virginia 88 2,245 

Wisconsin 198 4,293 

Wyoming 17 445 

United States volunteers .... 763 16,992 



Total 8,970 173,717 



THE FORCES 49 

Of the 28,000 officers and men of the existing regular army 
and of the 182,000 volunteers (a total of 210,000), eight corps 
were ordered to be established; one of these, however (the sixth), 
was finally not organized. These were localized as follows: 
The first at Camp Thomas, Georgia (Chickamauga Park), 
Major-General John R. Brooke; the second at Camp Alger, at 
Falls Church, Virginia, Major-General William R. Graham; 
the third at Camp Thomas, Major-General James I. Wade; 
the fourth at Mobile, Alabama, Major-General John J. Coppin- 
ger; the fifth at Tampa, Florida, Major-General William R. 
Shafter; the sixth (finally not organized) at Camp Thomas, 
Major-General James H, Wilson; the seventh at Tampa, 
Major-General Fitzhugh Lee; the eighth at San Francisco and 
Manila, Major-General Wesley Merritt. 

Under the appropriation made on March 9, 1898, of $50,000,000 
"for national defence," much had been done in preparation by 
the ordnance and engineer and signal-service departments, to 
which ten, five and a half, and one-quarter millions had been 
allotted, in the order named. The quartermaster, commissary, 
and medical departments up to April 23, by what would appear 
a singular interpretation on the part of President McKinley and 
his advisers, had not been allowed to go outside their ordinary 
routine. Thus, says Mr. Alger, the secretary of war, "they 
could not either procure or order anything in the way of equip- 
ment — clothing, tentage, harness, commissary stores, medical 
and hospital supplies, camp furniture, and other material. 
Because of this absolutely nothing had been added to the ordi- 
nary supply as it existed March 9, 1898."^ 

Secretary Alger continued later: "In one respect alone 
was the war department able to make immediate response to at 
least a part of the sudden demands made upon it. Including 
those already in the hands of the regular soldiers, there were 
53,508 .30-calibre Krag-Jorgensen rifles and 14,895 Krag-Jor- 
gensen carbines. This supply, however, was barely sufficient 
to meet the requirements of the increased regular army. 
Nothing was left for the volunteers except .45-calibre Springfield 
carbines, also in our arsenal[s], there was no smokeless-powder 
* R. A. Alger (secretary of war), The Spanish-American War, 11. 



50 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

ammunition, nor was any immediately obtainable. . . . The 
situation can be summarized in a few words. The war de- 
partment had, on April 23, accomplished some little extra w^ork 
on coast defences; it had ready for use enough .30-calibre 
rifles to arm the 33,000 men added to the regular army and 
enough .45-calibre Springfields for the volunteers, but that was 
all. There was in the supply bureaus absolutely nothing for the 
troops provided for during the last days of April nor for the 
additional forces created between the 10th and 25th of May, 
aggregating 249,000 men, exclusive of the regular army in its 
original status. If the wording of the act of Congress had per- 
mitted the war department to make use of some portion of the 
850,000,000 for offensive preparations, much could have been 
accomplished between March 9 and April 23 in the way of getting 
ready for the impending conflict."* 

Such, too frequently, is the lawyer in administration. It is 
difficult to understand an interpretation which could separate 
shelter, clothing, food, and medicine from the gun as part of 
the preparation for defence. To this unwise decision which 
sent troops to the tropics in the heavy clothing worn in 
Montana and with nothing which could be called shelter, 
must be laid much of the suffering and death in the Santiago 
army. 

The ordinary mind cannot understand such views. One 
would have thought that the quibbling of the Buchanan admin- 
istration in the last few months of its life would have been a 
lesson against hair-splitting in such circumstances. If anything 
is clear between the lines of the administration's procedure, it 
is that war had practically been decided upon. Mr. McKinley's 
message, read April 11, the sending in of which was in itself 
a declaration of war, w^as not the work of a day or a week. The 
outcome of such a paper could not but have been foreseen, 
and under the act of March 9 preparation should have been 
made to meet this to the fullest extent which the terms and 
spirit of the act could possibly have allowed. Provision for 
the healthful support of men who might be called into service 
and wiio were to use the guns, projectiles and powder which 

' Alger, 14. 



THE FORCES 51 

it was ruled could be bought, would seem as vital an element of 
defence as these latter. 

The navy department was much wiser; it read in the act 
authority to buy cruisers, yachts, and colliers, which was done 
in large degree before the outbreak of hostilities, besides per- 
fecting its arrangements of every kind as fully as time would 
allow. It is difficult to mention without some feeling the find- 
ing which caused the inaction in his department which Sec- 
retary Alger describes. 

The concentration of the widely scattered parts of the regular 
army had begun on April 15, when all troops which could possi- 
bly be spared were directed on New Orleans, Tampa, Mobile, 
and Chickamauga Park, Ga.^ A great part of the regular army 
was, therefore, either mobilized or in process of mobilization 
when on April 21 the American minister at Madrid was given 
his passport by the Spanish government.^ 

To the American forces must be added the Cuban, numbering 
probably some 15,000 men, most of whom were in the eastern 
part of the island. There were some 5,000 of these under Gen- 
eral Calixto Garcia in the vicinity of Holguin; 3,000 under 
General Perez in the region between Santiago and Guantanarao; 
1,500 under Generals Rabi and Cebreco to the west of Santiago, 
with the remainder under Gomez further west or distributed in 
small detachments in the vicinity of Cienfuegos,in the hills back 
of Mariel, in the vicinity of Matanzas, Sagua la Grande, Bara9oa, 
and other points, where were stationed Spanish troops, which 
were kept under observation.' 

The Spanish Army List of 1898 showed a total of 492,067 
officers and men, distributed as follows: 

In Spain and adjacent islands 152,284 

In Cuba (regulars and volunteers) 278,447 

In the Philippines (regulars and volunteers) . . 51,331 

Puerto Rico (regulars and volunteers) .... 10,005 

Total 492,067 

* For distribution, see Appendix B. ^ Alger, 16. 

^ Cuban official returns give 53,774 as the munber of men who, at one time 
or another, served in the war from its beginning in 1895 to its end. The 



52 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

The forces in Cuba were given in detail by the Anuario Militar 
de Espana, 1898, as follows: 

Infantry (regular forces) 134,919 

(volunteers) 63,760 

Total infantry 198,679 

Cavalry (regular forces) 7,752 

(volunteers) 14,796 

Total cavalry 22,548 

Artillery (regular forces) 5,308 

(volunteers) 4,123 

Total artillery 9,431 

Engineers (regular forces) 4,905 

(volunteers) 1,441 

Total engineers 6,346 

Hospital troops 1,975 

Pack trains 1,930 

Civil Guard 4,456 

Mobilized forces, volunteers and guerillas . 30,584 

Marine infantry 2,508 

Total 41,453 

Grand Total 278,457 

This showing of about 243,000 regulars (including therein 
the marine infantry, hospital troops, and pack-trains) may be 
taken as the total in Cuba from the outbreak of the insurrec- 
tion in March, 1895. At the beginning there were but some 
18,000 men in the island. By March 1, 1897, there were sent 
to Cuba 10 generals, 675 superior officers, 6,222 officers, and 
180,345 men; in all, in two years, 187,282.^ 

In this period 123 officers and 2,018 men had been killed or 
had died of wounds; 463 officers and8,164 menhad been wounded. 
Yellow fever had carried off 31 officers and 13,004 men, and 
some 40,000 had died from other causes. By returns of Febru- 
ary 8, 1897, there were in Cuban hospitals 18,000 officers and 
men. Well might any country but one moved by oriental fatal- 
total number of deaths among those who served was, during the war, 8,617; 1,463 
of these occurred in 1898. More than half the deaths were through sickness. 
(Official returns, Sargent, III, 173.) 

' In the same period were sent to Puerto Rico 4,827, and to the Philippines 
26,222, making the enormous drain upon Spain, in this short time, of 225,637 
officers and men. 



THE FORCES 53 

ism be aghast at the sacrifice. Nevertheless, the sacrifice con- 
tinued. In each period of 1895, 1896, and 1897, the assembling 
of the classes for service (some 85,000 in each year) had been 
advanced and the call in the autumn of the last-named year 
included an unusual proportion of very young men. However 
much the uselessness of the additional effort was to be deplored, 
one cannot but admire the spirit of the nation.^ 

By April, 1898, there were remaining in Cuba, as shown 
by an official statement in answer to an inquiry made through 
the American legation at Madrid, at the instance of a historian 
of the Santiago campaign, 155,302 officers and men of the regular 
army, a reduction of some 88,000 from the numbers shown by 
the Anuario Militar, through deaths and invalidism. It was, 
however, still a large army. The return was as follows : 

GENKRAL AND 

FIELD OFFI- COMPANY ENLISTED 
CERS OFFICERS MEN 

Infantry 319 4,022 123,308 

Marine infantry 13 122 2,895 

Cavalry 49 453 8,033 

Artillery 14 207 5,398 

Engineers 10 160 5,290 

Civil Guard 26 214 4,769 

Total of regular army . . 431 5,178 149,693 

Irregular infantry .... 32 1,462 27,637 

Mounted volunteers and guerillas 11 180 12,196 

Total of irregular forces . . 43 1,642 39,833 

or a total, officers and men, 196,820 regular and irregular 
organizations.* 

That this latter number was not far from correct is shown 
by the reports of the evacuation commission w^hich returned the 

* The author happened to be in southern Spain, as an ordinary sight-seer, in 
October, 1897. The train in which he returned from Granada to Algeciraa 
carried a large number of these conscripts. Many touching scenes took 
place at the stations where they were picked up. A Spanish gentleman in 
the same compartment with the author murmured, "Pobres madres." The 
latter felt that sympathy should have had wider scope and that the words 
should have been "Pobre Espaiia." 

' Sargent, The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba, III, 158 



54 THE SPANISH-AJMERICAN WAR 

Spanish forces as 140,005 regular troops and 80,504 volunteers. 
Many of these latter were of the character of " Home Guards," 
and can scarcely be considered as part of the effective force. 

Of the regulars, about 31,500 formed the garrison in and about 
Havana, with some 17,000 at Matanzas and other points of 
the province; 34,000 were in the province of Santiago, of whom 
9,430 were in the city of Santiago de Cuba and vicinity, 8,364 
at Holguin, and 8,668 at Manzanillo. 

These were formidable numbers, the meeting of which under 
ordinary conditions of warfare would have been a serious 
problem. But it was an army already faced by an active enemy, 
in a devastated country, with scanty supplies of food, and rav- 
aged by tropical fever — conditions which were soon to be ac- 
centuated by the effect of the blockade. The question of rein- 
forcement from Spain under such circumstances could not be 
seriously considered. What troops were in Spain were sure 
to remain there; the battle was to be met with such forces as 
happened to be in Cuba. Nor could there be much thought of 
redistribution. The mastering element in such a question was 
the food supply. Neither Santiago nor Havana could have sup- 
ported much larger numbers than were already at these points. 
There was thus no material change in the situation of troops. 
There was no plan of action beyond awaiting, in statu quo, the 
coming of the American forces. 



CHAPTER III 
STRATEGY 

The joint resolution in Congress passed in the early hours 
of the morning of April 19, 1898, and signed by President Mc- 
Kinley at 11.24 a, m., April 20, declared it "the duty of the 
United States to demand, and the government of the United 
States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at 
once relinquish its authority and government in the island 
of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
and Cuban waters." 

The objective was thus clear and definite. Cuba freed from 
the dominion of Spain, the war, so far as the United States were 
concerned, was to be ended. Cuba thus by the terms of the res- 
olution itself was made the main batde-ground. That the op- 
erations of the war should harass and distress Spain in general 
as a means of bringing the desired conclusion, was, where it was 
convenient and possible to do so, a matter of course, but such 
was an entirely secondary consideration. Thus, whatever might 
happen on the coast of Spain, in the Canaries, or in the Philip- 
pines, could only bear indirectly on the one great purpose. 
Until Spain should yield Cuba there was to be war; as soon as 
Cuba should be yielded the United States promised by implica- 
tion to be ready for peace. It would rest with Spain to continue 
hostilities. 

A blockade of the Cuban coast and military assistance of the 
insurgents ashore by supplying arms and munitions of war, or by 
sending armed forces, were thus the first steps to be considered. 
The Spanish troops efficiently blockaded both by sea and land, 
and under the ravaged conditions of the island, would succumb 
finally by mere starvation should not aid come by sea. This 
last could only be by Spanish naval predominancy. Naval 

55 



STRATEGY 57 

effort to hold communication with Cuba, if the island was to be 
preserved, was thus a necessity to Spain; to keep her fleet per- 
manently on her own coasts would have been to throw up the 
game. 

Into the consideration of these first steps mentioned thus 
came, as a main element, the question of the Spanish fleet, its 
strength and movements. So long as there was a Spanish 
squadron within reach of Cuba, so long would there be such un- 
certainty as to safety of expeditions as to make the sending 
from the United States of a considerable army a matter of doubt- 
ful judgment. There would be, also, a like uncertainty of ability 
to blockade successfully the Cuban ports, as the great majority 
of the blockading vessels would have to be of a class weak in 
fighting qualities. 

The following from an American official in Spain, though it 
did not reach the navy department until about the time that 
Cervera was to leave the Cape Verdes for the west, probably 
gives more nearly than anything else the views of the navy 
department as to the strength of the force to be met. The 
department had to form its estimate on information from ob- 
servers, and this official had better means of knowing than most. 



Madrid, April 16, 1898. 

Sir: Yesterday the Spanish government began to take extraordi- 
nary precautions to prevent the getting out of news relating to the 
movements of ships or anything pertaining to war preparations. It 
is quite probable, therefore, that definite information in regard to 
these subjects will be difficult, if not impossible, to get. My latest 
information, which I have telegraphed to date, is to the effect that 
the torpedo squadron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo 
boats, and the converted cruiser Ciudad de Cadiz, with the Colon and 
Maria Teresa, are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions. It 
is said that the Colon and Teresa left Cadiz in such a hurry that they 
were not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been sent 
to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply 
of ammunition. The Oquendo and Vizcaya from Porto Rico should 
arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite infor- 
mation, I believe the Pelayo arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from 
Cartagena. It was intended that she should go, after a few days' 
necessary delay in Cartagena, and it is reported that she was sighted 



58 THE SPANISH-AJVIERICAN WAR 

in tlie Straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. The Proserpina, 
Omdo, Desinictur, Barcelo, Retamosa, IJahana, Ilalcon, torpedo boats 
and destroyers, and the Vitoria are now practically ready in Cadiz, 
awaiting the arrival of the Carlos V and the Pelayo. The Alfonso XIII 
is also about ready in Cartagena. The installation for moving the 
guns by electricity in the Carlos V is not completed, and I am unable 
to get at any estimate of the date when she will be entirely ready for 
service. It is said on good authority, however, that in an emergency 
she could be used at once, working such parts as have not power 
apj)lied by hand. Work is being pushed, also, as rapidly as possible 
on the Cisneros, but she can hardly be ready for many weeks. The 
trans-Atlantic steamers Mexico, Panama, Santo Domingo, San Aiigus- 
iin, and Villaverde, now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary 
cruisers. Nine trans-Atlantic steamers in Spanish ports at present 
are also being armed as cruisers. To this number should be added 
the Columbia and Normannia, recently purchased in Germany, and 
the Giralda, now being converted in Barcelona. This makes twenty- 
one auxiliary cruisers concerning which I have quite definite informa- 
tion. The two steamers bought in Germany w^ere strengthened 
there and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew when 
they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day. I call your special 
attention to the newspaper slip which I inclose, entitled, "Fe en la 
armada." It was published in the Heraldo of April 6, the leading 
and most influential paper of Madrid. The Imparcial of the following 
morning called attention to it and spoke in very severe terms of the 
impropriety of a former secretary of the navy speaking so unreserv- 
edly of such important matters at this very critical time. The follow- 
ing is a translation: 

"We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General 
Beranger, the last secretary of the navy under the Conservative cabinet. 
To the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict 
pending with the United States he was kind enough to inform us 
that h(! confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces. The 
attack on our island ports is not to be feared, he said, by an enemy 
taking advantage of the darkness of night. The reason of this is that 
Havana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago, are defended 
by electrical and automobile torpedoes, which can work at a great 
distance (have a large radius of action). Senor Canovas del Castillo, 
who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, 
the shii)i)ing to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, icJtich are surely located in 
these ports at present. The transportation and installation of these 
war machines was in the charge of the distinguished torpedoist, 
Senor Chacon. I have already said that we shall conquer on the sea, 
and I am now going to give you my reasons. The first of these is 
the remarkable discipline that prevails on our war ships, and the 
second, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American ships will 



STRATEGY 59 

commence to desert, since we all know that among them are people 
of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to 
be feared. I believe that the squadron detained at Cape de Verdes, 
and particularly the destroyers, should have and could have con- 
tinued the voyage to Cuba, since they have nothing to fear from the 
American fleet. In this class of ships we are on a much higher level 
than the United States." ' 

The company Bandera Espanola have been ordered to "sus- 
pend the voyages of its ships to Havana." Without definite informa- 
tion, I presume the government intends to take these ships into service. 
Also the Compania Trasatlantica has ordered its ships not to touch 
at Corunna hereafter, presumably for the same reason as given above. 

It is said quite openly here that the intention of the government is 
to make some kind of an effort on our coasts. This comes to me 
from so many sources that I am inclined to believe they have this 
plan in view; but I have been unable to verify the reports or to get 
at any of the details. 

Just at this moment, here in Madrid, everything is very quiet. Con- 
siderable turbulence is reported from the provinces. How great this 
may be we are unable to judge, as the government is keeping a sharp 
watch on the telegrams and does not permit any very exciting news 
to be disseminated. There was some excitement, and for two days 
considerable danger of a mob, here in Madrid, after the announce- 
ment of the proclamation of the armistice in Cuba. That crisis is now 
apparently passed. Everybody here expects war, and the lower classes 
ardently desire it. The government and the more intelligent classes 
dread it; are willing to do anything they can to avoid it without revolu- 
tion, but will accept it if, from their point of view, it is forced upon 
them. The press has fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about 
the superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the superior discipline 
on board the Spanish ships, and the greater fighting power of the 
navy. The belief in this superiority of the Spanish navy over that 
of the United States accounts, in a large measure, in my opinion, 
for the determination to fight us. This opinion is shared also by 
many intelligent persons, in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards. They 
say they have nothing to lose, they could not be worse off with the war 
than without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can 
do incalculable damage to our commerce; seriously injure, if not 
destroy, our navy, and, although they would probably be beaten in the 
end, they will have taught us a salutary lesson in the meantime. 
One of the most intelligent, best-informed Spaniards I have met here, 
a man who has travelled much, and claims to have a great admiration 
for the United States, and who knows much about our history and 

* This opinion has been quoted above, p. 40. 



60 THE SPi^JNISH-AMERICAN WAR 

resources, a senator of the kingdom, told me yesterday that the 
thing that he dreaded most was the long period that the hostilities 
would last. He was sure that three years would be the very least that 
the struggle would continue. It may be of interest to you to know 
that he said he could very well understand and appreciate the feelings 
and ambitions of a young and powerful nation like the United States 
for concjuest. He could not help having a great deal of sympathy with 
an avowed proposition on our part to take the islands of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico, the Canaries, the Balearics, the Philippines, and even to 
come to Madrid itself; but what he could not understand was, that 
while protesting a desire for peace, a decided disinclination to the 
annexation of any territory, the people of the United States had done 
everything in their power to foment the rebellion in Cuba, and to make 
it impossible for Spain to overcome it, either by peaceable or forcible 
means. 

I give you this as a matter of interest solely, but it represents the 
attitude of the intelligent, educated, and travelled Spaniard. 

The writer, as this show's, had accepted the Pclayo and Carlos 
V, as practically already available; had named the ancient 
iron-clad Vitoria (built in 1865) as serviceable, as also four 
torpedo-boats, the Barcelo, Retamosa, Habaiia, and Halcon, 
which were of the same class as those which had already failed 
in an effort to cross the Atlantic. 

As will be seen, the Spanish minister of marine himself, who 
should have known better, expected to add the Carlos V and 
Pclayo to Cervera's squadron.^ With these he proposed to join 
"the eight larger vessels" in Cuba, ignoring the discouraging 
account of their condition reported by Admiral Manterola, who 
was in command of the naval station.^ 

It is needless to deal with "what might have been" had 

' Infra. 

^ Speaking of those in Cuban waters, Manterola said : " Of the fifty-five ves- 
sels which compose my squadron, thirty-two are launches and small craft 
of little use except to police the coast. The two cruisers are completely use- 
less; the Alfonso XII unable to move, and the Reina Mercedes has, of her ten 
boilers, seven useless and the other three little less so. Of the three cruisers 
Venailito [1,200 tons], Isabel II [1,200 tons], and the Ensenada [1,000 tons], 
only the first can steam; the other two cannot move under a month, that 
is, the first of July. The gun-boat Magallanes cannot light fires; the torpedo 
gun-boats u.sed as cruisers have lost their speed, their principal character- 
istic. Of the gun-boats built in England I had better not speak. The tor- 
pedo gun-boats M. Pinzon, Nucva Espafia, Molins, and V. Pinzon can be 
utilized; that is to say, can be moved." 



STRATEGY 61 

Spain been anything but Spain the Unready. The facts are 
that she could look forward in the near future to adding but 
two effective ships to Cervera's force besides the four destroyers 
which were retained at home. Had the Pelayo indeed been 
added, she would, however, have fitted ill in a high-speed squad- 
ron such as might have been made (including the Carlos V) of 
the five homogeneous armored cruisers. For she carried but 
630 tons of coal, which would have given her an effective radius 
of action of but about 2,000 miles. 

Had Cervera returned from the Cape Verdes to Spain, as 
he and his captains advised; had he awaited the Carlos V, 
spending the interval in a thorough overhauling of his ships, 
their guns, machinery, and bottoms, and in placing aboard the 
Coldn her 10-inch guns, he would have had a squadron which 
would have given cause for thought to the American government. 
In any event, while holding this force for the moment in Spain, 
there would scarcely have been any large army movement for 
a time, on the part of the United States, though expeditions in 
support of the insurgents, such as that first proposed for the 
south coast under General Shafter, would no doubt have been 
undertaken, and a rigorous blockade eventually established. 

Such suppositions, however interesting, could have had but 
little bearing upon the actual strategy of the United States, 
which had to meet probabilities based upon concrete facts. The 
broad lines of the American strategy had been almost at once 
prepared by Spain herself in separating Cervera's ships from 
those in home ports, and advancing them in the direction of the 
Caribbean by a step of nearly 1,500 miles. That it was intended 
to send this, the only force ready for service, alone to the West 
Indies, was almost a necessary corollary of such a situation. 
That this was to be soon, was clear from the fact that the Cape 
Verdes * were a Portuguese possession at which they could not 
remain long after the declaration of war. 

' These desolate volcanic islands are so named from their proximity to Cabo 
Verde (Green Cape), the most westerly point of Africa, from which they 
lie to the westward, some 290 nautical miles, between north latitude 15° and 
18°. Being directly in the steam route from Europe to Brazil and southern 
South America, the chief place, Porto Grande, is an important coaling-point. 
It supplies nothing else. 



62 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The presence there of the torpedo-boat squadron, enforced, 
as mentioned, by the difficulties of the sea, was the cause of the 
selection of these islands instead of the Canaries as a general 
rendezvous. No doubt the greater distance to Puerto Rico 
from the Canaries, of some 500 miles, had some force in such 
selection, but this should not have weighed against the im- 
mensely greater advantages in supply and preparation afforded 
by the national ports, Palmas and Santa Cruz. 

Admiral Cervera at the Cape Verdes was 2,350 miles from 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, where were large supplies of coal and 
a small navy yard available for moderate repairs to machinery. 
It was but 1,250 miles thence to the Chesapeake and 1,400 to 
New York. The distance to this latter by going first to San 
Juan would have been increased by 840 miles over the direct 
course, but to offset this increase was the fact that he would 
have coaled in a home port and going thence with full bunkers 
have been within easy reach of the American coast, where he 
could have arrived with still coal enough to return to Puerto 
Rico or go to Havana ^ without fear of meeting any American 
squadron of commensurate force with a speed sufficient to bring 
him to action. 

The formation north of the two American squadrons men- 
tioned is sufficient evidence that a raid upon the coast was 
feared. It could have been but a raid, but it would have been one 
in which the Spanish commander could have destroyed coasting 
vessels, would have terrorized the coast population (already in 
an unreasoning panic), have caused the withdrawal of the larger 
part of our effective ships from Cuba, and might have caused 
the adverse political sentiment of Continental Europe to have 
crystallized to a dangerous degree of enmity. That he would 
have had any difficulty in entering Havana had he chosen night- 
time in which to make the attempt, the writer cannot believe. 
The danger was a concrete one. It needed but a stout heart, 
which Cervera had, and a bold spirit of venture and initiative, 

' To go off New York and thence to Havana would have been to steam 
about 2,700 miles, about 000 less than the distance steamed in going from the 
Cape Verdes to Santiago de Cuba, a voyage performed by most of the large 
ships without any additional supply of coal. 



STRATEGY 63 

which he had not. The want of these last could not, in its 
ignorance of its enemy's race characteristics, be as fully relied 
upon by the American government in the beginning of the war 
as it could have been later. 

In this situation the flying squadron under Commodore 
Schley, with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and, shortly, 
the Neio Orleans, was early stationed at Hampton Roads, and 
a patrol squadron of cruisers under Commodore Howell estab- 
lished, on April 20, for the protection of the coast and coastwise 
trade from the Delaware Capes to eastern Maine. ^ It can scarcely 
be supposed that such action was taken but in deference to the 
unreasoning fear of dwellers on the coast, which fear was equally 
strong and uncontrollable in Spain and the United States. The 
natural place for all these forces in the circumstances, as they 
stood, was in the West Indies, and while such concession was 
made to local fears, it is natural to conclude that Hampton 
Roads was selected for the flying squadron instead of the more 
central position of New York on account of its being a day 
nearer the West Indies, the distance from New York to Havana 
being 1,227 miles; from Hampton Roads, 270 miles less. 

Sampson (the attack on Havana which, as will be seen, he so 
much desired being denied him) had leaned, on account of the 
facilities offered the Spanish squadron by San Juan, to the plan 
of leaving the smaller ships to establish the blockade and of 
moving eastward with the New York, Indiana, Iowa, Cincinnati, 
and Marhlehead, to the last easterly point where telegraphic com- 
munication could be had by a fast scout, and thence upon 
declaration of war of proceeding and capturing San Juan, thus 

* This squadron was composed at first of the San Francisco, flag-ship, the 
Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, and Yosemite (auxiliary cruisers of about 6,500 tons). 
During May the squadron was strengthened by the addition of the Columbia, 
Badger, and Southery. The Yankee was detached on May 29, the Yosemite 
on May 30, and the Dixie June 13, for duty in Admiral Sampson's fleet. On 
June 9 the Minneapolis was attached to the patrol squadron, but was stationed 
at Newport News to guard the battle-ships building there. On June 25, in 
order to add to the efficiency of the blockade of Cuba, Commodore Howell 
was ordered to Key West with the San Francisco, Columbia, Prairie, Badger, 
and Southery, and assigned by Admiral Sampson to the command of the 
First Division of the North Atlantic fleet, relieving Commodore Watson, 
ordered to command the squadron organized to go to the Far East. 



G4 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

depriving the Spanish fleet of a 'point d'appui which they would 
ahnost surely occupy and use if left open to them. This action 
again was not approved, as hazarding ships which should be held 
to meet the expected Spanish squadron; a perfectly sound reason 
in general, but which in this case, as shown by the almost scath- 
less result to the squadron in their attack on San Juan of May 12, 
could have been safely disregarded. 

As will be seen later, Cervera was to leave the Cape Verdes 
with orders to go to San Juan. 

If San Juan was not to be used as a stepping-stone for the 
purposes of a raid upon the American coast, it was difficult, in 
the writer's opinion, to suppose, in view of the belief in its de- 
fensibility held by most,^ that the Spanish could have any other 
objective than Havana; for there were supplies, a dockyard, and 
a dock; the encouragement of the presence of a governor-general, 
a large army, and the support of fortifications in which Spain 
naturally had much, but as will be seen, misplaced trust. Had 
the Havana fortifications really protected the place in anything 
like the degree supposed, Cervera should have attempted to go 
there at all hazards. In general estimation, it was a harbor 
secure from attack by sea. Had it been so, his presence there 
would have been a very serious matter for the American forces. 
The batteries so completely commanding the front to the north 
caused at all times the ships of the blockading fleet to keep a 
good offing in that direction.^ Thus, had the Spanish squadron 
been commanded by an officer of enterprise, one who had in him 
the spirit of a Paul Jones or a Farragut, he could, with ships 
coaled, bottoms cleaned, and machinery overhauled, have left 
the harbor during darkness, appeared upon the American coast, 

'So late as 1907, a student of strategy wrote: "That the city [Havana] 
could not have been captured by the combined forces of the army and navy 
of the United States without furious fighting, great hardships, and great 
loss of life, admits of little doubt." (Sargent, The Campaign of Santiago de 
Cuba, I, 13G.) 

^ These distances were usually during the day from seven to ten miles. 
There is no reason to doubt the measured distances, shawn graphically in El 
Hloqupo I) la Dejema de las Castas, Captain Severo Gomez Nuiiez, pp. 153-162, 
and which agree with the writer's own experience. 



STRATEGY 65 

and by again coming within reach of Havana have re-entered 
under cover of the night. 

It is well known how difficult it is to discover a ship under a 
high background of land even in broad day; at night, with the 
Havana lights darkened, ships leaving the port and turning east- 
ward under the high land adjacent to the Morro could not possibly 
have been seen from ships six or seven miles away. The prome- 
nade, close in shore, of two of the torpedo gun-boats, in the even- 
ing twilight of April 25, is a case in point. They were entirely 
unobserved from the American ships so far as the writer knows.* 
Had Cervera been observed in returning, the first shots, with 
the powder then used by the American ships, would further 
have so obscured the gloom that search-lights would have been 
useless and the strong probability is that he would have re-entered 
safely. Nor were the three torpedo-vessels of Cervera's squadron, 
added to the four torpedo-cruisers in Havana, to be disregarded 
under the circumstances of such a blockade. 

But, as will be shown, Havana was very open to successful 
attack by the American fleet, and had Cervera taken refuge 
there Sampson would then have been at liberty to carry out the 
views which will be explained a few pages later — action which 
must have resulted in the destruction or capture of the former's 
squadron. But as Cervera was ignorant of the ill defence 
afforded by the fortifications, as in fact were most American 
ofiicials, the actuality could have no bearing upon any determi- 
nation he might make. 

An Italian writer, who is among those who have dealt most 
intelligently with the subject of the war, is strongly of the opin- 
ion that Cienfuegos should in any case have been selected in 
preference to Havana and Santiago. He says: 

Two capital reasons, supply and effectiveness of defence, imposed 
the selection of Cienfuegos. The question of supply is evident, since 
at Cienfuegos Cervera would have found himself in railway communi- 
cation with Havana, and with the whole west of the island, whence he 
would be able to receive coal, than which there could be nothing more 
important. 

The defensive advantages were less evident, and in fact no military 
writer, not even Wilson or Mahan, lays stress upon this characteristic 

' See infra. 



G6 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of Cionfucgos, which by itself could not impose its selection. The 
blockade was sufficiently more difficult and dangerous, the probabil- 
ity of forcing an entrance greater than at Santiago or Havana, the 
security of the anchorage certainly not less; but that which gave Ci- 
enfuegos an absolute superiority over Santiago if not over Havana, 
was the impossibility of forcing a capitulation by an expeditionary 
force such as that of the Americans at Santiago. The whole of the 
military resources could have been concentrated at Cienfuegos with 
sufficient rapidity, and it can be unhesitatingly affirmed that a force of 
50,000 men would have been found insufficient to reduce the place; and 
since the Union did not have any such force the result for Cervera 
would have been the security of the squadron, the possibility of hold- 
ing on until the hurricane season, and for Sampson, the necessity of 
forcing the port, with gravest dangers, or of bombarding Havana 
d outrance, which would have been impolitic, in order to force the 
Spanish squadron to battle or to try another solution of the war more 
odious and less efficacious. 

Cienfuegos guaranteed, according to all probability, the safety of 
the squadron and the prolonging of the conflict to the period of rains 
and cyclones, with all the consequences which such delay invited; 
granted, and it is not admitted, that the means of existence and victual- 
ling would allow it. The conclusion is therefore that Cervera should 
have reached Cienfuegos at every cost even to burning all the wood- 
work of his ships if by such means he could have assured doing so.* 

Though the advantages thus mentioned by the Italian author 
were great, the much broader channel leading into Cienfuegos 
(nearly 600 feet in its narrowest part against the 190 at Santiago), 
and also the clear field of fire from the inner end of the channel, 
offered much greater advantages to an attacking squadron 
than Santiago afforded. Further, though Cienfuegos Bay is 
greater in extent than Santiago, there was the disadvantage of 
visibility of the usual anchorage from seaward, and though 
ships in the north-western part of the bay would be unseen, a 
removal from the customary anchorage would have so fixed 
the scjuadron's position that bombardment from the point of 
nearest approach (some three miles west of the entrance) would 
probably have been efYective. Thus, had Cervera's colliers been 
able to reach Santiago, and had proper energy been shown in using 
the squadron's guns for strengthening the batteries there, and 
could he have secured food, Santiago would have been his most 

' Bonamico, Insegnamenti della Guerra I spano- Americano, 74, 75. 



STRATEGY 67 

secure refuge; and it was refuge only, and not battle, which he 
sought. The failure of the first of these provisos was a mis- 
fortune, the second a direct and concrete fault, the third was a 
failure of anticipation of its selection and ignorance of the want 
which prevailed. 

Circumstances thus making it so largely a certainty that the 
Spanish squadron in coming west would first enter the Caribbean, 
would seem to have demanded the use of every available scout 
on its eastern border. Of these there were six of real value: 
the Columbia, Minnea'polis, Harvard, Yale, St. Paul, and St. 
Louis, all of great speed and large coal capacity. The four last, 
as hereinbefore mentioned, were ships of the American line 
between Southampton, England, and New York, and among 
the finest and fastest merchant-ships at this time afloat. All 
six were commanded by officers of experience and ability, their 
captains in the order named being Sands, Jewell, Cotton, Wise, 
Sigsbee, and Goodrich. Instead of all being sent to cover the 
approaches to the Caribbean, but three, the Harvard, Yale,^ and 
St. Louis, were so detailed in the first instance, the others at the 
critical period of Admiral Cervera's advent in western waters 
being the Columbia on the New England coast, and the St. Paul 
and Minneapolis at Hampton Roads — situations in which they 
were as useless militarily as if non-existent. 

It has been held that our two squadrons should have been off 
Havana and Cienfuegos as the two important ports in Cuba 
from which the Spanish squadron should be excluded; that if 
Cervera entered San Juan one or the other squadron could 
have been sent there on notice of Cervera's arrival. Waiving the 
present writer's opinion, just expressed, that considered merely 
from a defensive point of view neither Havana nor Cienfuegos 
was superior as a harbor of refuge to Santiago, such a disposition 
of our two squadrons would have produced a situation in no wise 
different from that which happened and was deplored (viz., the 
uncovering of one of the two first points), with the drawback that 
there would have been no squadron within easy reach of San 

* The names Harvard and Yale, as before mentioned, were given during 
the war to the New York and Paris, respectively. 



k 



OS THE SPANISH-.\^IERICAN WAR 

Juan to nu'ct the Spanish there before they could coal and get 
away. The time necessary to prepare to go the thousand miles 
east from Havana or Cienfuegos to San Juan, the filling with coal, 
the preparations for coaling en route, the possible break-downs 
and the slowness of many of our ships, by both of which latter 
difficulties Sampson in his movement thither later was hampered 
in a most disheartening way, cannot be ignored. Much less than 
a week would have afforded time for an active enemy to coal and 
get away. That the course of the Spanish squadron could have 
been followed by even the six scouts available, judging by the 
experience gained during the war, was very unlikely. The 
nights Avere dark, the moon being in its last quarter, and, when 
the extraordinary difficulty is considered of sighting at night 
ships carrying no lights, continued contact would have been very 
improbable, even had the Spanish squadron not been accom- 
panied by torpedo-vessels, the very proper fear of which would 
have brought such caution to the dogging scouts that such a near 
approach of the Spanish squadron as would have been necessary 
for observation and keeping touch with its direction would have 
been most doubtful. 

The positions of the two American squadrons thus should 
have been, in the writer's opinion, the one at Havana, the 
other at a point within easy reach of Puerto Rico. Such a point 
was the vicinity of the island of Tortuga off the north-west point 
of Hayti, 550 miles east of Havana and 420 from San Juan; or 
at Monte Cristi bank, a short distance east, where there was 
anchorage and smooth water for coaling, with Cape Haitien as a 
telegraph station. San Juan could have been reached from such 
a point within forty hours. It was also a position commanding 
the Windward Passage and the approaches to the ports on the 
south side of Cuba, Santiago being but 100 and Cienfuegos 415 
miles west of Cape Maysi (the eastern point of Cuba), or about 
215 and 530 miles from Cape Haitien. Thus the one could have 
been reached in twenty-one and the other in fifty-three hours at 
the easy gait of ten knots. 

The views of the navy department as to action, now that 
it was clear that Cervera's force was to cross the Atlantic, are 
best shown by its letter to Sampson of April 29, 1898: 



STRATEGY 69 

Sir: You are informed that we have telegrams from St. Vincent, 
Cape Verde Islands, stating in effect that the armored cruisers Infanta 
Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, Oquendo, and Vizcaya, also the three 
torpedo-boat destroyers Pluton, Terror, and Furor, sailed, it is claimed, 
for Cuba this morning; that at the same time the transports Ciudad 
de Cadiz and San Francisco and the three torpedo-boats Raijo, Ariete, 
and Azor, left for the Canary Islands. The transports and torpedo- 
boats returned shortly after leaving port, owing to a slight collision 
between the Ariete and Rai/o at sea. 

There are also reports that the Pelayo is in Cadiz, but this has not 
been confirmed by reliable telegrams, though it is thought to be true. 
The department does not find any reliable information of her having 
left Spain for the Atlantic. 

In order to obtain information regarding the Spanish fleet above 
mentioned, in case it should go to the West Indies, the department 
has sent out two of the American liners, the -S^. Louis and the Harvard, 
to cruise to the eastward of Guadeloupe and Martinique. A copy 
of the orders to these vessels is appended. 

It is also in contemplation to send a third liner to cruise around the 
island of Puerto Rico for the same object; all three vessels to tele- 
graph to the department and yourself as soon as they obtain reliable 
information. 

Though this Spanish squadron is reported in the telegrams above 
mentioned as being bound for Cuba, it seems very doubtful whether 
it would proceed immediately to your neighborhood, but it might, pos- 
sibly, go into San Juan, Puerto Rico, or to some other port of that 
island, or to the eastern part of Cuba. It is presumed that if they do 
take refuge in a port as above mentioned, that movement would be 
favorable to your operations against them. 

It has been frequently suggested that this Spanish squadron, or 
part of it, might proceed to the vicinity of Cape St. Roque for the pur- 
pose of intercepting the Oregon and Marietta, now known to be on 
their way to re-enforce you, and which are expected to arrive about the 
end of this month. 

Of course the department need not remind you of the importance 
of confining the enemy in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in case they go in there 
for coal or other supplies. It was a matter of common rumor some 
time ago that the Spanish authorities were preparing an old hulk 
or hulks, loaded with stone, for the purpose of obstructing the en- 
trance to the harbor. Whether they have been placed is not posi- 
tively known. 

It has, of course, been suspected that the destination of the four 
Spanish armored cruisers and torpedo destroyers might be on the 
Atlantic coast of the United States, probably to the northward, for 
the purpose of inflicting what injury they could upon our coastwise 
cities and townS; 3,od capturing such of our merchant ships and 



70 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

smaller men-of-war as they might fall in with. If this proves to be 
the case, it may be considered necessary to detach one of the battle- 
ships of' the squadron operating on the coast of Cuba to proceed to 
the northward and re-enforce the flying squadron and such other 
vessels as we might have in that region. Therefore, in reflecting upon 
the situation, you must be prepared to entertain the possibility of 
such detachment. It would seem that after such a detachnient had 
been made, the scpiadron on the coast of Cuba would be still strong 
enough to meet any other Spanish ships that might appear, or tp meet 
the four armored cruisers and the destroyers above mentioned, in case 
thev should leave the northern coast and suddenly appear upon the 
(;ui)an coast; but if the four Spanish armored cruisers, after feinting 
upon the northern coast, proceed to the West Indies for the purpose of 
there joining the Pclayo, Alfonso XIII, and Carlos V, it would be 
supposed that our northern squadron would follow them and re-enforce 
you in operating against them. 

Of course the above is mostly speculation, and is given to you for 
what it may be worth; the matter of the combinations of the Spanish 
ships being doubtless one that you have reflected upon very much. 

Very respectfully, 

John D. Long, Secretary. 

Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson, U. S. N., 

Commanding U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. 

As shown by this, the Pclayo, Alfonso XIII, and Carlos V 
were regarded by our navy department as already available, 
a marked instance of a failure in the very basis of successful 
operations — information. It will also be observed that particu- 
lar stress is laid upon " the importance of confining the enemy 
at San Juan in case he goes there for coal or other supplies," 
a view, as mentioned, entirely in accord with Sampson's own. 
The tenor of the letter, taken with the fact that if a raid upon 
the coast of the United States were meditated, calling at San Juan 
to recoal was practically imperative, was that the covering of 
San Juan was of primary importance. 

The foregoing deals with the subject mainly from a general 
stand-point. It remains to discuss Admiral Sampson's difTerent 
view to that of the navy department as to the probable success, 
without loss, of immediate attack by the fleet upon Havana. 

While recognizing as well as any one that the Spanish squad- 
ron was his main objective, the destruction of which w^ould 
necessarily cause the yielding by Spain of Cuba, he was con- 



STRATEGY 71 

vinced that Havana would fall without difficulty and without se- 
rious damage to his fleet, and that this in itself would practically 
end the war. The following is not in criticism of the perfectly 
sound and safe views of the navy department, which in the long 
run, in view of our superior force, were apparently sure to be 
crowned with success, but to show that Sampson would have 
reduced Havana on April 23, had he been allowed to act, and 
without any material damage to his ships. 

Although the conditions were even more favorable than Samp- 
son knew, he had reasoned largely upon the lines of the conditions 
about to be shown. One of his earliest acts upon taking com- 
mand was to call together the captains of the heavier ships 
present, the Indiana, Iowa, and New York, and lay before them 
his views favoring an immediate attack, in which all agreed. 

His first, and what may be called his tentative, plan of action 
is shown in the following order of battle drawn in full ex- 
pectancy of the navy department's concurrence: 

In case of war the vessels of this squadron will proceed at once to 
the coast of Havana. The approach will be made from the north- 
ward and to the westward of Havana, about Boques Chorrera Point. 

The cruising formation is given below. 

Upon approaching the coast, the fighting ships will take the lead, 
and, upon signal, form column with loim leading, which will carry 
the pennant of the commander-in-chief. The column will be so di- 
rected as to approach the westernmost battery from the westward. 
The loica will lead close in shore and at a distance of 600 or 1,000 
yards. Each ship in the line will open fire on the nearest battery as 
soon as she can bring her guns to bear. 

The rapid-fire guns will commence firing as soon as they can fire 
into the embrasures. 

The distance between ships, in order that they may support each 
other, will be three hundred (300) yards and the speed eight (8) knots, 
the steam pressure being kept low. Should it be found that the smoke 
from the ship ahead interferes with the aim of the following ship, 
the distance may be increased, or, each ship may steer inside the 
smoke of her leader, bringing each succeeding ship somewhat nearer 
the batteries than her leader. 

If the resistance of the batteries is not great the vessels will go to the 
eastward until they have passed the Santa Clara battery, when they will 
turn with starboard helm and return along the battery front. Great 
care will be exercised by each ship in returning to avoid running 



72 THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 

into the smoke of her leader. If the resistance is great for the num- 
ber of ships available, the leader will turn after passing the battery 
to the westward of Santa Clara. 

If at any time any of the enemy's vessels appear, they will irn- 
mediatelv be attacked by the cruisers, and the armored vessels will 
assist them if thought necessary. 

Should the attack on the batteries prove satisfactory, a demand 
under a flag of truce will be made for the city to surrender or suffer 
bombardment in twenty-four hours. 

Should the attack on the batteries be unsatisfactory, either owing to 
their power of resistance or to too few ships, it will be temporarily 
abandoned for a close blockade of Havana, which will be gradually 
extended both east and west. 

ORDER OF CRUISING 

1. The armored ships to be designated the first squadron, and the 
cruisers the second squadron, and to be referred to as such by squad- 
ron flags or displays. 

2. The signal 231 to designate "form in first order of cruising as 
designated by the commander-in-chief." The signal 232 to desig- 
nate "form in second order of cruising as designated by the com- 
mander-in-chief." 

CRUISING FORMATION 

3. At the signal 231 the armored ships will form in double line, same 
number of ships in each line, flagship {Iowa) on the left of the rear 
division; Indiana to be on the left of the van division, and the New 
York on the right of the rear division, so as to give the heaviest pos- 
sible flank fire in case a torpedo-boat eludes the scouts. It is consid- 
ered that there is little chance of attack from other classes of vessels. 
Distance 400 yards. Order, natural. 

Cruisers to act as linkers, the Nashville ahead of the van division, 
witliin easy signal distance, and the Cincinnati the same distance 
alicad of the Nashville. The Marblchead and the Detroit on the flank, 
V ithin easy signal distance of the flag-ship; the Castine and Newport 
astern in similar positions to those ahead. If more cruisers are 
available they are to be posted on the flank. 

Torpedo-boats to act as scouts, and to be stationed as shown, 
the heaviest [the Porter], and the one with the right-ahead fire, being 
in the van. 

4. On approaching the coast, signal 232 (second order of cruising) 
is to be made, when the force will form in three lines: 

(1) The first squadron, or armored ships; 



STRATEGY 73 

(2) The second squadron, or cruisers, including the New Yorlc.^ 

(3) The torpedo-boats, (The New York is not to be considered 
as having left the first squadron and joined the second.) 

5. The force will proceed in this order, the interval between the 
lines being regulated by the limit of visibility of signals. When the 
first squadron is sufficiently near the coast, the second squadron will be 
signalled to stop, and it and the torpedo-boats will keep out of range, 
but within signal distance of the first squadron, and will be manoeuvred 
by the senior officer of the second squadron with that end in view; 
he will, if necessary, detail a ship to take position between the two 
squadrons to repeat signals. He will be ready to make such an at- 
tack on the batteries as may be designated by the commander-in- 
chief, together with the commanding officer of the flotilla, will be 
on the alert to frustrate a torpedo attack by boats attempting to slip 
out of Havana harbor, or out of the small bay to the westward of the 
batteries, under cover of the smoke. 

The first squadron will execute "vessels left turn," and attack the 
batteries in column, as already detailed, the squadron regulating course 
and speed by the flag-ship, with or without signals. 

The ships available at this moment were the battle-ships Iowa 
and Indiana, the armored cruiser New York, the monitor Terror, 
the cruisers Cincinnati, Marhlehead, and Detroit, the gun-boats 
Castine, Nashville, and Newport; the torpedo-boats dishing, 
DupoTit, Ericsson, Foote, Porter, and Winslow. The monitor 
Amphitrite was added iVpril 8, and the monitor Puritan April 9. 

This was but an initial plan, subject to modification. The 
situation at Havana was naturally not as familiar to the navy 
department as it was to Sampson, whose many days' presence 
at Havana as senior member of the Maine court of inquiry had 
perforce given him a fuller knowledge of what he had to meet. 

The reply of the department to Sampson's telegram was as 
follows: 

[Confidential.] 

Washington, April 6, 1898. 
Sir: In the event of hostilities with Spain, the department wishes 
you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war- 
vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gun-boats which 
are stationed along the coast of Cuba. 

* It was arranged later that the New York should form part of the first 
squadron. 



74 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAIl 

2. The department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to 
be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, 
or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable 
Spanish vessels' should take refuge within those harbors. Even in 
this case the department would suggest that a rigid blockade and em- 
ployment of our torpedo-boats might accomplish the desired object, 
viz."^, the destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting un- 
necessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. 

There are two reasons for this: 

First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any capt- 
ured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry 
season begins, about the first of October. 

Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly de- 
sirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or 
destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels. 

3. The department further desires that, in case of war, you will main- 
tain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Havana, 
Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and 
Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause the Spaniards to yield 
before the rainy season is over. 

4. All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available United 
States ports for adjudication. 

5. Should it be decided to furnish the insurgents with arms and 
ammunition, the department suggests that Nuevitas and Puerto 
Padre would be the most suitable places to land them and establish 
communications with the Cuban forces. 

6. Should the department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to 
Puerto Rico, it is possible that the flying squadron may be sent thither, 
in which case some of your vessels may be needed to re-enforce that 
squadron. 

7. The department hopes to be able to cut the cable off Santiago 
de Cuba, even if it has to employ a special cable vessel for this pur- 
pose, and it also has under consideration the practicability of cutting 
the cable near Havana and connecting the end to one of the vessels 
of your command, so that you can always be in communication with 
the department. Whether or not this plan is feasible has not yet 
been determined. Please consider it. 

8. The department need not impress upon you the necessity for 
stringent sanitary regulations. It leaves this matter, as well as the 
details in regard to conducting operations, to the commander-in-chief, 
in whose judgment it has the greatest confidence. 

Wishing you every success, very respectfully, 

JouN D. Long, Secretary. 

Commander-in-Chief, 

U. S. Xaval Force, North Atlantic Station. 



STRATEGY 75 

Sampson answered this in the following letter: 

U. S. Flag-ship New York, 1st Rate, 
Key West, Fla., April 9, 1898. 

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your confidential 
letter of April 6. 

I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big ships against 
a possibly serious loss while the enemy's fleet is still intact. At the 
same time I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike 
hard as soon as hostilities commence. Havana is well defended by 
three or four batteries to the eastward of the entrance, mounting guns 
from 6 to 12 inch calibre. On the western side of the entrance there 
are three batteries, the guns varying in calibre from 8 to 12 inch, and 
two mortar batteries. AH the batteries face seaward, and those to 
the west of the entrance are quite near the shore. All are open 
batteries, with heavy traverses between the guns. The guns and 
people who serve them are quite unprotected. 

These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet from seaward, 
which approaches to within a moderate distance of a few thousand 
yards. I do not think they are well placed to resist an attack (for 
instance, the western batteries) from the westward and close in shore, 
where the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the fire of 
our big ships at short range, where the secondary batteries would have 
full effect. Even under these circumstances the ships must have 
such a heavy fire that the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed 
by its volume. Before the Puritan and AmpJiiirite arrived I was not 
entirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since their arrival 
yesterday I have little doubt of its success. 

Although the monitors are weak in secondary fire I expected to put 
a cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the interval between each two 
of them. In this way I do not think the Spaniards would be able to 
fire. They would be driven away from their guns and kept away, 
while the fire of the ships would so injure the guns or mounts that 
they would be unserviceable. Although the defences west of the en- 
trance are stronger than those east, the first has the advantage for us 
that all the projectiles which miss the batteries will fall in the city and 
furnish an additional inducement for the surrender of the city. 

In the memorandum which I furnished to the commanding officers 
of ships I provided that if our ships were not numerous enough, or 
the Spaniards proved better than I expected, we were at once to haul 
off and substitute for the direct attack a close blockade of the port, 
which was to be extended east and west to adjoining ports as quickly 
as possible. Having silenced the western batteries, it would be quite 
practicable to shell the city, which I would do only after warning given 
twenty-four hours in advance. 



76 THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 

I see the force of your reasoning that we would have no troops to 
occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, INIr. Secretary, it will be very 
unfortunate, besides a great loss of time, if we must delay until the 
rainy season is over. Probably a close blockade would terminate the 
trouble before October. 

I shall do my utmost to carry out your wishes as set forth in your 
letter. At the same time I hope you will consider the plan I have 
here outlined. I have discussed the matter freely with Captains Evans, 
Taylor, and Chadwick, and all unite with me that the direct attack 
is sufficiently promising to warrant its trial. 

I don't think the plan of cutting the cable at Havana and taking the 
end on board ship would succeed, for a ship could not anchor off 
Havana. I have already telegraphed you to send means for grappling 
a cable, with the intention of cutting those at Guantanamo and 
Santiago. 

I will try [to] keep you informed of our doings after leaving here by 
a cruiser sent here to the telegraph line. 

We are working day and night to keep the ships in readiness for 
service. The Helena and Puritan are now under repairs, which will 
occupy several days. There will be no delay in moving when the 
order comes. 

Respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson. 
The Secretary of the Navy, 

Nai^y Department, Washington, D. C. 

That Sampson's letter gives the impression that a resistance 
might be expected such as we now know would not have been 
found, is clear, but the writer know^s that the impression given the 
reader is far stronger than was Sampson's own view' as to the 
probable strength of resistance. He can recall no doubt ex- 
pressed by the commander-in-chief as to success; the intensity 
of disappointment brought him by the navy department's dis- 
approval can only be understood by those who are acquainted 
with Sampson's unbending purpose when his will was once fixed. 
Further study only intensified his opinion. 

Havana was, in fact, always at the mercy of the American 
fleet, as a study of the conditions will show^, the special consider- 
ations being the train of the Spanish guns; the want of defence 
south-west of Chorrera Bay; the great depth of water, which 
enabled ships to come almost within their length of the shore; 
and the bight west of the INIorro, which not only afforded excel- 



STRATEGY 77 

lent anchorage, but cut off, completely, the heavy guns of the 
batteries east of the entrance to the harbor. 

A few preliminary words are needed. 

The outbreak of 1895 had found Havana defenceless except 
for six 11-inch Krupp guns of 1876 installed in 1885; three of 
these were in the Velasco battery at the eastern side of the Morro 
Castle and three in the Santa Clara. There were some 8.25-inch 
iron howitzers, "perfectly useless," says Nunez, the Spanish 
officer of artillery and author, "for a combat against foreign 
squadrons." ^ 

General Martinez Campos, with the experience of the Ten 
Years' War (1868-1878), foreseeing trouble with the United 
States, took steps on his arrival in Cuba in 1895 toward a better 
defence, with the result that from December of that year to the 
succeeding March there arrived two 30.5-cm. (12-inch), two 
24-cm. (9.5-inch), eight 15-cm. (5.9-inch) Ordonez rifles; two 
30.5-cm. Krupp rifles, and eight 24-cm. (9.5-inch) Ordonez rifle 
howitzers.^ 

The mixed artillery and engineer commission charged with 
the subject included Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Santiago, Guanta- 
namo, and Nipe, in the project of defence, but nothing was done 
excepting at Havana. 

Work was begun and carried steadily forward. The batteries, 
far from complete when Sampson's fleet was sighted at 5 p. m. of 
April 22, 1898 (the only guns which had yet been tested by firing 
being the 12-inch of Santa Clara and a few of the eight 21-cm. 
[8-inch] howitzers), had a frontage in a straight line between the 
two extremes of 7.5 kilometres (4.7 miles). They began 2,300 
metres east of Morro Castle and ended 5,200 metres west.^ They 
were as follows (all guns being en barbette): 

Battery No. 1 (Cojimar). — A new earthwork revetted with 
masonry, 2,300 metres east of the Morro; 10.5 metres above the 

* Severe Gomez Nunez, La Habana, Influencia de las Plazas de Guerra, 29. 

' The following is the relation between centimetres and inches: 1 cm. = .394 
inch; 57 mm. = 2.25 inch; 9 cm. = 3.55 inch; 12 cm. = 4.7 inch; 15 cm. 
= 5.9 inch; 16 cm. = 6.3 inch; 21 cm. = 8.25 inch; 24 cm. = 9.5 inch; 
28 cm. = 11 inch; 30.5 cm. = 12 inch. 

' 1,000 metres = 1,093.63 yards = | of a statute mile. 



78 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

sea Armament— Four 15-cin. Ordonez." The easterly of these 
guns could train N. E. The westerly W. by S. All through an arc 

of about 130°. 

Battery No. 2 (El Barco Abandon ado). —A new earthwork re- 
vetted with masonry. 1,530 metres east of the INIorro; 18 metres above 
the sea. (This was the second most powerful of the Havana defences.) 
Arvmm£nL—l\\'o 30.5-cm. (12-inch) Krupp rifles (in center of bat- 
tery); four 21-cm. (8-inch) Ordoiiez B. L. howitzers (two on each 
flank' of the 30.5-cm.); two 57-mm. (2.25-inch) Nordenfelts (one at 
each end of the battery). The extreme range of any of these was 
N. E. ^ E. and W. S. W. f W.; that of the 12-inch at the moderate 
elevation which would make them eft'ective near the western shore, 
was but W. I S. There would have been no difficulty in keeping 
south of their train of fire. 

San Diego Battery.— On the hill 1,400 metres from the sea and 
2,300 metres E. by S. from Morro point, and 50 metres above the sea. 
Armament— Two 15-cm. (5.9-inch) B. L. siege-guns; four old M. L. 
bronze guns, rifled. (This battery was of no value except as a support 
to 1 and 2 in case of land attack.) 

ISIoRRO Castle.— The Velasco Battery, 15 metres above 
the sea. Armameiit— Three 28-cm. (11-inch) short Krupp guns 
of 1876. The guns bore N. E. by N. and W. It would have 
been easy to keep south of their line of fire. On the parapets, 
17 metres above the sea, were nine 21-cm. (S-inch) rifled cast- 
iron howitzers. ("In its present condition Morro Castle, including 
Velasco, need hardly be taken into consideration in the defence of 
Havana."— [/. S. Army Report, 1898, Captain John C. W. Brooks.) 
Lower Battery (del Sol). — Armament — Six 28-cm. (11-inch) 
cast-iron M. L. smooth-bores; two 21-cm. (8-inch) rifled cast-iron 
M. L. howitzers. ("I was told that if loaded they could fire one 
round at a passing vessel. I did not doubt this statement. These 
guns are entirely exposed to a fire from the sea."— t/. S. Army Report) 

The shore, beginning with the western angle of the Morro 

Castle, here made a deep bight, to the southward and westward, 

the depth of which from the line joining the Morro and the Santa 

Clara battery (2,400 metres west of the Morro) was 700 metres. 

It was this bight which Sampson proposed using as an anchorage 

after reducing the western batteries. 

* These guns are from designs by Brigadier-General Salvador Ordonez, 
and are known by his name. They are of cast-iron hooped with steel and 
with a partial tube of steel which contained the breech-block. The projectile 
of the ;i0.5 cm. Ordonez rifles in the Santa Clara battery weighed 836 pounds: 
the powder charge was 264 poimda; the initial velocity 1,706 foot-seconds. 
The Hontoria (all steel) guns were also named from the designer. 



STRATEGY 79 

Fort Cabaxas. — A large ancient fortification of great extent, 
about 1,000 metres S. E. of the Morro, 25 metres above the sea. It 
had no bearing upon sea defence. Armament. — Three 16-cm. (6.3- 
inch) old guns, rifled ; four 16-cm. rifled M. L. cast-iron guns. 

San Ambrosio Battery. Armament. — Six 16-cm. old bronze 
guns, rifled. 

Pastora Alta (high). — Armament. — Three 21-cm. (8-inch) Or- 
donez M. L. howitzers. 

Pastora Baja (low). — Armament. — Nine 21-cm. INI. L. howit- 
zers. ("None of the armament of this fort is of any value whatever." 
U. S. Army Report.) 

La Punta (The Point). — On the south side of the harbor en- 
trance, 300 metres S. from the Morro (this being the width of the 
entrance). 4 metres above the sea. Armament. — Two 25-cm. (9.85- 
inch) Parrotts; one 28-cm. (11-inch) smooth-bore; three 16-cm. (6.3- 
inch) old bronze guns, rifled. ("This battery is worthless from an 
artillery point of view." U. S. Army Report.) 

The Punta Annex. — Armament. — Two 15-cm. (5.9-inch) Ordo- 
nez. These guns could be trained only to N. W. \ W. 

CuARTEL DE LA FuERZA. — At inner end of entrance channel, op- 
posite Cabanas. No fire seaward. Armament. — Four 28-cm. (11- 
ineh) M. L. iron guns. ("Guns and defence are of no value." U. 
S. Army Report.) 

Reina Battery. — 1,800 metres S. W. of the Morro, and 8.5 metres 
above the sea. Armament. — Two 25-cm. (9.85-inch) Parrott M. L. 
rifles; seven 21-cm. (8-inch) Ordonez M. L. howitzers. ("The 
armament is hardly worth noting." U. S. Army Report.) 

The Santa Clara Battery. — A solidly constructed fort 1,030 
metres W. N. W. of La Reina, and 2,400 metres W. S. W. from the 
Morro. 14.4 metres above the sea. (This was the most powerful of 
the Havana batteries.) Armament. — Two 30.5-cm. (12-inch) Ordonez 
rifles; three 28-cm. (11-inch) Krupp rifles (1876); four 21-cm. (8-inch) 
M. L. howitzers; two 57-mm. (2.25-inch) Nordenfelts; three 16-cm. 
(6.3-inch) old bronze guns, rifled. The easterly 30.5-cm. could be 
trained due east; the westerly to W. N. W. ^ W. 

Battery No. 3. — A new earthwork, 950 metres W. of Santa 
Clara; 1.9 metres above the sea. Armament. — Four 21-cm. (8-inch) 
M. L. howitzers. 

Battery No. 4. — A new earthwork, 1,200 metres W. by N. of 
Santa Clara (3,800 from the Morro) ; 2.1 metres above the sea. Arma- 
m£nt. — Two 24-cm. (9.5-inch) B. L. Ordonez rifles; two 15-cra. 
(5.9-inch) B. L. Ordonez rifles. These guns trained from N. E. by 
E. to W. N. W. i W. 

Battery No. 5 (Chorrera). — A new earthwork, 1,100 metres 
W. by S. of No. 4, and 4,900 from the Morro; 2.2 metres above the 
sea. Armament. — Four 15-cm. (5.9-inch'l B. L. Ordonez rifles. T^*^ 



80 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

most easterly gun trained W. by S.; the others gradually more to 
the southward, the westernmost bearing about S. W. three-quarters 
W. (S. 54° W.). 

West of the city a mile inland, and having no bearing on the 
seaward defence, was the extensive and ancient Castillo del 
Principe, occupying the highest land of the neighborhood, 165 
feet above the sea. There were in this three 16-cm. old bronze 
guns, rifled. On the south a little more than two miles from the 
harbor entrance, was the smaller Castillo de Atares, equally 
venerable, 104 feet above the sea, with four guns of the like 
useless character. 

Says the talented captain of artillery, Severo Gomez Nunez: 

Finally, General Fuentes had the clever idea of establishing auxil- 
iary and simulated batteries, using some ancient mortars. These 
batteries we see mentioned in some foreign reviews as contributing 
to the defence of the ports and made there a great figure. 

The bombardment of Puerto Rico furnished the idea; it was observed 
there that the enemy's ships fired numbers of shots at short ranges, 
approaching close to the works, which would have caused in an attack 
at Havana, serious losses in the slightly protected batteries, as the 
enemy would, from a short range, have directed an accurate fire from 
his rapid-fire guns from the secondary batteries and tops of his ships. 
In order to avoid this these auxiliary and simulated batteries were 
installed in the hope that the fire of the ships would be divided be- 
tween many objectives. One was thus installed to the right of the 
Santa Clara battery; another of howitzers to the left of No. 3, another 
between No. 2 and Velasco; two between Nos. 1 and 2, which dis- 
sembled by the lay of the land and the vegetation would appear to 
contain guns of 9 cm. Be, of 7.5-cm. Krupp rapid-fire, and of 12 or 
15 cm. Verdes; all the elements, in a word, of a gun-fire fitted to con- 
tend with the like fire from the American ships, which, it was ob- 
served, they used in all cases, approaching closely to the works in 
order to reap the greatest advantage from their rapid-fire guns.' 

Three lines of torpedoes were laid near the entrance of the 
channel leading into the harbor, which has a width varying 
from 175 to 230 yards, with, for about a mile, a direction south- 
east by east. The first line, with 12 Bustamante mechanical 
mines, each carrying 100 pounds of gun-cotton, was placed 217 
yards within the entrance, at an angle with the axis of the channel, 

* Nunez, Habana, Influencia de las Plazas de Guerra, 73, 74. 



STRATEGY 81 

49 yards apart, and at a depth of 12 feet. The second, of 9 
Latimer-Clark observation (electric) mines, with 500 pounds 
of gun-cotton each, was laid from the point of the Morro to the 
point of the Castello de la Punta, 65 yards apart. These mines 
were on the bottom, the depth varying from 30 to 40 feet. The 
third line of 7 Latimer-Clark observation mines led from the 
Pescante (midway between the Morro and the Castle of Las 
Cabanas) to the landing-place at the Punta. Two tubes for 
firing Whitehead torpedoes were mounted on the mole of the 
Captain of the Port. A powerful search-light was established on 
the Pescante mole to illuminate the channel, and two heavy 
hawsers with floats were stretched, nighdy, one from the Morro to 
La Punta, the other from the Pastora battery to a sunken lighter 
on the opposite side of the channel. Two Nordenfelt one-pound- 
ers were also installed at this battery, near which was also the 
observation station. 

Three other search-lights were installed, all the important sta- 
tions connected by telegraph and telephone systems, and three 
telemetric stations established. 

The following is a full list of the guns in place: 

2 30.5 cm. (12-inch) B. L. Krupp (1890). 
2 30.5 cm. (12-inch) B. L. Ordonez (1894). 
6 28 cm. (11-inch) B. L. Krupp, 25 calibres long (1876). 
2 24 cm. (9.5-inch) B. L. Ordonez (1894). 
6 16 cm. (6.3-inch) B. L. Hontoria (from the Alfonso XII), 
14 15 cm. (5.9-inch) B. L. Ordonez (1890 and later). 
4 12 cm. (4.7-inch) R. F. 
6 12 cm. (4.7-inch) bronze, B. L. 

6 9 cm. (3.55-inch) bronze, B. L. 

7 57 mm. (2.25-inch) Maxim-Nordenfelt. 

6 16 cm. (6.3-inch) old M. L. bronze guns, rifled, of no value. 

6 15 cm. (5.9-inch) old M. L. bronze guns, rifled, of no value. 
12 21 cm. (8.25-inch) B. L. Ordonez mortars. 

38 21 cm. (8.25-inch) M. L. rifled mortars (iron), of little 

value. 

7 15 cm. (5.9-inch) smooth-bore mortars (iron), of no value. 
6 32 cm. (12.8-inch) old bronze smooth-bore mortars, of no 

value. 
19 28 cm. (11-inch) smooth-bore cannon (old), of no value. 
4 25 cm. (9.85) Parrott rifles, of no value. 

153 



STRATEGY 83 

An analysis of this list shows thirty-two effective guns (includ- 
ing the Krupp of 1876) bearing seaward. 

In advance of the ancient castles del Principe and Atares, 
and from two to six miles distant from the city, the line of de- 
fence against inland attack was formed by a number of well- 
constructed sunken casemate field-works protected by wire 
entanglements. The lines were further fortified by a number of 
block-houses for infantry defence. 

The foregoing, let it again be said, were the Havana batteries 
as they were after three months' work during the war. They 
were very far from this state of completeness in April. 

The extent and strength of the works against land attack 
were almost entirely neutralized by the fact that they were chiefly 
west of the Marianao railway, which ran parallel to the coast 
at a distance from it of less than 3^ kilometres (2.2 miles), and 
thus were subject at moderate range to the fleet's fire from the 
south-west, the easy slopes offering an incomparable terrain 
for such practice. The engineers charged with the preparations 
for defence, both landward and seaward, apparently overlooked 
the fact that the modern guns afloat could easily fire from four 
to six miles, and that they had left the south-west unprotected. 
A reference to the map showing the extreme train of the guns 
of each battery is necessary to a complete understanding of what 
follows. 

The shore a little west of Brava Point, where was placed 
Battery No. 3, trends almost directly south-west. A squadron 
lying less than a mile south-west of Chorrera Bay was but three 
and a half miles from the Prado, the centre of the city, and at 
the same time out of the range of fire from anything in the 
Havana batteries, except from two 5.9-inch guns in Battery No. 5, 
and perhaps from the four 8-inch howitzers in Battery No. 2; 
those in No. 3 would have been too close to be effective and in 
any case their life would in such an attack as that proposed have 
been very short. 

Neither of the powerful 12-inch guns of Battery No. 2 (a mile 
east of the Morro) could train farther south, at an elevation 
of 5°, than about West h South (to be accurate S. 84° 24'). This 
train would not have brought them to bear within a line 500 



84 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

yards from the extreme northerly point at Punta Brava, which 
the fleet would have had to round. A close hugging of this 
point, which could have been safely approached even within 
150 yards (the seven-fathom line being scarcely anywhere 
distant from the shore so much as 100 yards) would have kept 
the ships clear of the train of these guns. If the ships had kept 
so far even from shore as the 800 yards proposed in the battle 
order, they would have been exposed but a short time. 

Batteries 5, 4, and 3 (naming them from the westward) were 
practically at sea-level; they would have been enfiladed without 
the possibility of return fire except from the 5.9-inch of No. 5 
just mentioned. Though all had heavy traverses, fragments of 
bursting shell do not respect initial direction, and the gun em- 
placements, all of which were otherwise unprotected, would 
have been untenable. 

The Santa Clara battery, the most powerful of all, and whose 
heavy guns could only train to W. N. W. \ W., could, after 
the others were silenced, have been deliberately pounded for an 
indefinite period, at a distance of 2,500 yards, without being able 
to bring its guns to bear on the ships. After Santa Clara there 
was nothing to hinder anchoring in the deep bight west of the 
Morro, entirely free of any annoyance from the eastern batteries, 
in which at this time the four 8-inch howitzers finally in Battery 
No. 2 were not yet ready, nor even if ready the anchorage was 
too close for them to be effective, nor would they have attempted 
to fire into this bight at such close range for fear of the shell 
dropping upon the Morro or upon the batteries west of the 
entrance. 

That the city would not have surrendered under such circum- 
stances, had demand been made, with the guns of the fleet but 
a few hundred yards distant pointing up its streets and also 
directly into the harbor, is scarcely supposable. So complete 
a destruction, however, would if necessary have been made at 
leisure after anchoring, of all the western batteries, that Havana 
would no longer have been a fortified place. The ships in the 
harbor were a negligible quantity.^ 

' These were the following: Marques de la Ensenada, a protected cruiser of 
1,064 tons, 2,200 H. P., with four 4.7-inch B. L. and five rapid-fire guns; the 



STRATEGY 85 

It is possible to suppose that any one of several things, which 
may be mentioned, might have happened. (1) The Spanish 
commander might have surrendered both the place and the army, 
on an understanding that he himself would preserve order 
pending the arrival of an American force, (2) He might have 
surrendered the city and have withdrawn his troops to the region 
outside of Havana, though it is difficult to suppose this on account 
of a foodless and desolated country. (3) The American fleet 
could have held its position in the bight west of the Morro, or 
to the south-west of the city, with threat of bombardment if fired 
upon, to await the despatch of an expeditionary force sufficient 
to control affairs, and have then demanded a surrender. This, 
it may be said, is precisely what Admiral Dewey did at Manila. 

It would not have been necessary for this last supposed action 
to have lasted long. Almost the whole of the regular army 
was concentrated at Tampa and at other near-by points of the 
south by the end of April, and could have been quickly trans- 
ported to Havana by the transports now gathering, and by the 
unarmored vessels of the navy. 

The situation, it must be said, in Havana was essentially 
different from that of Alexandria, which suffered so greatly 
from "riot and arson" in 1882, when the batteries were bom- 
barded by the British, and the town left for a time unoccupied 
through apprehension of possible hostile action by the newly 
departed French fleet against the British force, which in such 
an event would have needed all its men. The uncontrolled 
population of Alexandria was violently disaffected, and opposed 
en masse to the British; the property destroyed was the property 
of the hated foreigner. The property interests of Havana, how- 
ever, were chiefly Spanish; and besides the Spanish army there 

Infanta Isabel (under repairs) and the Conde de Venadito, of about 1,190 tons, 
1,500 H. P., and similar batteries to that of the Marques de la Ensenada; 
the cruiser Alfonso XII (unable to move under her own steam), of 3,900 tons, 
4,400 H. P., with six 16.25-inch B. L. and thirteen rapid-fire guns; four tor- 
pedo cruisers, the Filipinas (useless), the Nueva Espana, Martin Alonso, 
and Vicente YaHez Pinzdii, of from 750 to 571 tons, with a nominal speed 
of from 18.6 to 20 knots and with six rapid-fire guns each; the gun-boat 
Magallanes, of 527 tons; the transport Legazpe, of 1,249 tons, and the Flecha, 
of 43 tons. (Nunez, 118.) 



86 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

were not less than 20,000 Spanish volunteers in the city, mainly 
property-owners, who would have prevented destruction even had 
the Spanish regulars been so inclined. It is inconceivable that 
tliese men should not have protected their own. The remainder 
of the Havana population was Cuban, which looked to the 
American forces as saviours and not as enemies; certainly they 
would not have attempted to ruin that which they expected 
soon to be under the Cuban flag. The interests thus both of 
Spaniard and Cuban lay in the preservation of property, and 
it is much more reasonable to suppose that the efforts of both 
would have been toward safeguarding property rather than 
toward its destruction. 

Nor in such matters can the Spanish sentiment of fundonor 
be put aside. Had the city surrendered (and it is difficult to 
believe that it would not have done so, with its streets and harbor 
commanded by the American guns at point-blank range), the 
Spanish character is such that the capitulations would have been 
loyally carried out. Turbulence among the Spanish troops, 
the most orderly and least prone to giving trouble, was not, in 
fact, to be expected. Havana, in the writer's opinion, would 
have been ours in peaceful possession. 

While thinking thus, the writer, turning to the subject as an 
abstraction, would express the opinion that the mere preserva- 
tion of property or of such life as might be lost by "riot and 
arson" in such a case, cannot be weighed against the much 
greater loss through the continuance of war. It is the long 
drawing out of hostilities which is the chief cause of the ex- 
penditure of treasure and life. For example, any "riot and 
arson" which could have occurred would surely have been less 
damaging to both property and life than the destruction from 
a siege such as the American government had, at first, con- 
fidently expected would have to be undertaken. 

Thus, the first reason assigned by the navy department for 
not pushing a successful attack upon the batteries to the extent 
of causing an immediate surrender, had military considerations 
demanded it, cannot, in the writer's view, be considered valid. 
No commander, in his opinion, can allow himself to forego a 
great and decisive military success such as the capture of Havana 



STRATEGY 87 

would have been for fear of "riot and arson" within. War is 
war. Its results are of such stupendous importance that they 
take on somewhat the character of the convulsions of Nature, 
which destroys and constructs without reference, so far as we can 
see, to questions of humanity. Man is doing in this last what 
he can, but his efforts must ever be of slight effect in face of the 
overpowering necessity of success. The rules of war allow the 
bombardment of fortified places even to their destruction. 
Only seventeen years before were Strasburg and Paris bom- 
barded until they yielded, without reference to the extent of 
destruction, whether of life or property. If the rules of war 
allow this, surely a supposititious danger of riot after surrender 
should not stand in the way of a decisive victory. A humani- 
tarian feeling which goes to the extent of deprecating a severity 
in war which has a great and assured end is misplaced, and in 
the end works a greater inhumanity, for the truly humane thing 
is to do that, at all risks, which will certainly bring an early end 
to hostilities. 

That Cervera would have returned from the Cape Verdes 
to Spain had the Havana batteries been destroyed on April 23, 
would, if Spain were not Spain, be taken as a matter of course. 
It is impossible to the writer to suppose that in such circumstances, 
Cervera's views and those of his captains, so opposed to crossing 
the Atlantic, would not then have been accepted, unless the govern- 
ment had determined in any event to sacrifice the squadron to 
the god which Spain has worshipped so long and so often under 
a false guise — Honor. If one may venture to endeavor to read 
the mind of the Spanish ministry, it would appear that Cuba 
was regarded as lost before the war began, and that there was 
no real intention of naval effort to save it. The instructions of 
April 9, 1898, to Cervera declare that the object of his expedition 
" will be the defence of the island of Puerto Rico. In this opera- 
tion you will take charge of the naval part, in co-operation with 
the army."^ It is thus possible that his transatlantic voyage 
would have been made whatever might have happened at Havana, 
the government holding that there must be a sacrifice; where, 
was immaterial. All that Sampson proposed would, however, 

^ Infra, 111. 



88 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

have been accomplished long before the Spanish squadron could 
have crossed the Atlantic. 

With Havana occupied it would have remained for the Amer- 
ican forces to reduce and occupy the other more important and 
ill-defended ports of Cuba, and also Puerto Rico, if time had 
allowed, at leisure. The aim declared by Congress would have 
been quickly accomplished. That Spain would have chosen to 
continue the war with the bone of contention in American 
possession, is scarcely supposable, except under the supposition 
of sacrifice to honor just advanced. The imminent danger 
of the loss of the Philippines would almost necessarily have 
overpowered this sentiment and have driven her quickly to 
make peace. The war would probably have been one of weeks 
instead of months. 

That Sampson, following the discussions which took place 
regarding the exposure of Havana to gun-fire from the vicinity 
of Chorrera, would have renewed his proposal to attack, had 
circumstances detained him in that vicinity, is not to be doubted. 
Events, after the navy department had decided that Cervera's 
arrival must be awaited, followed rapidly; the centre of interest 
so quickly changed that Havana ceased to be, for the time, an 
objective. 

The obstacles attending the despatch of a Spanish squadron 
to the East, and the uselessness of so doing, were such that the 
attempt made later was not to be expected by the American 
authorities. To divert their fighting force from the Atlantic, 
whatever was happening in the Philippines, was, if there was 
to be an effort to save Cuba at all, to violate the fundamental 
principles of strategy. The effort would be to reach a squadron 
of unarmored ships 15,000 miles from the true battle-ground, 
and one which could from a military point have no weight 
in the final determination of the contest. The ownership of 
islands is determined by general superiority at sea, not by an 
incidental contest between ships of moderate fighting capacity. 
The temporary loss by Great Britain of Malta, for example, 
would not determine the ownership of Malta. The island 
would finally fall to that one of the contesting powers which 



STRATEGY 89 

should show a final naval preponderance, Concentration, there- 
fore, was Spain's only hope if there was to be hope at all. 
Division of forces which was to end in bringing into the great 
theatre of action a hopelessly inferior squadron was most incon- 
siderate and ill-advised. Of course, if Cuba was to be yielded, 
and the principle of uti possidetis to be advanced, as in fact it 
was at the peace, the driving of the American squadron from 
the Philippines would have saved these islands to Spain. But of 
this, with the American force in the Pacific, there could with such 
a squadron as Camara's be no hope. The former had at command 
an unlimited coal supply; a temporary withdrawal from Manila 
until re-enforced by the two powerful monitors, Monterey and 
Monadnock, both of which were about the same distance from 
the Philippines as was the Spanish squadron at Suez, and which 
would have found in the generally smooth waters of Manila Bay 
the conditions most suitable for their utilization, would have 
ensured an American superiority of force and the destruction of 
the weak Spanish force finally started but stopped by the sup- 
posed threat against the Spanish coast.^ 

But, as just said, no such move as later made by Spain in 
sending Admiral Camara's force could have been anticipated 
unless it had been clear that Spain intended to yield Cuba and 
Puerto Rico without a struggle for their possession. It is clear 
that the full bearing of such action was not realized by the 
Spanish ministry when the strange orders given in the telegram 
of the minister of war, June 3, to General Blanco, are considered.^ 

The only other Spanish naval force than Cervera's and the 
few ships in the peninsular ports, was that in the Philippines 
under Rear-Admiral Montojo, now assembled in Manila Bay. 
At Hong-Kong, 628 miles north-north-west, was the American 

* A despatch received by the Spanish government on July 8, 1898, from 
General Blanco, insisted that the army, although crippled by the loss of 
Cervera's squadron, was ready and anxious to continue the war, but both the 
minister of war and Premier Sagasta replied on July 12 that as the Ameri- 
cans were masters of the sea and were preparing to attack the Balearic Isl- 
ands and the Spanish coast, which would be certain to produce an uprising 
in the interior, peace was imperative. Eight days later Spain took steps 
toward peace. ^ Infra, 352. 



90 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

squadron of five ships under Commodore Dewey, concentrated, 
as mentioned, at that point since February, 1898. Both squad- 
rons were the usual forces of unarmored ships then maintained 
in Asiatic waters; the one for the protection of Spanish rule in 
the PhiHppines, the other for the general protection of American 
commercial interests in the Eastern seas. The latter was soon 
to be re-enforced by the protected cruiser Baltimore (which, 
detached from her service as flag-ship of the squadron in the 
eastern Pacific, arrived at Hong-Kong April 22) and by the 
revenue steamer McCulloch, though the latter, weakly armed, 
was not to serve in the coming fight, but was preserved from 
possible damage to serve as a despatch-boat. 

Of the 37 Spanish vessels distributed through the Philippines, 
there were but six which could give Commodore Dewey any 
concern, as all the others were lightly armed vessels under 
600 tons (except a transport of 1900) and the greater number 
not exceeding 200; nine were armed launches of about 40 tons. 
At Manila were the Maria Cristina, flag-ship, of 3,520 tons; 
the Costilla, an old wooden ship used as a receiving ship, of 
3,260;^ two protected cruisers, the Isla de Cuba and Isla de 
Luzon, of 1,045 tons each; three small cruisers, the Don Antonio 
de Ulloa, Don Juan de Au^stria, and the Velasco, between 1,100 
and 1,200 tons; and three between 500 and COO. As the tonnage, 
speed, armament, protection, and coal capacity of all vessels of 
the Spanish navy, as well as their stations appeared in the 
Spanish navy list, there was no indefiniteness as to the character 
of the ships the Americans might meet. The Spanish authorities 
had equally full knowledge of the American ships. 

The Spanish squadron was an element of disquiet both to 
American commercial interests in Asia and to the people of the 
Pacific coast. In any case, however, it was a force to be sought 
and if possible captured or destroyed on the general principle 
of reducing the enemy's military power as much as possible. 
Nor can the fact that the American squadron was soon to be 
without a harbor in which to anchor, be lost sight of. Had it 
not fought for one in the Philippines it would have had to return 

' The Castilla appears in the Spanish navy list of 1898 among the "Ships 
in special service" as Deposito de Marineria en Manila. 



STRATEGY 91 

to United States possessions, the nearest convenient base being 
the Hawaian Islands, soon to be annexed. 

There was no crystallized thought of permanent seizure of 
Manila or the Philippine Islands, though no doubt the possibility 
of so doing was in the minds of some; the question which gov- 
erned was the duty of injuring the influence and power of the 
enemy. As the dominion of Spain over the Philippines was not 
a part of the question involved, the result of such action could 
for the moment be only moral, but in this respect and in later 
political effect, it was to be very great. 

Montojo's squadron, despite the apprehensions mentioned, 
was not of a character to make it possible to carry on offensive 
operations against the Pacific coast. For such, ships of large 
steaming radius are a primal necessity. Of these Spain had 
none capable of military action excepting those of Cervera's 
squadron. The difficulties of coaling and repairing in the vast 
stretches of the Pacific were too great to encounter in the face 
of an active enemy on its own coast, even had Spain been free 
to send the greater part or all of her naval force. None of 
Montojo's ships, however, except the flag-ship Maria Cristina 
and the ancient Castilla, were, as already mentioned, of over 1,200 
tons displacement or able to carry more than 250 tons of coal. 
That such a force might attempt operations across 7,000 miles 
of sea is an inadmissible supposition. A raid upon the Pacific 
coast to be effective is only possible to a great naval power able, 
apart from its raiding force, to convoy its colliers and occupy 
and protect a base. In the old sailing days a fleet was to a 
great degree its own base; its operations, as to time, were limited 
only by the amount of provisions it could carry, and this amount 
was very large. The man-of-war now, however, must have a 
collier within call; the heart of its action is the coal-pit, and the 
nation that controls the coal will, in the long run, in a military 
sense, as in the commercial, control the world. 

Montojo, in full expectancy of being sought and, if possible, 
brought to action by Dewey, had a choice of five courses of 
action: 

1. To give batde at sea. This, of course, would have been 
to court destruction. 



92 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

2. To seek shelter in Subig Bay under the defences which it 
was known the Spanish officials were endeavoring to establish 
there; action which Commodore Dewey expected would be taken. 

3. To anchor under the Manila batteries and accept battle 
there with their aid; the best solution, if he determined to remain 
in the buy. 

4. To take position at Cavite, where were also some defences — 
which he finally chose to do. 

5. To retire to remote parts of the archipelago, leaving the 
broken-down Castilla and the Ulloa and Velasco, which were 
under repair at the Cavite arsenal, and the arsenal itself to the 
mercy of the American squadron. As events turned, the writer 
is in agreement with Captain Concas (now rear-admiral and who 
at the moment was in command of the Maria Teresa) in thinking 
this Montojo's wisest course. Had he adopted this, and had he 
had sufficient foresight to arrange for provisions and coal from 
Japan or Australia, he would have drawn the American squadron 
after him in a search which might have been a long one, and 
although there was almost the certainty of final destruction, this 
destruction would not have been in Manila Bay, and this fact 
might have saved the Philippines to Spain. 

But says Montojo: "I could not abandon the bay without 
putting myself in direct opposition to Lieutenant-General Augus- 
tin in the matter, taking into account the manifested repugnance 
of that general on many occasions to the abandonment of the 
bay by the squadron." Public opinion was openly adverse to 
the departure of the squadron. 

Says Captain Calkins, who was a lieutenant and navigating 
officer on board the Olympia: "Unless the combined batteries 
of ships and forts were trusted to beat off our attack on Manila, 
it was a strategic blunder to concentrate there. The capital was 
bound to be one of our objectives and the fleet another; and 
we might have been forced to make scattering reconnoissances 
involving risky tactics, random pilotage, and unprofitable ex- 
penditure of time and coal. Nothing but a superior defensive 
situation could justify the plan adopted and Manila Bay afforded 
no such advantage." * 

' Historical and Professional Notes on the Naval Campaign of Manila Bay. 
Proceedings, U. S. Naval Institute, June, 1899. 



STRATEGY 93 

Failing such action as that just mentioned, Montojo's best 
post was under the guns of Manila, where, though in the main 
the existing armament was old and worthless, there were four 
9.4-inch rifles which in hands more practiced than those of the 
Spaniards, would have given him effective support. 

These defences could, however, have been supplemented by the 
guns wasted in the attempted defence of the entrances to the bay 
and of Cavite, which would have added eleven effective breech- 
loading guns, of which seven were of 5.9-inch to 6.3-inch, and 
in addition three 7-inch and three 8-inch muzzle-loading Arm- 
strong guns, which would have been good weapons if w^ell used. 

Commodore Dewey's information was sufficiently accurate to 
convince him that Montojo's squadron would be found in or 
near Manila Bay. His course was clear: to go there in search. 



CHAPTER IV 

SPANISH VIEWS 

In Spain everything was unready and in the air.^ As early as 
January, 1898, Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete,^ who 
had been placed in command of Spain's only effective squadron, 
in anticipation of war, had laid its shortcomings before the 
minister of marine, his friend and brother officer, Rear-Admiral 
Bermejo. His correspondence, pathetic in the light of later 
events, is given with considerable fulness on account of the vivid 
light which it throws upon the perplexities and unpreparedness 
of the Spanish government. Taken with the account of the 
council of war in Madrid on April 23, it has also much psycho- 
logic value. 

Cervera begins with a forecast of utter disaster. He writes, 
January 30, 1898, from Cartagena: 

Dear Cousin Juan Spottorno: About two years ago I wrote 
you a letter concerning our condition to go to war with the United 
States. I requested you to keep this letter in case some day it should 
be necessary to bring it to light in defence of my memory or myself, 
when we had experienced the said disappointment by the stupidity 

* Fortunately for history we have an almost complete record of the hopes, 
intentions, vacillations, and orders of the Spanish ministry of marine in the 
two following works: 

Collection of Dociime?Us Relative to the Squadron of Operations in the West 
Indies; arranged by Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, published at 
Madrid, September, 1898; translated and published by the Office of Naval 
Intelligonce, United States Navy Department, 1899; and The Squadron of 
Admiral Cervera, by Captain Victor M. Concas y Palau; translated and 
published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1900. Captain Concas was 
the captain of Cervera's flag-ship and later in the war also chief-of-stafT. 

^ In Spain it is usual among the better classes for men to use the surname 
of both father and mother. A married woman retains her maiden name, 
placing after it the name of her husband with the prefix de, as Ana Gonzalez 
married to a Velasquez becomes Ana Gonzalez de Velasquez. 

94 



SPANISH VIEWS 95 

of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of 
those with the best of intentions. To-day we find ourselves again in 
one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of the end, 
and I write to you again to express my point of view and to explain my 
action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with the other 
one, so that the two may be my military testament. The relative 
military positions of Spain and the United States have grown worse 
for us,' because we are reduced, absolutely penniless, and they are 
very rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only 
with the Colon and the torpedo-boat destroyers, and they have in- 
creased theirs much more. What I have said of our industry is sadly 
confirmed in everything we look at. There is the Cataluna, begun 
more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And 
this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patri- 
otism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps 
myself to-morrow. ... If the Carlos V is not a dead failure, she 
is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, 
and she lacks power. And remember that the construction is purely 
Spanish. The company of La Grana has not completed its ships, as I 
am told, and only these {Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Maria Teresa) are 
good ships of their class; but, though constructed at Bilbao, it was 
by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would be a sad thing 
for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak 
of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The Vizcaya carries a 5.5- 
inch breech plug which was declared useless two months ago, and 
I did not know it until last night, and that because an official inquiry 
was made. How many cases I might mention! But my purpose is 
not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a disaster. 
But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime 
to say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly 
to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure 
that we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is excellent; but 
I pray God that the troubles may be arranged without coming to a 
conflict, which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us. I 
intrust to you a most interesting correspondence which I had with 
General Azcdrraga, and which I desire and request you to preserve, 
together with this letter and the former one. In it you will see the 
opinion of Azcarraga. Without troubling you further, I remain 
your most affectionate cousin, who entrusts his honor to your hands, 

Pascual Cervera.* 

* Docs., 12. A certificate of the authenticity of this document was signed 
on July 2, 1898, by two gentlemen who "repaired this day to the residence 
of Juan Spottorno y Bi^nert at the request of the latter, who exhibited to 
them this letter," and other documents, which they mention in detail, fore- 
telling disaster. {Ibid., 13.) 



96 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

A week later Cervera sends the following to the minister of 
marine: 

General Captaincy of the Squadron, Staff. 

Honored Sir: Although I am sure that I am telling your excel- 
lency nothing new, I think it is not idle in these critical times to make 
a study of the condition of this fleet, if only to complete statistical 
statements of condition and power as to those matters which, for 
reasons I need not here set forth, do not appear in such statements. 
We must discount the Alfonso XIII, which has been under trials for 
so many years, and which we shall apparently not have the pleasure of 
counting among our available ships, which are therefore reduced to the 
three Bilbao battle-ships,' the Colon, the Destnictor,^ and the torpedo- 
boat destroyers Furor and Terror. The three Bilbao battle-ships are 
apparently complete, but you who have had so much to do with them 
while in command of the squadron, and since then in your present 
position, know only too well that the 5.5-inch guns, the main power 
of these vessels, are practically useless on account of the bad system 
of their breech mechanism and the poor quality of their cartridge 
cases, of which there are no more than those now on board. 

The Colon, which, from a military standpoint, is no doubt the best 
of all our ships, is still without her heavy guns. In this matter I 
have, at your instructions, communicated with General Guillen, in 
order to find a possible remedy, if there is one. The Destructor may 
serve as a scout, although her speed is deficient for that kind of service 
with this fleet. The torpedo-boat destroyers Furor and Terror are in 
good condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 
2.95-inch guns. As for the supplies necessary for the fleet, we fre- 
quently lack even the most indispensable. In this departamento 
we have not been able to renew the coal supplies, and at both Bar- 
celona and Cadiz we could only obtain half the amount of biscuit we 
wanted, including the 17,637 pounds which I had ordered to be made 
here. 

We have no charts of the American seas, and although I suppose 
they have been ordered, we could not move at present. Apart from 
this deficient state of material, I have the satisfaction of stating that 
the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will find it 
all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that we do not have 
better and more abundant material, better resources, and less hin- 
drances to put this personnel in condition fully to carry out its r6le. 
I will only add the assurance that whatever may be the contingencies 
of the future these forces will do their full duty. 

Yours, etc., Pascual Cervera. 

Cartagena, February 6, 1898. 

• Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, and Vizcaya. 



SPANISH VIEWS 97 

There follows in quick succession a series of plain statements 
showing an almost inconceivable poverty of resources in warlike 
material and delay in preparation. 

On February 12, 1898, Cervera writes to the minister that the 
Oquendo will leave Cadiz for the Canaries that afternoon. He 
returns to the subject of possible war and asks: 

1. The distribution and movement of the United States ships. 

2. Where are their bases of supplies ? 

3. Charts, plans, and routes of what may become the scene of 
operations. 

4. What will be the objective of the operations of this squadron — 
the defence of the Peninsula and Balearic Islands, that of the Canaries 
or Cuba, or, finally, could their objective be the coasts of the United 
States, which would seem possible only if we had some powerful ally ? 

5. What plans of campaign does the Government have in either 
event ? I should like also to know the points where the squadron will 
find some resources and the nature of these; for, strange to say, here, 
for instance, we have not even found 4-inch rope, nor boiler tubes, nor 
other things equally simple. It would also be well for me to know 
when the Pelayo, Carlos V, Vitoria, and Nwrmncia may be expected 
to be ready, and whether they will be incorporated with the squadron 
or form an independent division, and in that event what will be its 
connection with ours ? If I had information on these matters I could 
go ahead and study and see what is best to be done, and if the critical 
day should arrive we could enter without vacillations upon the course 
we are to follow. This is the more needful for us, as their squadron is 
three or four times as strong as ours, and besides they count on the 
alliance of the insurgents in Cuba, which will put them in possession 
of the splendid Cuban harbors, with the exception of Havana and one 
or two others, perhaps. The best thing would be to avoid the war at 
any price; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to put an end to the 
present situation, because this nervous strain cannot be borne much 
longer. 

On February 15, 1898, the minister answers Cervera, men- 
tioning the acceptance of the resignation of Senor Dupuy de 
Lome (minister to the United States), and the rejection of the 
Colon's heavy guns. He announces that the Carlos V and 
Pelayo (which are not to be ready for a number of months) are 
to join the squadron. He then proceeds to give the following 
extraordinary views, than which none could be more inaccurate 
and futile: 



98 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

As to the war with the United States, I will tell you my ideas about 
it. A division composed of the Numancia, Vitoria, Alfonso XIII 
(or Lepanto), the destroyers Audaz, Osado, and Proserpina, and three 
torpedo-boats would remain in Spain in the vicinity of Cadiz. In 
Cuba the Carlos V, Pelayo, Colon, Vizcaya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, 
three destroyers, and three torpedo-boats, in conjunction with the 
eight larger vessels of the Havana Navy-Yard, would take up a position 
to cover the channels between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic 
and try to destroy Key West, where the United States squadron has 
established its principal base of provisions, ammunition, and coal. 

If we succeed in this, and the season is favorable, the blockade could 
be extended to the Atlantic coast, so as to cut off communications and 
commerce with Europe — all this subject to the contingencies which 
may arise from your becoming engaged in battles in which it will 
be decided who is to hold empire of the sea. For your guidance in 
these matters, you are acquainted with the preliminary plans of the 
staff of this ministry, which I placed at your disposal, including the 
attack upon Key West. I will advise you as to the location of the 
United States ships and other data for which you ask. 

I will also inform you that twelve or fifteen steamers will be equipped 
as auxiharies to our fleet, independent of privateering, and in confi- 
dence I will tell you that if any ship of real power can be found, either 
cruiser or battle-ship, we shall buy it, provided it can be ready by 
April, My life is getting to be a burden, for to all that is already 
weighing upon me under the circumstances are now added the elec- 
tions and candidates for representatives. 

I believe, my dear admiral, that all the energy and all the good 
will of those who are wearing uniforms can do but very little toward 
preparing for the events which may happen. 

Yours, etc., 

Segismundo Bermejo. 



The much wiser and better-informed Cer\'era replies to this 
the next day (February 16, 1898): 

Cartagena, February 16, 1898. 

His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo. 

My Dear Admiral and Friend: ... To the grave Dupuy de 
Lome affair is added the news of the explosion of the Maine, which 
has just been reported to me, and I am constantly thinking of the 
I'izcaya, which should have arrived in New York to-day. God grant 
that no attempt is made against her. . . . 

It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the 
forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United 



SPANISH VIEWS 99 

States. In the Cadiz division I believe the Numancia will be lack- 
ing. I do not think we can count on the Lepanto. Of the Carlos V 
and the Pelaijo I have already spoken [as not being ready]. The 
Colon has not yet received her artillery, and if war comes she will be 
caught without her heavy guns. 

The eight principal vessels of the Havana station, to which you 
refer, have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn 
out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not 
moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions 
that may cost us very dear. Taking things as they are, however 
sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that 
of the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. 
It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think 
that with this force, attenuated by our long wars, we can establish 
the blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against 
that country will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a 
disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables 
may be turned. 

'" As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids 
with our fast vessels, in order to do them as much harm as possible. 
It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should 
be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our 
damages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged 
necessary, but I think it proper to analyze the situation such as it is, 
without cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disap- 
pointments. 

I will leave this painful subject and wait until to-morrow. 

The \lth. — Nothing has happened since yesterday and I will trouble 
you no further. The explosion of the Maine seems to have occurred 
under circumstances which leave no doubts of its being due to the 
vessel herself; nevertheless, I fear this may cause new complications 
and a painful position for the Vizcaya, which God forbid. 

Yours, etc., 

Pascual Cervera. 

Cervera is informed by the minister (February 23, 1898): 

. . . You will receive a less number of torpedoes than you asked 
for, because I have to bear in mind Cabrera Island and the Phihppines. 
In reply to your questions relative to studies on the war with the 
United States, I have sent you information on the location of their 
ships in commission, bases of supplies, coaling stations, etc. They 
really only have Key West; the others are at San Luis (Atlantic) [!] 
and at their navy-yards on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. 
Their ships, as far as the draft is concerned, are calculated for banks 



100 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

extending a long distance into the sea, as at New Orleans, for in- 
stance. . . . 

As I have told you before, my idea, though perhaps somewhat 
optimistic, is to establish two centres of resistance, one in Cuba, 
the other in the peninsula; and by the end of April our position will 
probably have changed. We shall have to be very careful, and if 
possible avoid until then any conflict with the United States; but we 
have to reckon with the excitable nature of our nation and the evil 
of a press which it is impossible to control. ... 

I will close this letter and see what I can do toward procuring funds 
for getting those ships ready — in this poor country which has to send 
16,000,000 pesos to Cuba every month. 

Yours, etc., Segismundo Bermejo. 

I am also looking after provisions, coal, and extra guns. 

Cervera's next letter is a careful and thoughtful comparison 
of Spanish and American forces on the sea. Using certain factors 
he finds: 

The offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will 
be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less 
than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling conclusion 
I have already said that it has been necessary to count the Pelayo 
and Carlos V, which probably will not be ready in time ; the Lepanto, 
which surely will not be ready, and the Alfonso XII, whose speed 
renders her of a very doubtful utility. 

Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the 
first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only 
be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless 
by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the 
United States ? It is evident to me that we cannot. And even if God 
should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably ex- 
pected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? 
Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources? 
I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this 
dcpartamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all that we may 
need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and 
that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would 
be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest 
of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great combat. In 
the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine 
rivers, aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources. 

This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible 
to carry on an offensive campaign, which has been the subject of the 
two reports which his excellency the chief of staff has been kind enough 



SPANISH VIEWS 101 

to send me. These two reports constitute, in my judgment, a very 
thorough study of the operations considered, but the principal founda- 
tion is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity to 
their xmdertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to 
me, at any rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will 
make our naval forces at least equal to those of the United States, to 
attempt by a decisive blow the attainment of such control. 

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, 
they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified 
ports which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, 
on the insurgents, and will use it as a base for their operations against 
us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult, and 
the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check of 
our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the 
Americans, would rapidly increase and become formidable. 

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable 
duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent 
to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without 
illusions, it may weigh the considerations for and against, and then, 
through the government of his jNIajesty, which is the country's legiti- 
mate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this deci- 
sion will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for 
we have but one motto: "The fulfilment of duty." 

Yours, etc., 

Pascual Cervera. 

Cartagena, February 25, 1898. 

Answering (February 25, 1898) a letter from the minister of 
February 23, Cervera expressed his pleasure in the view held 
by Bermejo that relations with the United States have not changed, 
"for I believe a rupture would mean a terrible catastrophe for 
poor Spain, who has done all she can and is by no means ready 
for such a blow, which would surely be fatal." Eulate's conduct 
in the Vizcaya at New York "has afforded me much pleasure 
and I have written to him at Havana congratulating him. Sobral ^ 
is disgusting. I can hardly believe he could have been guilty of 
such indiscretion; I should rather believe that our numerous 
crafty enemies have invented all that." He ends: 

I believe you are really optimistic in your views about a rupture 
with the United States. You think that if we can hold oflF until April 

> The Spanish naval attache in Washington, who indiscreetly criticised the 
discipline, etc., of the American navy. 



102 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

our relative positions will be considerably changed. I believe that 
this is an illusion, for, from what I know, it is my opinion that the 
Pelayo and Carlos J ' will not be ready by that time, and at the rate 
we are now progressing it is very doubtful whether the Colon will be. 
Nor will the Lepanto be ready, and the Alfonso XIII will never be 
anything more than she is now. The Vitoria may perhaps be ready 
for service, but the Nuviancia will not be. The Colon can go out for 
target practice whenever it may be desirable. 

February 26 he writes respecting the impossibility of recharg- 
ing the cartridge cases of the Colon, ending: 

Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but 
the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask 
myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself 
an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin 
of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was 
ours, but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose 
it by right in the war we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth 
and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and 
bullets, in the defence of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. 
Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known 
by the queen and by the whole council of ministers. 

Admiral Bermejo, in a short note (February 28), desired to 
wait before answering until he should have somewhat recovered 
from the painful impression received from Cervera's last letters. 
"As to the cartridge cases of the Colon, I am trying to find the 
means I lack for solving the question you suggest." 

March 4, 1898, the minister replies to Cervera's estimate of 
forces. As giving in detail the views of himself and the govern- 
ment, this letter needs to be quoted in full: 

[Private and confidential.] 

The Minister of Marine, 

Madrid, March 4, 1898. 
His Excellency Pascual Cervera. 

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I notified you that, when I 
should have recovered somewhat from the painful impression caused 
by the reading of your confidential letter, I should answer it, and 
I now do so, and will first take up the comparative study of the United 
States naval forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done, 



SPANISH VIEWS 103 

omitting some of our vessels at Havana, which are available for a con- 
flict with the United States, show a difference of tonnage, but not so 
excessive as would appear from your lines. 

In my opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint 
of the present distribution of the United States forces, remembering 
that it will be to their interest to maintain the ships now in the Pacific 
for the protection of San Francisco and the San Diego' arsenal, as 
also their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city and 
Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about 
to be annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are 
being maintained there. 

With your good judgment you will understand that the long and 
difficult voyage which these forces, among them the Oregon, would 
have to make in order to join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific 
region unprotected, could not be effected without the knowledge 
of others, and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lacking.^ I 
must therefore refer you to the enclosed statement. While it shows 
deficiencies, which the government is endeavoring to remedy at any 
cost by the acquisition of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, 
they do not exist to such an extent as stated in comparison with the 
United States Atlantic Squadron. There is no doubt that, in order 
to concentrate our nucleus of forces, we shall require some time — the 
whole month of April, in my estimation. 

Since I have been in charge of this department his INIajesty's 
government has known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval 
forces, which are being remodelled or repaired abroad, and in con- 
formity with such knowledge the government has endeavored, and is 
endeavoring by every possible means, with a view also to the general 
interests of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United 
States a policy of perfect friendship, although at times points have 
come up which were not easy of solution. 

But with your good judgment you will understand, and I want 
therefore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of 
Cuba. Our flag is still flying there, and the government, to meet the 
sentiments of the people, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires 
that this Spanish colony should not be separated from our territory, and 
is trying by every possible means — political, international, and mili- 
tary — to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is the pre- 
vailing opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. 
As already stated, the government is acquainted with our situation, 

' There is no navy yard at San Diego. There could have been none but 
the vaguest idea in the mind of Admiral Bermejo of a threat against the 
Pacific coast; it was wholly in his imagination. 

2 The Oregon left Bremerton Navy Yard, state of Washington, for San 
Francisco and the Atlantic three days later. 



104 THE SPANISH-AJMERICAN WAR 

and for that reason is endeavoring to collect all possible resources at 
Havana harbor, fortifying it so that it may serve as a base for our 
naval forces, equipping it with a dock, already in operation, where our 
ships will be able to repair slight damages, for it is my opinion that 
it will not be possible, either on our side or the enemy's, to repair 
those injuries which may be caused by the action of a battle in the 
short period of time in which international military campaigns are 
enacted, compared with the material interests they affect. 

The other harbors of the island, such as Cienfuegos, Santiago 
de Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. In 
your estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogene- 
ous troops, well trained and disciplined, as against the United States 
crews of mercenaries [mcrceiiarias], and you might find historical 
facts, evoking sad memories for us, to confirm what I say. I will 
close, never doubting for one moment that you and all of us will fulfil 
the sacred duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving 
you my opinions in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire 
more than peace. 

Yours, etc., 

Segismundo Bermejo. 

He appended a comparison of the available ships, showing an 
American tonnage of 66,537 against 63,018 Spanish, having in- 
cluded in the latter the Pelayo, Carlos V, the Alfonso XIII, the 
Alfonso XII, and the Reina Mercedes. The two last had long 
been practically immovable, facts which must have been known 
to the ministry of marine. 

Cervera in reply, March 9, 1898, still endeavors to disabuse 
the mind of the minister of his optimistic views. He had visited 
the Vitoria, on which he had counted, and had found himself 
mistaken. He continues, seeing nothing but disaster even with 
victory: 

The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be 
foolish for us to pretend to overcome the United States in wealth and 
production. The latter would recover easily, while we would die 
of exhaustion, although victorious, and the ultimate result would 
always be a disaster. 

Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire 
to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to discount the 
high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only 
be postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would 
become graver than it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in com- 



SPANISH VIEWS 105 

parison with the last. Even admitting the possibility of retaining 
Cuba, this island would cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity 
of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here the problem, al- 
ready pointed out by somebody, arises. Is the island worth the ruin 
of Spain? (Silvela, in Burgos.) 

I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to 
me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to 
privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on 
account of the character of modern vessels. Although I do not 
attach much importance to certain details which can have but little 
influence on the general events, I shall nevertheless speak of some 
upon which you touch, in order to set forth my point of view in answer- 
intr your letter. The accompanying statement, which appears to me 
to be more correct than the one enclosed with your letter, shows that 
our forces in the Atlantic are, approximately, one-half of those of the 
United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery power. . . . 

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have 
in the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events 
in the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great 
danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resist- 
ance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts of the 
Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are 
mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation 
will change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither the Car- 
los V, the Pelayo, the Vitoria, nor the Numancia will be ready, and 
nobody knows how we will be as regards .5.o-inch ammunition. 

It seems sure that by the end of April the 10-inch guns of the Colon 
will not be mounted." Even if I were mistaken, then our available 
forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of those of the Amer- 
icans in tonnage and 47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority 
would be in torpedo-boats and destroyers provided all of them arrive 
there in good order. I do not know exactly what are the sentiments 
of the people concerning Cuba, but I am inclined to believe that the 
immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But 
those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their 
own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the 
continuation of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which 
is not for me to analyze. 

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went over- 
board while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an 
old ridge rope. A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it 
has not yet been replaced. jNIore than one official letter has been writ- 
ten on this interesting subject. In times past, forty-three days after 
the Herndn Cortes was laid down, the vessel was at sea. It is now 
fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the 



106 THE SPANISH-AIMERIGAN WAR 

boilers of a steam launch of the Teresa, and I do not yet know when 
it will be finished. This will probably be the proportion between us 
and the United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having 
the Havana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all. 

x\s for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crewS 
that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the 
same way. I beg that you will not consider this an argument against 
yours, for that would be accusing me of great presumption in speak- 
ing of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs to me. 
These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express 
them to you with the request that you will transmit them to the gov- 
ernment. If you should deem it advisable for me to express them 
personally, I am ready to do so at the first intimation. After I have 
done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite 
ready to fulfil the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces 
wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their 
duty. 

Yours, etc., 

Pascual Cervera. 



He enclosed a fairly accurate comparative list of the forces, 
showing Spain's hopeless inferiority. 

The minister replies March 13, that he has informed the 
government of the deficiencies and " I repeat to you what I have 
said before, namely, that the government will act prudently 
in order to maintain friendly relations with the United States, 
and try by every means to w-ard off any conflict, since the opinion 
as to our unfavorable situation is unanimous." Ansaldo,^ he 
states, telegraphs that two new 9.84-inch guns for the Colon w^ill 
be furnished this month (March) from Spezia, and that he has 
applied to the Italian navy for 5.9-inch and 4.7-inch cartridge 
cases. The Carlos V, he is told, will be ready by the middle of 
April. He is endeavoring to purchase cruisers, torpedo-boats, 
and steamers of 1,000 tons and 20 knots to serve as despatch- 
boats; the squadron is kept at Cartagena, as it has not been de- 
cided what course it is to follow; the Colon, if her armament can 
he completed, must go to Genoa; arrangements have been made 
to send the testing and recharging machinery to Cartagena. " I 
will close now. I leave to you how arduous my work is. To- 

> The builder of the Col6n. 



SPANISH VIEWS 107 

day, Sunday, which the Lord set aside as a sacred day of rest, I 
commenced work at 8 o'clock in the morning and close it at 
9 o'clock at night with these lines." 
March 19, Cervera writes: 

In the way of 5.5-inch ammunition we carry seventy-eight rounds 
per gun, but of these only thirty cartridges have been pronounced 
serviceable by Guillen. I saw Pedro Aguirre yesterday and asked him 
concerning the ships at Havana. He says there is but one ship ready, 
namely, the Venadito. I had him repeat this statement several times. 
He also told me that the dock did not work. If the defects cannot be 
remedied we will have to do something about the Vizcaya, as she 
has not had her bottom cleaned for eight months. 

On March 21 the minister suggests that the Colon may ac- 
company the torpedo-boat flotilla to Puerto Rico, but says: 
"As this ship cannot enter there, she would have to go to St. 
Thomas for coal and return to Spain to complete her armament." 
In view of the later orders given Cervera, this statement of in- 
ability to enter a Puerto Rican port (though an error) is very 
extraordinary. 

On March 27 Cervera gives the total number of projectiles 
available as 1905 (but about a fifth of the number used by 
Sampson's squadron July 3), and on April 2 writes from Cadiz, 
where the squadron had gone: 

My fears are realized, for the conflict is approaching at a rapid rate, 
and the Colon does not have her heavy guns; the Carlos V has not 
been delivered, and her 3.94-inch armament is not mounted; on the 
Pelayo the redoubt is not completed, and I believe she lacks her 
secondary battery; the Vitoria is without her armament, and of the 
Numancia we had better not speak. 

He telegraphs April 4: 

I believe it very dangerous for torpedo-boat flotilla to continue 
voyage. As I have no instructions, deem it expedient to go to Madrid 
to receive them and form plan of campaign. The Canaries trouble 
me; they are in dangerous situation. If during my absence it should 
be necessary for squadron to go out, it could do so under second 
in command. 



108 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

To this he received the same day from the minister of 
marine an extraordinary reply, by telegram and letter, both of 
the same tenor; the latter is given: 

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I am in receipt of your tele- 
gram and letter. In these moments of an international crisis, while 
diplomacy is exerting its influence and while a truce is being discussed, 
and even the situation of the respective naval forces, nothing can be 
formulated or decided. Next time I shall write you more fully. 

Cervera answered these on April 6, in a letter not only such 
as any officer of the navy might and should have written, but 
such as the simplest common-sense, whether found in naval 
oflBcer or civilian, should have dictated: 

His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo. 

My Dear Admiral and Friend: In last night's mail I received 
your letter of the 4th, having previously received your telegram con- 
cerning the same matter. It is precisely on account of the general 
anxiety prevailing that it is very important to think of what is to be 
done, so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some 
chance of efficiency and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don 
Quixote, go out to fight windmills and come back with broken heads. 
If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States the ques- 
tion would be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar 
their way. 

But as our forces, on the contrary, are very inferior to theirs, it 
would be the greatest of follies to attempt to bar their way, which 
could only be done by giving them a decisive naval battle. That 
would simply mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy 
of the enemy, who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and 
by establishing there a base of operations, crush our commerce and 
safely bombard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely neces- 
sary to decide what we are going to do, and, without disclosing our 
proposed movements, be in a position to act when the time comes. 

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not 
changed since then. If we are caught without a plan of war, there 
will be vacillations and doubts, and after defeat there may be some 
humiliation and shame. You will understand these frank and loyal 
statements of an old friend and comrade, who desires nothing more 
than to help the government and act with circumspection. 

Events now followed rapidly. On April 7 the governor-general 
at Havana telegraphed to Senor Giron, the minister of the colonies: 



SPANISH VIEWS 109 

Public opinion remains dignified and quiet, though somewhat ex- 
cited by reports of impending war. Some dissatisfaction expressed 
over lack of ships in island. Those now here not in condition to 
render service. Detention of flotilla at Cape Verdes leaves our coasts 
unprotected. You know international situation better than I under 
present circumstances, and will realize expediency of sending ships. 

This telegram appears to have clinched the question of destina- 
tion and on the same day the minister of marine telegraphed 
Cervera: 

Squadron must go out to-morrow. Proceed to St. Vincent, Cape 
Verde. Immediately upon arrival take coal and water. Communi- 
cate with semaphore Canaries to notify you of anything new. In- 
structions, which will be amplified, are in substance to protect torpedo- 
boat flotilla, which is placed under your orders, Amazonas' and San 
Francisco being in Europe. These are the only American ships there 
at present. 

Cervera at once replied, under the same date, reiterating his 
appeal for a plan of campaign : 

These battle-ships are ready for any duty. Beg that you will per- 
mit me to insist on having general plan of campaign to obviate fatal 
vacillations. No doubt government has formed its plan; I must 
know it without fail if I am to co-operate with it intelligently. 

And in a second telegram, sent the same day, stated his inten- 
tion of leaving on the morrow for the Cape Verdes, adding: 

Not knowing plan of government, and not having been told what 
to do next, I shall await instructions, protecting the Canaries. 

The minister's response, also of the same day, was a simple 
evasion: 

Hurry of departure prevents for the moment making you acquainted 
with plan you ask for, but you will receive it in detail a few^ days after 
arrival at Cape Verde, as steamer loaded with coal is following in your 
wake. 

On the 8th Cervera informed the Spanish admiralty that he 
would await instructions at the Cape Verdes, and at 5 P. M. he 
left Cadiz with the Maria Teresa and the Colon. 

' New Orleans. 



no THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Before leaving Cadiz, however, he sent another note of warning. 
He writes on April 8: 

I regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon 
some plan, even on general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly 
requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the tele- 
grams received I think I see that the government persists in the idea 
of sending the flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky ad- 
venture, which may cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the 
defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger 
for the Canaries and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. 
I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have antici- 
pated it long ago. 

I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, 
while if left to defend itself with its present means perhaps it would 
give the Americans some annoyance. AYe must not deceive ourselves 
concerning the strength of our fleet. If you will look over our corre- 
spondence of the last two months you will see, not that I have been 
a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not 
have any illusions as to what we can do, which will be in proportion 
to the means available. 

^Yh^le sending this, the following letter from Bermejo was 
on its way to Cervera by the collier San Francisco, but was not 
received until he arrived at the Cape Verdes. As will be seen, 
the two matters which rested most heavily on the minds of the 
ministry were the defence of the Canaries and of the island of 
Puerto Rico, which latter throughout was regarded as the ob- 
jective of the Spanish squadron should it cross the Atlantic. 

Madrid, April 7, 1898. 

My Dear Admiral and Friend: We are in the midst of a serious 
international crisis. While I have not yet lost all hope of a peaceable 
solution, it being the wish of the government to avoid war at any cost, 
we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the in- 
fluence of foreign powers; but the president of the United States is 
surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is 
now trying to appease. It devolves upon you as the admiral of the 
squadron, and owing to the prestige which you are enjoying in the 
navy — or God himself has singled you out for that purpose — to carry 
out the plans which will be formulated and entrusted to your intelli- 
gence and valor. 

I believe that I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as it 
was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had 



SPANISH VIEWS 111 

the necessary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, 
my conscience is entirely clear. In the instructions which you will 
receive a general idea is outlined, which you will work out with your 
captains. I will close, begging that you will express my regards to 
the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which 
his Majesty and the government place in your high ability. 

The following were the instructions enclosed: 

Honored Sir: Although up to date the friendly relations existing 
between Spain and the United States of North America have not 
changed, yet, in anticipation of possible complications, and in view 
of the probable presence in European waters of the United States 
cruisers San Francisco and Aviazonas, it becomes necessary to pro- 
tect the first torpedo-boat division, which has recently reached the Cape 
Verde Islands, whether it be deemed expedient for such division to 
proceed to the West Indies, or whether it be necessary for it to return 
to the Canaries. 

Immediately upon receipt of this order you will therefore proceed 
with the flag-ship and the Cristobal Colon to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, 
where the division referred to is to join your fleet and remain for the 
present under your orders, together with the transatlantic steamer 
Ciudad de Cadiz, which accompanies it. At St. Vincent you will await 
instructions, which will be forwarded in good season, and if the exi- 
gencies of the service should make it advisable for the squadron and 
torpedo-boat division to proceed to Puerto Rico you will do so, bearing 
in mind that if prior to your departure the situation should have 
become aggravated the battle-ships Vizcaya and Oquendo will join you 
at Cape Verde or meet you at 18° 30' north latitude and 53° 30' west 
longitude. This point has been determined from the general Spanish 
chart of the Atlantic Ocean, and you will stand for that point for the 
purpose indicated. 

The protection given the torpedo-boats by you will place the division 
in much better condition from a military standpoint, as each battle-ship, 
as well as the transatlantic steamer, can take charge of two of the 
torpedo-boats for the purpose of provisioning them and lending them 
such other aid as may be necessary during the voyage, which under 
these circumstances can be made in less time and with greater safety. 
As far as the contingencies feared make it possible to determine the 
objective of the expedition, it will be the defence of the island of Puerto 
Rico. In this operation you will take charge of the naval part, in 
co-o])eration with the army, with the concurrence of the governor- 
general of the island, without forgetting, however, that the plan rests 
with you alone, in view of your incontestable ability, in your capacity 
as admiral, to measure the forces of our probable enemy, estimate the 



112 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

significance of their movements, as well as the best purposes to which 
the ships under your command can be put. 

If the case in question should arise, you will deploy the squadron 
so that the different tactical units composing it will sustain each other, 
supported by the destroyers and torpedo-boats, and not present a 
compact mass to the enemy, unless the hostile forces should be equal 
or inferior, in which case it will be expedient for you to take the offen- 
sive. It is on these bases that your plan must rest, considering as the 
principal factor the speed of our ships, which, as a general rule, is 
superior to that of the enemy's ships, and taking into account that the 
hostile forces which, if the case should arise, will operate in Puerto 
Rico will probably not exceed 7 ships, including 3 auxiliary vessels. 

As it may become necessary to give you further orders during your 
voyage from Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands, you will pass within 
sight of the semaphore of the Canaries (Punta Anaga). As to the 
provisioning of your ships at St. Vincent, the necessary instructions 
have been given to the commander of the torpedo-boat division; and 
in Puerto Rico, in case it should be necessary to go there, you will 
find every kind of supplies, including ammunition. 

In everything compatible with these instructions you will observe 
the orders transmitted to the commander of the torpedo-boat division, 
as far as relates thereto. The foregoing is communicated to you by 
royal order, and at the same time I beg to tell you that, in view of the 
grave circumstances through which the nation is passing at present, 
the government of his Majesty places full confidence in your excel- 
lency's zeal, skill, and patriotism, and in the incontestable valor of all 
who are subject to and will obey your efficient orders. 

Cervera arrived at Porto Grande, the principal port of the 
Cape Verde Islands, at 10 a. m., April 14, having communicated 
with the semaphore at Teneriffe on the morning of the 11th. 
He had made the run at a 12-knot speed, excepting at the end, 
when he reduced to 11 to make port at daylight; he reported the 
coal consumption of the Colon during the passage as "enormous," 
and that of the Teresa as "quite large." During the voyage 
of 1,570 miles the Coloii had used about 500 tons, the Teresa 
about 400.^ The Colon had but 550 and the Teresa 570 tons 

' Cervera in his report of April 15 gives the Coldn's expenditure at 12 
knots as 3.74 pounds per horse-power per hour; the Teresa's ixt the same speed 
as 2.55. The result showed in the Coldn bad and inexperienced firing. 
The chief engineer was unwilling to carry above 115 pounds steam pressure 
on account of leaks, which also showed a bad condition of boilers and con- 
nections. 



SPANISH VIEWS 113 

left. He asked for 1,000 tons of coal. WTiile writing the report, 
April 15, from which the foregoing is taken, he received the 
following telegrams of April 14 and 15 from the ministry of 
marine : 

Serious news. Transatlantic San Francisco leaves for Cape Verdes 
with instructions and 2,000 tons of coal. But begin coaling anyhow 
from the coal ordered to be purchased by commander of flotilla. 
Vizcaya and Oquendo under way since 9th to join you. 

Situation continues to be grave. Violent and humiliating speeches 
against our countr}^ in United States Congress. Great powers ap- 
pear desirous of peace. Confidential information received from 
Washington that flying squadron, composed of New York, Texas, 
Columbia, Minneapolis, and Massachusetts, put to sea the 13th to 
prevent our battle-ships from joining you. Doubt this to be true, 
war not having been declared, but you should nevertheless be warned. 
Provide yourself with everything necessary, and upon arrival of battle- 
ships refit them immediately. 

Even in this there was the same incorrectness as in almost 
everything else which concerned the administration. Cervera, 
in his report just quoted, mentioned that the captain of the 
transport Ciudad de Cadiz had received a telegram at 5.05 P. M, 
of the 15th, dated the day before, stating that the San Francisco 
had sailed from Las Palmas with 1,000 tons (not 2,000 as stated 
by the minister). Fifty-four shillings were asked for coal at 
Porto Grande. The admiral wrote: "As it is much needed I 
have ordered it to be bought."^ 

The report regarding the flying squadron brought the following 
telegram from Cervera, sent April 16: 

Nothing new. Owing to last report of your cipher telegram con- 
cerning flying squadron, the torpedo-boat flotilla is fitting for battle, 
lightening the coal which hampers it. 

'Says Captain Concas: "The United States consul had bought all the 
available coal at the Cape Verdes, and only after a thousand difficulties and 
by paying twice the regular price did we succeed in obtaining seven hundred 
tons, which was sold us upon orders from England, probably in the firm 
belief that the ten vessels we had there, counting both large and small ones, 
would not be able to do anything with that quantity . . . even with the 
coal bought by the San Francisco and Cadiz, there was not enough to refill 
the bunkers." (Concas, 24, Navy Department translation.) 



114 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The next day the weather was so heavy that the coal purchased 
could not be taken and on the 18th the collier San Francisco 
arrived, followed on the 19th, at 11 a. m., by the Vizcaya and 
Oquendo, which had taken ten days in making the voyage of 
2,350 miles from Puerto Rico. The former at once began to 
coal, working all night; the Oquendo, which arrived with but 
200 tons remaining, began to coal the next morning. 

A letter of April 19, from Cervera to the minister of marine, 
gives a depressing insight into the troubles with which the admiral 
was burdened: 



The boilers of the Ariete are practically unserviceable, so that this 
vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the 
fleet. She could only be used for local defence. The boiler of the 
Azor is eleven years old and is of the locomotive type, and that tells the 
whole story. As for the destroyers Furor and Terror, their bow 
plates give as soon as they are in a sea-way, and some of their frames 
have been broken. Villaamil has had this remedied as far as he has 
been able. The Pluton had an accident of this kind when coming 
from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol. 

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords 
good protection for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Maya- 
guez cannot be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most un- 
favorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall 
await the arrival of the Vizcaya, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly 
acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the 
Canaries. 

It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, 
as well as the small island commanding the port of La Luz in Grand 
Canary. From your instructions it seems that the idea of sending the 
fleet to Cuba has been abandoned, I believe very wisely. Concerning 
Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to ac- 
cumulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rico 
is loyal, it will not be such an easy task for the Yankees; and if it is 
not loyal, it will inevitably follow the fate of Cuba, at least as far as 
we are concerned. 

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, 
as I have already said, for the Canaries; and above all I fear the possi- 
bility of a bombardment of our coast, which is not unlikely, con- 
sidering the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with 
four or five vessels of higher speed than our own. 

For all these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for 
me to do, and I will not make any decision without your opinion and 



SPANISH VIEWS 115 

that of the council of captains, as indicated in your letter. I leave 
this letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen. 

I was here interrupted by the information that the Vizcaya and 
Oquendo were in sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them 
come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of 
health and spirits, but the Vizcaya needs docking badly. 

During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more coal than 
the Oquendo, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 
knots according to my reckoning, and a diminution of her radius 
of action of from 25 to 30 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed 
to which you called special attention in your instructions. Both are 
now coaling, but it is slow work, for, unfortunately, we do not feel 
at home here. We are indeed unlucky ! Until to-morrow. The mail 
has come in and will shortly go out again, I will therefore close this. 

The governor-general of Puerto Rico was telegraphing on 
April 20 in the same general tenor to the minister of the colonies 
(Gir6n) as Blanco, from Havana on April 7:^ 

Your Excellency and the minister of war know scant resources at my 
disposal. I should know what our naval forces are doing. Do not 
know situation of our squadron. 

On the same day that this last was despatched, at the sug- 
gestion of the minister of marine as precedent to a council to be 
held at Madrid, there was called on board the Cristobal Colon a 
council of war, the record of which appears as follows: 

The second in command of the naval forces and the captains of 
the vessels, having met on board the cruiser Cristobal Colon, by order 
of his Excellency the commander-in-chief of the squadron, and under 
his presidency, the president submitted for discussion the following 
question: "tJnder the present circumstances of the mother country, 
is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should 
it stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries and provide from here 
for any contingency?" Several opinions were exchanged concerning 
the probable consequences of our campaign in the West Indies; the 
great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that of the enemy were 
made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the islands 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to offer for the purpose 
of establishing bases of operations. 

In consideration of this and the grave consequences for the nation 
of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed 

' Supra. 109. 



116 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was 
unanimously agreed to call the attention of the government to these 
matters by means of a telegram, as follows: 

Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron to the Minister of 
Marine: 
In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of 
the vessels, I suggest going to the Canaries. Arieie has boilers in 
bad condition; boiler of Azor is very old. Vizcaya must be docked 
and have her bottom painted if she is to preserve her speed. Canaries 
would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, and all the 
forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defence of 
the mother country. 

Pascual Cervera. 
Jose de Paredes. 
Juan B. Lazaga. 
Emilio Diaz Moreu. 
Victor M. Concas. 
Antonio Eulate. 
Joaquin Bustamante. 
Fernando Villaamil. 



Cervera writes to the minister next day, April 21: 

Honored Sir: For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday 
about the council which met on board the Colon, and only sent you a 
copy of the proceedings. The council lasted nearly four hours. The 
prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the high 
spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished 
commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom 
it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical and 
solemn circumstances. 

The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in 
quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother 
country; but the vision of the same mother country abandoned, in- 
sulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat — for nothing 
else could be expected by going to meet them on their own ground 
with our inferior forces — compelled them to see that such sacrifice 
would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain 
in the hands of an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows 
what the consequences might be. I could see the struggle in their 
minds between these conflicting considerations. All of them loathe 
the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finishing 
once for all. 



SPANISH VIEWS 117 

But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon by the 
enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that 
courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm 
and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about 
war in general and naval warfare in particular and believe that the 
Alfonso XII or the Cristina can be pitted against the Iowa or Massa- 
chusetts, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests 
of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us. 

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opin- 
ion, saying that he would do what the government of his Majesty 
should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these 
sentiments, it is hardly necessar}' to say his scruples were soon over- 
come. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact 
report of everything that happened. Another of the captains, certainly 
not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the 
average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written 
down his ideas, and I send you a copy of his statement which reflects 
better than I could express them the opinions of all. 

This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in 
the meeting. Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your 
Excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the 
assurance of the excellent spirit of all. 

The following is the document referred to: 

Capt. Victor ]M. Concas, Cormnander of the Battle-ship Infanta 
Maria Teresa: 

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral 
of the fleet at the council of war held on board the battle-ship Cristobal 
Colon, my opinion is as follows: 

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior 
to our own in number and class of vessels, armor and armament, and 
in preparations made, besides the advantage given the enemy by the 
insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the latent 
insurrection in the East, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in 
the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the 
Philippines. 

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, 
perhaps, most urgent to reduce our \ailnerable points, which could 
have been done with a single battle-ship, any division of our limited 
forces at this time and any separation from European waters would 
involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Penin- 
sula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the pay- 
ment of large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island. 

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the 



118 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

American flying squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its pur- 
pose were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts 
the just alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this 
fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits 
of an easy victory. The only three vessels of war remaining for the 
defense of the Peninsula — the Carlos V, the Pelayo, whose repairs are 
not yet finished, and the Alfonso XIII, of very little speed, and even 
that not certain — are not sufficient for the defence of the Spanish 
coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries. 

The yacht Giralda and the steamers Germania and Normannia, of 
the acquisition of which official notice has been received, are not vessels 
of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy. 

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning 
Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American 
fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all 
the plans of the government on the subject, and even though it would 
be the maddest thing in the world, the government itself would be 
forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, 
under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose. 

(3) Even deciding upon the defence of Puerto Rico alone, the trip 
across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a 
military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an 
auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy — who, I suppose, will make St. 
Thomas his base of operations — is a strategic error, the more deplor- 
able because there have been months and even years in which to 
accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems prob- 
able, judging from the information acquired, that the supplies ac- 
cumulated at St. Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a 
base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab 
Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage 
must remain entirely with the government. 

(4) Adding these three battle-ships and the Crisiohal Colo?!, with- 
out her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few 
old torpedo-boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our 
coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic Islands 
and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of 
operations. This defence, however, will have to be a very energetic 
one if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be 
possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from 
suffering more or less if the enemy should bring along a light division, 
nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and there, as our 
ships are too few in number to be divided. 

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover 
all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present 
clearly the resources which the country gave us, and the needs which 
present circumstances bring on the country in danger. 



SPANISH VIEWS 119 

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation 
should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our pro- 
foundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most ener- 
getically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to 
these forces. But, after pointing out the probable consequences, the 
responsibility must remain with the government. 

Victor M. Concas. 



The whole tenor of this paper marks the hopelessness of 
Spain's cause. Cuba is left to the mercy of the enemy, and there 
is no thought but of the defence of the home coast against im- 
probable and, for the moment at least, useless attack. The 
fact that war had come had been telegraphed by the minister 
April 20, announcing that both houses of the United States 
Congress had approved armed intervention, declaring Cuba 
free and independent. Cervera was urged to complete fitting 
out. He replied asking that all torpedoes be sent to the Canaries 
if his going there should be approved. On April 21 the torpedo- 
boat Ariete was ordered to Spain in tow of the San Francisco. 
Cervera begged that the order be recalled, as she could co-operate 
in the defense of the Canaries, and reiterated his request to be 
informed of the destination of the squadron. He had telegraphed 
the same day: 

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that to continue 
voyage to Puerto Rico will be disastrous. I can leave for the Canaries 
to-morrow. The coaling is proceeding slowly, there being a lack of 
appliances. The captains of the ships are of same opinion as I, 
some more emphatically. I need instructions. 

But his destination had been fixed; other than the forces of 
the Peninsula were pressing to send him west across the Atlantic. 
Blanco was reiterating his fears, telegraphing on April 22: 

Public spirit very high; great enthusiasm among all classes. But 
I must not conceal from your Excellency that if people should become 
convinced that squadron is not coming, disappointment will be great 
and an unpleasant reaction is possible. Beg that your Excellency will 
advise me whether I can give them any hope of more or less imme- 
diate arrival of squadron. 



120 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Thus the minister replied to Cervera at once, the telegram 
reaching him on April 22: 

As Canaries are perfectly safe, and you are aware of telegrams 
on impending sailing of flying squadron, you will go out with all the 
forces to protect Puerto Rico, which is menaced, following the route 
which your Excellency has traced, bearing in mind the free scope which 
the instructions give you, and which I hereby renew. The phrase 
Am going north will advise me that you have sailed. Absolute secrecy 
must be maintained as to your movements. The nation, in these ex- 
treme moments of the declaration of war, follows your squadron 
in its expedition, and sends to it its enthusiastic greetings. 

Cervera's request to send the Ariete to the Canaries was 
granted in a telegram of the 22nd. He was informed: "The 
government is inquiring constantly about your sailing. It is 
absolutely necessary to go out as soon as possible." He ac- 
knowledged the receipt of this the same day, persisting, however, 
in his opinion, and disclaiming all responsibility for the conse- 
quences. He sent telegram after telegram, saying pathetically, 
"I do not know location of hostile ships nor on what the in- 
structions are based," and begging for " all possible information." 
He did not know officially whether W'ar had been declared, 
stating that it was absolutely necessary to know in "order to 
treat the American flag as an enemy." The minister of marine 
replied the same day: 

If war had been declared I should have advised you; but, as a matter 
of fact, a state of war exists, since the United States fleet will begin 
to-morrow the blockade of Cuba. The ships of the flying squadron, 
which I mentioned to your Excellency, and about which I have had no 
further information, are to blockade Puerto Rico, but have not yet left 
Hampton Roads. The foundation of the instructions is to entrust to 
your Excellency the naval defence of Puerto Rico. I have no special 
news to communicate to you to-day. 

The only answer to this was again a request for precise in- 
structions, to which came the following sage reply, also on April 
22: 

Have received your second telegram. Cannot give you more defi- 
nite instructions than you have, leaving you free to choose the route 



SPANISH VIEWS 121 

to be followed, eluding, if possible, an encounter with the hostile fleet, 
and reaching some point on the coast of Puerto Rico. The Ciudad de 
Cadiz will accompany you with as much coal as possible. 

Cervera was still unwilling to yield without further struggle, 
and telegraphs: 

I beg your Excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our 
voyage to America must be disastrous for the future of our country. 
That is the opinion of all men of honor. I beg your Excellency to 
read this telegram and my whole official and confidential correspond- 
ence to the president of the council, in order to ease my conscience. 

In addition he writes the same day (we are still in this busy 
April 22) that nothing could be expected of such an expedition 
"except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and de- 
moralized return." He says that Graciosa Island in the Canaries 
would be a base for American operations against Spain and 
that thus these islands w^ere not safe, as they surely would be 
with the squadron there not only defending that point but cov- 
ering the coast of Spain. He reiterates the defects of the ships 
adding to all that has gone before, " The Vizcaya can no longer 
steam, she is only a boil in the body of the fleet." He was to 
have still one more telegram on this day of trouble, the minister 
telegraphing at 6 p. m.: 

As result of heavy seas, Audaz had bow bent at right angles to port 
as far as second bulkhead. I notify you so that you may have bows 
of destroyers strengthened as much as possible. 

Cervera sent three telegrams April 23 asking that arrange- 
ments be made for confidential agents at the principal ports where 
he was likely to touch in the West Indies, and for opening 
credits. He again asks that he be informed before sailing if war 
be declared, and reports the torpedo-boats and destroyers ready, 
except the latter's 2.95-inch guns, which were taken off to allow 
more coal, but which could be remounted in a few hours. 

His protestations, however, had had an effect, and April 23 
he was informed that a council of officers had been called in 
Madrid to consider the course of action. The minister of 



122 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

marine (himself a rear-admiral), one admiral, four vice-admirals, 
eight rear-admirals, and five captains were thus hastily called to 
decide the fate of Spain's only fighting force, being convened, as 
remarked one of the members, Rear-Admiral Pasquin, without 
being informed of the object of the meeting and that thus they 
had not been able to prepare for a judgment upon plans of the 
importance and gravity of those respecting which they were to 
consult.^ 

The absence of all crystallized plans of action is painfully set 
forth in the detailed report of the conference.^ 

The minister explains that the plan of the government was to send 
the squadron now at Cape Verde, together with the first torpedo-boat 
division, to Puerto Rico, and entrust to the admiral the defence of that 
island, which he (the minister) considers in great danger from hostile 
attacks, being poorly defended, having very open coasts, and inade- 
quate garrisons in case of an uprising; that it was further intended 
to keep in Spain all other available ships, so as to be able to send 
them at the proper time wherever it might be necessary; but that the 
instructions issued to the admiral and received by him at Cape Verde 
had not yet been carried out, for the reason that the admiral made 
certain objections to the plan, which he did not consider expedient. . . . 

The minister says that he deems it important for the discussion to 
make the members acquainted with the last telegram received from 
the governor-general of Cuba, stating that all the Spanish of that 
island were animated by the very best spirit for resistance; but that 
this was due to a great extent to the hope they harbored that the fleet 
would promptly return to Cuban waters, and if the return was de- 
layed, or the hope lost, the Spanish population might at the same 
time lose the spirit animating it. 

With a fine contempt for the actualities, he says : 

that he should have preferred the formation of a comparatively numer- 
ous squadron, letting the ships go separately or in small divisions, so as 
to enable them to operate with greater freedom in seeking or refusing 

' There were present, besides Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo, the 
minister: Admiral Guillermo Chac6n y Maldonado; Vice- Admirals Carlos 
Valcdrcel, Jos6 M. Berilnger, Eduardo Butler, and Fernando Martinez; Rear- 
Admirals Manuel Pasquin, Jos6 Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha. Ismael Warleta, 
Manuel Mozo, Manuel de la Camara, Eduardo Revioso, and Jos6 de Guzmdn; 
and Captains Jos6 G6mez Imaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquin Lazaga, Joaquin 
Cincilnegui, and Ramon Aunon. 

* Documents; Cervera, p. 58 et seq. 



SPANISH VIEWS 123 

battle, as may be best; that the idea of going back now could not be en- 
tertained, because the advance toward Puerto Rico could be made by 
the fleet either as a whole or in divisions by different routes; some of 
the vessels might even be sent to the Bermudas, in order to compel the 
enemy to divide his forces; that, whatever plan might be adopted, 
he harbored the hope that the victory would be on the side of Spain, 
owing to the good qualities of her ships, the skill of those who com- 
manded them, and the valor of the crews. 

Rear-Admiral Mozo favored concentration in the Canaries and 
the carrying on of the war " in the nature of an active defence." 

Replying to Captain Aunon, who requested information at 
considerable length, the minister said: 

The two battle-ships coming from Puerto Rico carry provisions for 
forty-five days and those coming from Spain for thirty days; that 
he had sent them 2,000 tons of coal and instructed the admiral to get at 
Cape Verde whatever he might need, and that he therefore considered 
the battle-ships in perfect condition to engage in a naval campaign; 
that the three destroyers were in similar condition, but of the torpedo- 
boats only two were able to put to sea, because the Ariete had arrived 
with her boilers disabled. 

The fitting out of the Carlos V could not be completed until the 
beginning of May, the Pelayo would be ready before that time, 
and the Alfonso was ready now, but the greater part of the supply 
of ammunition for the Carlos V was on the way and he could not 
tell exactly when it would arrive. The Pelayo had so limited a radius 
of action that she could hardly go from the Canaries to Puerto Rico 
without being embarrassed, and the speed of the Alfonso XIII was 
so low that she might prove an impediment to the movements of 
the fleet. As to the Vitoria, he did not consider her fit to join the 
squadron on account of her slow speed, and as to the Numancia, 
although she would return to Spanish waters in a short time, the re- 
modelling of this ship was not completed, owing to strikes which had 
interrupted the work. 

In accord with a request: 

The minister reads a telegram from the admiral in which he ex- 
presses a desire to have it plainly understood that it is his opinion and 
the opinion of the captains of the ships that the voyage to Puerto 
Rico may mean a disaster for the future of the country; but that 
obedient to instructions he is hastening all the preparations, so as 
to carry out the order the moment it is received. . . . 



124 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

It remained for Rear-Admiral Lazaga to express to its full the 
extraordinary impracticality of Spanish naval ideas. 

Mr. Lazaga says that he has given some thought to the plan of 
campaign, and he submits his plan, such as it is, to the consideration 
of all. At first he was in favor of scattering the forces, but since 
reading the cablegram from the governor-general he has modified 
his opinion. The Carlos V should go out immediately to join the 
squadron, taking workmen along to complete the electrical installation 
for o})erating the turrets. The Pelayo should complete the work of 
fitting out, working night and day, and purchasing without delay 
whatever might be required. At Cadiz they should join the Alfonso 
XIII and the two destroyers now in Spain and go in search of the 
squadron, after first agreeing on a geographical point of rendezvous 
100 miles west of Cape Verde. 

The united forces should then proceed to Puerto Rico and fight 
a battle there under regular conditions, after which they should con- 
tinue their course south of Santo Domingo and Cuba, appear off 
Havana from the west, and enter that harbor, or, if necessary, engage 
in another battle with the blockading forces. The torpedo-boats 
should return to the Canaries or to Spain with the transatlantic 
steamers. The cruisers Patriota and Rdpido should be detached 
and sent to the Bermudas to divert some of the hostile forces to that 
vicinity and prey upon the enemy's commerce. 

The question was finally put: 

In view of the present state of war and the situation of our naval 
forces in Europe and at the Cape Verdes, what orders should be 
issued to said forces relative to their movements ? 

In a council of war, the view^s of the officers are taken in the 
reverse order of seniority, and those of the junior, Captain 
Aufion, which were read first, were favored by twelve of the nine- 
teen present, most of the remaining seven, however, favoring an 
immediate departure for the West Indies. One only. Captain 
Imaz, favored waiting until the Carlos V, Pelayo, and other 
available vessels should be ready to re-enforce the squadron. 
The views adopted were as follows: 

The four battle-ships and three destroyers now at Cape Verde should 
start immediately for West Indian waters, and after the imperative 
necessity of defending the island of Puerto Rico has been pointed out 



SPANISH VIEWS 125 

to the admiral, he should be given entire freedom of action as to the 
route, port to be entered, and as to the cases and circumstances in 
which battles should be sought or eluded, according to the condition 
in which the ships arrive, the strength of the hostile forces, and the 
information which the admiral may acquire or which may be trans- 
mitted to him prior to his arrival. 

The three torpedo-boats now at the Cape Verdes should return to the 
Canaries when and as best they can under conditions of comparative 
safety. The ships Pelayo, Carlos V, Alfonso XIII, Vitoria, Patriofa, 
and Rdpido, the destroyers which are in Europe, and other available 
ships which may be purchased or fitted out should be concentrated 
at Cadiz and speedily equipped; but the final destiny of these vessels 
should not be determined a priori, but according to the situation of 
the war at the time when these vessels are ready. 

The minister telegraphed the purport of these views to Cervera 
April 24, adding: 

Fifteen thousand pounds are at your disposal in London. The 
torpedo-boats are to return to Canaries with auxiliary vessels. You 
will prescribe their route. The United States flag is hostile. I renew 
the enthusiastic greeting of the nation and government. 

Cervera transhipped from the Ciudad de Cadiz the supplies, 
crews, and artillery of the destroyers, and made an attempt to re- 
pair the boiler tubes of the Ariete, with a view of taking her with 
him if possible. The ships were filled with coal; those of the 
Teresa class taking 1,080 tons each, the Colon 1,270. The de- 
stroyers were given 140 tons, or 34 in excess of their bunker space; 
with this they had, said Cervxra, a theoretical radius of action of 
2,800 miles at 10 knots. "But," he said, "I feel sure that I 
shall have to resupply them before reaching our destination in 
case the state of the sea should not permit me to tow them." 

Numerous telegrams passed between Madrid and the admi- 
ral during the succeeding days, in which he was informed that 
the flying squadron had not left Hampton Roads; that San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, would be advised of signal agreed upon with 
pilot, and that orders had been sent to London to send 5,000 
tons of coal to Cura9ao, which were to be at the disposal of him- 
self and the commandant of Puerto Rico. The minister's last 
telegram was sent April 28: 



126 THE SPANISH-AJNIERICAN WAR 

Hope this will arrive in time. Havana and north of Cuba still 
blockaded. San Juan, Puerto Rico, so far free. No hostile ships in 
European waters. Quiet and harmony reigning in Spain. Reiterate 
enthusiastic greeting of nation. Great activity displayed in fitting 
other ships. 

Cervera's reply, sent April 29, had but the words agreed upon 
as announcing his departure: "Am going north." 



CHAPTER V 

THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 

On April 21 the following ships of the North Atlantic fleet 
were at Key West or in the vicinity: The armored ships New 
York and Iowa outside the reef; the cruisers Marblehead and 
Wilmington anchored betw^een the reef and inner harbor to re- 
peat signals; the monitors Puritan, Terror, and Amphitrite; 
the cruisers Cincinnati, Detroit; the cruiser gun-boats Machias, 
Castine, Nashville, Newport, Helena, Dolphin, and auxiliary 
Mayfloiver; the torpedo-boats Dupont, Porter, Foote, Winslow, 
Gushing, and Ericsson; the armed tugs Leyden, Algonquin, 
Nezinscot, and Samosct; the Fern, and light-house vessel Man- 
grove. The Helena and Dolphin were under repairs. The 
Indiana had gone to Tortugas for coal the night of the 20th and 
returned the night of the 21st, anchoring near the flag-ship. 
Orders had been given to have the Detroit and Machias to take 
the duty of repeating ships on the 22d, and to coal and send out- 
side the reef the Cincinnati, Marblehead, Wilmington, Newport, 
Mayflower, Castine, and Nashville, and then coal the Puritan 
and Terror. 

The difiiculty of communication with Key West was great, 
owing to the small number of tugs available for such constant 
and active service; the use of the torpedo-boats, in addition, 
despite the desire to keep them in thorough order for the emer- 
gency of action, w^as a necessity to that vital element in mili- 
tary preparations or movements — information. This necessity 
continued throughout the war; it was a case of force majeure. 

A memorandum had been prepared some time before in an- 
ticipation of a blockade, and had been distributed to the fleet. 
This was recalled on April 18, and the following, of which the 
more important parts are given, was substituted: 

127 



128 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

U. S. F. S. New York, 
Off Key West, Florida, A'pril 18, 1898. 

2. Until colliers are provided for the squadron only ports on the 
north coast of Cuba will be blockaded. The following distribution 
of the vessels of the squadron is made for that purpose: 

Off Havana: The New York, Iowa, Wilmington, Helena, Dolphin, 
Mayfloioer, Vesuvius, Ericsson, Porter, and auxiliaries to be designated. 

Off Mariel: The Nashville, Castine, and auxiliaries to be desig- 
nated. 

Off Matanzas: The Amphitrite, Cincinnati, Dupont, Winslow, 
and auxiliaries to be designated. 

Off Cardenas: The Newport, Machias, Foote, dishing, and aux- 
iliaries. 

The Indiana, Marhlehead, Detroit, and auxiliaries to be designated 
will form a division for special service. 

The Terror, Mangrove, and Fern will remain at Key West. 

Auxiliaries will be used as despatch-boats. A telegraph operator, 
with instruments, will accompany the fleet. 

The ships detailed for Matanzas and Cardenas will comprise the 
second division. 

The ships intended for special service will form the third division. 

3. It will depend upon circumstances whether the torpedo-boats, 
any or all of them, will accompany the fleet upon its departure from 
Key West. They will, when attached to the fleet, be attached to 
vessels for supplies, towing, etc., as follows: 

Ericsson to the New York; Dupont to the Cincinnati; Porter to the 
Iowa; Winslow to the Amphitrite; Cushing to the Newport; Foote 
to the Machias. 

During the day, and in rough weather at night, torpedo-boats and 
other small vessels will seek shelter, where available, under the ap- 
proval of the senior officer present, guarding with care against surprise 
or attack. 

4. It is my intention to approach within sight of Havana with the 
entire force, and at that time or later to detach by signal the vessels 
designated to blockade INIariel, Matanzas, Cardenas, and for special 
service. The cruising order, upon leaving Key West, is appended. 

5. When signal is made to get under way the vessels inside of the 
reef will weigh and come out at once, without regard to order, and as 
rapidly as the crowded state of the harbor and the safety of navigation 
will permit. 

9. Upon arrival off Havana, or at a later time, the second and 
third divisions will be detached by signal. . . . When a division 
is detached it will be taken in charge of by its senior officer, to whom 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 129 

the vessels comprising it will look for signals. The senior officer will 
at once form his division in column, and will proceed to his station 
without further orders. 

10. The Cincinnati and Nashville will repeat all signals. . . . The 
scouts will repeat signals which affect the torpedo-boats. 

11. On the blockade, during the day, the vessels assigned to each 
port will form a single line of patrol, and will patrol in front of, and 
on either side of the mouth of the port, for a distance sufficient to 
ensure the detection of any vessel attempting to run the blockade. 
The distances between the ships will be equalized, and the line of 
patrol will be established just beyond the range of batteries. 

At night, the vessels will close in around the mouths of the harbor. 
The torpedo-boats will patrol as near the mouth as is safe; the cruisers 
will form a second line of patrol to seaward, and will keep a bright 
lookout to avoid the attack of small vessels armed with torpedoes. 
When the weather and sea will permit, they will send out one or more 
picket-boats on patrol duty. 

When the port is not defended by heavy guns, the blockading ships 
will remam close inshore, observing the same general plan day and 
night. 

During the night all lights will be screened. Every ship or boat will 
display the private signal when approaching another vessel. 

12. ... Vessels will be assigned to their stations by signal from 
the senior officer present. Cruisers, which move in closer at night, will 
be considered as holding their stations on the same bearing from the 
blockaded port, but will somewhat extend their patrol for the purpose 
of better covering the heavy ships in the outside line. 

14. Two Very's red stars fired in rapid succession will indicate 
the discovery of an enemy's or suspicious vessel. If the two red lights 
be immediately followed by a green one, it will indicate the discovery 
of torpedo-boats. The same signal will be employed by all patrolling 
ships and boats. Paragraph 4, Circular Letter No. 5, of April 1, 
1898, is modified accordingly." 

During the forenoon of April 21, a telegram was received 
from the navy department: 

Spanish fleet has left Cape Verdes, destination unknown. 

but this was soon contradicted by information that they had 
banked fires, it being added, however, that Spanish vessels were 
reported off Port au Prince, Hayti. 



130 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

At 4 p. M. came the following: 

Sampson, Key West: 

You are assigned to the command of the U. S. forces on the North 
Atlantic station with the rank of a rear-admiral immediately. 

Long. 

The reception of this telegram was equivalent to information 
that war was declared, inasmuch as under the law the president 
could only make such an assignment in war. This was quickly 
followed by: 

Blockade coast of Cuba immediately from Cardenas to Bahia 
Honda. Blockade Cardenas if it is considered advisable. Issue a 
proclamation of blockade covering the blockaded ports according to 
terms contained in my letter of April 6. Do not bombard. Permit 
neutrals now loading to come out. 

And 

Allow all neutral ships the latest possible hour in which to leave 
Cuba. Give every assistance and facility to foreign representatives 
who desire to leave Cuba. 

Sampson telegraphed his readiness to start and asked if he 
should await additional instructions. At once, however, an 
officer of the staff was sent to all the ships inside the harbor with 
orders to come outside the reef immediately. Lights were placed 
on the buoys, and aided by them and their search-lights, all the 
ships that w^ere ready for duty came out of the harbor before 
daylight of the 22d and lay to in the vicinity of the flag-ship. 

AH available ships were outside the reef and under way at 
4.30 A. M. At 4.58, signal was made, "Form in order of cruis- 
ing," and the fleet was formed in two columns, the Cincinnati and 
lighter ships forming the starboard column, the armored ships 
the port; the torpedo-boats Porter and Dupont, followed by the 
Mayflower and Wilmington, were in advance; the torpedo-boats 
Foote and Winslow on the rear flanks of the column-s. 

The Detroit, which had been advanced to the southw^ard as a 
picket, under the scouting orders previously mentioned, was met 
at 5.30. She was ordered to coal and join the fleet as soon as 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 131 

possible. Shortly before 8, a merchant-steamer was sighted 
standing north, close inshore; as she hoisted Spanish colors, the 
Nashville was ordered to take possession of her and carry her 
into Key West/ 

At 8 the flag of the rear-admiral was hoisted on the New York 
and saluted. 

The Cuban coast, distant from Key West ninety miles, was 
sighted at 3 p. m. Almost at the same time two large steamers 
were sighted to the south and east, standing eastward. It was first 
intended to send the Mayflower to overhaul them, and she was 
signalled to know what speed she could make. A heavy sea, 
however, was running, due to the very fresh trades blowing, and 
the admiral decided that the New York, which, from her size and 
power, was more independent of wind and sea, would more cer- 
tainly and speedily overhaul the ships, which were steaming 
fast in an almost opposite direction. Signal was made to the 
Iowa, "Take command while F [flag] is absent. Stop eight or 
ten miles from Havana." The flag-ship left the column, and 
being under all boilers, with all four engines connected, rapidly 
overhauled the strangers. The first, boarded just at sunset, was 
the Spanish steamer Pedro, bound for Santiago de Cuba, with a 
cargo of which 1,700 tons was rice, supplies which would have 
been later of utmost importance to the beleaguered army at that 
point. A prize crew was put aboard and she was sent into Key 
West.^ Night had fallen before the New York was able to board 
the other, a German ship, which was warned that a blockade 
was about to be established. 

Before this duty had been finished, the fleet had long since 
disappeared to the westward, and nothing of it but an occasional 
column of smoke could be seen in the rapidly darkening western 
sky, which was misty with the haze which accompanies a strong 

' The steamer, the Buenaventura, was condemned, and was sold; the cargo, 
being neutral property and not contraband, was restored to the owners. 
Appeal as to that condemnation was taken to the Supreme Court, and on a 
broad interpretation of Article 4 of the president's proclamation, the previous 
decision was reversed, without, however, allowing damages or costs. For 
the action taken in the prize cases, see Recent Supreme Court Decisions and 
other Opinions and Precedents, Naval War College, 1904; Benton, International 
Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War, 165-178 (with references). 

* The ship and cargo were condemned. 



132 THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 

trade-wind. The flag-ship headed for Havana, but it was not until 
well toward midnight that she picked up the first ship of the fleet, 
which was lying with all lights screened, scattered over many 
miles of a rough and heaving sea. The flag-ship in her search had 
stood well in toward Havana, which was ablaze with its usual 
lights. She repeated frequently the "night letter" made by 
flashing the electric signal lights, without any answer except the 
firing of three guns from one of the Havana batteries, showing 
that a hostile ship had been discovered. It is probable that these 
were fired merely as a signal to those ashore, as no others were 
fired during the night, nor for many days after. Shortly after 
this the lights of the city and that of the light-house on Morro 
Castle were extinguished. Standing westward, some of the ships 
were gradually made out. 

When morning broke with a sea which, as is usual in the re- 
gions of the trades near land, had become calm during the night, 
the fleet was seen scattered east, west, and north; added to it 
was the Marblehead, which had arrived from Key West at early 
daylight. 

The ships were quickly gathered and orders for blockade 
were signalled in accord with the memorandum of April 18,^ the 
Nashville and Castine to Mariel, the Machias and torpedo-boat 
Foote to Cardenas, the Puritan, Cincinnati, Amphitriie, and tor- 
pedo-boats Duj)ont and Winslow to Matanzas, the Newport to 
Cabanas. The ships off Havana were stationed: the New 
York, loiva, and Indiana to the north, the Marblehead north- 
east, the Detroit north-west; the Mayflower, Wilmingioyi, and 
the torpedo-boat Porter to the eastward and well inshore. The 
Terror and Helena, arriving in the afternoon, were sent, the 
former to Cardenas, the latter to the Yucatan channel to inter- 
cept arrivals from Vera Cruz which the admiral had been in- 
formed were to be expected with large supplies for the Spanish 
forces.^ 

The message regarding the expected arrival from Vera Cruz 

• Ante. 128. 

^ The Helena on her passage from Key West had captured the large steamer 
Miguel Jover, bound from New Orleans to Barcelona, laden with cotton. 
She was sent into Key West but was released under the president's procla- 
mation. {Infra, 143.) 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 133 

had been delivered at daylight by the torpedo-boat Ericsson. 
She also brought a telegram, emanating from the hydrographic 
office at New York, that the Spanish transports had sailed from 
the Canaries, April 13, for Havana (a wholly incorrect bit of in- 
formation). As these transports were the convoy of the Spanish 
torpedo-boat flotilla, the message, which stated the information 
as official, had weight with the admiral in the disposition of the 
vessels of the fleet, detaining the expedition which had been 
determined upon, for the cutting of the cables at Guant^namo 
and Santiago, and which, had it gone at this time on this duty, 
would probably have changed very materially the trend of events. 

The Ericsson returned to Key West the same evening with a 
despatch to the navy depar.tment that the blockade of Mariel, 
Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas had been established. 

This misuse of the torpedo-boats was a necessity — a case, as 
said, of force majeure. It was recognized by every one that if 
they were to be kept ready for the work for which they were built, 
they should be carefully nursed rather than knocked about in 
the tossing sea of the Florida channel, but the question of in- 
formation in war is paramount, and any sacrifice must be made 
to this end. There was, in fact, nothing else to use, and thus 
throughout the war these frail craft kept the sea, much as did the 
great ships of the fleet, but with a difference in comfort to their 
crews, both officers and men, which only seamen could appreci- 
ate, but which was borne with a cheerfulness beyond praise. 

It was but a meagre force with which Sampson began a block- 
ade which was necessarily confined to but a limited part of the 
Cuban coast-line of two thousand miles, an extent greater than 
that blockaded on our own coast during the civil war, the opera- 
tions against which occupied the attention of over six hundred 
ships. It was plainly impossible to extend operations for the 
moment beyond the limits laid down by the government, that 
is eastward from Havana as far as Cardenas, eighty-five nautical 
miles, and westward to Bahia Honda, fifty-five miles. There 
were in this distance of a hundred and forty miles, the im- 
portant harbors of Bahia Honda, Cabanas, Mariel, Havana, 
Matanzas, and Cardenas; the next port was Sagua la Grande, 



134 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

still another hundred miles eastward, and this at the moment it 
was impossible to cover. On the south side five hundred and 
fifty statute miles from Havana round by Cape Antonio was 
Cienfuegos, almost as important as a base of supply by its prox- 
imity to Havana by rail, as Havana itself. To blockade this 
completely and efficiently as should have been done, necessitated 
the establishment in the vicinity of a coaling base for ourselves 
by colliers, which, at the moment, we were not prepared for. 

During the afternoon of the 23d a large ship was seen close in- 
shore to the eastward, with the Wihiingfon and Cincinnati ap- 
parently in chase. The flag-ship at once stood in that direc- 
tion; the stranger was evidently a man-of-war, and from the 
distance at which we were looked uncommonly like one of the 
Vizcaya class, the whereabouts of two of which was then un- 
certain. Every ship at hand stood in her direction, and there 
was an animated moment until the Italian colors were made out, 
and it was discovered that she was the Italian cruiser Giovanni 
Bausan. Salutes were exchanged and she proceeded to Ha- 
vana. The Porter shortly after captured the sugar-laden 
schooner Sofia, which was sent into Key West. 

The Morro light was extinguished this evening at 7.30 and a 
powerful search-light, very effective in range and brilliancy, was 
turned onto the blockading ships, giving a startling feeling of 
discovery, though at such a distance it was impossible that the 
reflected light from their hulls should reach back to its origin. 

The armed yacht Hornet joined at 2 the next morning (April 
24), and was assigned to the western end of the Havana blockade. 
At 7 the Detroit came up from the westward with the Spanish 
steamer Catalina of 6,000 tons, laden with cotton from New 
Orleans to Barcelona.* The Dupont and Wilmington had also 
each captured sugar-laden schooners during the night, and several 
more such small craft were seized during the next few days, until 
coasting traffic entirely ceased. 

Telegrams were received in the evening of April 24 that the 
Spanish steamers Alicante and Montscrrat, the latter with 800 
troops aboard, had left St. Pierre, Martinique, the day before 
* She was sent into Key West, but released. 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 135 

(April 23), destination unknown but believed by the consul to be 
Cuba, and also that the American mail-steamer Allianga was 
due to pass Cape Maysi at nightfall of Sunday (April 30), on 
her passage from Colon to New York. The admiral was au- 
thorized to take steps to protect her, but Cape Maysi was 500 
miles away, the Allianga was fast, the time was to be night; the 
admiral knew that no Spanish gun-boat had her speed, and he 
rightly took no steps to render such useless assistance, the de- 
mand for which came, no doubt, from over-timid owners. He 
telegraphed the navy department the distribution of the ships 
already given, adding: 

Special service division Indiana, Detroit, Marblehead, Mangrove, and 
Algonquin being kept for more close blockade of Havana until the 
arrival of the Spanish transports and supply-vessels, after which they 
will proceed for coal to Key West, Dry Tortugas, and thence proceed at 
once to Guantanamo [and] Santiago de Cuba, to cut cables. Man- 
grove fully prepared. I shall blockade Bahia Honda as soon as Eagle 
and Hornet arrive. The greatest attention should be paid imme- 
diate need of colliers. Special service division [intended for cable- 
cutting at Santiago] would be quite independent if they could have 
one with them. 

A telegram was also sent to the bureau of supplies and ac- 
counts requesting two fresh-provision supply-ships w^th cold- 
storage facilities to make regular trips between the fleet and 
some northern port. 

The first of the telegrams mentioned as received this day con- 
veyed information of special importance. It was in error re- 
garding the Alicante,^ but the surmise respecting the Montserrat 
proved true. This ship, one of the finest of the Spanish Tras- 
atlantica line, was reported as carrying a large quantity of stores 
for the troops and ammunition and guns for the Havana defences, 
besides a large sum of specie. She was armed and fast; in every 
respect an important prize. The admiral at once took steps 
to intercept her, judging correctly that her port was Cienfuegos. 

* This ship arrived at Fort de France, Martinique, in company with the 
Montserrat, April 23, 1898. She was supposed by the consul, Mr. Darte, to 
have been a hospital-ship laden with supplies. She remained at Fort de 
France throughout the war, leaving August 4, under a safe-conduct to Santiago 
de Cuba, to convey sick and wounded Spanish soldiers to Cadiz. 



136 THE SPANISH-AIVIERICAN WAR 

It was thought that the Marblehead with the Nashville in com- 
pany would be able to reach Cienfuegos, 480 sea-miles distant, 
before the Montserrat could cover the 1,200 between that port 
and Martinique, despite the handicap of the latter's nearly two 
days' start. But the Marblehead was not able to get away until the 
next morning (April 25) when, at 9, she left, accompanied, in ad- 
dition to the Nashville, by the fast armed yacht Eagle, which 
had arrived from Key West at 8 A. M. The Nashville was picked 
up off Mariel, and the little squadron proceeded at its best speed. 

Next morning, however (April 26), at 3.45 A. M., the Marble- 
head and Eagle ran on to one of the shoals of the dangerous 
Colorado reef which skirts the whole of the western end of Cuba, 
from Bahia Honda to Cape Antonio.^ The Marblehead got off 
at 9.55 A. M., but they did not succeed in releasing the Eagle from 
the intricate channel into which she had run until 3.50 p. m. and 
all three were going ahead again at 4.15. 

This delay, however, had no bearing upon the result; the 
Montserrat had already, at noon of the same day, reached Cien- 
fuegos, where she remained until May 6. Carrying so much of 
warlike value, her escape was, naturally, a great gratification to 
Spaniards both in Spain and Cuba. The rejoicings were extreme 
and the captain was much lionized in Havana and on his re- 
turn home. 

The only chance of capture was in the almost immediate re- 
ception of the information which had been sent to Washington 
very promptly by the consul at St. Pierre. She had left Fort de 
France the night of the 23d, the information reached the admiral 
the evening of the 24th; the only available ship at hand, with a 
good battery, was the Marblehead. Had she been able to leave 
at once, there would have been a chance; or had it been possible 
to divert the flag-ship temporarily, the capture, with her high 
speed, would have been a certainty. This diversion was, how- 
ever, scarcely possible in the circumstances. 

• This accident was caused by the deflection of the steering compass of the 
Marblehead through the quartermaster's having arranged a small screen of sheet 
tin of a few square inches to screen the binnacle light of the steering compass. 
The iron in this piece was sufficient to cause a serious error. So sensitive 
is the compass that men at the wheel are not allowed to have any steel objects 
of any kind, as knives, etc., about them. 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 137 

Commander McCalla, who had become convinced, on account 
of his grounding, of the futility of attempting to intercept the 
Monfserrat, did not immediately go off Cienfuegos. He boarded 
and warned a number of foreign vessels of the blockade and 
sought for the Silvertown bank, south-east of Cienfuegos, across 
which he hoped to find the cable to Santiago. He thus did not 
arrive off Cienfuegos until the morning of April 29/ 

Shortly thereafter a torpedo gun-boat, believed to be the 
Galicia,^ ventured out of the bay as far as Cocos Point, a mile 
within the entrance, but soon returned. Smoke sighted to the 
westward proved to be that of the coasting steamer Argonauto, 
from Bataban6 to Cienfuegos and Santiago. On seizure she was 
found to have on board among her passengers eight Spanish 
officers and eight soldiers. Along with a general cargo, she 
was laden with provisions, Mauser rifles, and ammunition. A 
prize crew was put aboard from the Nashville, with Ensign 
Kuenzli in charge, and her civilian passengers with their baggage 
were sent into Cienfuegos in two of her boats. Shots later were 
exchanged with the torpedo gun-boat, which twice ventured as 
far as Cocos Point, over the lowland of which her smoke could be 
seen. A battery, supposedly of field-guns, and some infantry 
at the light-house, also opened fire, with, however, no result. 

At 5 P. M. April 29, Commander McCalla, under the necessity 
of coaling, left with all his ships for the blockade off Havana. 

While in the vicinity of Cienfuegos McCalla received infor- 

* The very remarkable bay of Cienfuegos, one of the most typical of Cuba, 
is practically a large lake eight nautical miles in length and from two to three 
in breadth. Its main axis is north- west to south-east; it affords anchorage 
for large ships in almost every part. Midway on the eastern shore is the 
town of Cienfuegos, named from a former captain-general of Cuba. The 
bay is connected with the sea by a channel two and three-quarters nautical 
miles in length, which, starting from the south-west corner, goes south-west for 
three-quarters of a mile and thence turning at Point Pasacaballos goes south- 
south-east. The easterly point at the broad entrance, Point de los Colorados, 
has a light-house. The depth of water in the channel is from seventeen to 
twenty-eight fathoms. Opposite Point Pasacaballos is the antique castle of 
Our Lady of the Angels of Xagua (the Indian name of the bay). Shipping 
in the harbor can be seen from outside, from aloft, as was established by 
Commander Dayton in the Detroit on July 10, 1898. {Infra.) Map, p. 267. 

* This was an error; the Galicia was never able to leave port. The gun-boat 
was the Vasco Nunez de Balboa. 



138 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

mation that but one line of torpedoes had been laid, and these 
just north of Point Pasacaballos, and that there was no inten- 
tion of placing any farther out; also that there were some 6- and 
8-inch modern guns on hand not yet mounted, though a new 
battery could be seen north-north-west of the castle of Los 
Angeles, in which there seemed to be mounted two large guns; 
he also heard that there were in the harbor two old gun-boats 
besides the Galicia and eleven armed steam-launches. 

The Dolphin, from Key West, had joined the flag at 9 A. M. of 
the 25th, and was sent off to Bahia Honda; the Hawk reported 
at 11.30 and was stationed at the western end of the Havana 
blockade. At about 5 p. m. of this day, a steamer was reported 
by the signalmen of the New York in the north-east, which 
turned out to be the Panama, of whose departure from New 
York with contraband the admiral had been warned by the navy 
department in a telegram of April 23. The Indiana, which had 
been standing from that direction toward the flag-ship, had her 
attention called to this stranger and at once turned about for her, 
but before she was well on her way, the armed light-house vessel 
Mangrove, on her way from the Matanzas blockade to Key West 
for coal, had brought her to. A prize crew was put aboard by 
the Indiana (the Mayigrove with her crew of twenty-eight having 
no men to spare for such purposes), and she was taken into Key 
West.^ 

The flag-ship, on observing that the Mangrove had already 
made sure of the seizure of the Panama, stood for a ship coming 
out of Havana, which proved to be the British ship Lucilene, 
bound for Bermuda and Philadelphia. The captain very foolishly 
stood on, disregarding two shots fired across his bows as a signal 

' The Panama had left New York on April 20 with a large cargo and twenty- 
nine passengers, all Spanish except one Frenchman. With a species of 
Oriental fatalism which belongs to the race, no effort seems to have been 
made to avoid the blockading squadron, even by awaiting nightfall. The 
ship was finally condemned, the case turning upon the fact that she was 
armed. This armament, two 9-cm. guns, a Maxim, twenty Remingtons, 
and ten Mausers, had been placed aboard three years before, under the usual 
contract of the Trasatlantica company with the Spanish government, by 
which they could be taken over by the latter for war purposes. (See United 
States Reports, vol. 175, 535; also Naval War College, International Law, 
1904, "Recent Supreme Court Decisions.") 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 139 

to heave to, and his failure to heed such warning might have 
had serious consequences had not his better sense come to his aid. 
She had on board a large number of refugees, who, from their 
continuous cheering, were evidently pleased to get away from 
the blockaded city. 

This same evening the gun-boats Vicente Yafiez Pinzdn and 
the Marques de Molins are reported by a Havana journal to 
have made an excursion outside the harbor, and to have remained 
some time "near the enemy's ships." "These," says the Diario 
de la Marina of April 26, "seeing the decision of our sailors, and 
that they w^ere directing toward them, disappeared somewhat 
from view amongst their other ships. Our gun-boats, which 
proudly flew the Spanish ensign, moved about majestically at 
some distance from land and almost beyond the range of the 
shore batteries. At nightfall and after having reconnoitred the 
shore where the Cojimar and Chorrera batteries are established, 
they returned to port." Whatever the extent of their short cruise, 
it was not observed from the flag-ship, busied, in the fall of the 
night, with the Panama and Lucilene, nor was any report made 
by other ships of their venture; a failure to see which is not at 
all surprising, as it is extremely difficult to distinguish a ship, 
even at a moderate distance, w^ith a background of high land. 

Anxiety was expressed in a letter only now received from 
the navy department, dated April 20, regarding the telegraph 
line between Key West and Charlotte Harbor, Fla., which 
throughout this distance was laid in the shoal waters of southern 
Florida, and thus easily disturbed. These waters were fre- 
quented by the Havana fishing-vessels, and it was apprehended 
that some of these might be employed for such a purpose. The 
admiral was directed to send a light-draft vessel to Charlotte 
Harbor, so that in case the line should be cut, the government 
could communicate. The department was informed that the 
revenue cutter McLane had been patrolling these waters since the 
14th. A letter of the same date (April 20) stated that the navy 
must convoy army transports conveying troops from New Or- 
leans, Mobile, and Tampa to Cuba, and that as vessels would 
be detailed from the squadron this fact should, while making 
arrangements for the blockade, be borne in mind. 



140 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

On the morning of the 26th the flag-ship stood eastward along 
shore on a tour of observation ; parties of cavalry were observed 
along shore, but no demonstration was made. When some thirty 
miles east of Havana, the flag-ship was communicated with by 
the armed yacht Honiet, which had on board a lieutenant of 
infantry, Juan del Pino, and private Manuel Martinez, whose 
names are worth mentioning as those of the first prisoners of the 
war. The lieutenant had been on his way from his post at Santa 
Cruz, to Matanzas, to visit his wife, who had lately given birth to 
a boy, and the father, under the circumstances, was naturally 
desirous to see the two. His boat had been seized by the Am- 
phitrite on the 25th, and the two men were transferred to the 
Hornet for transportation to the flag-ship. Both were in a state 
of trepidation when received aboard, but they were treated with 
kindness, fed well, and landed near by, after the signing by Lieu- 
tenant del Pino of a parole not to serve farther during the war. 
It so happened that as they were preparing to leave, a tug arrived 
alongside with the men who had been sent to Key West as a 
prize crew in the Pedro, among whom were five marines. As 
these men arrived on deck and were formed with their arms at an 
order, the fright of the private was extreme. He clearly thought 
that he had certainly been brought on deck to be shot. He was, 
however, soon reassured and left happy. 

As already noted, it had been intended to send a special di- 
vision eastward, with Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, as senior 
oflficer, to destroy the telegraphic connections of Cuba, which, 
with the exception of the Havana-Key W^est cable, centred about 
Santiago. Guantdnamo (forty miles east of Santiago, and six 
hundred miles distant from Havana), where the French cable 
left the island, was to be the point of first attempt. As early 
as April 8, Sampson had telegraphed to the navy department 
asking that materials for grappling submarine cables be sent by 
the first vessel joining him from New York. Information had 
also been asked, by telegram of April 16, as to the landing-place 
at Guantanamo, and requesting all instructions possible as to 
methods of lifting and destroying the cables. As nothing ar- 
rived from the north, the admiral was thrown on the very moderate 
resources at Key W'est. A large winch fitted on board the Mari' 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 141 

grove and the well-worn cables used by the telegraphic company 
for service in Florida waters were appropriated. The Marble' 
head, Detroit, the armed tug Algonquin, and the Mangrove were 
to form part of the expedition under Captain Taylor. 

On the 26th the Indiana went to Tortugas to fill with coal, 
the Mangrove being already there and the Marblehead expected 
to join as soon as she should return from Cienfuegos. Sampson 
had asked for a collier to accompany the expedition so that it 
might be independent of a distant base. During the day, how- 
ever, a telegram arrived by the Algonquin: "Telegraph cables 
must not be interfered with until further orders." The admiral 
at once sent a telegram by the Detroit, to be despatched from Key 
West, asking if this referred to those on the south side also, with 
the following memorandum of instructions to her commanding 
oflBcer: 

Upon your arrival at Key West wire Captain Taylor the substance 
of the despatch from the navy department and direct him to await 
at Tortugas the secretary's reply. Direct the telegraph censor at 
Key West to have all cipher despatches for me sent to you without 
delay. If the reply to my telegram to the navy department is "Yes," 
the plans for the expedition will be entirely off and you will direct the 
Indiana and Mangrove to rejoin the blockade at Havana and you will 
also rejoin it with your own ship. Should the answer be negative, the 
expedition will proceed. Should it be discretionary, transmit it to 
Captain Taylor and direct him to use his judgment. 

A telegram was received the same day announcing that two 
Spanish steamers, the Pio Nono and the Maria Herrera, had 
arrived at Vera Cruz, and that the Villa Verde had cleared 
from there on the 24th with a valuable cargo of provisions for 
Havana. 

During the early morning of the 27th a letter was received on 
board the flag-ship from Captain Harrington, of the PuritaUf 
and senior officer off Matanzas, stating that the enemy were 
busily engaged in the construction of some new earthworks on 
the western side of the entrance at Gorda Point. The admiral, 
determining to observe for himself the state of things, left the 
Havana blockade at 10.40 and arrived off Matanzas shortly 
before 1 o'clock, finding the Puritan and Cincinnati. The flag- 



142 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ship stood in toward the batteries and on discovering the new 
works opened fire against them at 12.50, the first shot of the war 
by the navy being fired from the port 8-inch gun (in broadside) by 
Naval Cadet Boone. This gun was selected for the honor on 
account of the extreme rivalry between the crews of the two tur- 
rets, which was so intense that it was considered advisable not to 
give the first gun to either. 

The new battery as well as the old opened a weak fire, but their 
shells passed over harmlessly. The Puritan and Cincinnati 
asked permission to open fire, and for some minutes there was a 
brisk cannonade, which tore up the ground in and about the earth- 
work, apparently with great effect as far as the work itself was 
concerned. Later we learned that no men were injured. 

The action was a mere reconnaissance and had no object 
beyond the sudden determination to stop the building of the 
new works and to give the men some gun practice, for which 
there could not have been a better opportunity. Here was 
demonstrated for the first time the uselessness of the monitor 
in a rough sea, such as was running at the time. Some of the 
Puritan's 12-inch shells fell but a few hundred yards from the 
ship, though the gun had been laid against the eastern battery 
between two and three miles distant. It was a striking instance 
of the effect of the extremely rapid oscillation of this class of ves- 
sel, which makes any surety of gun-practice mere chance. It 
was the beginning of the doom, in naval estimation, of the moni- 
tors as sea-going fighting-ships.^ 

' However excellent in harbors (and in smooth waters they have most 
valuable qualities), the strongest advocates of the monitor had to yield to the 
experience in the campaign in the Caribbean, and grant to the battle-ship, 
which is but the logical development of the monitor, far higher qualities 
as a sea fighting machine. The battle-ship, besides having the general good 
qualities of the monitor, has also those of habitability and comfort, with the 
increased health and vigor to the crew accompanying such qualities, the im- 
portance and value of which are beyond estimation: it has further the capa- 
bility of high speed, which the monitor has not. The writer would repeat a 
previously expressed opinion that the monitor is a floating hell in discomfort 
in such operations as those in the West Indies, and no government is justified 
in subjecting its servants to the torture which their crews must have under- 
gone in such waters (and most heroically and uncomplainingly) so long 
as it is able to supply what, in the practically unanimous estimation of the 
naval world, is a far better ship. 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 143 

The New York returned off Havana during the afternoon, 
having instructed the senior officer off Matanzas to not allow 
further work on the batteries. The Terror, off Cardenas, had 
captured during the morning the large Spanish steamer Guido, 
bound for Havana with provisions; having also seized the day 
before the small steamer Ambrosia Bolivar, attempting to run 
from Gibara to Havana with provisions and some seventy thou- 
sand Spanish silver dollars, worth the same as Spanish paper 
— about fifty per cent the value of gold coinage. 

During the evening the tug Tecumseh, which had arrived from 
Key West the day before, came alongside the flag-ship and re- 
ported herself as sinking. Naval Constructor Hobson, who had 
been attached to the flag-ship for the purpose of looking after the 
repairs of the fleet, was sent on board to report. He shortly 
returned, reporting the cause as the opening out of a plate in the 
wake of the boiler compartment while watering alongside the 
New York in the rough sea, but thought the vessel might be kept 
afloat sufficiendy long to take her into Key West, as they were 
able to control the leak to some degree. He asked permission to 
go in her to superintend repairs, and in a few minutes she left, 
with considerable uncertainty in all minds as to the outcome. 
The instance is an example of the readiness of Hobson to under- 
take any duty, and though the present one perhaps did not offer 
anything worse than a recourse from the sinking ship to small 
boats in a rough sea, it is indicative of the thorough courage 
which is his possession by nature, and which he showed in many 
ways during his career aboard the flag-ship. One of the press 
boats fortunately was going to Key West, and offered to accom- 
pany the Tecumseh, so that any fear of actual danger to the crew 
was removed. 

During the day was received a telegram conveying the procla- 
mation of the president, announcing the declaration of war. It 
was as follows: 



Whereas, by an act of Congress approved April 26, 1898, it is de- 
clared that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of 
April, A.D. 1898, including said day, between the United States of 
America and the Kingdom of Spain; and 



144 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon 
principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned 
by their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy 
of this government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere 
to the rules of the Declaration of Paris: 

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United 
States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Consti- 
tution and the laws, do hereby declare and proclaim: 

1. The neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, with the exception 
of contraband of war; 

2. Neutral goods, contraband of war, are not liable to confisca- 
tion under the enemy's flag; 

3. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; 

4. Spanish merchant vessels in any ports or places within the 
United States shall be allowed till May 31, 1898, inclusive, for loading 
their cargoes and departing from such ports or places, and such Span- 
ish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be 
permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of their papers, 
it shall appear that their cargoes were taken on board before the ex- 
piration of the above term, provided that nothing herein contained shall 
apply to Spanish vessels having on board any officer in the military or 
naval service of the enemy, or any coal, except such as may be neces- 
sary for their voyage, or any other article prohibited or contraband of 
war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish government; 

5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21st, 1898, 
shall have sailed from any foreign port, or place in the United States, 
shall be- permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her 
cargo, and afterwards, forthwith, to depart without molestation, and 
any such vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be 
permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded ; 

6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for the 
rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not to be inter- 
fered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of 
law, in respect to contraband of blockade. 

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal 
of the United States to be affixed. 

Done at the city of Washington on the 26th day of April, in the year 
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the 
Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second. 

William McKinley. 
By the President: 

John Sherman, Secretary of State. 

The United States government thus finally accepted the 
Declaration of Paris (185G) in full, from which it had withheld 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 145 

assent unless with the abolition of privateering should be coupled 
the exemption of private property from capture unless contra- 
band/ 

Spain, on April 23, also issued a decree, embodying the second, 
third, and fourth of the articles of the Declaration of Paris (the 
first, second, and third of President McKinley's proclamation), 
but declined to be bound by the first, which abolished privateers. 
While maintaining her right to commission these, it was declared 
that she would now organize from the merchant marine a service 
of "auxiliary cruisers of the war marine," to be subject to the 
statutes and jurisdiction of the naval forces,^ thus following 
practically the example of the United States. At no time during 
the war did she issue letters of marque. 

The United States government rules were, however, notably 
more liberal than those of Spain in dealing with enemy mer- 
chant shipping at the outbreak of war. Thirty days from April 
21 were allowed under article five, whereas Spain gave but five 
from April 24. Article Five of the proclamation was also, it may 
be said, liberally construed, so that Spanish merchant-vessels 
which had already left American ports were included in the 
immunity.^ 

The admiral also on this date, calculating that the Marble- 
head and her consorts had reached Cienfuegos, sent the follow- 
ing telegram to the navy department: 

Blockade of Cienfuegos commences to-day. Cannot continue unless 
colliers are sent before supply approaches exhaustion. 

In fact, as seen by Commander McCalla's report, all three ships 
were obliged to leave for Key West the 29th for coal, a striking 
instance of the necessity of having a supply immediately under 

* President Pierce's annual message December 2, 1856. Messages and 
Documents, V, 412. 

* Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900, 157. 

' Instructions to blockading vessels and cruisers, drafted by Lieutenant 
(now Rear-Admiral) Staunton, assistant chief of staff, covering the various 
questions which generally arise in the circumstances, were issued by Admiral 
Sampson on April 27. These, but slightly modified, by the state department, 
appear in General Order No. 10, Report of the Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 
Appendix, 168-170. 



146 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

one's lee, and the want of which made the blockade of Cienfuegos 
largely inoperative for the greater part of the W'ar. 

The Spaniards in this short period had already lost a number 
of fine steamers. The capture of the Buenaventura, Pedro, 
Catalina, Miguel Jover, Panama, Argonauta, and Guido, within 
a week, was a very serious injury to their mercantile marine and 
formed a very considerable percentage of the whole. The squad- 
ron was also active in picking up the small vessels engaged in 
coasting traffic, and in the fisheries of the Campeche bank. 
Though this may seem small work, such measures are necessary 
in war as part of any scheme of blockade, which, as in this in- 
stance, particularly aimed to prevent further supplies reaching 
forces which were known already to have no surplus supplies of 
food. Several fishing-schooners were released after their cargoes 
were thrown overboard, but the admiral, in doubt as to the pro- 
priety of such release, telegraphed to the navy department: 

I find that a large number of fishing-schooners are attempting to get 
into Havana from their fishing-grounds near the Florida reefs and 
coast. They are generally manned by excellent seamen belonging to 
the maritime inscription of Spain, who have already served in the 
Spanish navy and who are liable to further service. As these trained 
men are naval reserves and have a semi-military character and would 
be most valuable to the Spaniards as artillerymen either afloat or 
ashore, I recommend that they be detained as prisoners of war, and 
should be authorized to deliver them to the commanding army ofiicer 
at Key West. 

His suggestions were approved by a telegram from the navy 
department, dated April 30, but not received until May 2, as 
follows : 

Spanish fishing-vessels attempting to violate the blockade are sub- 
ject to capture with crews, and any such vessel or crew likely to aid the 
enemy may be detained.' 

* The final outcome of this action was of an extraordinary character. In 
accord with the navy department's instructions, which would seem suffi- 
ciently explicit, a number of these vessels were sent into Key West. They 
were adjudged prize by the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida. Appeal was made to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, where the decision was reversed and the vessels restored. The de- 
cision of the Supreme Court was written by Associate- Justice Gray. (JJ. S. 
Reports, 175, p. 677.) 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 147 

Information was received April 28 that the Mianionomoh, on 
her way to join the fleet, had arrived at Charleston; that the 
transport Panther had left April 22 for Hampton Roads, with a 
battalion of 635 marines, whence she would go to Key West under 
convoy of the cruiser Montgomery; and that the Resolute would go 
to Newport, R. I., April 30, to receive mines requested by the ad- 
miral for countermining purposes in Cuban ports. It was or- 
dered that on the arrival of the Resolute at Key West, as she had 
accommodations for a thousand men, the marines should be 
transferred to her and that she would remain with the squadron 
as a marine transport, the Panther going north to fit as an aux- 
iliary cruiser. The Newport, with a captured schooner, and 
the Puritan, from Matanzas, went to Key West for coal. The 
Fern arrived at Key West with ammunition for the fleet from 
Tampa. 

The admiral, on account of a report received of rough treat- 
ment of the prisoners in the numerous prizes now in the harbor 
of Key West, requested that the harbor be placed under the con- 
trol of the commandant of the station, who should have an efficient 
assistant for affairs afloat. The result of this was the appoint- 

While the present writer has the utmost respect for the ability and learning 
of this eminent judge, he cannot think his treatment of this case wholly logical. 
No one of his citations covering liberty to fish (and they extend back to 
the time of Henry IV of England, 1403) was analogous to the situation 
off Cuba. While there were seizures made in the North Sea by the British 
at the end of the eighteenth, and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the 
general rule is that fishermen are not subject to capture. But in every case 
cited by Associate Justice Gray, the fishermen were furnishing food to a 
whole people and not to besieged places. The Havana vessels were furnishing 
food to a beleaguered army; beleaguered by sea by the fleet, practically by land 
by the insurgents, to the extent at least that food was not obtainable from 
the surrounding country. Their only ports were those so blockaded. The 
cutting off of the food supply of an enemy so situated has always been rec- 
ognized as a military duty and as an important element in the reduction of a 
fortress. This of itself demanded at least their detention. The fact that their 
crews were reservists of the Spanish navy, trained men who undoubtedly 
would have been utilized in the Havana defence, was an additional reason 
of equal or perhaps greater weight. The writer is convinced that had the 
learned judge been commander-in-chief off Havana, he would have at least 
detained the vessels and crews for the period of the war. This perhaps was 
the action that should have been taken. But as the case stood, the fishing- 
vessels seized and condemned were intending to violate a blockade and carry 
food to a besieged enemy. 



148 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

ment of Commodore George C. Remey as commandant of Key 
West as a naval base, and the following letter: 

Washixgtox, April 28, 1898. 

Sir: The department has decided to send you two commodores, to 
serve under your orders, the senior to command the naval base at Key 
West, which will include the naval establishments on shore and all the 
vessels in the harbor permanently and those that at any time may 
enter. 

In a general way his duty will be to see that the ships of your squad- 
ron are coaled, provisioned, and supplied with ammunition speedily, 
and that any repairs on them which have been authorized by you are 
pressed with all the despatch possible with the facilities on the ships 
themselves and at the station on shore. It will also be his duty to see 
that the coaling and provision facilities are maintained in a most effec- 
tive condition and by the best methods practicable; and the same with 
the arrangements regarding the furnishing of ammunition. He is, in 
fact, to maintain a general command over the Key West station, but is 
entirely under your orders. This control on his part will extend to 
Tortugas. One of his most important duties will be to complete each 
vessel that you send him or that comes into his station as quickly as 
possible and return her to you. 

The present commandant at the Key West naval station will con- 
tinue to execute the duties which he is already -charged with, but of 
course subject to the orders of the commodore who commands the 
whole base. 

The junior commodore' sent you is to be employed in the squadron 
operating on the coast of Cuba or in the general neighborhood. You 
will assign him a ship on which to hoist his pennant and will charge 
him with such duties suitable to his rank as you may think best. 
The object of sending him is to assist you in the military duties de- 
volving upon you in connection with the squadron of operations. 
This officer may of course be sent on any detached expedition or on the 
south side of the island of Cuba, or where it seems to you most ex- 
pedient to have him go. 

If for any reason you should be obliged to be absent from the sta- 
tion, the senior of these two officers will succeed to temporary com- 
mand. Very respectfully, 

John'D. Long, Secretary. 

The following telegram was received, dated Washington, 

April 26: 

' Commodore John C. Watson was appointed; he later was ordered to 
command the squadron destined for the East in case Admiral Camara's 
squadron had continued its voyage. 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 149 

Your orders do not prevent the use of a few vessels to scour both 
coasts of Cuba, capturing and destroying Spanish men-of-war. Use 
your judgment in the matter (of) monitors accompanying. While the 
department does not wish to bombard forts protected by heavy guns, 
it must be left to your discretion to destroy light batteries that may 
protect vessels. If you desire to attack you can do so if without ex- 
posure to heavy guns. 

In the early morning of the 29th the Indiana, Detroit, and 
Mangrove returned from Tortugas, the Indiana signalling: 

No further message from the department respecting the cutting of 
cables, therefore have returned with the Detroit and Mangrove. 

On the afternoon of the 29th, the flag-ship, accompanied by 
the torpedo-boat Porter, stood westward as far as Cabanas, thirty- 
five miles from Havana, wdth a general view to note the several 
points at which it was thought possible to land an army. The 
charming landscape of the region which rises a little west of 
Mariel into most picturesque hills, w^iich a little further become 
a series of rugged mountains, was marred at every few miles by 
the scarred and blackened walls, which were all that was left of 
the splendid centres of the great sugar estates of the region. 
These had to be seen to have a realization of the sad destruction 
wrought by the ruthless orders of Gomez during the strife of the 
past two years. At several points were small ancient fortifica- 
tions, and here and there signs of a Spanish military post. Look- 
ing into Mariel, a bay of the usual bottle-like conformation so 
peculiar to Cuba, were seen two small gun-boats, one well within 
range, the other at the town, some three miles from the entrance 
of the bay. The near one quickly lifted her anchor and skurried 
townward without any molestation on our part, the admiral 
humorously remarking, in reply to an inquiry as to whether a 
shot should not be fired at her, " She is too little." While lying 
quietly, just before sunset, about a mile and a half off Cabanas, 
musketry was heard, and looking ashore were seen from the 
water's edge of a neighboring knoll the flashes of a number of 
rifles, which it was seen were fired by some dismounted cavalry 
A 4-inch gun was turned on them with the result of a hast) 



150 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

mounting and skurrying for shelter. The flag-ship and her com- 
panion returned the same evening to the blockade off Havana. 

The few days which the blockade had lasted had already made 
clear certain facts, the most prominent of which was that ships 
on the north shore west of Cardenas must return to Key West 
in order to coal, and that even at Cardenas, with some lee under 
the keys from the heavy sea of the trades, it was very difficult to 
coal from a collier. The other two important points were that 
our ships were very deficient in fresh-water supply, and that 
torpedo-boats were wholly unfit for the rough service to wdiich 
they were being applied. They had been holding their own with 
hearty goodwill along shore, doing scouting work close in, which 
would have been admirable had there been anything to look 
after, but the short, heavy sea produced by a strong trade blow- 
ing east at from two to three knots an hour, knocked them about 
in a way which called for much greater strength of structure, and 
which must have made life almost unendurable to those aboard. 
The qualification of the "almost" is used; though no complaints 
ever came from the unfortunate officers and men aboard, it was 
evident that they were enduring more than those in the great 
floating fortresses, which they were attending, thought possible. 

But their speed was too tempting not to use them as despatch- 
vessels, and several were kept running between the blockading 
squadron and Key W^est until warning came through complete 
break-down of several of the weaker. 

The squadron had begun to feel the monotony of the block- 
ade, the smaller ships were running out of coal and already a 
considerable number had been obliged to go in to Key West, and 
by May 2, the Cincinnati, Puritan, Terror, Detroit, Hawk, 
Hornet, Mangrove, and the torpedo-boats Cushing, Dupont, and 
Windoio, were included. 

The boilers of the Cincinnati had almost completely given out. 
She had, of course, done a great deal of steaming during her com- 
mission on the South Adantic station, and in her return north. 
She was ordered to Norfolk for the necessary work, and the ad- 
miral telegraphed asking that workmen be sent to Key WVst 
instead, where, while repairing by workmen to be sent from the 
north, she could act as station ship and be an effective defence 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 151 

with her powerful battery of 5-inch quick-firing guns; but this 
was refused. Several things occurred, however, to detain her 
until some time later, and she finally did not arrive at Norfolk 
until June 3. 

On April 30 the Amphitrite resumed her station off Matanzas. 
This same day a telegram was received that the St. Louis and 
Harvard had left New York that day to scout for Spanish fleet 
as follows: The Harvard on a line from 15° 38' N. and 59° 4f 
W., to 14° 25' N. and 59° 30' W., and to touch at Martinique on 
May 10 if no information had been received in the meantime; 
the St. Louis on a line from 16° 55' N. and 59° 50' W., to 15° 
38' N. and 59° 40' W., and to touch at Guadeloupe on May 10 
if no information had been received. 

A letter was also received from the department stating the 
conditions under which Miss Clara Barton, the representative 
of the National Red Cross Association, had gone to Key West, 
and directing that she be afforded every facility for distributing 
the supplies carried by the State of Texas to reconcentrados at 
either Matanzas or Cardenas or both, taking care that none fall 
into the hands of the Spanish army. The admiral also received 
the somewhat belated news that the Montgomery had left Norfolk 
on the 27th for Key West, in company with the Panther, carry- 
ing the marine battalion of 647 officers and men, under Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, taken on board at the New York 
Navy Yard whence they had sailed April 22 for Hampton Roads. 
Leaving there April 26 they had already arrived at Key West 
on April 29, where they had at once gone into camp on the beach 
some two miles east of the town.^ 

' The battalion was formed of six companies, one of which was an artillery 
company having four 3-inch rapid-fire guns, received from the ordnance 
department, navy yard, New York. The following was the organization of 
the battalion: 

Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, commanding; Major P. C. Pope (de- 
tached from the battalion at Key West); Major H. C. Cochrane; First Lieuten- 
ant H. L. Draper, adjutant; Captain C. L. McCawlej'', A. Q. M., quartermaster; 
Surgeon John M. Edgar, United States Navy, surgeon; First Sergeant Henry 
Good, sergeant-major; First Sergeant W. J. Limerick, quartermaster-sergeant. 
Company A: Captain Allan C. Kelton, First Lieutenant F. J. Moses, Second 
Lieutenant L. J. Magill. Company B: Captain B. R. Russell, First Lieutenant 
C. L. A. Ingate, Second Lieutenant M. J. Shaw. Company C: Captain G. F. 



152 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Further information was also received regarding the Spanish 
steamer Villavcrde, reporting that forty car-loads of supplies 
had been placed aboard her at Vera Cruz by the Spanish pa- 
triotic association of Mexico, and that she was expected to sail 
on the 29th. 

Sampson, knowing the desire of the government to keep in 
touch with the insurgent leaders, now sent Mr. Sylvester Scovel, 
the World correspondent, who volunteered for the duty, to com- 
municate with General Gomez, writing him on April 30 a letter 
asking to be informed as to his ideas concerning co-operation 
and his needs as to arms, munitions, and supplies in general. 
Scovel was to go east in the torpedo-boat Porter, Lieutenant Fre- 
mont, and land at some point near Caibarien, which is some 
two hundred miles by sea east of Havana. 

At the moment when the Porter was near the flag-ship, her 
commander receiving his final instructions, Mr. Seppings 
Wright, an English artist employed by the London Illustrated 
Neics, came aboard and presented his credentials. Hearing the 
mention of the Porter's duty, he at once asked permission to go, 
and within five minutes was over the flag-ship's side, taking as 
quick a leap into the unexpected and unknown as probably ever 
fell to a newspaper correspondent. 

The Porter was off Caibarien the next morning; sighted two 
Spanish gun-boats, which withdrew, and was piloted in the shallow 
and intricate waters of the approach by Fremont himself, the 
Cuban pilot engaged showing himself useless. Landing Scovel 
and Wright at Point Caguanes, the Porter left for the Havana 
blockade uninterrupted by any of the five Spanish vessels known 
to be in the vicinity. The two adventurers ashore met the party 
previously landed, with the addition of Mr. Frederick Summer- 
ford, a correspondent of the Neio York Herald, who had been 

Elliott, First Lieutenant L. C. Lucas, Second Lieutenant P. M. Bannon. Com- 
pany D: Captain W. F. Spicer, First Lieutenant W. C. Neville, Second Lieu- 
tenant Newt. H. Hall. Company E: Captain H. K.White, First Lieutenant 
J. E. Mahoncy, First Lieutenant A. S. McI.«more. Company F (artillery): 
Captain F. IL Harrington, First Lieutenant C. G. Long, First Lieutenant 
W. N. McKelvy. Color guard: one sergeant, two corporals. 

The battalion remained in camp at Key West until June 6, when it again 
embarked in the Panther for Guantdnamo. 



THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES 153 

long with Gomez. Though very anxious to reach Key West, 
Summerford volunteered to go back and see Gomez, while the 
others cast about for a means of getting away in time to prevent 
the Porter's being risked in her proposed attempt to return and 
take them aboard, the information brought by the correspond- 
ents being thought sufficient in the circumstances. A fishing- 
boat was captured and the party started, but before getting away 
Summerford returned and joined them, with letters from Gomez 
to President McKinley, Admiral Sampson, and General Miles. 
The boat had made her way to the vicinity of Piedras Key, near 
Cardenas, some ninety miles west of Caibarien, when she was 
picked up by the torpedo-boat Winslow, which a few days later 
was to be so roughly handled in Cardenas harbor. The party 
was transferred to the torpedo-boat Foote, and landed at Key 
West in time to prevent the despatch of the torpedo-boat 
Ericsson, which had been detailed to fetch them away, the Porter 
being now with Sampson on her way to Puerto Rico. It was 
a bold and gallant adventure upon the part of all concerned, a 
marked instance of the spirit of the newspaper correspondent, 
who has so generally shown himself ready to dare with the best. 
On May 1 the cruiser Montgomery and the armed tug Osceola 
joined the fleet and were stationed off Havana, the Mayflower 
and Detroit going to Key West for coal. The Montgomery 
brought information that the colliers Saturn, Merrimac, and 
Niagara had sailed for Key West and were to be attached to 
the fleet, but carried also the much more important word in a 
telegram from Washington dated the day before (April 30) : 

The Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, Terror, 
Furor, and Pluton left yesterday (April 29), are believed for Cuba. 
The Ciudad de Cadiz and the San Francisco^ for Canary Islands. You 
are authorized to cut cables south coast of Cuba. 

' A collier. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE BATTLE OF MANILA 

On the day that Sampson received word of the departure of 
Cervera from the Cape Verdes the Spanish squj^dron in the Phil- 
ippines was annihilated by Commodore Dewey. 

Since February, as already noted, the American ships of 
what was known as the Asiatic squadron had, except the ancient 
double-ender Mo7iocacy, been concentrated at Hong-Kong under 
the telegraphic order of February 25. There were present on 
April 2V the Olympia, Captain Gridley;^ the Boston, Captain 
Wildes; the Raleigh, Captain Coghlan; the Concord, Com- 
mander Walker; and the Petrel, Commander Wood. Besides 
these were the revenue vessel McCulloch, Captain Hodgson, 
which had joined April 17, and the two purchased steamers 
Nanshan and Zafiro, the one a collier the other a supply- 
vessel. The next day, April 22, Eastern date, arrived the Bal- 
timore, Captain Dyer, with the ammunition which had been 
transferred to her from the Mohican at Honolulu, the third 
week in March. Had the conquest and retention of the Philip- 
pines been in the mind of the American government the two 
powerful monitors Monterey and Monadnock should at once have 
been added, instead of delaying the departure from California 
of the former until June 11, and of the latter until June 23. 
That they were not sent at once is but added proof that the 
holding of the islands was an afterthought. 

' Manila is in 121° east longitude from Greenwich, or 196° east of Wash- 
ington. Its time is thus thirteen hours earlier than Washington time. Its 
1 A. M. of, say, April 21 is but noon of the Washington 20th. The difference 
in date should be kept in mind. 

2 Commander (now Rear-Admiral) Lamberton had arrived as the relief of 
Captain Gridley; the latter on his urgent request retained the command for 
the time and Lamberton was appointed chief of staff. 

154 



156 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The question of docking the Baltimore, which had now been 
a long time without docking, was a dehcate one. Diplomatic 
relations had already ceased between Spain and the United 
States by the withdrawal of the Spanish minister from Wash- 
ington on April 20 (the date of the signature by the president 
of the joint resolution of Congress passed the day previous), 
and by the request of passports by the American minister at 
Madrid on April 21, the actual day, by Western date, of the 
Baltimore's arrival at Hong-Kong. War, however, had not been 
formally declared, though on the afternoon of that day Samp- 
son had been ordered to blockade Cuban ports. This informa- 
tion was telegraphed Commodore Dewey: 

The naval force on the North Atlantic station are blockading Cuba. 
War has not yet been declared. War may be declared at any moment. 
I will inform you. Await orders. 

Sent late on the Washington 21st, this telegram could not 
reach Hong-Kong until the forenoon of the Eastern 22d. The 
Baltimore wxnt into dock Saturday, April 23, at 8 A. m., and 
came out at the same hour Sunday, the 24th, on which day 
Dewey was informed by the Hong-Kong authorities that as 
war had begun, and Great Britain was a neutral, his squadron 
must, within twenty-four hours, move out of British juris- 
diction. At 2 P. M. the Boston, Concord, and Petrel left, 
accompanied by the McCulloch and the two store-ships, for 
Mirs Bay, thirty miles east of Hong-Kong, on the Chinese 
coast. The Olympia, with the Baltimore and Raleigh, waited 
for the arrival of the American consul from Manila, which 
he had left on April 23, and also for some parts of 
the Raleigh's machinery repairing ashore. The consul, how- 
ever, was delayed longer than had been expected, and the 
time limit being expired, the three ships left Hong-Kong at 9 
A. M., April 25, cheered to the echo as they steamed from the 
harbor by the British soldiers and sailors ashore and afloat, 
who, with the blood of the race, envied them the prospect of 
a fight. The afternoon of April 25 was spent in distributing 
to the several ships the ammunition which had been brought 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 157 

by the Baltimore, and the next day was largely occupied in 
stripping the ships of all wooden articles which could be spared 
and sending them on board the transports. 

The revenue cutter McCulloch, being regarded a non-comba- 
tant, was sent to Hong-Kong for news. She returned on Tuesday, 
April 26, with a telegram which removed all doubt, and which 
had been sent the day before (Washington date April 24): 

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Pro- 
ceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, 
particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or 
destroy. Use utmost endeavors. 

On April 27 Consul Williams arrived in a tug from Hong- 
Kong, bringing with him the parts of machinery left by the 
Raleigh, and also the president's proclamation declaring the 
existence of war between the United States and Spain which 
had been telegraphed the same day (Washington date April 26). 

The commodore returned by the tug a telegram to be trans- 
mitted from Hong-Kong: 

Williams, the United States consul from Manila, has arrived. The 
squadron will sail immediately for the Philippine Islands. 

and called his captains aboard the flag-ship for consultation. 

Mr. Williams brought information that the greater part of 
the force in the Philippines had been concentrated in Manila 
Bay; "that there w^re three or more batteries along the water- 
front of the city, two on Sangley Point protecting the navy yard 
at Cavite, one or more at Mariveles, two or more on Corregidor 
and Caballo Islands, and one or more on the south shore of the 
entrance to the bay, all of six to nine inch calibre. He had 
also been credibly informed that the customary entrance to 
the bay between Corregidor Island and Mariveles and the 
waters in the vicinity of Cavite had been extensively mined. 
He further stated that a large merchant transport, the Isla 
de Mindanao, of the Compania Trasatlantica, arrived the day 
before his departure, laden with munitions of war, including 
coast guns, automobile torpedoes, and submarine mines, the 



158 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

latter intended for the larger entrance to the bay south of Cor- 
regidor." 

His information as to batteries was in the main correct, and 
partially so as to mines. That these should be extensively 
placed in the waters in the vicinity of Cavite was, of course, 
necessarily incorrect, as it was in these the Spanish ships were 
finally to take position. It was the vague information brought 
by one not conversant with such matters, and naturally some- 
what disproportioned to facts. Whatever the state of Spanish 
preparation, however, it weighed nothing with Commodore 
Dewey or his officers. 

At 2 p. M. signal was made to get under way and the squadron 
stood for Luzon. ^ 

Some preliminary explanation is necessary to enable the 
movements which follow to be understood. 

Manila Bay is a pear-shaped sheet of water about thirty 
nautical miles in its longest axis. On the eastern side, twenty- 
five miles from the entrance, is the city of Manila, the population 

' During the afternoon, on signal from the flag-ship, the following remark- 
able proclamation from the governor-general of the Philippines was read to 
each of the ships' companies: 
"Spaniards: 

"Between Spain and the United States of North America hostilities have 
broken out. 

"The moment has arrived to prove to the world that we possess the spirit 
to conquer those who, pretending to be loyal friends, take advantage of our 
misfortunes and abuse our hospitality, using means which civilized nations 
count unworthy and disreputable. 

"The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, 
have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfidious mach- 
inations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of 
nations and international conventions. 

"The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of Victories will give us 
one as brilliant and complete as the righteousness and justice of our cause 
demand. Spain, which counts upon the sympathies of all the nations, will 
emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and blasting the ad- 
venturers from those states that, without cohesion and without a history, 
offer to humanity only infamous traditions and the ungrateful spectacle of 
Chambers in which appear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and 
cynicism. 

"A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor 
discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly inten- 
tion of robbing us of all that means life, honor, and liberty. Pretending 
to be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable, the North Ameri- 



160 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of which was and is about three hundred thousand. As early as 
the beginning of the seventeenth century what is known as the 
walled town was surrounded by a wall of hewn stone some three 
miles in circuit. Through the middle, and separating the walled 
town from the native city, runs the Pasig River. The whole has 
a frontage on the bay of some two nautical miles. Six and a 
half miles south-west by south from the walled town, is Sangley 
Point, the extremity of a peninsula with a north-east and south- 
west direction, forming a bay about three miles broad, in which, 
on a small peninsula jutting east out of the larger one and about 
a mile and a half in length, is Cavite. A small bay between 
Sangley Point and Cavite is known as Caiiacao. 

The great bay opens to the sea at its south-west angle with 
an opening ten nautical miles broad. Two miles from the 
northern shore is Corregidor Island, of a squirming scorpion- 
like shape, with a head a mile in diameter to the west, and with 
a dwindling tail running east. A sand-spit and Caballo Island 

can seamen undertake as an enterprise capable of realization, the sub- 
stitution of Protestantism for the Catholic religion you profess, to treat you 
as tribes refractory to civilization, to take possession of your riches as if they 
were unacquainted with the rights of property, and to kidnap those persons 
whom they consider useful to man their ships or to be exploited in agricult- 
ural or industrial labor. 

"Vain designs 1 Ridiculous boastings! 

"Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the attempt to carry 
them into realization. You will not allow the faith you profess to be made 
a mock of; impious hands to be placed on the temple of the true God; the 
images you adore to be thrown down by unbelief. The aggressors shall 
not profane the tombs of your fathers, they shall not gratify their lustful 
passions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honor, or appropriate the 
property your industry has accumulated as a provision for your old age. 
No, they shall not perpetrate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness 
and covetousness, because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish 
and abase the people that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have ex- 
terminated the natives of North America, instead of bringing to them the 
life of civilization and of progress. 

" Philippines, prepare for the struggle and, united under the glorious Span- 
ish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the conviction 
that victory will crown our efforts, and to the calls of our enemies let us 
oppose with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, the cry of * Viva 
Eepana.' 

" Your General, 

"Basilio Augustin Da VILA. 
"Manila, 23d April, 1898." 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 161 

continue the tail to the south and west. The whole contorted 
length is about five miles. It is nearly five and a half nautical 
miles from Caballo Island to the south headland of the bay, but 
about three and a half miles from Caballo and nearly two from 
the headland is a large precipitous rock known as El Fraile (the 
Friar), not much larger than the deck of a small ship. The 
northern passage is known as the Boca Chica (little mouth) ; the 
southern as the Boca Grande; over the greater extent of these 
two passages the water is from eighteen to thirty fathoms or 
more in depth. 

Thirty-five nautical miles north-west of the Boca Grande, 
is Subig Bay, some ten miles deep. About two-fifths the way 
up the bay and almost in the middle of its narrowest part (two 
and a half miles) is Isla Grande, which the Spanish had elected 
to fortify and did not. Farther in on the east side is the small 
bay of Olongapo, where the Spanish had begun a naval station, 
which later the United States government at one time thought 
seriously of completing and extending. 

On March 15 the governor-general called together a meeting 
of the authorities, at which was Admiral Montojo, who expressed 
the opinion that his " poor squadron would not be able to with- 
stand the onslaught of the American ships, and that he was 
firmly convinced that it would be destroyed." The governor- 
general asking the admiral's opinion as to the steps which 
should be taken, the latter gave these remarkable views : 

" Considering that I have heard your Excellency say repeatedly that 
the port of Subig would have to be the refuge of our ships in extreme 
cases and that said port possessed exceptional qualifications as a mili- 
tary port, I suggest that it be fortified, if only temporarily, at the earli- 
est possible moment, so that our fleet may repair to it and there await 
the enemy, provided they come at all, keeping the fleet in readiness, in 
case Manila should be assaulted, to hasten there at night and attack the 
Americans unexpectedly as soon as the governor-general sends notice 
by telegram that the time is propitious for such a manoeuvre, count- 
ing on the hostile squadron being somewhat fatigued by that time." 

"I am entirely of your opinion," answered General Primo de 
Rivera,' "and I trust the admiral will tell us what he deems necessary 
to be done at Subig for its immediate defence." 

The admiral replying, advised that the narrower and more shallow 

* General de Rivera was relieved and sailed for Spain April 12. 



162 THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 

eastern channel to Subig be closed by sinking ships, the western to be 
protected by mounting guns on the coast and Isla Grande, which 
stands a little to the east of the mid-line of the entrance, and continu- 
ing, said: 

"Then the fourteen JNIathieson mines, the only ones there are at 
Cavite, should be planted in a line inside the entrance. The ships 
should be stationed still further inside, so that, under the protection 
of the batteries and mines, they can engage in battle with the Ameri- 
cans." 

"And can anything be done at the other ports for their protection ?" 
asked the governor-general. To this INIontojo replied: 

"Nothing can be done at Cebu, Ilo-Ilo, and Isabella de Basilan, 
which are the most important ones," said the admiral; "but the ob- 
struction of the channels of the latter two ports is feasible, and the 
entrance to the former can be closed by sinking boats in it." 

The admiral's suggestions were adopted and orders given to 
send a mixed commission to Subig to determine the best po- 
sition for the four 5.9-inch guns which were at Manila. Two 
more 5.9-inch guns were to be sent to Sangley Point (Cavite). 

Admiral Montojo made all preparations possible in his squad- 
ron for coming hostilities, and sent six hundred tons of coal 
to Subig and sank two merchant-vessels and the old trans- 
port Sa7i Quintin in the eastern entrance, the operations being 
superintended by Captain del Rio, the naval commandant in 
Subig Bay. 

The mixed commission decided that no guns could be mounted 
on the almost perpendicular west coast and that only on Isla 
Grande or Maquiling would it be possible. Orders were so 
given, with directions that the work proceed with all energy. 
Admiral INIontojo was informed from time to time that the 
work was progressing rapidly. "Del Rio informed him by 
telegraph that when he was not disturbed by insurgent parties 
from Bataan, he worked with two hundred men and never 
stopped a minute. Arizmendi, assistant inspector of ordnance, 
reported that as long as the engineers had not finished the cement 
work he could do nothing, and Rizzo, assistant inspector of 
engineers, stated that he could not just say what the status of 
the work was; that he was waiting for an official report from 
Commander Sidrach, who had charge of the work, before he 
could answer." 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 163 

On TNlarch 26 Lieutenant-Commander Rafael Benavente, 
of the General Lezo, submitted an additional scheme for for- 
tifying the entrances to the bay, which, being adopted by the 
ever necessary junta which had to be called together, and ap- 
proved by the governor-general, was taken in hand by the navy, 
Colonel Maximiano Garces de las Fayos, of the marine artil- 
lery, and Lieutenant-Commander Benavente (whose ship was 
under repairs at Cavite) being placed in charge. The work 
was carried on with an unusual and most praiseworthy energy; 
two cranes, six launches of the harbor works, two gun-boats, 
and two hundred men from the Cavite Navy Yard, and from the 
General Lczo and the JJlloa, being used. From these two ves- 
sels were taken three of the 4.7-inch guns which were supplied. 

The work was completed on April 29, at which date the fol- 
lowing batteries in Boca Chica and Boca Grande were in con- 
dition to fire (the batteries being named from south to north): 

Below Point Restinga (on the south side of Boca Grande): 
Three 6.3-inch M. L. R. 

El Fraile Rock: Three 4.7-inch B. L. R. (one from the Ulloa; 
two from the Lezo). 

Caballo Island: Three 5.9-inch B. L. R. Armstrong guns 
(taken from the Velasco). 

Corregidor Island: Three 8-inch M. L. R. Armstrongs. 

Punta Lassisi (on the north side of Boca Chica): Two 6.3- 
inch converted B. L. R. 

Punta Gorda (on the north side of Boca Chica) : Three 7-inch 
M. L. R. 

Seventeen guns in all, nine of which, being muzzle-loaders, 
could scarcely be regarded as effective against a rapidly moving 
squadron on account of their slow service. 

An attempt to improvise mines filtered down to the use of 
war-heads of the Whitehead torpedoes, which were carried by 
some of the ships and which were planted in the waters near 
Caballo Island. 

The protection of so broad and deep an entrance as the Boca 
Grande by such means was, however, hopeless unless unlimited 
time and perfect appliances were used, such as would tax the 
best-equipped arsenal, and even in such case no dependence, 
on account of the depth and the strong tidal current frequently 



164 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

found, could really be placed upon their action. As much 
also might be said of any in the Boca Chica. In fact, though 
the energy and will shown were fine, both were thrown away 
in such circumstances. Nor can a channel of such breadth 
be defended by gun-fire against a squadron entering at night, 
even with every provision of search-lights and numerous long- 
range guns; the chances of passing without damage are all with 
a squadron of fair speed and gun-power. 

"It was hoped," said the author from which the information 
regarding the improvised batteries is taken,^ "that the four 
5.9-inch guns taken to Subig, if not already mounted, soon 
would be, but the admiral was to suffer a terrible disappoint- 
ment and deception." 

Of the two hundred and twenty-six guns of all kinds mounted 
at Manila (of which one hundred and sixty-four were muzzle- 
loaders), there were twelve breech-loaders of from 4.7 inch to 
9.45 inch. These twelve, and particularly the 9.45 inch, of which 
there were four, were the only really effective guns on the sea 
face. Two of the 9.45 inch, built at Trubia, Spain, in 1883, were 
in a battery at the south end of the Luneta drive. They were 
20 feet above water and behind 30-foot earthworks, sloping to 
the water's edge with a traverse about 20 feet at the base on 
each flank and between the guns. They were on gravity-return, 
centre-pivot, friction-recoil carriages trained by hand gear. 

At the north end of the Luneta drive, near the water, were 
four 8.26-inch muzzle-loading rifled howitzers, behind 30-foot 
earthworks, with wing traverses, with casements in each wing. 
These were mounted on gravity-return, muzzle-pivot carriages 
trained by tackles and handspikes; the projectiles were nose- 
fused common shell. These pieces were of an old type and 
could not give serious concern. 

Fifty yards north of this last was a third 9.45-inch breech- 
loading Trubia gun, built in 1885. A short distance north of 
this was a battery of six breech-loading rifled guns behind 30- 
foot earthworks with wing traverses, separating the guns in 
pairs. Four of these had been converted in 1887 from bronze 
smooth-bores of eighteenth-century design, by cutting off the 

' C. P. Admiral Montojo Before Opinion and Before History, chapters 
III and IV. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 165 

cascabel rifling and slotting the breech for a Krupp breech-block, 
thus making them into 5.5-inch breech-loading rifles; the other 
two were 5.9-inch breech-loading rifled bronze siege-guns made 
in Seville in 1893. They were mounted on siege wheeled car- 
riages, anchored by a hydraulic-recoil cylinder. They were 
supplied with nose-fused common shell. 

Nine hundred yards northward again was a 9.45-inch breech- 
loading rifle similar to those in the south battery. All these 
were directly on the water-front, in front of the walls. 

The walls themselves, with a sea frontage of nearly a mile, 
were of heavy masonry filled with earth over the casemates, with 
a breadth of 50 feet, a height above the land of 20 feet, and 
with a moat of 50 feet filled with water about 10 feet in depth. 
On the walls at the south bastion were nine 6.3-inch muzzle- 
loading rifled bronze guns, eighteenth-century design, rifled in 
1864 for studded projectiles, having wooden gravity-return, 
centre-pivot carriages trained by tackles. These could serve 
no useful purpose. In the centre bastion were five 8.27-inch 
muzzle-loading rifled howitzers, similar to those already men- 
tioned. In the north bastion were five 6.3-inch muzzle-loading 
rifled guns similar to those in the south bastion. 

In a small bastion facing the Pasig River, with an arc of fire 
from the Pasig light-house north, were five 4.7-inch muzzle- 
loading rifled howitzers of no value; three more of these how- 
itzers and two 3.15-inch Krupp field howitzers were in a lunette, 
in an angle between the sea-front and river-front walls, sweeping 
the river. 

In a circular masonry redoubt on the south mole at the entrance 
of Pasig River were two bronze 4.7-inch breech-loading rifled 
field-guns of 1893, mounted on wheeled siege-carriages an- 
chored by hydraulic-recoil cylinders, and two 6.3-inch muzzle- 
loading rifles of the same pattern as those in the south bastion, 
with a field of fire from Cavite to the eastward. The old fort 
at San Antonio contained only light field-pieces. 

At Canacao, near the beach, was one 4.7-inch Hontoria breech- 
loading rifle mounted on a ship's centre-pivot, gravity-return 
carriage, hydraulic recoil. This was on a timber foundation 
embedded in masonry. Another similar foundation had been 
prepared, but the gun had not yet been mounted, being found 



166 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

later in the arsenal. There was a small masonry bomb-proof pit 
in the sand twenty feet east of the mounted guns, and a breast- 
work of sand about three feet high had been formed around the 
seaward front of the battery by placing boiler iron on edge and 
packing the sand against it. This gun had an arc of fire of one 
hundred and eighty degrees to seaward of the shore line. Eleven 
nose-fused common shells remained in the bomb-proof after the 
battle, and one shell in the gun. 

In Fort Sangley, a permanent casement fort of a semi-hex- 
agonal contour looking toward Manila Bay, there were six 
gun positions, two each in the east and west fronts and one in 
each of the next adjacent, the north front being occupied by the 
main magazine. High mounds of sand protected the rear of each 
gun position. Two 5.9-inch Ordonez breech-loading rifled guns 
only were mounted in the fort, and they occupied the northern- 
most emplacements in the east and west fronts. The western 
gun trained from the village of San Roque (just south) one hun- 
dred and twenty degrees to the west and north; the eastern gun 
trained from Bacoor one hundred and twenty degrees east and 
north. The mounts were gravity-return, centre-pivot, hydraulic- 
recoil land-carriage trained by hand gearing. The muzzles were, 
when level, about twenty feet above water. 

At Cavite arsenal there were mounted two 64-pounder Arm- 
strong muzzle-loading rifles, a 6.3-inch converted muzzle-load- 
ing rifle on gravity-return, friction-recoil, muzzle-pivot carriages 
trained by tackles and elevated by wedges and screws, and two 
6.3-inch breech-loading Hontoria and one of the two 4.7-inch 
breech-loading Hontoria guns taken from the Don Antonio de 
Ulloa, which ship was under repairs, these three guns being the 
only ones of any value, the range of the former being wholly in- 
effective as compared with that of modern guns. All these had 
an arc of fire from Canacao to Manila.^ 

Admiral Montojo, as has been seen, fully recognized the diflS- 
culties of his position. He expected defeat. 

On April 17 Montojo telegraphed: 

How many days free from molestation have I for installing new 
batteries and obtaining men from Mindanao? 

' A report of defences was made by Lieutenant (now Conamander) Ellicott. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 167 

There was no answer to this. But on April 19, the minister 
sent: 

Circumstances demand the closing of ports on the islands with 
mines, merchant-vessels waiting outside will be guided in by pilots. 

Montojo answered: 

Your Excellency is aware that I have no mines; I will do all I can. 

On the same day Bermejo replied: 

Seventy mines are on the way. I regret I am unable to do more, 
for I am positive hostilities will break out on Saturday. 

Montojo hoped that the mines would arrive by the Mindanao, 
expected every moment. She arrived April 23 without them. 
Montojo says in his report: 

On the 25th of April, at 11 at night, I left the bay of Manila 
for Subig with a squadron composed of the cruisers Reina Cnstina, 
Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, despatch-boat 
Marques del Duero, and the wooden cruiser Castilla. This last could 
be merely considered as a floating battery, incapable of any move- 
ment or action, principally on account of the bad condition of her hull. 
The following morning, being at Subig, I had a conference with Cap- 
tain del Rio, who, though he did not relieve my anxiety respecting 
the completion of the defensive works, assured me that they would 
soon be finished. 

In the meanwhile the cruiser Castilla, even on this short cruise, was 
making much water through the bearings of the propeller and the 
seams of the stern. They worked day and night to stop these leaks 
with cement, finally making the vessel nearly water-tight, but making 
it absolutely impossible to use her engines. 

On the morning of the 27th I sailed with the vessels to cover the 
entrance to the port of Subig. The Castilla was taken to the north- 
east point of the Isla Grande to defend the western entrance, since 
the eastern entrance had already been closed with the hulks of the 
San Quintin and two old merchant-vessels which were sunk 
there. 

With much disgust I found that the guns which should have been 
mounted on that island still needed a month and a half to be got in 
position. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that the navy had 
installed (with no little difficulty) at the entrance of the bay of Manila, 
under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artillery Senor 



168 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Garccs and Lieutenant-Commander Benavente, were ready to fire 
twenty-four days after the commencement of the work. 

I was also disgusted that so little confidence was to be placed in the 
efficacy of the few torpedoes which they had found feasible to put 

there. 

The entrance being thus undefended by torpedoes or by the batteries 
of the island, the squadron would have had to bear, with its poor 
means of action, the attack of the Americans in forty metres of water; 
therefore it was almost certain that our ships would not only be de- 
stroyed, but that they could not save their crews. I still held a hope 
that the Americans would not go to Subig, and give us time for more 
preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish consul 
at Hong-Kong a telegram which said: "Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 
p. i\i. from Mirs Bay, and according to reliable accounts, is bound for 
Subig to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila." 

This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they should 
find my squadron and that the port of Subig had no defences. 

The same day, the 28th of April, I convened a council of the cap- 
tains, and all, with the exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal, 
thought that the situation was unsustainable and that we should go to 
the bay of Manila in order to accept there the battle under less unfavor- 
able conditions. 

The idea of placing our ships near the city of Manila was rejected 
because, far from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bom- 
bard the plaza, which would infallibly have been demolished on ac- 
count of its few defences. It was unanimously decided that we should 
take position in the bay of Canacao, in the least water possible, in order 
to be able to combine our fire with that of the batteries of Point Sang- 
ley and the UUoa. 

I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most 
strategic point of the arsenal, making every preparation to burn the coal 
and stores before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I 
sent the Don Juan de Austria to Manila to get a large number of lighters 
filled with sand to defend the water-line of the Castilla (which could not 
move) against the enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10.30 A. M. on 
the 29th I left Subig with the vessels of my squadron, towing the Cas- 
tilla by the transport Manila. 

In the evening of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Canacao 
in eight metres of water. On the following morning, April 30, the 
Cristina, Don Juan de Austria, Don Juan de UUoa, Luzon, Cuba, 
and Marques del Duero were anchored, with springs, in line of battle, 
while the transport Manila was sent to the Bacoor roads to join the 
Velasco and Lezo, which were undergoing repairs. 

At 7 p. M. I received a telegram from Subig announcing that the 
enemy's squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitring, doubtless 
seeking our ships, and that they left directed for Manila. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 



169 



It is clear from the foregoing that the Spanish sailors were far 
from inactive; that in fact they did all that gallant men could 
have done under the uncheerful circumstances in which they 
were placed and had in part selected. The refusal of the gov- 
ernor to allow the squadron to place itself in a situation where 
the guns at Manila could be used in its partial defence was 
fatal to any prospect of success. Not having left the bay, it 
was the one course left. Damage to Manila could not from a 
national point of view be commensurate with the loss of the 
archipelago, and this latter was the real risk which the governor 
insisted upon taking. He could not recognize that a great 
question was in his hands to decide as might be best for Spain, 
not for Manila. 

The American force was as follows: 



SHIP 


TONS 


SPEED 


z 

UO 

4 
4 

2 

10 


6 
6 
1 
6 
4 

23 


2 '^ 


IS 

o 
to 

14 
4 

'8 
2 

28 


ss 

10 

10 

6 

6 

7 
7 


o 

a 
a 




8^ 




5,870 
4,413 
3,000 
3,213 
1,710 
892 


21.68 

20.09 

15.6 

19 

16.8 

11.79 


10 

16 

20 


4.7 

4 

1.5 

2.5 
.3 
.3 


6 

'4 


412 
386 
278 
314 
195 
122 










Petrel 






19,098 




46 




10 


1,707 



The ships under Admiral Montojo which the American 
squadron was to meet in action, were: 



amp 


TONS 


SPEED 


i, 

n 
to 


U5 


z 


z' 

CO 


z' 

CO 

2 


■* • 
O) z 
c^ " 

3 

2 

2 


01 Z 

OD p 
«g 

12 
14 

4 
4 
9 
9 

1 




2.5 
2.5 


. m 

p. H 
K « 

2P 

5 
2 
3 
3 

2 
2 


8^ 




3,520 
3,260 
1,045 
1,045 
1,159 
1,160 
500 


13.98 

13 

14 

14.14 

14.5 

12.5 

10 


6 


'4 


2 
4 

4 
4 
4 
2 


409 
369 
187 
187 
209 
189 
114 


CastiUa 






i 




D. Juan de Austria 

D. Antonio de Ulloa^. . . . 
Marques del Duero 




11,689 




7 


4 


20 


2 


2 


7 


53 




17 


1,664 



Note: — The complements are taken from the Spanish navy list and are of course nomi- 
nal. The CastiUa, being a receiving ship, could scarcely have a definite crew. Montojo's 
Defence {Ante la Opinion y Ante la Hisloria, p. 140) gives 1,134 as the total. 

* Two of the Ulloa's guns had been removed to shore batteries. 



170 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

To the list of Spanish guns afloat, which were to be in action, 
should be added those which could be used at Cavite and Sang- 
ley Point; to repeat somewhat, these were the two 6-inch Arm- 
strong muzzle-loading rifles mounted at Fort San Felipe in 
Cavite arsenal, and which could have been fired over the 
ships, two 5.9-inch breech-loading rifles (Ordonez) at Sangley 
Point, and one 4.7-inch at Canacao, about a mile south-west of 
Sangley Point. 

The Castillo} was a wooden ship built in 1881, and used as a 
receiving ship. Her condition was as described in Admiral 
Montojo's report, just given. The Ulloa, though under repairs, 
and with two of her four 4.7-inch guns removed ashore, was to 
take her place in Montojo's line. The guns of the Velasco and 
General Lezo, both of which were repairing, had gone to strengthen 
Boca Chica and Boca Grande; their crews re-enforced those of 
the other ships. The surveying vessel Argos, with one small 
gun, and the Mindinao and Manila, transports, the latter of 
which carried three small guns from 3.15 to 2.75 inches, were 
under the shelter of Cavite.^ 

Summarizing the more effective guns afloat, which were to be 
used in the coming action, we have: 

AMERICAN SPANISH 

10 8-inch 7 6.3-inch 

23 6-inch 4 5.9-inch 

20 5-inch 20 4.7-inch 

11 3.4 to 2.24-inch 

The disproportion in gun-power, and the even greater dis- 
proportion in mobility (facts easily available to the Spanish naval 
officers from the official and other publications which give the 
qualities of naval ships in completest detail), naturally wrought 
despair in the heart of the Spanish commander. His acquiescence 
in doing exactly that which he should not have done: accepting 
battle wholly unsupported by the shore defences of Manila, 

* Pronounced Casteelya. 

2 Though the presence of mines in the waters between Manila and Cavite 
was long mooted, definite information to the author from Spanish officers 
makes it certain that none existed. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 171 

strengthened as they might have been by the guns from what 
would have been the inshore batteries of the ships, removed any 
hope. The navy yard at Cavite should have been abandoned to 
its fate. That the ships would have been finally destroyed even 
in such a position by the longer-range eight-inch guns of the 
American squadron may be taken to have been almost as sure as 
their destruction at Cavite, but the Spanish would have fought 
under more heartening conditions and they would at least have 
had chances which did not exist at the point selected. The going 
to almost certain destruction at Cavite was but another sacrifice 
to pundoiior such as that now just taken in sending Cervera's 
ships to the Caribbean. 

In view of what has just been said and of the opinions 
expressed by the writer on the subject of Havana, it is not 
amiss to quote Mr. H. W. Wilson on the situation at Manila. 
Apparently the governor-general and the admiral were equally 
averse to subjecting the city and its population to bombardment. 
"But," says Wilson, "though few will blame Montojo'for his 
anxiety to save the civilian population from suffering any injury, 
it was a military mistake not to take position under the far more 
powerful batteries of Manila [rather than under those of Cavite], 
when the issue of the engagement might have been different. 
The general or admiral must in war steel his heart and neglect no 
advantage."^ The stake played for admits of nothing less. 

It is six hundred and twenty miles from Mirs Bay to Manila, 
a distance which the American squadron at its ordinary cruis- 
ing speed of eight knots would cover in three days. At 2 p. m. 
on April 27, the squadron started to the southward and east- 
ward across the smooth sea of the season. No concealment 
w^as attempted; lights were carried as in ordinary cruising and 
electric signals freely exchanged. On their way across, the 
ships were stripped of their superfluous woodwork, of which so 
much existed in all men-of-war of their date. Says Lieutenant 
Fiske, who was navigator on the Petrel: "Probably the princi- 
pal thing remembered about the trip to Manila by most of the 

'Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, 132. 



172 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

people in the American column is the enormous quantity of 
woodwork flung overboard by the ships." Chain cables were 
wound around the ammunition hoists, and all chests and other 
articles of wood not absolutely necessary and which had not 
already been put aboard the transports, were thrown overboard 
along with the wooden bulkheads. 

The venture of the American commander was somewhat a 
leap in the dark. "The real problem was that of finding the 
enemy's ships. However defective they might be in offensive 
power and in mobility, they had their choice of a dozen harbors 
within a day's run of their naval base." ^ 

Very little information had been received as to the Spanish 
preparations because very little existed, as we have seen in the 
report of Admiral Montojo, on account of vacillation of policy, 
even among the Spaniards themselves. There was no certainty 
as to the whereabouts of the Spanish squadron, though it was 
rumored that it had gone to Subig, which had been regarded by 
the Spaniards themselves as the natural naval base for the de- 
fence of Manila to the extent that they had begun, years before, 
the establishment at Olongapo, within the bay, of a naval 
arsenal. It was practically certain, however, that the squadron 
had not, and could not in the short interval which had elapsed 
since previous information, have left the vicinity of Manila 
Bay. 

The Olympia's log for Saturday, April 30, begins with, " Light 
breeze from E. by S.; weather clear and warm. Bright star- 
light, moon set at 12.55. At 2.45 sighted Cape Bolinao a half 
point on port bow." The fair and pleasant weather and smooth 
sea continued, and the whole day was spent in skirting the 
western shore of Luzon toward Subig Bay. At 5 a. m. the 
Boston and Concord had been sent ahead to reconnoitre Subig, 
where it was expected the Spanish squadron might be found. 
At 10.40 A. M. the Zafiro had been ordered to speak a Spanish 
fishing-boat, which, however, could give no news, and at 11.20 
the Baltimore was sent ahead also to join the other two scouts, 
the remainder of the squadron standing on steadily at eight 

* Lieutenant Calkins, "Naval Campaign of Manila Bay," Proceedings 
Naval Institute, June, 1899, vol. XXV, 269. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 173 

knots. Many fishing-vessels were sighted during the forenoon 
watch. 

At 5.15 the whole squadron, with no news of the enemy, was 
together off the entrance to Subig Bay, which had been ex- 
amined to the very head, ten miles within. Shortly after, all the 
captains of the fighting-ships were ordered aboard the flag-ship 
for consultation and final instructions. At this time (5.30) was 
the usual evening muster of the crew at quarters, and ammuni- 
tion was now got up and supplied at all the guns. At 6.24 the 
squadron stood S. 36° E. for Boca Grande, the main entrance 
to Manila Bay, thirty-five miles away. 

The early nightfall of the tropics had now set in: 

As darkness slowly descended the scene took on u character at once 
soothing and disturbing; soothing, because everything was so beau- 
tiful and so calm; disturbing, because of the grim preparations evi- 
dent. The guns were all ready; considerable ammunition was on 
deck, and the men lay or sat or stood by their guns. As few lamps 
as possible were lit, and all lights which would shine outward were 
screened, except one small light over the stern of each ship. The night 
was clear and calm, and the hours from 8 to 12 rather dragged. 
There was nothing to do, for all preparations had been made; there 
was nothing to see, except the dim outlines of a few ships and the vague 
outline of the coast two or three miles distant; and there was nothing to 
hear, except the sound of the engine and the swish of the water along 
the sides.* 

It was moonlight when not obscured by passing clouds; warm 
with occasional flashes of lightning, and sometimes a passing 
shower; a true tropic night. 

Approaching the entrance, the Olympia went to quarters at 9.42. 
She entered the channel on a course S. 68° E. The lights on Cor- 
regidor and Caballo Islands and on San Nicolas bank were found 
extinguished. The course was changed to east when the west 
end of Corregidor bore north, distant 3.7 miles. At 11.55 El 
Fraile (The Friar) bore south distant half a mile. Course was 
then changed to the northward and eastward. Signal lights, 
says the log, were observed and reports of guns heard, but as no 
flash was seen the position of the batteries could not be fixed. 

* Lieutenant (now Captain) Fiske, United Service Magazine, Jan., 1902, 25. 



174 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

At 12.17 A. M. in the next watch, the Olympia's log notes: "At 
12.17 the Raleigh and ships astern and Baltimore began firing, 
shots having been fired from batteries along the south side of 
the channel." 

The incident is noted by the other ships in the usual com- 
pressed language of the log-book; in that of the Baltimore: "Sev- 
eral shots were exchanged by a shore battery near Point de la 
Restinga." The Raleigh's says: "About 12.10, when Fraile 
Island was close abeam, saw a flash on the island. Shortly 
afterward another flash, then a gun was fired and a shell passed 
close over us, striking the water ahead. We replied with after 
5-inch starboard side. The shore battery fired four more 
shells at Concord and Boston, which were answered, and firing 
ceased." The Boston's log says: "At 12.10 . . . the fleet was 
fired on by a battery on the southern shore, this single shot being 
followed by another after an interval of about six minutes. The 
Concord replied with three shots, the McCulloch with three, and 
this vessel with one." 

The little action was thus quickly over, and no stop being 
made by the squadron they were soon out of sight and range. 
No attention was paid to the question of mines, as the great 
difficulty of mining so deep and broad a channel is, as already 
mentioned, well understood by every naval seaman.^ All water- 
tight doors, however, were closed in case of any possible ac- 
cident of the kind. 

Says Lieutenant Calkins: 

As soon as our ships were clear of the danger space in the channels 
of entrance they commanded the bay with excellent anchorages any- 
where within a circumference of sixty miles. This security led to 
some talk of clearing ship for action by getting rid of the boats. The 
Olym/pia had a dozen big wooden boats inconveniently arranged on 
cradles, requiring two hours' work of the ship's company, unassisted 
by steam winches, to launch them overboard. The other ships had 
their boats swung at davits and might have lowered them in a few min- 

' Thus Admiral Dewey, on inquiry of May 12 from the na\'y department 
asking if in case of attack by a superior force he "would desire submarine 
mines," replied, May 20: "I do not consider submarine mines practicable 
here on account of great depth and width of bay and entrance." Appendix 
to "Report of Bureau of Navigation," 1898, 100. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 175 

utes. Of course the danger from fire and splinters was recognized, but 
it was not convenient to do the work after dusk and the sighting of the 
Spanish fleet at dawn disposed of any notion of precautionary delays. 
Yet it must be held as a wonder that no damage was done to the boats 
by the enemy's fire, and that our own fire was unobstructed by flames 
or fragments from these boats. Those carried outboard were generally 
wrecked by concussion, so that the Olympia had the advantage for this 
exceptional occasion.' 

It was a run of twenty-two miles from the Friar to Manila, 
directly toward which the squadron stood. Speed was slowed 
so as not to arrive before daylight. The lights of the city 
were visible at 3 o'clock. The McCulloch, Nanshan, and 
Zafiro were now detached from the column and ordered out of 
range of the batteries. The situation at daybreak is well de- 
scribed by Lieutenant Fiske: 

I was aroused from my sleep by a noise at my door and a voice say- 
ing, "The captain wishes to see you on the bridge." "What about?" I 
said sleepily. " I don't know," he said, " but it is ten minutes to 5, and 
they have begun to shoot at us." Then I aroused my dormant senses 
and realized the fact that I was about to go into battle for the first time. 
When I reported to the captain on the bridge, he simply smiled and 
said, "All right." I looked ahead in the dim morning light and saw 
the Olympia, Baltimore, and Raleigh, and ahead of them a great num- 
ber of masts, which looked very indistinct. I heard the sound of one 
or two very distant guns ahead and saw their smoke. "The Spanish 
fleet is over there," said the captain, pointing over on our starboard 
side; and there could be discerned a few indistinct shapes that looked 
like ships. All the men were congregated about their guns, and the 
guns were loaded. A few were getting some coffee and crackers at 
the galley and the scene about the deck was as quiet and peaceful as 
I had ever seen it. 

No stop w^as made, the squadron standing steadily in toward 
the city, its movements known to the Spanish commander from 
the moment of its passing Cape Bolinao. 

Cavite, says Lieutenant Calkins (who, as navigating officer 
of the Olympia, was on the bridge with Commodore Dewey), 
was not reconnoitred in approaching from the westward. "At 
5 o'clock we were three miles west of the mouth of the river 

' Calkins, " Historical and Professional Notes on the Naval Campaign of 
Manila Bay," Proceedings, U. S. Naval Institute, June, 1899, 274. 



17G 



THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 



which divides Manila. Sixteen merchantmen were counted; 
no steamers, no cruisers, lay off the city. Not many minutes 





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later the Spanish line was made out stretching to the eastward 
off Sangley Point [six miles away], in front of the white build- 
ings of the arsenal." ^ 

The Olympia turned to the right, followed "at distance" (four 
hundred yards between each ship) by the Baltimore, Raleigh, 
Peircl, Concord, and Boston in the order named. 

The column stood to the southward, parallel to the shore, the 



' It is six and a half nautical miles from the mouth of the river Pasig, which 
runs through the middle of Manila, to Sangley Point. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 177 

Olym'pia having the Spanish squadron well on the starboard 
bow. Fire had been opened by the guns of the Manila batter- 
ies, which was returned by the Concord, but the range of the 
Spanish guns, which continued their aimless cannonade through 
the coming action, was not sufficient to do harm. The squad- 
ron continued south. 

"No attempt," says Calkins, "was made to count the enemy's 
force, or to identify individual vessels. Our own line was mis- 
counted, and the Helena was added to the list in the report of 
the Spanish admiral. There was no occasion for close compari- 
sons; general information served to convince us that our six 
cruisers could defeat all the vessels that Spain had in the Phil- 
ippines, especially if they chose to lie massed and motionless 
within easy range of open waters deep enough for safe naviga- 
tion. There were seven of them in line, as it turned out; two of 
them, the Castilla and Don Antonio de Ulloa, were moored with 
springs on their cables. The others steamed about in an aimless 
fashion, often masking their comrades' fire, occasionally dodg- 
ing back to the shelter of the arsenal, and now and then making 
isolated and ineffectual rushes in advance-rushes which had no 
rational significance except as demonstrations of the point of 
honor. They were mere flourishes of desperation inspired by 
defeat." 

The first shell came from Sangley Point, but fell short, as did 
also a shot fired by the Olympia to try the range, but she was 
still six miles or more from the Spanish squadron, the fire of 
which now grew more rapid as the American line advanced. 
When at an estimated range of fifty-five hundred yards (some- 
what over three land-miles), the Olym'pia, with the Spanish 
squadron still on her starboard bow, fired an 8-inch shell from 
one of the forward turret-guns, and stood on nearly another 
mile, and turning westward opened with a general fire. 

At this moment there was a distraction from the main objective, 
thus described by Lieutenant Calkins: 

A small steam-launch with awTiings spread and a big Spanish ensign 
streaming astern, advanced from the cove behind Sangley Point, 
crossed the bows of the Olympia, and then turned toward the shore as 



178 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

if to lie in wait for that formidable antagonist. There could be but 
one interpretation of this movement: this was a torpedo-boat, and she 
had to be treated as such. Secondary batteries began to pick up the 
range and their shells were soon veiling the target in spray and smoke. 
A few rounds were fired from even the main batteries, while the ma- 
rines did all that may be accomplished with Springfields at twelve hun- 
dred yards range. Yet the reckless craft still floated, though no 
longer able to steam or disposed to use any weapon. She drifted 
ashore under the guns at Sangley Point, where she continued to draw 
fire from the six-pounders, in spite of keen remonstrance from high 
authorities, until the action was over. 

It seems proved that the launch was no deadly microbe, but only a 
humble market-boat, manned by Filipinos and bound to Manila by 
direction of the English family residing at Canacao. The literal 
oriental manner of executing domestic routine amid the shock and 
thunder of battle eliminates the heroic from an action of amazing 
rashness. But the moral of this incident is all on the side of genuine 
torpedo-boats. Here was a conspicuous craft slowly executing the 
traditional manoeuvres of torpedo attack, and awaiting the advance 
of a squadron not undistinguished in the annals of naval gunnery — a 
squadron which surpassed its enemy by a score of one hundred to one. 
Yet the frail hull was not shattered, nor the boilers exploded. Even 
the crew escaped with their lives, though a shot had pierced the steam 
cylinder. The boat was repaired and fitted to carry generals by the 
time that American troops appeared on the scene.' 

The distance taken up by the American squadron was de- 
termined by the depths shown on the charts. It was not con- 
sidered safe to take the Olympia, drawing twenty-four feet, into 
less than about five fathoms. Thus on reaching the five-fathom 
curve the column, steaming at six knots, turned westward and 
at 5.41 began firing at a range of about four thousand yards 
(two sea-miles),^ which was decreased to about tw^enty-five hun- 
dred yards ofif Sangley Point, where the column "counter- 
marched," returning nearly over its former track. The ad- 
vance was thus at angle with the general line of the Spanish 
ships, making a gradually decreasing distance which brought 

» Calkins, 276. 

2 The time and distances are those given by the Olympia; the reports from 
the other ships are as follows: Boston began firing 5.35, continued at varying 
distances; Raleigh "a few minutes after 5" (no distances); Baltimore began 
firing at 5.40, distance 6,000 yards, later 5,000 to 2,600; Concord (no report 
of time or distance); Petrel began firing 5.22, at 5,000 yards. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 179 

even six-pounders into effective action. This was, of course, to 
the relative advantage of the Spanish, as it brought the Ameri- 
can ships well within range of the lighter batteries of the former. 
An equality of conditions was offered the Spanish which, through 
their want of anything to offset the American 8-inch guns, would 
have been almost wholly absent had Commodore Dewey chosen 
to fight at long taw. The battle was thus far less unequal than 
the comparison of armaments would indicate and became a con- 
test of marksmanship. 

Five times the American squadron thus passed before the 
Spanish position, thrice to the west, twice to the east, turning 
each time with port helm.* 

To continue Lieutenant Calkins's excellent and graphic 
account: 

Animated by desperate counsels, Spanish vessels had made one or 
two attempts to advance to meet us in front of their line. Only one of 
these efforts was persistent or significant enough to be remembered. 
As we stood to the eastward on our third passage along the zone of 
fire, the Reina Cristina, bearing the flag of Admiral Montojo, was seen 
to detach herself from her consorts and to approach a gap in the line, 
with the apparent purpose of coming to close quarters with the Olym- 
pia, which had just changed her course sixty degrees to the southward 
of her previous tracks toward the turning point. The two flag-ships 
seemed closing rapidly, but the Spaniard had only advanced a ship's 
length or so beyond his line before his progress was arrested by a hail of 
concentrated fire which produced immediate and visible results. His 
speed slackened; smoke puffed out forward and aft; a white plume of 
escaping steam showed that his motive power was crippled, and an 
awkward turn, exposing the unprotected stern, suggested that his 
steering-gear had met the same fate. The beaten flag-ship crept 
toward the arsenal, where she grounded, burned, and blew up during 
the morning. We all saw that she was disabled, but it required some 
hours to demonstrate her destruction. 

Hitherto there had been much disappointment among those who 
tried to observe the effect of our fire. Some of the gun-boats had 
seemed to flinch and had dodged in and out near the arsenal. The 

' There has been some confusion of statement as to the manner in which 
these turns v/ere made, but that of the Boston's log would seem to fix this 
rather than later memory. The log says: "(4 to 8 a. m.) . . . This action 
was fought at an average range of three thousand yards, the fleet steaming 
twice around an ellipse, turning with port helm and engaging the enemy 
with both batteries." The log of the Petrel uses the phrase "around in circle." 



180 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

white bulwarks of the Casiilla had been scarred and blackened by our 
fire, but even her wooden hull had not burst into flames after two 
hours of brisk bombardment. Annoyed by this delay in destruction, 
the commander-in-chief had decided to try the effect of stationary 
practice. The signal was made to prepare to anchor; the Petrel was 
warned to detach herself for turning the eastern end of the Spanish line. 
The station selected for the Olympia lay well inside the five-fathom 
curve, and within two thousand yards of the centre of the enemy's 
position. The course had been changed to south-east when the Cris- 
tina's advance was noted. Since she had to be met underway, the 
signals were annulled. Anxiety in regard to the swinging of the ship 
when anchored was thus removed; it was a case of applying the maxim, 
"Ef know wind and know tide, know telling," written by an aspiring 
but unliterary mariner during the present year of grace. Doubt- 
less the time for closing and finishing with the enemy was at hand, but 
the experiences of target practice, supplemented by that of this action, 
fail to show that any advantage would result from anchoring. Twin 
screws enable vessels to be pointed as well as to be held in their sta- 
tions. But the circling movement in column had not failed in practice 
and might have been continued until resistance was crushed. In fact, 
one more turn was made and our ships passed to the westward of 
Sangley Point in unchanged order. 

It has been assumed by remote interpreters of the lessons of this con- 
test that the Spanish fire was promptly silenced or smothered by the 
superiority of our broadsides. There was a visible falling-off in the 
rapidity of the enemy's shooting, but, judging from our own experi- 
ence, we attributed this to the expenditure of accumulated stores of 
ammunition — our decks were soon cleaned of great mounds of rapid- 
fire shells — and to the obstructive effects of smoke. In accuracy the 
Spanish gunners had neither gained nor lost; they could drop shells 
close alongside or they could send them soaring aloft. But each ship 
seemed to carry its own charmed circle — not always of large circumfer- 
ence either, since one seemed to count a hundred shells within a ship's 
length during the two hours of actual combat. Of course, these 
shells, which burst before our eyes, scattered radial showers of frag- 
ments which cut rigging and scored spars, and there is a record of some 
half a dozen actual hits, though nothing larger than a six-pounder ac- 
complished both penetration and explosion. But the fact remains 
that the enemy was not silenced after two hours' work, and that none 
of his ships were structurally destroyed or obviously disabled during 
the period when our fire was returned. 

The two largest Spanish ships, the Reina Cristina and the 
Casiilla, had visibly suffered; flames had been seen to burst out 
in both; but the fire of the squadron had not visibly slackened 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 181 

to any great extent. The action had lasted about two hours; 
a report of shortage of ammunition was started in the Olympia, 
and this determined the commodore to haul off and take an ac- 
count of stock and damages. Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an 
officer of the navy, now a correspondent of the New York Herald 
aboard the Olympia,^ says: 

When we hauled off from the fighting line at 7.36 o'clock, the situa- 
tion had become apparently serious for Commodore Dewey. We 
had been fighting a determined and courageous enemy for more than 
two hours without noticeably diminishing the volume of his fire. It is 
true, at least three of his ships had broken into flames, but so had one 
of ours — the Boston. These fires had all been put out without ap- 
parent injury to the ships. Generally speaking, nothing of great im- 
portance had occurred to show that we had seriously injured any 
Spanish vessel. They were all steaming about in the bight back of 
Sangley Point, or in Bacoor Bay, as actively as when we first sighted 
them in the early dawn. So far, therefore, we could see nothing indi- 
cating that the enemy was less able to defend his position than he had 
been at the beginning. 

On the other hand, our condition was greatly altered for the worse. 
There remained in the magazines of the Olympia only eighty-five 
rounds of 5-inch ammunition, and though the stock of 8-inch charges 
were not proportionately depleted, it was reduced enough to make the 
continuance of the battle for another two hours impossible. When it is 
remembered that Commodore Dewey was more than seven thousand 
miles from a home port, and that under the most favorable conditions a 
supply of ammunition could not be obtained in less than a month, the 
outlook was far from being satisfactory. The commodore knew that 
the Spaniards had just received an ample supply of ammunition in the 
transport Mindanao, so that there was no hope of exhausting their 
fighting power by an action lasting twice as long. If we should run 
short of powder and shell, we might become the hunted instead of the 
hunters. 

I do not exaggerate in the least when I say that, as we hauled off 
into the bay, the gloom on the bridge of the Olympia was thicker than 
a London fog in November. Neither Commodore Dewey nor any of 
the staff believed that the Spanish ships had been sufficiently injured 
by our fire to prevent them from renewing the battle quite as furiously 
as they had previously fought. Indeed, we had all been distinctly 
disappointed in the results of our fire. Our projectiles seemed to go 
too high or too low — just as had been the case with those fired by the 
Spaniards. Several times the commodore had expressed dissatis- 

* Mr. Stickney acted as an aid to Commodore Dewey during the battle. 



182 THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 

faction with the failure of our gunners to hit the enemy. We had 
begun the firing at too great a distance, but we had gradually worked 
in further on each of the turns, until we were within about twenty-five 
hundred yards at the close of the fifth round. At that distance, in a 
smooth sea, we ought to have made a large percentage of hits; yet, so 
far as we could judge, we had not sensibly crippled the foe. Con- 
sequently Commodore Dewey hauled out into the open bay at the end 
of the fifth round to take stock of ammunition and devise a new plan 
of attack. 

As I went aft the men asked me what we were hauling off for. 
They were in a distinctly difi'erent humor from that which prevailed 
on the bridge. They believed that they had done well, and that the 
other ships had done likewise. The Olympia cheered the Baltimore, 
and the Baltimore returned the cheers with interest. The gun- 
captains were not at all dissatisfied with the results of their work. 
Whether they had a better knowledge of the accuracy of their aim 
than we had on the bridge, or whether they took it for granted that the 
enemy must have suffered severely after so much fighting, I do not 
know; but, at any rate, they were eager to go on with the battle, and 
were confident of victory. I told one of them that we were merely 
hauling off for breakfast, which statement elicited the appeal to Cap- 
tain Lamberton, as he came past a moment later: 

"For God's sake, captain, don't let us stop now. To hell with 
breakfast!" 

Lieutenant Calkins's account says of this incident: 

Since there has been so much public discussion of the motive for 
hauling off to the northward and discontinuing our fire at 7.30 A. M., 
it may be well to submit a reconciling statement to harmonize popular 
notions with official records. We did not stop fighting because our 
men were hungry, and there was no shortage of ammunition. Never- 
theless, some seventeen hundred Americans did eat a hearty, though 
scrambling, breakfast during the next hour. The last meal seemed to 
belong to a different historic epoch, although the Olympia's people had 
had lukewarm coffee at four o'clock. Some ships' companies had 
missed even that unsatisfying refreshment. Few were glad to stop 
fighting, even for the sake of food, but all had a general sense of victory, 
though details remained questionable and the enemy's flag was still 
aloft when we ceased firing. It is true that there was some concern 
over the state of our ammunition rooms until the task of restowing and 
counting was completed. The weak point in the Olympia was the 
supply of shell for her ten o-inch rapid-fire guns. These splendid 
weapons had consumed three hundred and fifty shells in two hours — 
nearly forty per cent of the original supply. But a mere verbal under- 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 183 

standing had carried a more depressed account to those in authority, 
and the resulting inquiry consumed time and interrupted the battle. 
The 8-inch guns could hardly have expended their projectiles in a 
week's fighting and the 6-pounders were equally overstocked. 

All the same, breakfast was not a thing under such circumstances to 
be despised. The Ohjmpia had had nothing but coffee and hard bis- 
cuit at 4 o'clock. The immense nervous and physical strain of an 
early morning battle makes tremendous demands upon the powers of 
men. Even if given a sufficient breakfast, a 4-o'clock appetite is not 
generally such as to induce them to take much food. Hunger under 
the conditions of a long-continued action makes paramount demands, 
and the action apparently lengthening itself indefinitely, it was not 
unwise in the circumstances from this consideration alone to give his 
squadron the increased fighting power which would come to his seven- 
teen hundred men from full bellies. The remark of Napoleon that an 
army "travels on its belly" is doubly and trebly true when it comes to 
battle. 

Count of the ammunition was ordered, and it was found that fear of 
shortage was not justified. 

The captains were called aboard at 8.40 to report and the sur- 
prise was great when it was found that there were no serious 
casualties, and that the damage to the ships had been of the 
slightest. The Olympia had an indentation of one and one-half 
inches on the starboard side of the superstructure just forward 
of the 5-inch sponson, three deck planks slightly torn up on the 
starboard side of the forecastle, the strong back of the gig's 
davits slightly damaged, a hole between frames 65 and 66 on the 
starboard side below the main-deck rail, made by a 6-pounder, 
a lashing of port whale-boat davit shot away; one of the rail stan- 
chions carried away outside of port gangway, and a slight indenta- 
tion in the hull starboard side. The Raleigh was struck by a 
6-pounder, which passed through a whale-boat and glanced 
along the chase of the 6-pounder gun on the starboard side of 
the poop without injuring the gun or striking a man. On the 
Boston a 4.7,-inch shell had pierced the foremast thirteen feet 
seven inches above the upper deck. Three 2.7-inch shells had 
struck five feet forward of port midship 6-inch gun five feet 
above the gun-deck; another, fourteen inches above the water- 
line, passing through a state-room on the port side, WTCck- 
ing by explosion the berth and drawers; the third struck the 



184 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

hammock netting, exploding in the chart-room and causing a 
fire sufficient to be noticed by other ships during the action. 
A shell had also grazed the main topmast just below the cap. 
The Concord was not hit. The Petrel was struck below the 
hawse-pipe by a piece of bursting shell. The Baltimore, which 
offered an unusually large target from her height above the water, 
had suffered more severely. She was struck five times. The 
most serious hit, happily attended with no serious injury to any 
one, came from a 4.7-inch steel projectile, which entered the 
ship's side forward of the starboard gangway, about a foot above 
the line of the main deck. It passed through the hammock net- 
ting, downward through the deck plank and steel deck, bending 
and cracking the deck beam in wardroom state-room No. 5, then 
glancing upward through the after engine-room coaming, over 
against the after cylinder of No. 3.6-inch gun (port), carrying 
away lug and starting several shield bolts and putting the gun 
out of commission; deflected over the starboard side, striking 
a ventilator ladder and dropping on deck. In its passage it 
struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition of the fourth division, 
exploding several charges, and wounded Lieutenant Kellogg, 
Ensign Irwin, and six men of the gun's crew — none very seriously. 
A second shot came in about a foot above the berth-deck, just 
forward of the blowers, passed through the thwartship alleyway, 
hitting the exhaust pipe of the starboard blower, causing a slight 
leak. A third shot struck about two feet above the water-line 
on the port side, abreast bunker B-110, passed into the bunker, 
cutting blower drain and main air-duct, and exploding in bun- 
ker. A fourth shot came in about six feet above the berth- 
deck, starboard side, abreast the forward end of the forward 
washroom, and broke up in a clothes locker. A fifth struck 
the starboard ventilator, slighdy bending it. The upper cabin 
skylight, the after range-finder, and the two whale-boats hang- 
ing at the davits were all destroyed by the shock of discharge 
from the 8-inch guns of the second division.^ 

During the hours devoted to refreshments, to counting ammunition, 
and to consultation, the S])anish line was seen melting away; the 

' Reports of the captains, Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, Appendix 
73 et seq. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 185 

CastiUa in flames, the Reina Cristina blowing up as her magazines 
kindled, and the smaller vessels taking refuge behind the arsenal. 
Only the Don Juan de Ulloa kept her ensign flying and maintained her 
station close to the battery on Sangley Point. Two guns from this 
earthwork and two 24-cm. guns from the battery on the luneta south 
of the bastions of Manila still roared ineffectually at intervals. Four 
or five miles north of Sangley Point engines were stopped and our 
cruisers gathered in irregular groups, which continued to draw the 
enemy's fire. Now and then a shell splashed within a few hundred 
feet of one ship or another, but these demonstrations had lost interest. 
When we first found ourselves in range of the batteries at the entrance 
only twelve hours before, every nerve was strained and every gun was 
ready to answer the enemy's fire. Now we could wait while our crews 
finished breakfast and cheered themselves hoarse when comrades 
passed within hail or the enemy's ships exploded. 

Uncertainty as to the enemy's condition and anxiety about the sup- 
ply of ammunition served to obscure the magnificent completeness of 
our victory. Blockade was the next step of belligerent action, and the 
question was raised whether that operation could not be more safely 
conducted from the port of Mariveles at the entrance of the bay and 
twenty-five miles below Manila. Fortunately, it was soon made plain 
that only a shattered remnant could oppose absolute occupation of 
the whole bay.' 

It soon became clear that no further resistance of impor- 
tance was to be expected from the Spanish ships, and that the 
work remaining was in the form of an aftermath. "The Spanish 
cruiser Reina Cnstina," says the log of the Baltimore, "was ob- 
served to be hauling into shoal water behind Sangley Point, on 
fire fore and aft; a gun-boat behind same point appeared to 
be aground or sunk in shoal water; a large merchant transport 
lay beached and abandoned under shore batteries on Sangley 
Point; and two gun-boats were retiring behind mole at Cavite. 
At 9.15 the captain visited the flag-ship, returning at 10.40. At 
10.15 the Spanish cruiser CastiUa was observed to haul down her 
flag and to be on fire, and the Reina Cristina to be completely 
destroyed by fire and explosion." 

While aboard the Olympia, Captain Dyer, of the Baltimore, 
was directed to intercept a steamer coming up the bay, reported 
to be fl}ing the Spanish colors. Soon after starting he discovered 
her to be British and so reported. In the meantime, at 10.50 

» Calkins, p. 286. 



186 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

general signal had been made to follow the motions of the flag- 
ship, and five minutes later the Baltimore, by the course she had 
taken being two miles south south-west of the flag-ship and, by 
so much, nearer Cavite, was directed to lead. The general 
signal was made, " Attack the enemy's batteries or earthworks," 
and the w'hole squadron stood in, the order being the Baltimore, 
Olympia, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, and Petrel. 

The Baltimore, favored by her start, moved into a position ofF the 
Canacao and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard 
battery at about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which and 
2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stop- 
ping the engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and ac- 
curate fire upon the shore batteries and a gun-boat just inside of Sang- 
ley Point, since proven to have been the Don Antonio de Ulloa, prac- 
tically silencing the batteries in question before the fire of another 
ship became effective, owing to the lead we had obtained in our start 
for the supposed Spanish steamer.' 

The Raleigh, when signal was made to re-engage, started ahead at 
full speed (using reserve speed) to keep up with the flag-ship, but it 
was found to be impossible, and falling behind all the time I cut 
across to join line abreast of Cavite battery just as the flag-ship passed 
the Baltimore and that fort, at which time we opened fire with all guns. 
At 12, in obedience to signal, this vessel attempted to get into the inner 
harbor to destroy the enemy's vessels, but getting into shoal water — 
twenty feet — was obliged to withdraw and so reported. While at- 
tempting to get inside, the battery was used on an enemy vessel at 
anchor (supposed to be the Don Antonio de Ulloa) until she sank. 
Not being able to find a channel farther inside, and everything in 
sight having been destroyed, this vessel at 1.30 P. m. withdrew, and 
later anchored near the flag-ship.* 

The Concord was signalled to destroy a steamer which, after 
the first action, had been run ashore near Las Pinas, some four 
miles eastward across the bay from Sangley Point. In pass- 
ing, the Concord fired with great effect with her 6-inch guns at 
the curtain of the fort at Cavite, and at two of the vessels. 
Opening fire on the steamer ashore from a distance of 2,500 
yards, the latter's crew deserted her in some ten boats and 
landed on the beach. Before the two boats lowered by the Con- 

' Captain Dyer's report. 
* Captain Coghlan's report. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 187 

cord for the purpose of setting fire to the ship had reached her, 
she burst into flames and was soon wholly destroyed. 

It turned out that this was the mail-steamer Isla de Min- 
danao, which had been advertised to leave for Barcelona May 7. 
She had just arrived and was advised, April 30, by Admiral 
Montojo to go to Singapore, as the American squadron could 
probably not get to the entrance of the bay before midnight. 
But with the common paralysis which seemed to seize the Span- 
ish mind in such an emergency, the captain did nothing except 
to follow the admiral's permission to anchor in shallow water 
as near as possible to Bacoor. He seems, from the admiral's 
report, to have based his inaction on the fact that "he was not 
authorized by the Trans-Atlantic (Company) to leave the port."^ 

The chief engineer Duncan McKinlay, a British subject, in 
his report to the office of the Trasatlantica Company in Madrid, 
says: 

At 1 o'clock p. M. two American cruisers came toward the Mindanao. 
All of us officers were on deck, wondering what they wanted to do with 
our ship and ourselves, when they suddenly opened a galling fire on us. 
After the first few shots, fire broke out in the captain's cabin, who, seeing 
that it would be futile to remain on board, ordered the crew to take to 
the boats, which was done in good order, while the enemy continued to 
fire on the ship. Luckily no casualties occurred either on board the 
Mindanao or in the boats, nor while landing on the beach, although 
the shells fell very near.* 

The Ulloa seems to have served as a general target. Says 
Lieutenant Fiske of the Petrel: 

We engaged first a vessel, which afterward proved to be the Don 
Antonio de Ulloa, and we fired on her for a long time without seeming 

* This steamer had aboard two 9-cm. (3.55-inch) guns, but no ammunition. 
A telegram had been received on April 28 to fit her for war. Says the chief 
engineer: "At 12.25 not a Spanish flag was flying in the harbor, except from 
the staff of the sunken cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, submerged behind 
Sangley Point. The Reina Cristina was a mass of flames and sunk near the 
bastion at Cavite, and the Castilla was burning rapidly in Canacao Bay. 
The remaining vessels of the Spanish fleet sought refuge behind the arsenal, 
and several of them were on fire; the guns at the Cavite and Sangley batteries 
had almost ceased firing and a white flag appeared upon the sheers at the 
arsenal." (Report of Lieutenant-Commander Colvocoresses, executive officer 
of Concord, to Commander Walker. 

"Admiral Montojo Before Public Opinion and Before History, 134. 



188 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

to do much damage or eliciting any reply. We afterward found that 
the ship had been abandoned, and that, while our projectiles had 
pierced her a great many times, they had not really inflicted on her 
any very serious injury. One shell, however, went over to the arsenal, 
and went through the commandant's house (so we heard afterward), 
and passed through the dining-room, where a number of people were 
together. The result was the immediate hauling down of the Spanish 
flag (12.30 p. M.) and the hoisting of the white flag. As soon as this was 
known aboard the flag-ship, she hoisted the signal long expected by us, 
"Petrel, pass inside." This signal was shortly followed by another to 
us to burn the Spanish ships. 

These events, as seen ashore, are thus described by the com- 
mandant of the Cavite Navy Yard: 

The order to sink the ships which had taken refuge in Bacoor Bay 
having been carried out . . . the enemy had to concentrate his fire 
on the arsenal, directing against it a furious and destructive cannon- 
ade. The situation in a few moments became very serious. The 
Guadalupe gun useless, the two on the esplanade of the sheers injured, 
their fire in any case not bearing in the proper direction, left the arsenal 
without any means of attack against the enemy. The useless cannon 
being abandoned, the only offensive means were the Mausers with 
which the men had provided themselves in expectancy of a landing. 
On their part the ships of the hostile squadron, distributed in the 
quadrant north-east of the arsenal, swept it, unresisted, with a fierce 
and destructive fire; it was not a battle, but a slaughter, since the gar- 
rison of the arsenal found itself reduced to impotence. The many 
wounded disembarked from the squadron were forsaken; each instant 
the fierce fire of the enemy added to their number. Orders were thus 
given for the concentration of the men behind the lienzo (curtain) south 
of the wall of Fort San Felipe, the only shelter left the undefended 
arsenal. This protection lasted but a while, as the Petrel came to the 
south-west without apprehension from the destroyed vessels at Bacoor. 
She enfiladed the refuge with her guns, firing with impunity against 
the people collected there and who saw themselves newly uncovered. 
The means of defence already exhausted, abandoned by the garrison 
of the army post, which fired not a single shot during this terrible 
slaughter, and seeing that at each instant the number of victims in- 
creased, without advantage or benefit of any kind. Commodore Sostoa 
determined to sacrifice no more lives and finally ordered the white flag 
to be hoisted. . . .' 

» Defensa de General Sostoa, 80-82. (The title of general is old Spanish usage 
for commodore and ranks above.) 



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190 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The duty of destruction, a work which was naturally to the 
satisfaction of the Spanish admiral himself, whose code required 
the destruction of his ships before surrendering, is thus de- 
scribed by Commander Wood in his official report: 

Lieutenant Hughes was sent with a whale-boat's crew of seven men, 
this whale-boat being the only one on the ship which would float, and 
set fire to the Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, General 
Lezo, and Marques del Duero. Afterward Ensign Fermier was sent 
to set fire to the Velasco and El Correo (Elcanof). The Isla de Cuba, 
Isla de Luzon, and Don Juan de Austria were aground and full of 
water when they were fired. Their outboard valves were opened and 
the ships allowed to fill. The breech-plugs of 4-inch [4.7] guns had 
been taken off and could not be found. During the night the maga- 
zines of the Don Juan de Austria blew up. The Manila was not 
burned because the Spanish officers begged that she be not destroyed, 
because she was unarmed and a coast-survey vessel. Lieutenant Fiske 
and Passed Assistant Engineer Hall raised steam on the ship this 
morning, the 4th instant, and brought her out. At the time she was 
aground. The Don Antonio de Ulloa was sunk, and the Reina Cris- 
tina and Castilla were burning in the outer harbor. 

Lieutenant Fiske was sent ashore and brought ofT two tug-boats, 
the Rdpido and Hercules, and three steam-launches. 

I was anchored in Cavite harbor from 12.50 to 5.20 P. M., when I got 
under way and returned to the fleet. 

There were no casualties or accidents of any kind, the ship having 
been struck only once, just beneath hawse-pipe, by a piece of shell, 
which burst just as it sank, and threw a column of water over the 
forecastle. 

This plain and matter-of-fact statement, however, should be 
supplemented by Lieutenant Fiske's admirably graphic account 
of the ending of the battle. 

During the time of the withdrawal of the American fleet the Span- 
iards had run their ships as close in as the depth of water permitted, 
and abandoned them. W^e supposed, of course, that they had laid 
trains to their magazines, so that the task of burning them would be 
by no means a safe one. The cai)tain at once told the executive officer, 
Hughes, to go and burn them, and called for volunteers. The call for 
volunteers was immediately answered by a chorus of voices, the first 
being that of a seaman named Sprong, who called out instantly, 
"Here's one." 

The Petrel had anchored near the long stone bastion of the arsenal, 
but from that position we could not see the Spanish ships that Hughes 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 191 

went in to bum. The consequence was that soon after he started off 
he was lost to sight behind the bastion. I immediately went to the 
pilot-house to consult the chart and see if it was not possible to go in still 
farther, to a place where we could get a good view of the arsenal and 
the party of Hughes. I soon saw that it was possible, and went on the 
bridge to tell the captain so; but before I could suggest the matter, he 
said, "Don't you think we can get in closer?" I replied, "I know we 
can, sir, because I have just looked it up." So we picked up the 
anchor and steamed to the southward, to a position where our keel 
just cleared the bottom. 

We saw a lot of nice-looking tugs and launches, and what seemed to 
be several thousand soldiers and sailors in the arsenal grounds. The 
captain said he thought that he ought to get as many of those tugs and 
launches as he could, as they might be very useful; I replied that it 
would be very easy to get them. He then called for volunteers, which 
were very quickly got, and in a few minutes I shoved off and went 
alongside of the arsenal dock, with half a dozen men. I never had 
at any time during either the Spanish or the Filipino war the slightest 
trouble with the men in pushing them ahead, but always trouble in 
holding them back. On this occasion as I went alongside of the dock 
I had to reiterate my order to remain in the boat and not load their 
muskets. 

I got up on the stone dock and looked about me. I had scarcely 
done so when I saw advancing toward me a large number of Spanish 
officers, I should say from recollection at least twenty-five; behind 
them, farther up the dock, was what looked to me like a small army of 
soldiers drawn up in regular formation under arms, and a crowd of 
some hundred sailors, who did not seem to be in any formation what- 
ever, but walking about as they pleased though armed. I advanced 
toward the officers and they advanced toward me, and we exchanged 
punctilious salutes. We tried to talk in English and Spanish, but they 
could not talk English well enough, and I could not talk Spanish well 
enough, but I managed to get along fairly well with one of the officers 
in French. 

The Spanish officers seemed to be somewhat excited, and they asked 
me questions that I could not at first understand; but finally I found 
out that there were two principal questions: one was whether the firing 
from the American ships would begin again, and the other question was 
whether they would be permitted to go back on board their ships, 
which they had abandoned in such haste that they had left behind 
them their pocket-money, and the pictures of their families, and all 
their clothes. In reply to their first question, I told them that the 
Americans had recognized their white flag and that they would not 
fire again at the arsenal, but would respect their white flag so long 
as they — the Spaniards — respected it. This statement seemed to 
gratify them, and they all cried out, "Americanos siempre caballeros!" 



192 THE SPANISH-AISIERICAN WAR 

To this I replied, "Siempre." To the other question as to whether 
they could f^o on board their ships and get their belongings, I replied 
I had not the authority to give them that permission, but that I had 
a boat there, and, it' any of them wished, I would allow them to take it 
and go over to the Petrel, and that I was sure the captain would give 
them permission. My remark seemed to strike them queerly, for they 
half smiled and remarked that they did not care to take advantage of 
my kind offer. I then said, "Very well, I will go over myself and ask 
the captain and come back and tell you what he says." I did this 
and soon returned with the captain's permission. They were await- 
ing my reply, and when I told them that the captain gave his free per- 
mission on the condition that none of them would attempt to put out 
the fire on board their ships, they seemed much pleased, and some of 
them said again, "Americanos siempre caballeros." Now the peculiar 
ending of this incident was that, although there were quite a number of 
small boats at hand, belonging to the arsenal, not one of these officers 
went to a ship or took advantage in any way of the permission they had 
requested and received. 

My men were soon engaged in the work of clearing away the fasten- 
ings which held the tugs and launches; and for some reason which I 
cannot now remember this work was not easy. Seeing a number of 
Spanish sailors congregated about, looking on with languid interest, I 
told a couple of them to help. This they did without any objection, 
and I soon had a number of our enemies pulling and hauling and 
working away like good sailors. The consequence was that in an 
hour or two I was going back to the Petrel with two large tugs, three 
steam-launches, and some smaller boats. 

_ By this time Hughes had returned to the Petrel, having with the as- 
sistance of Ensign Fermier fully carried out his dangerous work, and 
the rest of the fleet was well out in the bay. Then the Petrel steamed 
up toward it, towing our prizes. At nightfall the whole fleet started 
toward Manila city, lighted on our way by the brilliant flames of the 
ships of our conquered foes. 

It was, of course, as events turned, a needless destruction, 
but, done in the heat and excitement of action, and with the 
uncertainties of the moment, not to be criticised from a cool 
stand-point. 

The Spanish commandant seems to have taken Lieutenant 
Fiske's statement of what he proposed to do as a message from 
Commodore Dewey, stipulating that the ships must be burned 
or the cannonade continue. Despite his helplessness in such a 
situation, he went through the form of soliciting by Commander 
Sidrach, who carried his message, his admiral's authorization 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 193 

for "such convention," an "authorization which the admiral 
granted by the same channel," a curious instance of Spanish 
officialdom. "A Httle later," by Spanish account, "a second 
American officer arrived at the arsenal, expressing on the part 
of the commodore the desire that the batteries of Corregidor 
would not fire on the American ships on their leaving the bay, 
in exchange for which the ships would not fire upon them." 
There was again an evident difficulty in understanding one 
another, the Spanish officials evidently taking the message to 
mean the withdrawal of the American squadron from the bay, 
while Dewey's intention was merely to cause the surrender of 
the batteries without the necessity of an attack. In any case, 
Sostoa made a new reference to his admiral at the convent 
near by, with the result shown in the following telegram, sent 
at 5.15 P. M. from the latter to the senior naval officer in Manila 
for transmission to the governor-general: 

Second attack was upon fortifications, arsenal of Cavite and ships 
which had taken refuge in Bacoor Bay. Ships were abandoned the 
last moment and sunk. Commandant-general asked for parley with 
commander-in-chief of hostile squadron to place women and children 
in safety. He replied that it was not his intention to injure the town, 
but to destroy our fleet and burn the ships which had been sunk. 
The commandant-general consulted me on this point and I consented 
in view of the circumstances [!]. They asked, moreover, that they 
be not fired upon by the batteries when they left the harbor. Tell the 
governor-general of this in my name, asking for his decision, and in 
case he acquiesces a tug must be sent to Corregidor to give instructions 
not to fire.^ 

Evidently there was much confusion of ideas, but the sober 
expression of consent to a demand understood to be made, and 
impossible in any event to resist, and its reference to still another 
superior officer, are but antecedent phases of the difficulties 
which the defeated Spanish officer must prepare himself to meet 
in the coming court upon his conduct. 

Turning to Admiral Montojo's report, we have a very fair 
account of the battle as seen from the Spanish side; he says: 

* Admiral Montojo Before Public Opinion and Before History, 102. 



194 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

At 4 A. M. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4.45 the Austria 
signalled the enemy's squadron, a few minutes after which they were 
rccof^nized, in a somewhat confused column parallel with ours, at 
about 6,000 metres distant; the flag-ship Olympia ahead, followed 
by the Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, Helena,^ Petrel, and 
McCulloch,- and the two transports Zafiro and Nashan. 

The force of these vessels, excepting the transports that were non- 
combatant, amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horse-power, 163 guns 
(many of which were rapid-fire), 1,750 men in their crews, and of an 
average velocity of about 17 miles. The power of our only five effective 
ships for battle was represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horse-power, 
76 guns (very short of rapid-fire), 1,875' crew, and a maximum speed 
of 12 miles. 

At 5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots 
fell short, and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots were not 
answered by the enemy, whose principal object was the squadron. 

This battery only had two Ordonez guns of 15 centimetres [5.9- 
inch] mounted, and but one of these could fire in the direction of the 
opposing fleet. 

In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 
5.15 I made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered 
immediately. The battle became general. We slipped the springs 
and the cables and started ahead with the engines, so as not to be 
enveloped by the enemy. 

The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us number- 
less projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted 
themselves almost entirely to an attack upon the Cristina, my flag-ship. 
A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the 
forecastle, and put out of action all those who served the four rapid- 
fire guns, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the 
helmsman on the bridge, upon which Lieutenant Jose Nunez took the 
wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering 
until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile another shell exploded 
in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately 
able to control. 

The enemy shortened the distance between us, and rectifying his 
aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. About 7.30 one 
shell destroyed completely the steering-gear. I ordered to steer by 
hand, remaining without steering power in this interval, which was 
lengthened by the explosion of another shell on the poop, which put 
out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead and 

' In the Atlantic. ^ Not in action. 

^A grave discrepancy from Montojo's later statement 1134 (seep. 205). 
1,875 is evidently an error, as the number is much in excess even of the stand- 
ard complements (10(34) of the seven ships noted on p. 170. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 195 

gaff, bringing down the ensign and my flag, which were replaced im- 
mediately. A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the 
hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated 
there. Another exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the 
quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering- 
gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the maga- 
zines when it was already beginning to reach the cartridge-room. 

Amidships several shells of smaller calibre went through the smoke- 
stack and one of the larger ones penetrated the fire-room, putting out 
of action one master gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another 
rendered useless the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, 
fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull 
and exploded on the deck. 

The broadside guns, yet without material injuries, continued firing, 
and one gunner with one seaman, the only ones remaining unhurt, 
went on firing them as they were loaded by the men on general duty 
about deck, who replaced repeatedly those who were put out of action 
at the guns. 

The ship being out of control; the hull, smoke-pipe, and mast rid- 
dled with shot; enveloped in the flames of two fires; half of her crew 
out of action, among whom were seven officers, I gave the order to 
sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, mak- 
ing signal at the same time to the Cuba and Luzon to assist in saving 
the rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the Duero and 
the arsenal. 

I abandoned the Cristina, directing beforehand to secure her flag, 
and accompanied by my staff', and in profound grief, I hoisted my flag 
on the cruiser Isla de Cuba. 

After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, a shell 
destroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was direct- 
ing the rescue. 

The Ulloa, which also defended herself with tenacity, using the only 
two guns which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the 
water-line, putting out of action her commander and half of her small 
crew, which was only that indispensable for the service of the two 
guns already mentioned. 

The Castilla, which fought heroically, was left with her artillery 
useless, except one stern gun, with which they continued to fight vigor- 
ously; she was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy's shells, 
then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew in the best order, and well 
directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Morgado. The casualties 
on this ship were twenty-three killed and eighty wounded. 

The Austria, very much damaged and with bunkers on fire, went 
to the aid of the Castilla. The Luzon had three guns dismounted, and 
was slightly damaged in the hull. The Duero was left with one of her 



196 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

engines useless, the bow gun of 12 centimetres and one of the re- 
doubts. 

At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron havmg sus- 
pended its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take posi- 
tions in the bottom of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the 
last moment, and that they should be sunk before they surrendered. 

At 10.30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal 
and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horriJDlc 
fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which 
we still had mounted. 

There remained the last recourse, to sink our vessels, and we ac- 
complished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguish- 
ing pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech-plugs 
of the guns, and the signal codes. 

After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo 
de Cavite, to be treated for a wound received in the left leg, and to 
telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.' 

The following transcript of the log of the Ohjmpia for the 
next few days shows history as written in a ship's log. It begins 
with the first dog-watch of May 1, the Olympia now at anchor 
after the second action: 

4 to 6 p. M. 

Clear to warm. Light to gentle breeze from S. E. At 4.10 Con- 
cord, and at 4.25 Boston, went over to Cavite. 

M. M. Taylor, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

6 to 8 p. M. 

Partly cloudy and warm, with light airs to light breeze from S. S. E. 
The Petrel came over from Cavite with several small launches in tow, 
anchoring near at hand. The commanding officer of Petrel came on 
board, and reported having burned several Spanish gun-boats, and 
captured a Spanish signal book. During the watch several explosions 
took place among the gun-boats on fire at Cavite. Compartments re- 
ported dry. Barometer steady. 

F. Brooks Upham, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

8 p. M. to Midnight. 

Light breeze from S. E. Weather fair and pleasant. At 10.45 the 
Concord coming from Cavite signalled (Ardois), "Have Spanish officer 

» The report printed in El Mundo Naval Ilustrado of August 1, 1898, is 
followed, as being fuller, in some respects, than that in Montojo's Defence 
{Montojo Ante la Opinion y Ante la Historia), 93 et seq. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 197 

on board with important communication for commander-in-chief," 
and at 1 1 Commander Walker and two Spanish army officers from the 
general commanding came on board and had an interview with the 
commodore. 

V. S. Nelson, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 

MONDAY, MAY 2, 1898 

Midnight to 4 a. m. 

Fair and pleasant. Light breeze from north and N. N. E. Com- 
partments dry. A Spanish officer, purporting to represent the captain 
of the port of Manila, came on board, and represented that he was on 
his way to Corregidor Island to instruct the forts there not to fire on 
the U. S. fleet. 

Stokely Morgan, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 

4 A.M. to 8 A. M. 

Clear and pleasant. Light airs from N. N. E. to calm. Compart- 
ments dry. At 6.30 the McCulloch shifted her anchorage. At 7 the 
Petrel got under way and stood over to Cavite. At 7 made the uniform 
and dress signal. 

S. M. Strite, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 

8 A. M. to Meridian. 

Clear and warm. Calm to light breeze from N. N. E. The rep- 
resentative of the senior Spanish naval officer in port, who left during 
the night purporting to take a message to the commandant at Corregi- 
dor not to fire on the U. S. fleet, returned, and at noon returned to Cor- 
regidor on the U. S. S. Raleigh, which ship was accompanied by the 
U. S. S. Baltimore. The U. S. S. Concord returned from Cavite in 
obedience to signal at 11, and after communicating returned to Cavite. 
At 11.35 the fort at Cavite fired on the U. S. S. Boston, who returned 
the fire, and at 11.45 the Boston signalled, "Enemy has hoisted flag of 
truce." The U. S. S. Petrel returned from Cavite at 11, and went back 
after communicating. 

M. M. Taylor, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

Meridian to 4 p. m. 

Calm and light airs from west and south. Weather fair and hot. At 
11.55 called all hands up anchor, got underway and stood across the 
bay for Cavite, and at 3.30 anchored off Cavite in 7^ fathoms of water 



198 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

and veered to 30 fathoms on starboard chain. Observed several hun- 
dred troops marching across the peninsula from Cavite toward San 
Roque. 

V. S. Nelson, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 

4 P. M. to 6 P. M. 

Clear and warm. Calm to light airs from S. W. Sent landing 
party on shore under Lieutenant Morgan, U. S. N., to destroy Spanish 
batteries. English man-of-war, and tug-boat flying the Spanish flag, 
came in. Concord under way to overhaul them. Zafiro under way. 
IMustered at evening quarters. Discovered lenses for two broadside 
and after search-lights were broken. 

A. G. Kavanagh, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

6 P. M. to 8 p. M. 

Clear and pleasant. Calm to light airs from E. S. E. Compart- 
ments dry. H. M. S. Linnet, accompanied by a Spanish tug, came 
near the anchorage. The commander-in-chief sent the Concord to 
board the English man-of-war, and to capture the Spanish tug. At 
7.30 the Concord returned to the anchorage with the tug. At 7.50 the 
party in charge of Lieutenant Morgan, ordered to destroy guns in 
Cavite, returned on board. 

S. M. Strite, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 

8 P. M. to Midnight. 

Clear and warm. Light airs from E. S. E. At ILSO U. S. S. 
Raleigh and Baltimore returned from harbor entrance and anchored. 
Compartments dry. 

M. M. Taylor, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1898 

Midnight to 4 A. M. 

Partly cloudy and moonlight, with light airs from E. S. E. to light 
airs and light breeze from N. N. E. Riding to wind. Lights were seen 
moving about in the vicinity of Cavite, and three volleys were heard 
fired in same vicinity.' 

F. Brooks Upham, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

• Note by author. These were fired by Concord. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 199 

4 A. M. to 8 A. M. 

Wind light N. N. E. Weather fair and warm. Compartments 
dry. Concord and Raleigh left for Corregidor at 6 o'clock. Sent 
Zafiro in shore to capture steamer Isabel I. 

V. S. Nelson, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 

8 A. M. to Meridian. 

Clear and warm. Calm to light airs from N. by W. U. S. S. 
Petrel got under way about 9 o'clock, and stood off the city of Manila. 
The Zafiro captured a Spanish steamer, Isabel I, about 10 o'clock, 
and towed it near our anchorage. Hauled the captured tug Rdpido 
alongside and began repairing machinery. The landing parties 
ashore for the purpose of destroying the Spanish batteries around 
Cavite returned on board. 

A. G. Kavanagh, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

Meridian to 4 p. m. 

Clear and hot. Light airs to light breeze from south. Sent burial 
party from squadron to bury unknown dead in Cavite. Sent tug to 
transfer sick from hospital on reservation, but her services were de- 
clined. U. S. S. Petrel went to arsenal to tow out transport Manila, 
but could not, she being aground. 

M. M. Taylor, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

6 p. M. to 8 p. M. 

Light breeze from S. E. Weather fair and hot. At 5.30 mustered 
at quarters, and had setting-up drill. Lieutenant Morgan and party 
returned on board at seven o'clock. Raleigh and Concord in sight 
returning from Corregidor. Compartments dry. Engineer's force at 
work repairing launches Rdpido and Vicia. 

V. S. Nelson, 

Lieutenant, U. S. N. 

8 p. M. to Midnight. 

Cloudy but pleasant. Light to gentle breeze from N. E. to north. 
Raleigh and Concord returned and anchored about 8.45. Compart- 
ments reported dry. For fighting, J. Maice (sea) and T. Bates (Pr. 
M.) were placed in single irons to await action of commanding officer. 

A. G. Kavanagh, 

Ensign, U. S. N. 

A good deal, however, had happened of which but little or 
nothing appears in the scant "remarks" of the officer at the 
deck. 



200 THE SPANISH-A^IERICAN WAR 

The Olympia had anchored, after the firing had ceased, about 
four miles north of Sangley Point and about the same distance 
from Manila, the light-house at the mouth of the Pasig River 
bearing north 57° east (magnetic). By 4 o'clock the Balti- 
more and Raleigh were anchored near the flag-ship. The 
Petrel was still busy in shore with her work of destruction, and 
did not arrive until 7, when she returned towing six captured 
launches. The Boston and Concord came out, but both were 
soon sent to the vicinity of Cavite, where they were later joined 
by the Petrel. 

About 3 P. M. the British consul at Manila, Mr. Rawson 
Walker, came aboard the flag-ship, on behalf of the foreign resi- 
dents, to request that the city should not be injured. Dewey, 
though he had no intention of action against it unless attacked 
himself, consented on consideration of being supplied with coal 
and having the facilities of the cable to Hong-Kong. Though 
to these demands the governor-general would not accede, it was 
understood that no shots would be fired. The question of the 
cable was to be solved by the cutting of it at 2 A. m.. May 2, and 
taking the ends aboard the Zajiro, action which cut off Manila 
itself from the outer world. 

On the morning after the battle. May 2, Commander Lam- 
berton, Dewey's chief-of-staff, went in the Petrel to take pos- 
session of the arsenal. Says Lamberton: 

I steamed in close to the wall of the arsenal and with an armed 
boat's crew landed at the usual landing. Captain Sostoa, with his 
aid, a tall young medical officer acting as interpreter, met me at the 
landing and escorted me to his office near by. I explained my mission 
but si)ecified no time for complying with it. Captain Sostoa requested 
time to consult and to my question as to with whom, mentioned "my 
government at Madrid; "^the captain-general of the Philippines; my 
admiral." I promptly refused each one, and then he said, "With 
my officers." Knowing he was fighting for time, I replied "YesI 
you can have two hours to consult. At twelve o'clock you can hoist 
the white flag in token of unconditional surrender, or the Spanish 
flag which we will fire upon as soon as we see it." I then returned to 
the Petrel and steamed down to the flag-ship and reported what had 
taken place. The admiral replied, "Very well, Lamberton, go back 
and finish up your job." I again went to the Petrel and steamed 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 201 

down toward Cavite. At 1L30 a. m. it was reported to me that a 
white flag had been hoisted over the arsenal. 

When Lamberton reached the landing again there was no one 
to receive him, and upon going up to Captain Sostoa's office, he 
found that the entire naval contingent had marched away. 

Lamberton continuing says: 

Passing through the yard, I went to the gates and locked them. 
Shortly after I met a Spanish military officer in full uniform, who 
introduced himself as Colonel Pazos of the Seventy-fourth Spanish 
Line, who informed me that he commanded two regiments of troops 
outside the arsenal, in Cavite. He explained the predicament he was 
in and requested leave to remove his troops. I made no terms with 
him, but advised him to remove at once and to give us no cause to 
fire upon him. [Commander Lamberton here pays him a personal 
compliment.] I advised him to make a straight wake for Manila. 
He vacated before sundown and we had complete possession without 
having any prisoners or incumbrances on shore.^ 

Colonel Pazos was captured by the insurgents on his way to 
Manila, but suffered no harm. 

Commodore Sostoa, though his previous hoisting of the white 
flag was a virtual surrender and though his departure without 
awaiting Commander Lamberton's return is open to criticism, 
had to keep in mind the military code of Spain, which is applied 
in cases of surrender often with irrational severity, as several 
were to find by personal experience. He is, too, the more easily 
excused as, however irregular his proceeding, his going away 
removed any difficulties which might have arisen as to the care 
of prisoners, a burden of which Commodore Dewey was more 
than satisfied to be free.^ 

* Commander (now Rear-Admiral) Lamberton to author. 

^ That Sostoa's fears were well founded is shown by the fact that both he 
and Admiral Montojo were put in the prison of San Francisco, Madrid, on 
March 4, 1899, pending a trial which was not completed until September of 
that year. The prison treatment was of extreme humiliation. The cells were 
small, with walls covered with obscene inscriptions; the prison bars were ex- 
amined frequently by a sergeant and two privates. "Nothing," says the 
document from which this is taken, "can give an idea of the squalidness of 
those infamous quarters. At the very entrance the heart felt oppressed by 
the darkness of the corridors, the scaled off walls and the total absence of 



202 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

The situation of the Spanish ships at the end of the action, as 
described by Lieutenant Ellicott, who made a careful examina- 
tion of the ships and their injuries, was as follows: The Reina 
Crisiina, which was the flag-ship of the admiral during the 
greater part of the action, was sunk in the shoal water under 
the north wall of Cavite, heading eastward, where she burned, 
with her bulwarks awash. The Costilla, which had been moored 
head and stern, with a string of iron lighters loaded with sand as 
a protection to her water-line, had sunk to her main deck. All her 
upper works had been consumed. The Don Antonio de JJlloa, 
which had been under repair, with part of her machinery and 
port battery ashore, was sunk by gun-fire and lay with her poop 
awash and the forecastle and superstructure above water. The 
Don Juan de Austria had been sunk by her crew behind Cavite 
arsenal, heading east. She was set afire by the Petrel and burned 
from the after engine-room bulkhead to the stern. The same 
fate happened to the Isla de Luzon, the Isla de Cuba, the Marques 
del Duero (which was entirely gutted by the fire), the Velasco 
(not seriously burned), the General Lezo, and the Argos. The 
ships had all been sunk in shallow water, so that a considerable 

whitewash and paint." After describing the situation of the cells, the docu- 
ment continues: " In cell No. 1 was General Jaudenes (the governor of Manila 
at the surrender). . . . No. 2 was not as good. . . . Here was General Toral 
(who signed the capitulations at Santiago), sick at heart and in body, whose 
only diversion was the contemplation of the squalid walls and ceiling covered 
with objectionable inscriptions and obscenities. Admiral Montojo was locked 
up in cell No. 3. This cell had no alcove and was still more filthy than the pre- 
ceding one. ... It was impossible to look out. . . . Further on was cell No. 
4, occupied by Commodore Don Enrique Sostoa, smaller than the others and, 
if possible, more squalid and obscene." {Admiral Montojo Before Public 
Opinion and Before History, by C. P., 309, et seq.) 

The following decree was published in the Gaceta de Madrid on the 12th of 
October, 1899: 

"As proposed by the minister of marine, in accordance with the council 
of ministers: 

" In the name of my august son the King Don Alfonso XIII, and as Queen 
Regent of the kingdom: 

"I order the retirement from active service of Don Patricio Montojo y 
Pasaron, rear-admiral in the navy, who will be placed on the reserve list, and 
forbidden to discharge any public duties. This by virtue of the sentence 
passed by the Supreme Council of War and Marine acting as Court of Justice, 
on the 21st of September of the present year, in proceedings instituted in 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 



203 



portion of their works was still above the surface. The de- 
struction was not so complete but that the Isla de Cuba, Isla de 
Luzon, and Don Juan de Austria were raised later, sent to Hong- 
Kong under their own steam, repaired, and taken into service. 

The following ammunition was expended in the American 
squadron: 



SHIP 


8-INCH 


6-INCH 


5-INCH 


6- 

POTJNDER 


3- 

POUNDER 


1- 

POUNDEK 


TOTALS 


Olympia . . 
Boston . . . 
Baltimore . . 
Raleigh . . 
Concord . . 
Petrel . . . 


36 
48 
73 


162 
122 
53 
182 
116 


281 
341 


1,000 

220 
547 
137 
220 


256 

120 
313 


361 
400 
692 
100 
60 
19 


1,678 

1,086 

1,434 

631 

582 
448 




157 


635 


622 


2,124 


689 


1,632 


5,859 



single instance [i. e., without appeal] in the matter of the destruction of the 
fleet of the naval station in the Philippines, and surrender of the arsenal of 
Cavite. 

" Given at San Sebastian, October 10, 1899. 

"Maria Cristina. 
"The Minister of Marine, 

"Jose Gomez Imaz." 

A similar royal order was published in the Official Journal of the Ministry 
of War, concerning the sentence of the Supreme Council of War and Marine, 
imposing the same penalty on General of Division Don Fermin Jaudenes y 
Alvarez, for the capitulation of Manila on August 13, 1899. Concerning the 
trial of the latter official, see: "Defensa del General Jaudenes, Hecha por el 
General de Brigada Don Ignacio Salinas y Angulo. Leida el 29 de Septembre 
de 1899 ante el Consejo Supremo de Guerra y Marina, reunida en Sala de 
Justicia." 

Such treatment of honorable and brave men, who had done their duty 
and who, in the circumstances in which they were placed, succumbed but to 
the inevitable, is a stain upon the honor of Spain. Certainly Montojo's most 
gallant conduct deserved a better fate. His sentence, just given above, was, 
from an American stand-point, of extreme rigor and injustice. Sostoa was 
acquitted, notwithstanding that he had hoisted the white flag at 12.15 of 
May 1 at the arsenal, without referring to his near-by commander-in-chief, who 
was at the convent just outside the arsenal walls. His act, though he stated 
that it was merely to obtain a truce for the removal of women and children, 
could not be regarded by the Americans, at least, as other than a true sur- 
render. The fiscals (the prosecuting officers) passed over that event very lightly. 



204 THE SPANISH-AIVIERICAN WAR 

The ammunition remaining after battle was as follows; 



SHIP 


8-INCH 


6-INCH 


5-INCH 


6- 

POUNDER 


3- 

POUNDER 


1- 

PODNDER 


Olympia 


312 




318 


6,080 




3,539 


Boston 


138 


248 




948 


2,131 


1,712 


Baltimore .... 


211 


454 




1,319 




3,428 


Raleigh 




86 


565 


3,863 




2,267 


Concord 




255 




718 


814 


1,250 


Petrel 




274 






745 





The number of hits noted by Lieutenant Ellicott was as fol- 
lows : 



VESSEL 


8-INCH 


6-INCH 






6 PDR. 


UNSPECIFIED 


TOTAL 


5-INCH 


LARGE 


SMALL 


UN- 
KNOWN 


Reina Cristina . . 
Castilla .... 
Don Antonio de Ul- 

loa 

Don Juan de A ustria 
Isla de Luzon . . 
Isla de Cuba . . 
Marques del Duero 
Velasco .... 
General Lezo . . 
Argos 


5 

4 

1 


2 

3 
2 

1 


1 


5 

2 

5 
4 


7 
3 

10 
5 

4 
2 


13 
4 

14 

1 

1 


1 


9 
6 

1 
2 


2 

1 
1 
1 
1 


39 

37 

37 
13 
3 
5 
5 
1 
1 
1 










Total .... 


10 


8 26 


31 


33 


28 


6 


142 



Lieutenant Ellicott thinks that the number of hits noted on 
Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, represent prob- 
ably not more than half the shots which took effect. As the 
total number of shots fired by the American squadron during 
the action was 5,859, the percentage of hits noted was 2.43. If 
the number against the first three ships in the table be doubled 
the percentage would be 4.35. 

The injuries to the crews were as disproportionate as those to 
ships. Of the 1,743 Americans engaged, but two officers and 
six men of the Baltimore were slighdy wounded by splinters. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 



205 



Of the Spanish, the losses as established by Lieutenant Ellicott, 
of the Baltimore, "by painstaking inquiry," were as follows: 





KILLED 


WOUNDED 


TOTAL 


Reina Cristina 


130 
23 


90 
80 
2 
6 
22 
10 

4 


220 

103 

2 

6 

22 

18 

10 


Castilla 

Isla de Cuba 






Don Juan de Aiistria 

Don Antonio de Ulloa 


8 
6 


McLTQues del Duero 


Shore batteries 




Total 


167 


214 


381 



Montojo's own statement differs somewhat from this as to 
totals: he gives in his final statement but 1,134* as the number 
of his men, and the casualties: 



In the squadron 
In the navy yard 

Total . . . 



58 
17 



75 



WOUNDED 



236 
45 



281 



294 
62 



356 



Lieutenant Ellicott's return of but ten casualties ashore would 
appear from many accounts much too small. 

The wounded and sick at the naval hospital at Canacao, num- 
bering some 300, were sent to Manila under flag of truce. "A 
small marine guard was detailed to guard the navy yard. Work- 
ing parties were sent ashore to disable the guns at Sangley Point, 
which was easily effected by exploding a ring of gun-cotton 
disks around the chase of each gun. The magazine was inci- 
dentally blown up during the operation. Much small-arm am- 
munition was dumped into the bay at Cavite, whence the Fili- 
pinos afterward recovered it and refilled the cartridges. Some 

^ El Almirante Montojo ante la Opinion y ante la Historia, 149. 



206 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of the smaller rapid-fire guns were recovered from the wrecks, 
and the Manila and Callao were destined to bristle with an 
eccentric armament. Some of the larger guns were also recov- 
ered from the ships, but breech-blocks were lacking, and rust 
and fire were allowed to do their work on the main batteries. 
The Filipinos were allowed to gather some weapons from the 
arsenal — perhaps a hundred serviceable rifles, a trivial pair of 
bronze howitzers, and two or three old smooth-bore guns were 
the only important items — all abandoned by the Spaniards as 
not worth carrying away." ^ 

On May 3, in accord with the understanding made with two 
officers sent from the governor-general to the Olympia late in 
the evening of May 1, the batteries at the entrance of the bay 
were surrendered to the Raleigh and Baltimore, the guns dis- 
abled, and the ammunition thrown into the sea. Later, when 
it was found that the Filipino insurgents were endeavoring to 
remove some of the guns, these shared the fate of the ammu- 
nition. Colonel Garc^s, in command of the batteries at the 
entrance of the bay, and Lieutenant INIiranda, of the navy, who 
commanded at Corregidor, had no choice under the arrange- 
ment with the governor-general but to capitulate. Miranda, 
with 100 men, remained at Corregidor; Garc^s with his officers 
and 293 men, with their equipment and ammunition, went to 
the near-by Port Mariveles and took up the difficult march to 
Manila round the head of the bay, through the provinces of 
Bataan and Pampanga, arriving at Manila on May 5. They, 
as did the other men of the fleet, aided thenceforth ashore in the 
defence against the insurgents. 

The battle thus brought to a close must, despite the disparity 
of force and the unprepared state of the enemy, rank as a brill- 
iant action on the part of the American forces. Commodore 
Dewey had every reason to believe in the existence of the mines 
which the Spanish were supposed to be supplied with, and had 
reason to suppose that attempts at least had been made to lay 
them in Boca Grande, though, as said before, no experienced 

1 Lieutenant Calkins, Proceedings Naval Institute, June, 1899. For the 
official reports of the battle, see Appendix, Report of Bureau of Navigation, 
1898, 73-8G. 



THE BATTLE OP MANILA 207 

naval oflBcer would pay serious attention to efforts to mine a 
passage of the width and depth of the latter with the limited re- 
sources at the command of the Manila authorities. The ranges 
of the Manila guns, and the value of the Sangley Point and Ca- 
nacao batteries, were unknown quantities with which to deal, 
and with reference to which he could only generalize in a hazy 
way, as he had no information as to the locale of the Spanish 
squadron. Having discovered the ships, he attacked with the 
confidence and decision which had marked thoroughly his 
preparation and advance. While the distinguished English 
author, Mr. H. W. Wilson, terms the batde "a military execu- 
tion rather than a real contest" which "must be placed on the 
same plane with the destruction of the Chinese fleet at Foochow 
by Admiral Courbet, or with the bombardment of Alexandria," 
he likewise says, and truly, that this cannot detract from Admiral 
Dewey's deserved reputation. "It was not his fault that the 
enemy was not in great strength, and he did his work without a 
trace of doubt or hesitation." This latter is just and deserved 
praise; but the former statement is greatly misleading. The 
American ships were thoroughly vulnerable; the action was at 
short range; and had the scores in marksmanship been reversed, 
the victory, despite their inferiority of force, would have been 
with the Spanish. The gist of the matter is thus in that master- 
ful quality in human affairs, racial temperament, and in the supe- 
rior training of the American gunner. Coolness of action and 
its corollary, accuracy of aim, were the deciding factors. 

The work which lay to the admiral's hand to do was thoroughly 
well done. The conduct throughout of officers and men, the 
handling of the ships and the boldness and decision of the ad- 
miral in every later event, were such as to merit the plaudits so 
generously extended by the country. While the military results 
of an action fought in a remote part of the world, at the antipodes 
of the real theatre of war in which lay the bone of contention, 
could not be great, the results, moral and political, were vast 
and far-reaching. It was not so much that a colony was taken 
from Spain as that the United States had planted herself in the 
East and had introduced herself as a physical factor in the East- 
ern world. 



208 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Perhaps none were more surprised to find a great archipelago 
at their command than were the gentlemen composing the ad- 
ministration in Washington; the idea of possession had prob- 
ably but vaguely entered the minds of any until it was known 
that a victorious American squadron commanded so completely 
the situation. The moral effect was more immediate and 
equally forcible. The repose of Continental Europe in the value 
of the Spanish navy was largely shattered, to be completely so 
two months later. There was no longer talk in the press of 
sitting in judgment upon the United States, and of putting 
limitations upon their conduct. The victory at once gave a 
new aspect to the whole subject of the war. 

The first news of the battle reached the United States by way 
of Madrid. The first of the telegrams to reach Spain was from 
the governor-general of the Philippines, and was such as to allow 
Spain a momentary elation. The text of this rather remarkable 
document was as follows: 

Last night, April 30, the batteries at the entrance to the port 
announced the arrival of the enemy's squadron, forcing a passage 
under the obscurity of the night. At daybreak the enemy took up 
positions, opening with a strong fire against Fort Cavite and the 
arsenal. 

Our fleet engaged the enemy in brilliant combat, protected by the 
Cavite and Manila forts. They obliged the enemy, with heavy loss, 
to manoeuvre repeatedly. At 9 o'clock the American squadron took 
refuge behind the foreign merchant shipping, on the east side of the 
bay. 

Our fleet, considering the enemy's superiority, naturally suffered 
severe loss. The Maria Crisfina is on fire and another ship, believed 
to be the Don Juan dc Austria, was blown up. 

There was considerable loss of life. Captain Cardaso, command- 
ing the Maria Cristina, is among the killed. I cannot now give fur- 
ther details. The spirit of the army, navy, and volunteers is excellent. 

This was printed in the American papers of ^Monday, May 2. 
Its effect was qualified by despatches of the same date from Spain 
of a saner and more truthful sort, based no doubt upon telegrams 
from Montojo himself. These appeared as follows: 

During the two engagements that took place Commodore Mon- 
tojo, commanding the Spanish fleet, lost three of his largest ships. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 209 

His flag-ship the armored cruiser Reina Maria Cristina, and the 
cruiser Castilla, were burned, and the cruiser Don Jiian de Austria 
was blown up. Several other Spanish vessels were badly damaged. 

There was a heavy loss of life among the Spanish. Captain Car- 
daso, commanding the Maria Cristina, was killed. Commodore 
Montojo, commanding the fleet, shifted his flag from the Maria Cris- 
tina to the Isla de Cuba, a much smaller steel protected cruiser, just 
before the Cristina sank. The blowing up of the Don Juan de Aiis- 
iria was attended by a great loss of life among the crew, her com- 
mander also being killed. 

Commodore Dewey's squadron, leaving Subig Bay, a few miles from 
Manila, about 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon, proceeded toward Ma- 
nila. Under the cover of darkness he entered the harbor of Manila, 
the batteries located there announcing his arrival. 

Both fleets lined up for battle about daybreak — about 5 o'clock — 
this morning. The guns of the American war-ships began firing on 
the fortress of Cavite and the arsenal of INIanila. 

Under the protection of the guns of these fortifications the Spanish 
war-ships opened fire on the American fleet. For several hours the 
harbor resounded with the roar of guns, the crashing of steel and 
timbers, the shrieks and groans of the wounded. Thick clouds of 
smoke at times almost obscured the opposing fleets from each other. 

A well-directed shot reached the iron cruiser Don Juan de Austria, 
a vessel of 1,100 tons. A terrific explosion followed and the ship was 
blowTi up. 

All the time during the engagement the American ships were under 
way, their manoeuvring being intended to render the marksmanship 
of the Spanish gunners less effective. 

The American squadron, about 9 o'clock, drew off to the east 
side of the bay, and took refuge behind some foreign shipping. The 
ships had evidently suffered considerable damage. After some hasty 
repairs they returned to the conflict. 

During this engagement the guns of Cavite maintained a steadier 
and stronger fire upon Commodore Dewey's ships than in the first 
encounter, but the American guns were being used with telling effect. 

As the smoke lifted it was seen that the flag-ship Reiyja Maria Cris- 
tina was on fire. The vessel was completely burned. In the interval 
between the two engagements Commodore INIontojo moved his flag 
from the Cristina to the smaller cruiser Isla de Cuba. To the fact 
that he made this change he doubtless owes his life. 

The cruiser Castilla, next to the flag-ship the largest and most pow- 
erful of the Spanish squadron, was also burned. The cruiser Don 
Antonio de Ulloa and the Mindanao were also badly injured in this 
encounter. 

That the American squadron received severe damage in the engage- 
ment cannot be doubted. Early reports had it that five of Commo- 



210 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

dore Dewey's ships had been sunk. Later advices from ISIadrid put 
the number at two. I have been able to ascertain nothing more defi- 
nite than this, but I consider it highly significant that the latest ad- 
vices I have received from INIadrid and Lisbon make no mention of 
any American ship being destroyed.* 

The next day the New York Herald printed the following 
from its special correspondent in Manila: 

Commodore Dewey's squadron completely destroyed the Span- 
ish fleet in Manila harbor early yesterday morning. Three of Ad- 
miral ]Montojo's ships were burned, one was sunk, and the rest of the 
Spanish war-ships rendered Jwrs de combat by the American guns. 

Our fleet entered Manila Bay yesterday morning at 5 o'clock, 
and, anchoring before Cavite, the ships took up their positions in line 
of battle. 

The forts on shore at once opened fire on our ships at long range, 
and the Spanish fleet, anchored off Cavite, immediately followed 
with their heavy guns. 

Commodore Dewey's flag-ship, the Olympia, then signalled the rest 
of the American fleet to draw closer inshore, and soon afterward 
our ships opened a terrific cannonade. 

After half an hour's hot fighting Dewey's ships moved out of range 
of the lighter Spanish guns and continued the bombardment with 
the big guns with terrible effect. 

Twenty minutes later the Olympia again signalled the other Amer- 
ican ships to draw in at close quarters and once more a rapid and 
incessant cannonade began. 

This terrific bombardment soon ended the fight. One after the 
other the Spanish vessels were silenced, and three of them caught 
fire, including Admiral INIontojo's flag-ship, the Reina Maria Cris- 
tina, from an explosion caused by a shell from one of our vessels. 
The admiral at once transferred his flag to the Ida de Cidm. 

One Spanish vessel was sunk and several were run ashore to escape 
capture. 

Commodore Dewey's attention was now directed to the land bat- 
teries, which he silenced after a brief and energetic bombardment. 

The battle lasted an hour and a half, and it was a great and terri- 
ble spectacle. The Spanish fought bravely against a superior force 
and suffered leavy losses. Four hundred Spanish are reported killed, 
including two commanders. Their losses by fire are also probably 
very great. 

The Spaniards would not give in and when the American fleet 
returned to Cavite some shots were still fired from the forts on shore, 

' New York Herald, May 2, 1898. 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 211 

but our ships poured in such a terrible cannonade that further resist- 
ance was impossible. 

The American ships were apparently uninjured. Commodore 
Dewey's attack was well carried out. The manoeuvres of his squad- 
ron were a beautiful sight, and the navigation of the bay by our ships 
was a remarkable feat of seamanship, avoiding as they did the nu- 
merous shallows. 

All is now over at Cavite. Commodore Dewey awaits the decision 
of the Governor-General of the Philippines before commencing the 
bombardment of Manila. Unless a favorable reply is received from 
the governor-general to the United States' terms the bombardment 
will commence to-morrow at half-past 11. 

That fairly accurate information had arrived at Madrid is 
shown by the account telegraphed from there by the correspond- 
ent of the London Times, May 2. On the evening of May 1, 
however, the British Foreign Office had received two despatches, 
appearing in the newspapers of Monday (May 2), the first stat- 
ing that the Spanish squadron had been annihilated, and giving 
Dewey's demands upon the governor-general for the surrender 
of all torpedoes and guns at Manila and the cable offices; the 
second announcing the refusal of the governor-general to accede 
to these. 

Enough had been received in the United States by May 3 to 
know that there had been a complete victory. The informa- 
tion sent out the afternoon of the 2d by the telegraph offices 
that communication w'ith Manila had ceased made it clear that 
Dewey had himself taken possession of the cable. This had been 
grappled by the Zafiro, cut, the ends sealed and buoyed. As 
the Hong-Kong office refused to accept messages not originating 
in the Manila office,^ the commodore was obliged to use the 

* The Hong-Kong and Manila Telegraph Company held its concession from 
Spain on condition that it should not send telegrams forbidden by the Spanish 
government. The refusal of the company to forward Dewey's despatches 
from Manila was thus, in a way, a case of force majeure. The United States 
endeavored to get a concession from the British government to lay a new 
cable from the Philippines to Hong-Kong. On consultation with the law officers 
of the crown, it was decided that the government was not at liberty to grant 
this. The president of the cable company sought permission from the Span- 
ish government to take telegrams from both sides. This being, for the time, 
declined by Spain, the use of the cable by the United States was refused, 
unless a guarantee against all losses should be given by the latter. On July 



212 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

McCulloch, the only ship which could be spared, as a despatch- 
boat. It was necessary for her to fill with coal, in order to have 
enough to return, as she would not be allowed to coal at Hong- 
KoncT. It was thus not until noon of May 5 that she left, carry- 
ing Flag-Lieutenant Brumby, three other officers, and three 
newspaper correspondents. She was escorted outside the bay 
by the Boston and Concord, and at noon of the 7th sent from 
Hong-Kong the two telegrams given below: 

Manila, May 1, 1898. 

The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning; im- 
mediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish ves- 
sels: Reina Cristina, Casfilla, Anionio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, 
Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, and Marques del Duero, El 
Correo, Velasco, one transport, Isla de Mindanao, water battery at 
Cavite, I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The squadron 
is uninjured, few men were slightly wounded. I request the depart- 
ment will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer with 
ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to the American 
consul at Hong-Kong. 

Manila, May 4, 1898. 

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite, Philippine 
Island, and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications 
bay entrance, paroling garrison. Have cut cable to mainland. I 
control bay completely and can take city at any time, but I have not 
sufficient men to hold. The squadron excellent health and spirits. 
The Spanish loss not fully known; very heavy; 150 killed, including 
captain, on Reina Cristina, alone. I am assisting and protecting 
Spanish sick and wounded, 250 in number, in this hospital, within 
our lines. Will ammunition be sent ? I request answer without de- 
lay. I can supply squadron coal and provisions for a long period. 
Much excitement at Manila. Scarcity of provisions on account of 
not having economized stores. Will protect foreign residents. 

Already, on May 3, President McKinley had telegraphed his 
congratulations. On May 7, on the reception of Dewey's tele- 

11, the Spanish government signified, through the representative in London 
of its telegraph department, its willingness for a complete neutralization of 
the cable and freedom of use. The American ambassador was instructed 
next day to postpone consideration of this offer for the time being. It was 
not until August 22 that the cable was reopened. (See For. Relations, 1898, 
976-980; also Moore, International Law Digest, VII, 940.) 



THE BATTLE OF MANILA 213 

grams, he thanked the commodore, his officers and men, in the 
name of the American people for their "splendid achievement 
and overwhelming victory," and assigned Derwey to his command 
with the rank of rear-admiral. On May 10 Dewey received the 
thanks of Congress, was later raised to the rank of admiral of 
the navy, and his chief of staff, flag lieutenant, and commanding 
officers, on his recommendation, advanced in rank. 

Dewey was now in possession of a harbor in Asia with no 
one to dispute his occupancy. His future action was quickly 
determined by the home government, which, whatever its previ- 
ous mind, now declared its intention of conquest by at once fit- 
ting out at San Francisco an expeditionary force, the first part 
of which was to sail for the Philippines on May 28. 

Note. — ^A corrected list of the vessels destroyed and captured was given in 
a telegram of June 12 : " Two protected cruisers, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon; 
five unprotected cruisers, Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Don 
Juan de Austria, Velasco; two gun-boats, General Lezo, Marques del Duero; 
one transport, Isla de Mindanao ; one surveying vessel, Argos, both armed. 
The following have been captured: one transport, Manila; one gun-boat, 
Callao." This last, a small vessel of 208 tons, had arrived from the south 
the day this telegram was sent. Her commander was wholly ignorant of 
what had happened. 



CHAPTER VII 

SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD, THE ATTACK ON SAN JUAN, 
AND CERVERA'S ARRIVAL IN THE CARIBBEAN 

On the reception by Sampson of the news of the departure of 
Cervera's squadron from the Cape Verdes a consultation of the 
captains was called aboard the New York and the admiral 
decided to go with part of the force eastward, and telegraphed 
the secretary of the navy: 

The New York, Iowa, Indiana, Amphitrite, and Terror, after coal- 
ing, will sail immediately Windward Passage Cuba and await develop- 
ments. Recjuest you to communicate through consul at Cape Haitien, 
Turks Island, Nicolas Mole. Duplicate despatches should be sent to 
all of them. Request the Massachusetts and Texas may meet me lee- 
ward of Tortugas Islands, Hayti, May 6. 

The flag-ship left at 5.25 P. m., May 1, for Key West and 
anchored outside the reef, off Sand Key, at 11.45, finding there 
the Cincinnati, Detroit, and Mayflower. When daylight broke 
the Iowa, Indiana, Hawk, Tecumseh, and Algonquin were seen 
standing in from seaward, and the Dolphin was sighted in the 
harbor. The Nashville came in from Cienfuegos during the 
afternoon. 

Though the admiral mentioned the Windward Passage as the 
point to which he intended to move, he was already practically 
determined to go to San Juan in case specific news should not 
be had in the W'indward Passage to turn him from his purpose. 
He felt strongly that San Juan was Cervera's objective, as in fact 
it was. To find the Spanish squadron there in a harbor exposed 
to gun-fire from the sea was all that he could ask of fortune. 

Sampson calculated upon arriving at San Juan by the time 
the Spanish squadron would reach that longitude; if it should 
turn out that San Juan should not be its objective, he calculated 

214 



SAJMPSON'S INIOVE EASTWARD 215 

that he would be able to return and be off Havana in time to 
assist in covering the blockade of that port. His reasoning, 
as it turned out, was perfecUy sound and accurate, though the 
accuracy of his calculations as to his own movements was se- 
riously upset by the inefficiency of the monitors as to speed. 
It was unfortunate, however, that they had not been even slower, 
in which case Cervera would have been found in San Juan and 
the war would practically have ended in May. 

Much was to be done in preparations before leaving, besides 
the prosaic work of coaling and overhauling machinery. Let- 
ters were written calling the department's attention to the un- 
serviceable condition of some of the auxiliaries sent to re-en- 
force the blockade and reiterating a suggestion to turn prisoners 
over to the care of the army post at Key West. Endeavor 
(without avail, however) was made by telegraph to modify orders 
now received to send the Cincinnati north for repairs, the 
admiral urging repair at Key W^est, where she could serve mean- 
while excellently as a station defence.* 

A telegram arrived from Washington: 

Clyde Steamship Line reports small Spanish gun-boats from Puerto 
Rico are cruising in Mona Passage and about Santo Domingo, trying 
to capture American steamships. Cherokee chased April 29 into port. 
Department thinks you should send one or two cruisers to eastern 
Santo Domingo ports and Mona Passage. 

To this, however, Sampson gave no serious thought, putting 
no faith in the reported gun-boats, or if they did exist, was sure of 
their inability through their low speed to give trouble to steamers 
of the class mentioned. He was, besides, going himself into the 
vicinity of the reported danger. 

The Marblehead and Eagle arrived next day (May 3) with the 
Spanish mail-steamer Argonauta as a prize, and at the same time 
the Castine and Ericsson, from the blockade, and the colliers 
Niagara, Saturn, and Evelyn from the north. 

As one looked from the anchorage off the reef into the harbor 
six miles distant, with its increasing forest of masts, it was im- 

' The Cincinnati did not, however, as will be seen, leave for the north 
until some time later. 



216 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

possible not to be struck by the large percentage of ships in such 
circumstances unavailable. The absolute necessity of coaling, 
of replenishing water supply, the frequent break-downs of ma- 
chinery in the smaller ships, made an estimate of one-third 
as a permanent number of unavailables not excessive. 

In furtherance of the expedition eastward, orders were sent 
by the torpedo-boat Porter to the Amphitrite, off Matanzas, the 
Terror, oft" Cardenas, and the Monfgomery, off Havana, to pro- 
ceed at once to a point seven miles north of Cruz del Padre 
Light and await the arrival of the flag-ship with the Iowa, 
Indiana, Detroit, Wompatuck, and collier Niagara, the Porter 
herself to join the flag after the delivery of her messages. The 
navy department was telegraphed: 

The New York, Iowa, Indiana, Amphitrite, Terror, Montgomery, 
Detroit, and Niagara (collier) will sail to-day for San Juan, Puerto 
Rico. 

No reply had yet been received to the telegram of May 1, 
requesting the Massachusetts and Texas; and Sampson, tele- 
graphing the coaling would delay him until 4 p. m., requested 
to know if there was to be one. He was answered: 

It is considered undesirable to detach the Massachusetts and Texas 
at present. Army movement contemplated. Details not settled. 

This was quickly followed by: 

Large army movement cannot take place two weeks, and small 
movement will not take place until after we know whereabouts four 
Spanish armored vessels, three destroyers. If objective San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, they should arrive about May 8 and action immediately 
against them and San Juan is then authorized. In this case flying 
squadron will re-enforce you.^ 

Signal was made at 6 P. M., May 3, to get under way, but a few 
minutes later, when most of the ships were aweigh, a telegram 
was received: "Important instructions will be telegraphed you 

* It is hardly possible to grasp the logic of this re-enforcement, unless it 
was supposed that Sampson would await for four or five days the arrival of 
this squadron before attacking. He certainly had no intention of any such 
delay. 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 217 

this afternoon." Answer was made: "Fleet under way; please 
telegraph important instructions at once." 

The reception of the telegram mentioned of course left the ad- 
miral somewhat in doubt, and after some hours of expectant 
waiting he ordered the Iowa, Indiana, and Detroit, at 11.15 p. m., 
to proceed off Havana, the Wompatuck and Niagara having 
been sent to the rendezvous early in the day. 

The revenue cutter Merrill coming from Key West at 3.15 
A. M. with no further despatches of importance, the admiral de- 
cided that the permission to proceed to San Juan was the im- 
portant telegram referred to, and telegraphing the navy de- 
partment, "Let Yale meet squadron off Cape Haitien early 
morning May 7, having sent a boat in for orders," got under 
way at 5.45 a. m., May 4, for Havana. On arrival off Havana 
at noon, Commander Hunker, of the Annapolis, was ordered 
to act as senior officer present until his senior. Captain Harring- 
ton, of the Puritan, still at Key West, should appear. A memo- 
randum had been sent to the latter before the departure of the 
flag-ship with the expectancy that he would shortly arrive on 
the blockade.^ 

Night was falling when the Neio York and her three consorts 
from Key West arrived at the rendezvous, eighty-five miles east 
of Havana, where were found the other ships previously ordered.^ 
The flag-ship took the Terror in tow, the Iowa the Amphitrite, 
and the Montgomery the Porter, but what with the heavy sea, the 
difficulties of making fast, and the parting of tow-lines, it was not 
until 9.15 P. M. that the squadron started ahead in double column. 

The night was one of difficulties; tow-lines were snapped and 

^ The Puritan's arrival was unavoidably delayed by necessary repairs 
until May 21. These instructions were as follows: "I have directed the 
senior officer present at Key West to order the Uncas, Wasp, and Annapolis, 
and any other vessels that may arrive, to report to you off Havana for duty 
on the blockade. He has also the colliers Saturn and Merrimac to be held 
subject to your instructions. When you have sufficient vessels you will in- 
stitute a blockade off Cienfuegos and such other ports on the south side of 
Cuba as will be possible with the force at your disposition. When such a 
blockade is instituted you will call upon the senior officer present at Key 
West for a collier to be sent to that coast." 

- Part of the afternoon had been spent by the New York in chasing a strange 
steamer, which proved to be a Brazilian chartered by a press association. 



218 



THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 



rerun, and it soon became clear, with the added troubles of leaky 
boilers in the Indiana and Detroit, that the squadron would by 
no means reach San Juan by May 8, as was expected. The 
morning of May 5 was varied by the capture of the Spanish sail- 
ing vessels Lorenzo and Frasquito, standing west through the 
Bahama Channel, bound to Havana with dried beef from the 



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River Plate, which were boarded by the Montgomery and sent 
into Key West/ At 4.30, on the morning of the 6th, the Mont- 
gomery was sent ahead to Cape Haitien to communicate with 
the navy department, and return at once if anything important 
developed, turning over her tow to the Terror, which latter was 
still appended to the New York. At 2.30 p. m. the next day 
(May 7), the Porter was also sent ahead to Cape Haitien with a 
despatch from the admiral: 

I have arrived off Cape Haitien, bound for San Juan. I shall com- 
municate off Puerto Plata to-morrow, Sunday, morning for further 
information from the department. 

' These vessels and cargoes were condemned. 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 219 

Both the monitors were again in tow, with the same exasper- 
ating experiences, and the squadron, holding a course well off 
land to avoid being sighted, arrived at 10.45 p. m.. May 7, at 
a point agreed upon, twenty-five miles north of Cape Haitien, 
where were found the Montgomery and Porter awaiting its ar- 
rival. Nothing had been received by either ship, and the Porter 
was at once sent in again, returning at 1 o'clock with the follow- 
ing telegrams, all dated Washington, May 6: 

Ambulance steamer Solace will leave May 7 for Cape Haitien; 
leave orders to follow you. 

American Line steamers New York [Harvard] and St. Louis keep 
a lookout for Spanish fleet about eighty nautical miles to the eastward 
of Martinique, Guadeloupe. Paris [Yale] cruising around Puerto 
Rico for that purpose. They will inform you if they get any reliable 
information. 

German steamer reports from Cape Haitien to-day Spanish vessels 
coaling and loading ammunition at St. Thomas, and Spanish man- 
of-war patrolling outside of harbor. 

Do not risk so crippling your vessels against fortifications as to 
prevent from soon afterward successfully fighting Spanish fleet com- 
posed of Pelayo, Carlos V, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, Cris- 
tobal Colon, four destroyers, if they should appear on this side.^ 

* This last telegram was supplemented by a written despatch of the same 
date (not received, however, until May 18, on the flag-ship's return to Key 
West), which gave full freedom of action against fortifications protecting 
ships of military value. This despatch was as follows: 

"[Confidential.] 

"Navy Department, 
"Washington, May 6, 1898. 

"Sir: Referring to the department's confidential instructions of the 6th of 
April, 1898, to confidential order of April 21, 1898, modifying the above in 
so far as it concerns the blockade of Cuba, and to the department's cipher 
despatches of April 21, 1898, and April 26, 1898, you are informed that the 
department has not intended to restrict your operations in the West Indies, 
except in regard to the blockade of certain portions of Cuba and in the exposure 
of your vessel to the fire of heavy guns mounted on shore which are not pro- 
tecting or assisting formidable Spanish ships. 

"The department is perfectly willing that you should expose your ships to 
the heaviest guns of land batteries if, in your opinion, there are Spanish ves- 



220 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Fresh provision steamer will leave Philadelphia to-morrow for Cape 
Haitien. Leave orders with consul for her to follow you. 

From Halifax, N. S., it is reported that several vessels with coal 
Spanish fleet are to be near Point a Pitre, Guadeloupe; possible con- 
tingent supply. 

At 2 A. M., May 8, all the captains were called aboard the 
flag-ship to a conference, which ended only with the dawn and 
with a decision on the part of the admiral to continue to San 
Juan if nothing definite had been heard regarding the Spanish 
squadron. He was, as just said above, well aware that in mak- 
ing this decision he was running the risk of traversing the sound 
rule of holding the interior line, but he felt that the risk was 
worth taking; that he was not warranted in giving Cervera the 
chance to coal at San Juan, overhaul his machinery, and get 
away uninterfered with. He judged the activity and energy 
of the Spanish commander by his own. To wait off Havana 
to hear of their arrival at San Juan and thus give them oppor- 
tunity to coal and start upon a raid of the eastern coast, which 
with any energy they could have done long before the squadron 
could have gone from Havana to San Juan, was, to Sampson's 
mind, out of the question. Had Sampson remained off Ha- 
vana, and had Cervera arrived at San Juan, whither he was 
ordered, and had he left there and appeared upon the eastern 
coast of the United States, where there was no force with suf- 
ficient speed to bring him to action, one can well imagine the 

sels of sufficient military importance protected by these guns to make an attack 
advisable, your chief aim being for the present the destruction of the enemy's 
principal vessels. 

"The department writes this letter because it has been intimated by civil- 
ians, and it is believed by officers of rank serving under you, that you are not 
permitted to take the offensive even against small land batteries, and that 
you must wait to be fired upon before making an aggressive movement against 
any port, no matter how poorly fortified. 

"The department does not think, however, that you have personally held 
this view; but in order to guard against any probable misconception on your 
part it has concluded to define more particularly its views as expressed above. 

"Respectfully, 

"John D. Long, Secretary. 

"Commander-in-Chief, United States Naval Force, 
"North Atlantic Station." 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 221 

outcry against the American commander-in-chief for not having 
met him at Puerto Rico. The question was a difficult one, but 
it was decided by Sampson with his usual independence of mind, 
and with accurate forecast of the enemy's intentions. 

Naturally, and almost unavoidably, there were in company 
with the squadron a number of steamers belonging to the press. 
Admiral Sampson fully recognized the demand of the country 
for the fullest information which could be properly furnished, and 
placed no impediment in the way of this being supplied, beyond 
what military necessities demanded. His present movement de- 
manded secrecy to the fullest extent possible and the press boats 
were in company with this understanding — fully and honorably 
regarded, the writer is glad to say, by every person but one. 
While it was evident that his movements could not be wholly 
secret, inasmuch as the mere disappearance of so many large ships 
from the blockade was in itself evidence to the enemy of an im- 
portant change in the disposition of ships, the destination had 
been kept a profound secret on the side of the officers of the fleet, 
but the one correspondent referred to telegraphed to his paper 
all he knew or could surmise.^ 

On the other hand, valuable services were rendered by others, 
the Dauntless, of the Associated Press, serving at Cape Haitien 
as an excellent aid in order that repeated visits of the Moni- 
gomery and Porter should not excite suspicion of the squadron's 
presence. She carried, in the morning of the 8th, the final tele- 
grams from the admiral: 

Have received no information of the Spanish armored vessels. I 
request three American liners be ordered to report by telegraph or 
otherwise near St. Thomas. Lacking the service of these vessels I 

* The following is a sample of the despatches published in one of the New 
York papers, which, of course, were known in Martinique at the time of 
Cervera's arrival there and helped to divert him from San Juan to Cura9ao 
and Santiago: 

"Cape Haitien, May 9. — Admiral Sampson's squadron of eight war- 
ships passed this harbor this morning going east. The appearance of the 
American fleet caused great excitement in the tovra. . . ." 

Secrecy of movement on either side was an impossibility. Sampson for- 
bade the presence of this correspondent in the squadron on account of his 
telegrams. 



222 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

shall have to return to the westward immediately. I shall await 
answer to this request at Cape Haitien, and if granted shall proceed 
to San Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establish a tempo- 
rary base Culebra Island to the east of Puerto Rico, as entrance 
to San Juan is obstructed. If Spanish squadron in the West Indies 
I shall expect the Massachusetts and Texas. 

The Dauntless at 11.45 a. m. brought out a telegram from 
the navy department dated the same day (May 8): 

The receipt of telegram of May 8 is acknowledged. Pelayo, Car- 
los V, one deep-sea torpedo-boat, cannot leave Cadiz two weeks. 
Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, two deep-sea tor- 
pedo-boats, published in newspaper were seen last night Martinique. 
Completion of cruise American Line steamer off Windward Passage 
May 10, Puerto Rico, May 13, I order them to St. Thomas to await 
instructions from you. Blockade Cuba and Key West will be in 
danger if skipped by you Spanish squadron. Therefore you should 
be quick in your operations at Puerto Rico. In everything the de- 
partment has utmost confidence in your discretion. The department 
does not wish to hamper you. Long. 

It will be seen from this telegram, wholly incorrect as to news, 
how vague was still the information regarding the Pelayo and 
Carlos V. It left Sampson to understand that these ships, though 
somewhat delayed, were to be added to his possible antagonists 
at a period not far away. The news regarding the Cape Verde 
squadron was much more important. It placed it near at hand, 
within three hundred and thirty miles, a day's sail, of Puerto 
Rico, from which, with a squadron supposed very much lower 
in speed, Sampson was equally distant. It seemed clear that 
the report was believed by the department, which was also evi- 
dently deeply exercised as to the possibility of Sampson's being 
passed by and left in the air, while the Spanish squadron could 
at will break the blockade, destroy the weak blockading force, 
and enter Havana. The nervousness regarding the safety of 
Key West was shown to be still in full force. 

In the meantime rumors were rife in the United States: the 
strength of the Spanish fleet was reported to be as yet unknown; 
so defective was the information of the press that it was doubted 
whether the armored cruiser Carlos V had not already joined 



SMIPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 223 

Cervera's squadron;^ an Associated Press despatch of May 4 
reported the return of Cervera to Cadiz, to be denied, however, 
the next day; wild rumors had gone from Hayti of the arrival 
the evening of May 8 of seventeen Spanish vessels, war-ships 
and others, at Puerto Rico, and of an engagement between the 
Montgomery and a much larger Spanish ship, supposed to be 
the Vizcaya, off Cape Haitien. 

Sampson's arrival at Cape Haitien could not in the circum- 
stances be concealed, nor was there, as just said, secrecy as to 
his jBnal destination kept in the United States. Certainly the 
governor of Puerto Rico knew of his approach May 9, having 
telegraphed this information to Madrid that day, and one New 
York journal printed in its edition of May 10 a sketch map, 
showing with very fair accuracy the squadron's position. 

The interval of waiting off Cape Haitien had been indus- 
triously used in coaling the monitors and the Montgomery and 
Detroit, all of which were of such small coal capacity that advan- 
tage had to be taken of every opportunity, however slight. At 
noon, however. May 9, the flag-ship took the Terror in tow, the 
Amphitrite signalling that she could make eight knots, and the 
squadron, after standing to the northward and westward suffi- 
ciently to give the impression in Cape Haitien that it was bound 
westward, stood east. It was for two short hours only, however, 
as at 2 p. M. the Amphitrite' s engines gave out and she was not 
ready to start again until 6 p. m. The Indiana, with sadly leaky 
boilers, was making but seven knots at best; the monitors occa- 
sionally steamed alone, but for most of the time were in tow, 
the New York varying the Terror with the Amphitrite. 

The situation is well described by the Associated Press corre- 
spondent aboard the New York: 

At 5 o'clock that evening, after the Montgomery was well on her 
way, the bidiana signalled that the crown sheets of one of her boilers 
were coming down, and that she could only make eight knots. So 
the speed of the squadron was reduced to that limit. Then the hawser 
between the Iowa and Amphitrite broke, and for an hour the squad- 
ron stopped, so that another hawser could be passed to the monitor. 
The Terror cast a line to the torpedo-boat Porter, and the squadron 

' Washington despatch to New York Herald, May 3. 



224 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

went ahead slowly, presenting the curious sight of the armored cruiser 
Neio York towing both the bulky Terror and the tiny Porter. The 
delays caused by these accidents were intensely irritating, in view of 
the fact that Long had specified the 8th as the day Cervera should 
arrive at Puerto Rico. But the worst was yet to come. The next 
morning, between 4 and 5 o'clock, the loiva's hawser to the Amphit- 
rite again parted, and the squadron slowed down to five knots. At 
1 o'clock in the afternoon the Terror's steering gear got out of 
order, and once more the war-ships scarcely moved through the water, 
waiting for the monitor to make repairs. After nearly two hours' 
delay a fresh start was made. Forty minutes later I happened to be 
in the rear-admiral's cabin, discussing these various accidents. They 
worried him greatly, and he deplored the necessity that compelled 
him to take monitors so far from home. Suddenly there was a report 
like the firing of a 4-inch gun just over our head. The flag-ship shook 
as if she had been jerked out of water. Before the deck steadied 
there was another loud report. I jumped up, thinking, though it was 
broad daylight, that we must have discovered an enemy. "I am 
afraid she's gone," said Sampson, in a tone of resignation. "Who's 
gone?" I asked, impatiently. "The Terror," he replied, and taking 
his cap went up on deck. And so it turned out. The Terror's steer- 
ing gear had broken down again, and she had taken a rank sheer to 
starboard, carrying both hawsers with her and just missing the New 
York's stern in her mad career. After stopping for an hour and thirty 
minutes new hawsers were passed to the monitor, and just before mid- 
night the squadron lay motionless twenty miles north of Cape Haitien.' 

The squadron was still distant three hundred miles from San 
Juan. It was a disheartening piece of business, which reflected 
no credit upon any one but the unhappy crews who labored in 
these monstrosities of ill design and construction, with a loyalty 
and manfulness which deserve every recognition. To fight a 
battle was easy work in comparison with the ceaseless heat, the 
toil of carrying broken tow^-lines, and the everlasting sweep of 
the sea across the low decks, which made the life aboard the 
monitors a living hell to officers and men. The w-riter rejoices 
in this opportunity to give public expression to his admiration 
for the pluck and endurance of their crews, from captain to 
messenger-boy. Even the cheap reward of a medal for the com- 
ing battle, the longest continued and in some of its phases the 
hottest of the war, was long denied them. 

* Goode, With Sampson Through the War, 63. 



SMIPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 225 

Sampson had become determined to engage the batteries of 
San Juan, even should he find the Spanish squadron not there, 
in the possibility of its yielding without such resistance as might 
endanger the efficiency of his squadron. His attitude of mind 
was somewhat expressed in the answer to an inquiry, "If you 
don't find the Spanish fleet at San Juan will you take the city?" 
" Well," he replied, " if they want to give us the city, I suppose 
we can't refuse it." ^ But there was more than this; he felt that 
it should not, if ready to fall, be left to the possible occupancy 
of any of the Spanish ships. Its seizure would take from them 
a stepping-stone toward the true seat of conflict of distinct 
advantage, which it was his duty, if conditions favored, to 
annul. It was his intention, if successful, to leave the moni- 
tors in possession, and transport the garrison north in the 
Yale, or nearest scout, either of which could have carried the 
whole. 

At 5 p. M, of the 11th, the squadron now nearing San Juan, 
the admiral shifted his flag to the loiva, taking with him Lieu- 
tenant Staunton, assistant chief-of-staft", liieutenant Marsh, his 
secretary, and Ensign Bennett, flag lieutenant. The chief-of- 
staff, being also captain of the Neio York, remained, of course, 
aboard his ship. The shifting of his flag was due to the supe- 
rior ability of the Iowa to take heavy knocks in case such should 
come, and the natural desire of the admiral to be in a position 
to command, under any circumstances, the situation. There 
was, too, it may be supposed, the latent affection for the "old 
ship," which he had commanded from her first commissioning 
until he was made commander-in-chief. 

The second battle order, based upon the supposition that the 
Spanish ships would be found in the harbor, had been sent to 
each ship during the morning. Though they were not there, it 
was in accord with this plan that the battle was fought. It was 
as follows: 

Order of the Battle — Second Plan of Action. — Finding the Spanish 
vessels in the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico. 

Anticipating this condition the s([uadron will pass near Salinas 

* Goode, With Sam'pson Through the War, 77. 



226 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Point and will then steer about east to pass just outside the reefs of 
Cabras Island. The column will be formed as follows: 

Iowa (flag), 
Indiana, 
New York, 
Amphitrite, 
Terror. 

The Detroit will go ahead of the Iowa, distant one thousand yards. 

The Wompatuck will keep on loxva's starboard bow, distant five 
hundred yards. 

The Detroit and Wompatuck will sound constantly after the land 
is closed, and will immediately signal if ten fathoms or less are ob- 
tained, showing at night a red light over the stern, and in the day- 
time a red flag aft. 

The Montgomery will remain in rear of the column, and will stop 
outside of the fire from the Morro, and will look out for the torpedo- 
boat destroyers. If Fort Canuelo opens fire she will silence it. 

The Porter will take station under cover of the Iowa on the port side. 

The Niagara will remain to the westward off Salinas Point. 

While approaching, a sharp lookout will be kept upon the coast be- 
tween Salinas Point and Cabras Island for the torpedo-boat destroyers. 

When near Cabras Island — one-half mile to one mile — the Detroit 
will rapidly cross the mouth of the harbor and will lie close under Morro 
to the westward, screened from the fire of Morro's western battery. 

If the old guns on the north face of IMorro are used she will silence 
them. The two cruisers will look out especially for the Spanish tor- 
pedo-boat destroyers coming out of the harbor. 

The Porter, when the action begins, will cross the harbor mouth 
behind the Iowa and will get close under the cliff to the eastward of 
the Detroit and will torpedo any Spanish armored cruiser trying to 
get out of the harbor, but will not attack a destroyer. 

The Wompatuck will tow one of her boats, with a mast stepped 
and a red flag flying, and will have the boat's anchor on board the 
tug so arranged that she can slip the boat and anchor it at the same 
time. She will anchor this boat in about ten fathoms of water, with 
Fort Canuelo and the western end of Cabras Island in range. 

There will be two objects of attack, viz.: the batteries upon the 
Morro and the men-of-war in port. If it is clear that the Spanish 
vessels are lying in the port, fire will be opened upon them as soon as 
they can be seen over Cabras Island, the motions of the flag-ship 
being followed in this regard. If it should become evident, however, 
that neutral men-of-war are in the line of fire, a flag of truce will prob- 
ably be sent in before the vessels are opened upon. 

The Porter will hold herself in readiness for this service. 

Care will be taken to avoid striking the hospitals on Cabras Island. 



SAIVIPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 227 

If it becomes necessary to silence tlie Morro batteries a portion of 
the fire will be directed to this object; but the principal object is to 
destroy the ships. 

After passing the harbor mouth the Iowa will turn a little to star- 
board toward the town and then will turn out with starboard helm 
and will again pass the port, and will, after passing Cabras Island 
to the westward, turn again with starboard helm and pass as at first. 

Should this plan be changed and it be decided to hold the ships in 
front of the entrance, the signal "Stop" will be made at the proper time. 

The Indiana, Neiu York, and the monitors will follow the motions 
of the flag-ship, and will remain in column. The course after Fort 
Canuelo is brought in range with the west end of Cabras Island will 
be E. by S. 

Should nightfall come with the port still in the enemy's hands, 
and their ships inside, the cruisers will take up positions just out- 
side the harbor, the Montgomery to the eastward and the Detroit to 
the westward, their batteries ready and men at the guns. They will 
show no lights. 

The other ships will in succession sweep the entrance to the harbor 
and the channel leading in to the anchorage with search-lights to keep 
the torpedo-boat destroyers from coming out. 

In case the enemy should attempt to escape from the port the fire 
will be concentrated on the leading ship. Should the attempt be 
made at night the search-lights in use will be turned on her bridge 
and conning tower and held there. Attention will be specially given 
to this, as it is of essential importance in the event of such attempt 
to sink the leading vessel in the channel. 

Arrangements will be made for illuminating all sights not telescopic. 

A heavy swell was evidence that a strong gale had been blow- 
ing to the northward, boding ill for the accuracy of next day's 
firing. Every preparation had been made which foresight could 
suggest; woodwork had been ruthlessly torn out and thrown 
overboard until the sea was strewn with the wreckage for hun- 
dreds of miles, which later washing on to the Cuban coast caused 
General Blanco to telegraph reporting the wreck of an American 
ship; the ship's cables were wrapped about the ammunition 
uptakes and tho more vulnerable parts of the turret supports; 
chests, carpenter's benches, alcohol, and other inflammable arti- 
cles w^ere got rid of until the ships were stripped of everything not 
absolutely necessary for fighting purposes or to life aboard. 

A word as to what we were about to meet: The little city of 
San Juan, of 30,000 people, enclosed by ancient and elaborate 



228 



THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 



fortifications, is built on the western end of what is apparently 
a long spit but is really an island, some two and a quarter miles 
long, which is but three-eighths of a mile broad in most parts, 
but about five-eighths^ at the point where lies the compact little 
town. South-west of this island lies the bay, some three miles 
in its longest axis, which runs north-west and south-east. At 
the extreme north-west corner is the castle of the Morro, built 
on a precipice, the face of which rises almost vertically from the 
water; the walls, rising over a hundred feet above the water, 
make it one of the most imposing and picturesque of seventeenth- 
century strongholds. The western extremity for half a mile, 
and the northern face for a mile, thus presented a lofty aspect 
of wall and fortification. 

Mounted upon these, beginning with the Saint Helena bat- 
tery an eighth of a mile south of the Morro and going round 
by the north, were the following guns: 



B. L. RIFLES 
5.9-INCH 



Santa Elena 

San Fernando 

Macho 

Carmen 

San Antonio 

San Cristobal (Signal Station) . 

San Cristobal (upper north and 
west face) 

San Crist6bal (east angle, Plaza 
de Armas) 

San Carlos (commanding bay 
and approaches) 

Santa Teresa 

La Princesa 

Escambron {2}4 miles east of the 
Morro) 

In the entrance and command- 
ing the approach were: 

Concepcion 

Santa Cutalina 

San Augustin 



Totals 



25 



B. L. RIFLE 
HOWITZERS 
9.5 



M. L. RIFLE 

HOWITZERS 

9.5 



L. lUFLE 
HOWITZERS 
8.25 



' The measurements are in nautical miles; about a sixth should be added to 
turn these into statute miles. 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 229 

All these guns were in place, and with the exception of the 
two at Santa Catalina and Concepcion, were engaged on May 12. 

Later, the rapid-fire battery of the Isabella II (a small vessel 
of 1,150 tons, with an armament of four 4.7-inch guns) was in- 
stalled just inside of and below the San Fernando battery. 

It was a formidable armament which the fleet was to meet; 
stronger, in fact, even than report made it, and stronger than, 
under a strict reading of the orders of the navy department, 
should have, in the circumstances, been engaged. It may frankly 
be said that when the actual situation was faced, the admiral's 
fighting instincts, supported by the reasons previously given for 
the occupancy of the place, were too strong for him. 

It was also understood that the entrance, which was about 
seven hundred feet broad, was obstructed by a hulk and that 
there were mines. Though later there were two hulks sunk, 
each of which was filled with explosives, and in the middle of 
the channel an electric mine with six hundred pounds of explo- 
sive, and an inner line of Bustamante contact mines, nothing of 
these existed on May 12. 

There were 4,500 troops in the island, besides several thou- 
sand volunteers. They were distributed in small detachments 
over the island, none of the garrisons exceeding 300 (as at 
Ponce), excepting that at San Juan there were 600 men. 

The lights of San Juan were sighted at 2.30 in the morning 
of May 12, eight days after leaving Key West. It had thus 
taken nearly four days longer than the admiral had first cal- 
culated, to make the 960 miles, the average speed of the squad- 
ron during the time it had been under way being less than 6 
knots instead of the 10 hoped for. It was, however, one of the 
fortunes of war, though in this case not so much a matter of 
fortune, as of the antiquated and ill-designed machinery in some 
of the ships, and the ill-repair of some of the others, a status 
which must always be that of a navy which is not rigidly kept 
up to a war standard. 

San Juan was still a good many miles away and there was 
plenty of time before daybreak for breakfast, which was given 
all hands at 4 o'clock. The morning was hazy and the lofty 
precipices on the eastern side of the narrow entrance, crowned 



230 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

by the picturesque castle, were barely visible as the Montgomery 
and Detroit steamed ahead to take the positions assigned and 
the W ompatuch to plat-e the boat which was to serve as a turn- 
ing point. When this had been done the column steamed slowly 
in, in the order named. No sign was shown of discovery of the 
squadron; the flag had not yet been hoisted over the Morro, 
it being not yet sunrise. Over the misty, heaving sea a deep 
stillness brooded, which seemed only accentuated by the dis- 
tant boom of the surges against the low coral shore west of the 
harbor entrance; the whole, with the deeply rolling ships, and 
with the lofty battlements of the Morro Castle showing gigan- 
tic in the dim light, forming a picture not soon to be forgotten. 
After a little a few masts could barely be discerned in the har- 
bor, showing, however, sufficiently clearly to make it pretty 
certain that the Spanish squadron was not there. Every one 
was watching the Iowa, in the lead, when, just as she gave a 
deep plunging roll, she fired at 5.16 the first shot, a 6-pounder, 
as the signal to begin firing. This was followed quickly by 
guns from all the squadron. 

The surprise was apparently complete; it was eight min- 
utes, though it seemed longer, before there was an answering 
shot; one wondered at the silence of the towering fortress which 
was our target. W^hen it opened, its first shot was fired at the 
Detroit, to which attention for some little time was wholly de- 
voted, the constant splashes of white foam about the little ship 
showing a very proper activity on the part of the enemy. The 
guns of the eastern batteries joined as the column turned to 
head west. Thence on, there was no cessation of a heavy fire 
until the end of the action. The column had become disordered 
by the slower action of some of the ships in turning and by the 
loitering in going westward. Signal was made at 5.59 to form 
column and the Ioidci again led in to the attack. At 6.09 the 
admiral signalled, "Use only large guns," partially to prevent 
the expenditure of so much small ammunition against the heavy 
stone walls of the fortress, partially to avoid enveloping the 
squadron again in the heavy pall of smoke which in the usual 
calm of the early morning there was no wind to drive away. 
The Detroit was ordered out of her unsafe position at 6.15, and 




c 


a 

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o 




a 


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a 


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U) 


c; 


^ 




a? 


^^ 





232 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

she and her sister ship, the Montgomery, ordered at 6.30 not to 
follow the battle-ships, were thereafter practically passive. Fir- 
ing by the loica was begun again at 6.35 at a range of 1,500 
yards, the other ships following closely. A third and last turn 
was made, 7.16 and 7.45 o'clock marking its beginning and end 
as made by the flag-ship. The ships of the rear of the column 
by this time, however, had become more intent upon the bat- 
teries than they were upon the flag-ship, and loitered in the last 
turn, loath to leave the stirring work of battle. The Terror was 
close in under the eastern batteries still most actively engaged, 
and became the target of all the batteries as one by one the other 
ships, following the order of the admiral, withdrew. Her gal- 
lant captain, Ludlow, seemed determined to fight to a finish, 
and the dense clouds of smoke having drifted away from the 
other ships left an unobstructed view of a wonderful picture; 
the sunlit sea, the nobly picturesque fortress, the loitering ships, 
the fighting monitor, and smoke-crowned batteries making a 
scene which had in it every element of the beautiful and stirring. 
It was not until 8.45 that the final shot was fired from ashore 
at the withdrawing force, the Terror the last, being then some 
6,000 yards distant.^ 

* The following times were taken by the admiral's secretary aboard the 
Iowa: 

4.00: Call "All hands" complete clearing ship for action. Squadron 
standing in for San Juan, the lights of the town being plainly visible, Detroit 
leading; Wompatuck on starboard bow to anchor boat for turning stake, as 
provided in my " Order of battle— second plan of action "; the other ships in 
column as follows: Iowa, Indiana, New York, Amphitrite, Terror, and Mont- 
gomery. Speed, 4 knots. 

4.58: Detroit inshore, standing across harbor entrance. In this passage 
across the front of the harbor, and very close to the town, the DetroU received 
no fire at all. No Spanish flag was flying on the Morro or elsewhere. No 
Spanish vessels could be seen in the harbor. There was one merchant steamer 
in the inner harbor. 

5.00: Sounded "General quarters." 

5.16: Iowa began firing on the Morro with forward 6-pounder, and then 
with all starboard battery. Smoke hanging over the ship made firing slow. 

5.24: First return shot from the shore batteries. 

5.30: loiva turned from the batteries, circling to the westward. 

5.59: Made signal, "Form column." 

6.09: Made telegraphic signal, "Use only large guns." The smoke from 
the smaller guns had been interfering with the fire of the heavier guns. The 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 233 

The torpedo-boat Porter, which had been sent eastward close 
under the cliff, had soon drifted far enough seaward to come 
under the enemy's fire. Nothing could have been more exposed 
than she was in such a position. Lieutenant Fremont, her 
commander, had apparently lost sight of the purpose for which 
he had been sent into his earlier berth, or perhaps had become 
convinced that there was no Spanish cruiser to be torpedoed, 
as called for in the battle order, and spent his time in exercising 
his 1-pounder against the batteries so close above him. That the 
frail little craft escaped without a scratch appeared little short 
of miraculous. But this word may, indeed, be applied to the 
wonderful immunity of all the ships, not only then but ever 
after. But two ships were struck. In the loiva, a 6-inch shell 
exploded in the skid frames, on the port side, abreast of the 
after 8-inch turret. The fragment of this shell wounded three 
men, passed through the sailing launch and made several holes 
in the stanchions, ventilators, and other deck fittings; other 

column was headed in for the batteries in the same line of attack as in the 
first round. 

6.15: Detroit seen standing from Morro, with the Montgomery not far 
off her port beam. From the time when the shore batteries began firing 
(5.24) until this time (6.15) the Detroit had been lying close inshore, between 
the line followed by the squadron and the Morro, and she had been subjected 
to what seemed a concentrated fire of all the shore batteries for all this time, she 
in the meanwhile pouring in broadsides from her own rapid-fire battery. 

6.30: Made signal to Detroit and Montgomery not to follow battle-ships. 
By this time all the shore batteries had been developed and they were more 
numprous than the information received had led to suspect. 

6.35: 7ou)a began firing at Morro on the second round; range, 1,500 yards. 

6.40: Iowa ceased firing. Almost calm; smoke hanging over the shore 
fortifications, pretty effectually screening them. 

7.12: Amphitrite signalled, "After turret disabled for to-day." 

7.16: Iowa began firing on the third round. 

7.38: Signalled to Detroit and Montgomery, "Report casualties." Re- 
ceived replies as follows: Detroit, "0"; Montgomery "0." 

7.45: Iowa sounded, "Secure." 

7.45: Made signal, "Form column, course north-west," and hauled down 
the signal at 8.01. 

8.12: Made signal, "Report casualties." 

8.15: The Terror, which had been lying close inshore engaged with the 
fortifications, ceased firing. 

8.47: New York reports "1 killed, 4 wounded." All other ships reported 
no casualties, except the Amphitrite, which reported the death of one gunner's 
mate from the effects of heat. 



234 THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 

fragments did considerable injury to the joiner work of the 
bridge, narrowly missing the admiral, Captain Evans, an4 Lieu- 
tenant-Commander Rodgers, who were standing together upon 
the bridge. Another shell exploded above the boat skids on the 
starboard side, inflicting trifling injury. In the New York, at 
7.40, a 6-inch shell struck the after stanchion on the port side 
of the superstructure deck. Its explosion killed a seaman and 
wounded four others at the port waist 8-inch gun, wrecked the 
fourth cutter and port search-light, made numerous holes in 
the ventilators and smoke-pipes, and cut the boat-falls to such 
an extent that the lowering of a boat to obey the admiral's 
command to commanding officers to go aboard the flag-ship 
was long delayed. The only life lost besides the seaman of the 
New York, was a gunner's mate aboard the Amphitrite, who 
succumbed to the heat in the turret. 

It was after 9 o'clock; the fatigue of all hands, astir since 
3, and with a breakfast but an hour later, made a rest advis- 
able and food a necessity in any case. Numbers, both officers 
and men, as soon as they found that the action was not to be 
at once continued, had thrown themselves upon the deck, sunk 
with fatigue, and were sound asleep.^ 

The fact faced the admiral that the main object of the expedi- 
tion was absent, but with every probability that it was not far 
distant. The mere credit of the reduction of the place weighed 
not at all in his mind, and its occupancy, unless immediate, 
could have no weight in comparison with a meeting with the 
Spanish fleet. It seemed clear that the news of his being in 
Puerto Rican waters would cause a divergence of the Spanish 
admiral elsewhere. Was it wise, even with the certainty of sur- 
render of the port, to risk further any danger of injury to his 
most important ships? None of importance, except to the mon- 
itors from concussion of their own guns, had yet occurred. 
Sampson agreed with the general judgment of his captains, 
and finally decided. No. As put by himself in his report: 

It was clear to my mind that the squadron would not have any 
great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the facts that 

' For the several reports by commanding officers of the action, see Ap- 
pendix, Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 368-382. 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 235 

we should be held several days in completing arrangements for hold- 
ing it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival 
of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, 
our main objective, were still unknown; that the flying squadron was 
still north and not in a position to render aid; that Havana, Cervera's 
natural objective, was then open to entry by such a force as his, while 
we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement 
toward Havana imperative. I thus reluctantly gave up the project 
against San Juan and stood westward for Havana.* 

While pondering upon and discussing this important question, 
the resting fleet was allowed to drift idly, awaiting the repair 
by the Terror of her main stop-valves. 

The whereabouts of the Spanish fleet was to be solved also, 
if possible, before leaving too quickly the vicinity of the only 
available telegraph station, St. Thomas, sixty miles away. The 
press boat Dauntless was awaiting the despatches of the corre- 
spondent who had accompanied the admiral on board the Iowa, 
and it was decided to move slowly westward, awaiting such 
news as might be had from St. Thomas by the Yale, expected 
to be found there, and which, if found, was to be ordered to 
report to the flag. The following despatches were sent by the 
Dauntless: 

Have received no information Spanish armored vessels. The 
Spanish fleet is not here. The United States fleet in great need of 
repairs seven days from Havana to San Juan. If I cannot obtain 
information of Spanish vessels by Yale at St. Thomas will leave to- 
morrow for blockade of Havana. 

A portion of the fleet under my command reached San Juan this 
morning at daybreak. No armored vessels were found in the port. 
As soon as it was sufficiently light I commenced an attack upon the 
batteries defending the city. This attack lasted about three hours and 
resulted in much damage to the batteries and incidentally to por- 
tions of the city adjacent to the batteries. The batteries replied to 

• There were 13 persons in all killed ashore; 113 was the total of killed and 
injured, the large majority, unfortunately, being not of the army. 

The author has been informed by one officially with the evacuation com- 
mission that a Spanish officer, in a position to know, told him that the place 
would have surrendered had the fleet remained a half hour longer; not so 
much on account of the injury done, which was moderate, but on account 
of the terror of the inhabitants and the pressure brought thereby upon the 
governor. 



236 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

our fire, but without material effect. One man killed aboard the 
New York and three slightly wounded in the squadron. No serious 
damages to any ship resulted. 

The admiral returned aboard the New York at 1 p. m., col- 
umn was formed at 4, and the squadron, after stopping to bury 
the two dead, stood slowly to the northward and eastward until 
it should be dark, w^hen course was changed to the westward, 
the Montgomery at 9.30 leaving for St. Thomas, also in search 
of news lest the Yale should fail to bring any. 

At this most critical time the means of information w'ere 
painfully defective. There were but three efficient scouts to 
cover the eastern Caribbean, a thing impossible to do with so 
limited a number, and even now but two were sent where they 
could do real service. 

Scouting to be effective should cover every point of the prob- 
able line of the enemy's advent. Detection at night being, as 
has already been so frequently said, almost impossible but by 
accident, the line of scouts should be so handled as to assure (as 
may be done with a reasonably sufficient number of ships) that 
the enemy must pass the line, if at all, in daylight. We used 
but two of our six,^ three being kept north through the agitation 
of the public, and one being sent to cruise around Puerto Rico. 

On the arrival at Washington, April 29, of the news of the 
departure of the Spanish fleet from the Cape Verdes, sealed 
orders were sent to Captain Cotton, of the Harvard: 

The department intends to employ you to ascertain whether the 
Spanish fleet, which was lately at the Cape de Verde Islands, intends 
moving upon the West Indies, and if so, to what locality. 

For this purpose you will proceed, with the U. S. S. Harvard under 
your command, immediately to the eastward of the Windward Islands 
and cruise on a line extending between latitude 15° 38' north longitude 
59° 40' west, and latitude 14° 25' north and longitude 59° 30' west. 

If you get no positive information by noon of May 10, you will pro- 
ceed to touch at the chief ports of the island of Martinique, for the 
purpose of obtaining information concerning the Spanish fleet in case 
it should have passed you without your knowledge, and if you obtain 

' These six, as already mentioned, were the Harvard {New York), Yale 
{Paris), St. Paul, St. Louis, Columbia, and Minneapolis. 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 237 

what you consider to be reliable information as to its presence in the 
West Indies, you may, if advisable, proceed to that vicinity to get con- 
firmatory evidence, being careful, however, not to thus sacrifice time 
that might be better employed in giving notice to the commander-in- 
chief in Cuban waters and to the department, as mentioned in para- 
graph 4. 

If you should find the Spanish fleet is approaching, or has entered 
the West Indies, you will telegraph the department and also the 
commanding officer at Key West for transmission to the commander- 
in-chief on the coast of Cuba, or wherever he may be at that time. 
You will then proceed, with your ship, either to observe and keep 
touch with the Spanish fleet, or to personally inform the commander- 
in-chief, either oft' Havana or wherever he may be at the time. 

The department relies upon your discretion as to whether it would 
be best to observe the Spanish fleet, or to proceed to personally inform 
the commander-in-chief that it has entered the West Indies. 

If the Spanish fleet enters the West Indies, and you have informed 
the commander-in-chief on the station, you will, if he so requires, 
proceed to act in accordance with his instructions, in further observ- 
ing or getting intelligence of the movements of said fleet. If he does 
not require such service, you will proceed to a port where there is tele- 
graphic communication, inform the department, and wait twenty-four 
hours, after which, if you get no instructions, proceed to Hampton 
Roads, Va. 

In case you should get no reliable intelligence of the Spanish fleet 
being bound to the West Indies, or if you obtain reliable intelligence 
of its movements or destination elsewhere, you will so telegraph the 
department and the commander-in-chief on the station, after which 
you will wait at the same place twenty-four hours for orders from the 
department, and if not received, proceed to Hampton Roads, Va. 

For your information there is enclosed a copy of the orders sent to 
the commanding officer of the U. S. S. St Louis, who is directed to 
cruise on a line in extension of the one assigned to you. One of the 
American liners has been detailed to cruise around the island of 
Puerto Rico. 

A copy of your orders has been sent to the commander-in-chief of 
the North Atlantic Station. 

In case of capture, you will, without fail, destroy or sink these 
instructions, as well as any publications of a confidential nature. 

It is very important that you should, if possible, make 336 miles per 
day on the passage from New York to your cruising ground. 

Similar orders were sent the St. Louis, Captain Goodrich, 
the latter's limits of cruising being set at latitudes 15° 38' and 
16° 55' north, and longitudes 59° 40' and 59° 50' west, being a 



238 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

continuation of the line of observation by the Harvard. May 1, 
the Yale, Captain Wise, was ordered to cruise round Puerto 
Rico until the evening of May 13, and if no positive information 
should be received by the evening of that day, the ship was to 
go to St. Thomas or to any other island where the captain should 
think it probable that word of the Spanish movements could be 
obtained. He was also informed that the Harvard and St. 
Louis were cruising between latitudes 14 and 17 on a line about 
one hundred miles east of Martinique and Guadeloupe. 

The orders were most judicious in character and showed an 
almost perfect forecast of the Spanish movements. A serious 
error, however, as it turned out, was made in the date set for 
going into the island ports, due to the unexpected slowness of 
the Spanish ships. The Harvard, obeying orders, went into 
St. Pierre, Martinique, arriving there at 9.30 a. m.. May 11, 
expecting to sail for St. Thomas the following morning. While 
Captain Cotton was ashore with the consul, the latter received, 
at a few minutes before 6 p. m., from Fort de France, the naval 
station and capital of the island, a telegram that a Spanish 
torpedo-destroyer had arrived at 4 p. m. At 8 o'clock. Captain 
Cotton, having at once gone aboard to prepare a telegram for 
despatch to W^ashington, was visited by the captain of the port 
with the official information from the governor at Fort de France 
of the arrival of the Spanish destroyer Furor at 4, and that she 
would depart at 7, and " that therefore in accordance with usage 
in such cases, our ship could not go to sea before 7 P. M. on the 
12th." Being thus detained. Captain Cotton at once requested 
the consul, accompanied by Lieutenant Kane, of the Marine 
Corps, to go to Fort de France for complete information. They 
made the journey (12 miles) in a row-boat, arriving at 2 a. m. 
of the 12th, returning to St. Pierre by the local steamer at 9 a. m. 
"They reported that they saw and counted, hull down, in the 
offing five large steamers; that the Spanish steamer Alicante,^ 

' It is inexplicable, if this ship carried coal, as would appear by the minis- 
ter's telegram of May 15th {infra, 252), why she should not have been at 
once directed to Curasao or Santiago. That Villaamil should not have known 
of her presence would seem impossible, but no mention of such knowledge 
appears in the correspondence, which gives the impression that her presence 
was not known to him, or if so he did not know that she carried coal. 



SAINIPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 239 

a so-called hospital or ambulance ship, was lying in the inner 
harbor, and said to have hospital stores and troops aboard, and 
that as they were leaving the harbor in the steamer bound for 
this port they passed, at about 8.15 a. m., a quarter of a mile dis- 
tant, a large Spanish torpedo-destroyer standing into the harbor 
from the direction of, and evidently belonging to, the ships in 
the offing, to the southward and westward, which were appar- 
ently standing off and on." 

At noon the captain of the port brought word from the gov- 
ernor that the Terror had arrived at 8 a. m. and would probably 
leave about noon, and that Captain Cotton was at liberty to 
go to sea at 8 (of the 12th) if he so desired, but that if he did 
not do so he would be required to give the governor twenty-four 
hours' notice of his leaving. Captain Cotton became mistak- 
enly convinced that he was under the surveillance of the Span- 
ish squadron to an extent that he was practically blockaded by 
it. In his report of May 15 he says: 

Our friends are very few here or at Fort de France, while those 
whose sympathies are wholly and openly with Spain are many. Fish- 
ermen and men from the hills report that Spanish cruisers and small 
steamers have been seen cruising at night near St. Pierre, and in the 
straits north and south of the island; that strange and unusual signals 
have been made at sea and on the hills back of the town; that a tor- 
pedo-cruiser passed near the town, going to the northward and south- 
ward, on the night of May 11, and that one lay off Pearl Island last 
night six and one-half miles north of the town. As to the signals there 
is no doubt, for at frequent intervals last night we saw them on shore 
along the hills, back, and north and south of the town, and one col- 
ored signal some distance at sea. On the night of the 11th we saw 
rocket signals from a hill north-east of the town, and an English gen- 
tleman who owns a plantation in that vicinity told I\Ir. Davids that 
some men, known to be Spanish sympathizers, had been found on his 
place with rockets on the night of the 11th instant. In view of all the 
circumstances connected with our situation here; of the presence of 
a powerful Spanish fleet, including fast destroyers, in our vicinity; 
of their undoubted intention to capture this ship if possible; of her 
great value to the United States; of her much greater value, as a 
prize, to Spain; of the fact that it requires nearly one hour after get- 
ting under way for this ship to reach a speed of 20 knots; of the pecul- 
iar status of the officers and crew, who are serving on board of an 
armed ship, while they do not belong to either branch of the naval 



240 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

or military service of the United States; the doubt as to their treat- 
ment by Spain, under the existing conditions, should they be capt- 
ured — a long and careful consideration of all those conditions finally 
led me to the conclusion that I would be fully justified in not putting 
to sea at the present time; and I acted accordingly. That we were 
expected to go to sea last night was evidenced by the lively signalling 
going on on shore; and that the Spanish squadron was so distributed 
as to give us the least possible chance of escape, I have no doubt. 
What would have been the result had we gone out is conjectural. 
Two other reasons that weighed with me in remaining are, that while 
we are here I may be able to give valuable information relative to the 
Spanish fleet, and that we may be such a bait as to induce it to remain 
in this vicinity until the approach of one of our fleets.' 

That this extreme watchfulness was kept by the Spanish 
squadron on the Harvard we may now, knowing what we do of 
its intentions and difficulties, well doubt. The Spanish admiral 
was much more intent upon the shelter of a port than upon the 
detention at Martinique of a steamer of the Harvard's char- 
acter, which could not be reckoned as a factor in the coming 
battle. All this is seen clearly from the account of Captain Vic- 
tor Concas, of the Maria Teresa, who mentions that Captain 
Villaamil, in the Furor, being informed by the governor of 
Martinique that the Harvard had gone, *' believed that she had 
about six hours' start of him, and when he saw^ a large steamer 
on the coast, he believed himself discovered and even pursued,"^ 
a striking instance of the fact that one's enemy is usually the 
victim of imaginary dangers as much as may be one's self. 

The news from Captain Cotton of the arrival of the Spanish 
squadron off Martinique reached Washington during the night 
of May 12. It was in the Ne%o York Herald of May 13, sent by a 
resident of St. Pierre, who, how^ever, in his next day's despatch ex- 
aggerated the force to " eight war-ships and seven torpedo-boats." 

Sampson was slowly going westward, hoping for some news 
out of St. Thomas by the Marblchead, sent there, as mentioned, 
particularly for despatches. At 10.30 a. m. of the 13th the tor- 
pedo-boat Porter, accompanied by the collier Niagara, left the 

' Appendix, Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 408. 
* Concas, The Squadron of Admiral Cervera, 45. (Translation by the Office 
of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department, 1900.) 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 241 

squadron to go to Samana Bay in order to coal in smooth water, 
the squadron standing slowly on, a vague report having arrived 
by a press boat from St. Thomas, now distant nearly 300 miles, 
that the Cape Verde squadron had returned to Cadiz. At mid- 
night, May 13-14, while stopped off Puerto Plata to await the 
arrival of the Porter, and hoping for the Marhlehead, the hospi- 
tal ship Solace, Commander Dunlap, which had left Key West 
May 11, being hurried thence on account of the action at San 
Juan, joined the fleet. It was not impossible that Cervera had 
returned to Spain and was at Cadiz, a report no doubt which 
had as a basis the telegram to return sent him while off Marti- 
nique. Should this be true, there was but one thought in Samp- 
son's mind: to return at once to San Juan and take the place. 
When the Porter rejoined, at 10.30 a. m., she was at once sent 
in to Puerto Plata with the following despatch to the navy de- 
partment; 

Is it true the Spanish ships are at Cadiz; if so, send to San Juan 
collier from Key West or elsewhere. 

The Porter was to await an answer, or to come out as soon as 
she should receive any news of importance. The wounded were 
transferred to the Solace and the monitors attempted to coal from 
the collier Niagara, which had rejoined, but the sea was too 
rough for this. The day thus passed in weary waiting, and it 
was not until half-past three the next morning, May 15, that 
the Porter arrived, preceded, an hour earlier, by the scout St. 
Louis, Captain Goodrich, from the eastward. The Porter 
brought despatches which effectually disposed of any further 
thoughts of San Juan. They were as follows: 

Flying squadron will sail to-day for Charleston, S. C, ready to re- 
enforce Cuban blockade or Key West if necessary. The Mirmeapolis 
leaves to-day to watch between Monte Christi and Caicos Banks, Ba- 
hamas, and the St. Paul to watch between Morant Point, Jamaica, 
and west end of Hayti. Very important that your fast cruisers keep 
touch with Spanish squadron. 

Later. The Spanish fleet from Cape Verde Islands, off Cura9ao, 
W. I., May 14. Flying squadron en route to Key West, Florida. 
Proceed with all possible despatch to Key West. Acknowledge by 
telegram. 



242 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

The Spanish torpedo-boat, deep-sea class, Terror, remains at Fort 
de France, Martinique, only Spanish man-of-war observed May 13. 
The St. Louis re]wrted having arrived from St. Thomas. Captain 
Goodrich reports having cut a cable between St. Thomas and San 
Juan. 

Telegrams were sent to the Yale at St. Thomas and the Har- 
vard at Martinique: 

Take all coal permitted at St. Thomas and await additional in- 
structions. Telegraph any news to Cape Haitien. 

To Commodore Remey, commanding at Key West: 

Have all coal lighters filled with coal for ships in my squadron on 
18th. 

Despatches went to the navy department, asking for more men 
for the ships; to Cura9ao asking if the Spanish ships were at 
Curasao and if so what ships. The Porter, after sending these 
at Puerto Plata, was to go to Cape Haitien to receive replies. 

The St. Louis, w^hich had left Guadeloupe the 11th, had passed 
St. Thomas the 12th and was off San Juan the 13th, thus fail- 
ing to receive the navy department's telegram of that day, sent 
to St. Thomas with the hope of catching her there, giving in- 
formation of the presence off Martinique of the Spanish squad- 
ron and directing that Sampson be informed. Captain Goodrich 
had cut the cable between St, Thomas and San Juan. His 
appliances were very meagre and the ship of great size for such 
work, but he was confident of his ability to continue it, and a 
large part of the early hours of the morning was thus spent in 
sending aboard all the wire hawsers and heavy grapnels which 
the New York could furnish. Notwithstanding the difficulties 
in equipment, she left, accompanied by the Wompatuck, with 
the object of cutting the cables leading from Santiago and Guan- 
tanamo and of cutting those from Puerto Rico, in the endeavor 
to isolate Cuba completely from communication with Spain. 

The monitor Terror, having broken down, w^as taken in tow 
by the collier Niagara, the monitor Amphitrite by the Iowa; 
and the flag-ship, having arranged a rendezvous in the Wind- 



sa:mpson's move eastward 243 

ward Passage, left the squadron to pursue its course of enforced 
leisure and steamed for Cape Haitien, off which she arrived at 
8 P. M., the 15th, finding there the Montgomenj from St. Thomas. 
At 12.30 A. M. of the 16th the Porter came out with telegrams 
from the American consul. Smith, at Cura9ao, sent to the Amer- 
ican consul at Cape Haitien: 

Maria Teresa and Vizcaya in harbor coaling; arrived Saturday; 
Oquendo, Cristobal Colon, Terror, and Pluton outside; only two ad- 
mitted at time; short of coal and provisions; dirty bottom. 

Inform Admiral Sampson Spanish squadron will leave 6 post- 
meridian, destination unkiiown. 

Two telegrams came from the navy department: 

Five vessels supposed to be men-of-war observed off Fort de France, 
Martinique, May 14, afternoon; 

and 

Spanish fleet from Cape de Verde off Cura9ao on May 14. Vizcaya 
and Maria Teresa entered into port as reported and to leave Curasao 
on May 15. Department heard from London 10th instant colliers 
would probably meet them north coast of Venezuela. Flying squad- 
ron sailed May 13 for Key West. 

The navy department also telegraphed Commodore Remey 
at Key West: 

Inform at once vessels blockading at Cienfuegos the Spanish fleet 
may appear at any time on south coast of Cuba. 

Sampson gave orders to the scouts, which are embodied in 
the following telegram to the navy department. May 16: 

Auxiliary cruisers are ordered to cruise as follows: Yale to assist 
St. Paul between Morant Point, Jamaica, Xicolas Mole and Cuba; 
Harvard, Mona Passage and on north side of Puerto Rico Island; 
St. Louis cutting cables at Santiago and Guantanamo, Cuba, then at 
Ponce, Puerto Rico, then to St. Thomas about May 19 to await orders. 
United States squadron proceeding at best speed, 7 knots, to Key 
West and will arrive early May 19. Solace and Supply joined squad- 
ron. 

He telegraphed the Harvard, at St. Thomas: 



244 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Four Spanish cruisers, two torpedo-destroyers, now at Cura9ao to 
leave 6 P. M. May 15. Probably small supply of coal. Destination 
unknown, probably Santiago de Cuba ' or San Juan, Puerto Rico. 
St. Louis will destroy cables at Santiago, Guantdnamo, May 16, then 
Ponce, P. R., arrive St. Thomas about May 19. Cruise as follows: 
Yale to assist St. Paul between Morant Point, Jamaica, Nicolas 
Mole and Cuba. Harvard Mona Passage and north side of Puerto 
Rico. St. Louis to await orders at St. Thomas. 

At noon of the day (May 16) when these telegrams were sent, 
the harassed Spanish admiral was but 135 miles north-west of 
Cura9ao, having made less than a fourth of his distance to San- 
tiago de Cuba (635 miles), toward which he was proceeding at 
the very slow rate of about 7 knots. It had been impossible for 
the American commander to suppose that these fine ships, all 
of them rated at not less than 20 knots trial speed, had been 
brought to such condition. Sampson's course to Key West laid 
directly past the Windward Passage, and at noon, May 16, he 
was looking down it with Cervera 450 miles south-east of him 
heading for Santiago, still 500 miles distant, but which was only 
160 miles from Sampson's position of that day. 

Sampson's foresightful orders of May 16 failed of execution. 
On May 14 the navy department ordered all the scouts to Key 
West to watch the Yucatan Channel. Changing these the next 
day on the misguiding information that Spanish colliers had 
been sent to the Venezuelan coast, it ordered thither the Yale, 
St. Paul and Minneapolis, orders which rapid developments 
soon annulled. There was thus no ship but the St. Louis, now 
cutting cables, in the sea between Jamaica, Hayti and Cuba 
which Sampson had ordered watched and over which Cervera 
had taken his course. W^ith the flying squadron now probably 
in a situation to watch Havana, there can be little doubt that 
Sampson, left to his own judgment, would himself have gone 
by the south side of Cuba. Short, however, of its annulment, 
Sampson was obliged to obey the imperative order of the navy 
department to return to Key West. 

> It Bhould be noted that Sampson placed upon record, as shown by this 
telegram to the Harvard, his beUef in the possibility of Santiago's being an 
objective. 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 245 

Sampson, having sent the telegram just mentioned into Cape 
Haitien by the Porter, and being joined by the Montgomery and 
store-ship Supply, which carried to the fleet a most welcome cargo 
of fresh provisions, stood westward to overtake his own slow- 
moving squadron, which had been standing its westerly course 
throughout the night, and which was overhauled at 10 o'clock 
the next morning, May 17. Instructions w'ere given Captain 
Evans, of the Iowa, the officer next in rank, to make the best 
time possible to Key West; and, directing the Niagara and 
Montgomery to go off Cardenas to coal the latter and any other 
ships there, the flag-ship at 11.30 left the squadron at full speed 
for Key West. Some little delay was experienced by the flag- 
ship's overhauling and capturing in the afternoon the Spanish 
bark Carlos F. Rosas, with a cargo of jerked beef for Havana. 
After a futile attempt to tow her at a good speed, she was left 
with a prize crew aboard under the command of Ensign Brumby, 
to make her own best w^ay to Key West, and the Neiv York 
stood on at 16 knots. 

At 6 r. M. the torpedo-boat Dupont was met, with a copy of a 
despatch from the navy department to the station commandant 
at Key West and telegrams to the commander-in-chief. The 
following was that to Commodore Remey: 

Sampson is due May 17, 1898, in the vicinity of Lobes Cay. Send 
immediately your fastest vessel to inform him that department has 
just heard that Spanish fleet have munitions of war essential to the 
defence of Havana and the order of the Spanish fleet is imperative to 
reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a railroad port connected with Havana 
at all hazards, and as Cienfuegos appears to be the only port fulfilling 
the conditions, Schley, with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and Texas, 
to arrive Key West morning of the 18th, will be sent to Cienfuegos as 
soon as possible, so Admiral Sampson take or send his most suitable 
armored ship (one) to join Schley and hurry with remainder of his 
heavy ships to join Havana blockade. Acknowledge this by tele- 
graph, reporting action taken. 

To the commander-in-chief: 

Washington, May 14. — On account of the presence of Spanish 
fleet near Cura9ao send with all possible despatch swift vessel to direct 
all except smallest blockading vessel off Cienfuegos to Key West. 



246 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Warn the blockading vessels off north coast of Cuba but do not re- 
move any of them. Hornet sent Cienfuegos jNIay 14 P. M. Uncas sent 
to north coast 2 a. m. 15th. 

W'ASHiNGTON, May 14. — Spanish fleet with torpedo-boats are 
reported sighted off Curasao by our consul at that place, morning 
May 14. Are probably fleet which was at Martinique on May 12. 
Keep close lookout for Yucatan Channel, as the enemy may round 
Cape Antonio, or enter Gulf of ]\Iexico. Keep very efficient despatch 
service to these lookout ships. St Paul will probably join you early 
morning 17th May. Enemy may appear at point on south side of 
Cuba. Cincinnati and Vesuvius in Yucatan Channel. 

Washington, May 16. — Previous plans for St. Paul are changed 
and she must coal immediately and proceed with all possible despatch 
to Venezuela Gulf, South America, where it is considered the Spanish 
fleet from Cape Verde Islands will coal. She must find and keep in 
communication with enemy, exercising the utmost care to avoid being 
captured. More vessels will be sent to join her, probably Harvard. Key 
West and the department must be kept advised of iriiportant move- 
ment and plans of enemy. St. Paul and Harvard not arrived 6 p.m. 16th. 

Washington, May 16. — The Texas, Massachusetts, and Brooklyn 
are expected to arrive to-morrow to coal. 

Washington, May 17. — Armored vessels and monitors and flying 
squadron must be coaled immediately upon arrival at Key West, also 
four gun-boats of the force of the Marblehead. Flying squadron, 
after being increased by the armored vessels commander-in-chief 
North Atlantic station considers most suitable, proceed with despatch 
(utmost) off Cienfuegos, accompanied by the smaller vessels above 
mentioned and such torpedo-boats, if any, as the commander-in- 
chief will choose to send. The remainder of the naval force on the 
North Atlantic station and the monitors will blockade_ Havana closely, 
remembering the importance of having current in their favor. Samp- 
son have choice the command off Havana or at Cienfuegos, Schley 
in either case to remain with his own squadron. Commander-in- 
chief is authorized to make such changes of detail in this plan as he 
may think proper. In general, the object is to engage and capture the 
enemy off Cienfuegos if possible, or otherwise blockade him in that 
port. See department's telegram of the 16th. 

From Captain Cotton, of the Harvard: 

Martinique, May 17. — In obedience to your orders May 15 will 
leave to-morrow. Detained on account of twenty-four hours' notice. 
Terror remains at Fort de France. Coal eight days 15 knots an hour, 
eleven days 12 knots per hour. 



I 



SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 247 

The flag-ship arrived at Key West at 4 p. m. the next day, 
May 18, and found Commodore Schley, who had arrived at 
1 A. M. the same day, with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, and 
Texas anchored outside the reef. 

Commodore Schley had left Hampton Roads May 13 under 
these orders: 

Direct squadron to proceed at once off Charleston, S. C, taking 
colliers. Anchor. Keep in communication with department by ves- 
sel. You are thus moved to be more near to re-enforce either Samp- 
son or blockade of Cuba, as movements of Spanish squadron may 
require. Keep the New Orleans at Hampton Roads. The depart- 
ment will send St. Paul immediately to cruise Windward Passage. 

He was met at Charleston with an order carried out to him 
by the light-house tender to proceed to Key West "with all pos- 
sible despatch and on arrival report Remey. He will have in- 
structions." 

The Iowa arrived at Key W^est three hours after the New 
York and reported having been overhauled by the Porter from 
Cape Haitien with the following telegram which had been sent 
to Cape Haitien from the department to the store-ship Supply: 

Cruise between Caicos Bank and Monte Christi until you fall in 
with the Minneapolis, due there the 16th or 17th, and transmit to her 
commander the following cipher message, after which proceed to 
Key West, distributing supplies en route. For Mimieapolis : the 
Spanish squadron off Curasao on May 15 is believed going to 
Venezuela Gulf, South America, to coal. Proceed with all despatch 
to that vicinity, get and keep touch (Spanish squadron). Care must 
be taken to avoid capture; <S^. Paul and Yale have been ordered upon 
this duty. If not able to find enemy, communicate by telegraph by 
nearest station. 

The St. Paul, Captain Sigsbee, was at the anchorage, about 
getting under way, with instructions already delivered by Com- 
modore Remey: 

Order St. Paul proceed with all despatch to Cape Haitien and 
chere communicate. If he meets Yale Windward Passage Cuba, take 
Yale with him, but he must not delay in order to find her. Further 
instructions at Cape Plaitien. 



248 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

Sigsbee, leaving as Sampson arrived, picked up the Yale in 
the old Bahama Channel, and arrived with both ships at Cape 
Haitien, May 20.^ 

The natural anxiety of the navy department was shown in 
supplementing its previous telegrams by sending to Key West, 
the day of Sampson's arrival, orders to Schley to go off Havana 
with all possible despatch to support blockade until the former's 
arrival, leaving the Puritan and Miantonomoh to defend Key 
W'est; but as both squadrons arrived the same day, arrangements 
were made as the department had first intended. 

The flying squadron had been coaling since its arrival; Com- 
modore Schley at once came on board the New York and a con- 
sultation was held in the admiral's cabin as to the dispositions 
to be made under the navy department's two important tele- 
grams given above, embodying the orders for the general disposi- 
tion of the fleet — orders given under the misinformation which 
appeared to make Cienfuegos or Havana Cervera's necessary 
objective, whereas his only orders had been to go to San Juan, 
Puerto Rico.^ 

Sampson had already decided before arrival to give the op- 
portunity at Cienfuegos to Schley, and himself remain off Ha- 
vana. He had determined upon adding the Iowa, as the best 
ship of the fleet, to Schley's squadron, which, with the smaller 
vessels, the Marhlehead, Castine, and Eagle, and torpedo-boat 
Dupont, soon to be available, gave an ample and indeed an over- 
powering force with which to meet that of Cervera, who had but 
four armored cruisers against the one armored cruiser and three 

• The developments during his passage were to cause both ships to go at 
once off Santiago instead of Venezuela; the Minneapolis, at St. Thomas May 
19, immediately followed on May 20. 

* The following ships were now at Key West, or arrived next day. Off the 
reef: New York, Brooklyn, Massachusetts, loim, Texas, Indiana, and colliers 
Niagara and Sterling. In the harbor: the monitors Amphitrite, Mianto- 
nomoh, Puritan, and Terror; the cruisers Marhlehead, Montgomery, and De- 
troit; gun-boats Machias, Castine, and Newport; armed revenue vessels Win- 
dom and Morrill; armed yachts Scorpion, Wasp, Eagle, Hawk, and Hornet; 
armed tugs Osceola and Tecumseh; torpedo-boats Ericsson, Dupont, Rodgers, 
and Winslow; the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius; tbe transport Panther, with 
the marine battalion; the hospital ship Solace; a total of thirty-five vessels. 



SAJVIPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD 249 

battle-ships (two of which were of the first class) to be with 
Commodore Schley. The smaller ships named and the power- 
fully armed yacht Scorpion were an ample set-off to the two 
torpedo-destroyers of the Spanish squadron. 

Telegrams came and went with painful frequency. On the 
18th the navy department ordered a fast cruiser of 2,000 or 
3,000 tons to be sent as soon as possible to keep a close look- 
out for the Spanish fleet off Cienfuegos, but answer was made 
that none was available larger than the Castine. A suitable 
defence was ordered by the department to be left at Key West, 
and the utmost despatch was urged to get the force off Ci- 
enfuegos; information was also received that the Oregon had 
arrived at Barbados all well. 

Sampson telegraphed: 

Schley will leave Thursday morning, 19th, for Cienfuegos with 
Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and two cruisers and two torpedo- 
boats. Iowa will leave as soon as coaled. 



CHAPTER VIII 

CERVERA'S VOYAGE 

The Spanish squadron had lost sight of the Cape Verdes at 
10 A. M., April 29. The large ships, the Vizcaya excepted (on 
account of her foulness and consequent large coal expenditure), 
had towed the three torpedo-destroyers the greater part of the 
way across the Atlantic. There was no special equipment for 
this work, and much difficulty was experienced with the im- 
provised appliances; the tow-lines parted frequently through 
the yawing of the destroyers. An average of but 6.5 knots had 
thus been made to May 10 (a slowness w^iich it was impossible 
for the American authorities to anticipate), when the admiral 
sent the Terror and Furor ahead to Martinique to obtain coal, 
and more especially news. In doing this duty they had been 
expected to make 20 knots, but a few hours after leaving the 
squadron the Terror's boilers gave out " and there she was on the 
open sea nothing but a buoy." ^ Villaamil, in the Furor, stood 
by her until picked up by the squadron, when she was again 
taken in tow. Villaamil w^as ungraciously received by the gov- 
ernor (who seems to have preserved an entirely neutral atti- 
tude throughout), who informed him he could have no coal, 
and that he was prohibited from going out on account of the 
Harvard's arrival just before. Nor was there news of the col- 
lier which the Spanish government had promised should be 
at Martinique. Despite the governor's prohibition, however, 
the Furor left at midnight, boats from the Spanish hospital 
ship in port, the Alicante, lighting the positions of the buoys.^ 

' The Terror repaired her boilers at Fort de France, Martinique, and left 
there May 25, arriving at San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 26. 
'^Concas, 44. 

250 



252 THE SPANISH-AIVIERICAN WAR 

It was shortly after 2 a. m. (of the 12th) that Villaamil, in 
the Furor, was picked up by the squadron by her search- 
lights thrown upon the clouds, and at 3 was alongside the 
admiral. 

The information brought by Villaamil as to Sampson's prox- 
imity to Puerto Rico was sufficiently definite to convince the 
admiral that it would be madness to follow the orders to go to 
San Juan. He called a council of war, the unanimous decision 
of which was as follows: 

Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, which is 
extremely critical, owing to the scant supply of coal, the Governor of 
Martinique having refused to give aid in that direction, and it having 
been learned that there is no coal in San Juan, nor probably at San- 
tiago, and in view of the bad condition of the boilers of the destroyers, 
those of the Terror being practically unserviceable, so that it became 
necessary to send her back to Fort de France this morning to await 
orders from the government, these officers seeing no other solution — 
on penalty of placing the squadron in a position where it will be unable 
to move and will hence become an easy prey for the enemy — except 
to go to Cura9ao, in hopes of finding there the coal announced by the 
minister of marine in his telegram of April 26. 

In witness whereof they sign the foregoing, at sea, off Fort de France, 
Martinique.' 

' Signed by the admiral, the commodore, and all the captains. (Cervera, 
Documents, 73.) 

A telegram from Cervera had been sent from Martinique to the minister 
of marine: 

"Squadron arrived safely. Spirit excellent. Villaamil is to obtain informa- 
tion on which future operations will depend." 

A request for increase of credit at London followed. 

Had Cervera awaited an answer, the complexion of affairs would have been 
very materially altered, as the reply, sent the same day, permitted a return 
to Spain. The minister sent the three following telegrams this day: 

"Government is pleased to hear of your arrival at Martinique. Nothing 
new in the Peninsula. Telegram received to-day announcing attack San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, by hostile fleet, composed of New York, Indiana, Terror, 
Puritan, two cruisers, one torpedo-boat, and two colliers. Island of Puerto 
Rico is watched by auxiliaries Paris and New York. Admiral at Havana 
says four hostile ships in sight yesterday, one at Matanzas and several off 
Cienfuegos. News of bombardment of Cardenas by a battle-ship, monitor, 
and another vessel; enemy repulsed. 

"Credit increased; another 15,000 pounds on same house London. Steamer 
Alicante with coal must have arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer 



CERVERA'S VOYAGE 253 

Cervera's own account of what to this moment had happened, 
is shown in a letter written three days later at Cura9ao: 

[Confidential.] 

The Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Min- 
ister (Berviejo). 

Captaincy-General of the Squadron. 

Honored Sir: Through my official letter of the 8th, written on 
the sea, your Excellency knows of the few incidents of our monotonous 
voyage across the Atlantic, during which I sacrificed everything in 

with 3,000 tons is to make that harbor under orders of captain of Alicante. 
Both vessels at your disposal." 

"According to late information battle-ship Oregon, accompanied by Mari- 
etta and another similar ship, are on the way from Rio de Janeiro to West 
Indies." 

"Situation changed since your departure. Your instruction amplified so 
that if you do not believe that your squadron can operate successfully may 
return to Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Ac- 
knowledge receipt and indicate decision." [These never reached Cervera.] 

The knowledge in Havana and San Juan of the sending of the latter tele- 
gram brought violent protests from Blanco and Macias, the governors of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico, to the minister of the colonies, Girdn: 

Havana, May 17, 1898. 

(To be deciphered by your Excellency personally.) 

Have asked commandant navy whether he has received news on situation 
of our squadron. He tells me received from San Juan confidential cipher 
message saying that telegram has been sent to commander-in-chief of squadron 
at Fort de France that his instructions are amplified, and if he cannot operate 
there successfully may return to Peninsula. If this should happen, situa- 
tion here would be wholly untenable, and I could not prevent bloody revolu- 
tion in this capital and whole island, feelings being already overmuch excited 
by delay in arrival of our squadron. Therefore, beg your Excellency to tell me 
whether it is true that order has been issued to squadron to return to Peninsula, 
and if so does government realize the significance of such a decision, which 
might be the cause of a bloody page staining our history, and of final loss of 
this island and the honor of Spain? If our squadron is defeated, it would 
increase here determination to vanquish or die; but if it flees, panic and 
revolution are certain. 

Puerto Rico, May 18, 1898. 

Orders for squadron to return to Peninsula will end enthusiasm and high 
spirit in island. Inhabitants will say Spain abandons them and situation 
may become very critical. Consider it my sacred duty to tell you so. (Cer- 
vera's Documents, 72, 73, 78.) 



254 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

order that our frail torpedo-boat destroyers might arrive fresh and in 
condition to render useful service. But my efforts were in vain, for 
hardly had the Furor and Terror been made for twenty-four hours to 
maintain two-thirds of their trial speed, when the boilers of the latter 
became disabled, putting us to the necessity of losing still further time, 
and finally leaving the Terror in the neutral port of Fort de France in 
the island of Martinique. 

The accompanying copy of the official report of her captain, marked 
"Document No. 1," will give your Excellency further details as to 
what has occurred. It was a great and very unpleasant surprise to me 
when I saw our two destroyers at daybreak of the 11th, the Terror 
nothing but a buoy, and the Furor guarding her, so that she might not 
be abandoned in the midst of the ocean until she was sure of being 
seen by the squadron. When we reached her I took her in tow, and 
we had to proceed even more slowly than at the beginning, as the de- 
stroyer no longer had the protection of the swifter with which the 
commander of the flotilla had provided her. 

I will say nothing further of this accident, since it has occurred to 
a ship under very efficient command, and with an engineer-in-chief 
who enjoys the highest reputation. It only proves the frailness of these 
ships. They have another defect, almost worse, namely, the temper- 
ature which develops in them and which is unbearable for all, but 
especially for the engineers and firemen, who are frequently over- 
come by the heat. 

The commander of the flotilla, who, as your Excellency is aware, 
went to Martinique in search of information, went out with the F^iror 
at daybreak of the 11th, and at midnight of the 11th he rejoined the 
squadron, brimful of news, but all bad, and, among other obstacles 
encountered, having had to contend with a chase by a hostile cruiser. 
The commander. Captain Villaamil, has once more demonstrated in 
this enterprise the rare intelligence, energy, and presence of mind 
with which he is gifted. The information he brought me, in answer 
to the questions I gave him upon trusting the mission to him, is as fol- 
lows: That the hostile ships are blockading the western part of Cuba, 
from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, with the nucleus of their fleet; that just 
now, according to secret information which, however, is not entirely 
reliable, they are off San Juan de Puerto Rico, with their admiral, 
and bombarded the capital on the 11th; that San Juan appears to be 
blockaded and Santiago free; that two of the enemy's auxiHary 
cruisers, the Harvard and St. Loiiis, are at Guadeloupe and Marti- 
nique, respectively; that the Americans have taken possession of 
Puerto Plata and, it is believed, also of Samand; that the war of 
insurrection in Cuba is still going on, and the last news is of a fierce 
battle at Sierra Maestra; that Spain is passing through a ministerial 
crisis; that we should not be permitted to take coal in Martinique, 



CERVERA'S VOYAGE 255 

but that we could get provisions there; and finally, that there was no 
special news from the Far East. 

He also brought me a bundle of press telegrams containing a great 
deal of news; among others, of the destruction of our poor fleet in the 
Philippines, which, glorious though it may be, is nevertheless a great 
disaster. In view of the very serious news, and although my opinions 
on the subject have been manifested (too frankly, perhaps) in my 
correspondence with the government, by telegrams as well as official 
letters, and in my confidential communications to the minister of 
marine, I considered it my duty to assemble the captains and second 
in command of the squadron, whom I acquainted with the situation 
and consulted as to what, in their opinion, was best to be done. 

After discussing this very serious question, it was decided that there 
was no advantage in going to Martinique, since we would gain nothing 
thereby and only consume coal. To go to San Juan would be mad- 
ness, as we would only be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. 
And, as we have hardly coal enough to reach Santiago de Cuba, with 
the speed necessary on the sea of operations, and as our destroyers 
would probably not be able to withstand the trip, it was the unanimous 
opinion of the officers that we should go to Curasao in search of the 
coal which was promised us by telegram of April 26. Proceedings 
were drawn up to that effect, a copy of which, marked "Document 
No. 2," accompanies this letter.' As I was of the same opinion, we 
proceeded to that island, adopting at first a wrong course in the direc- 
tion of Santo Domingo, until at a distance of 30 miles from Martinique. 

Cervera then proceeds to reiterate the folly of mere sacrifice 
and ends with events at Cura9ao: 

Permit me here to make a few observations to explain and justify 
my operations. 

There is not the least doubt that a sacrifice, such as made by our 
comrades in the Philippines, is worthy of the highest honor, and I 
take pleasure in expressing to them from here my enthusiasm and 
admiration. But is there any practical result in such sacrifice ? Evi- 
dently not, and from pitting vessels like the CastUla and Cristina 
against modem ships no other result than the one obtained can possi- 
bly be expected. The result will always be the same where there is 
great disparity between the opposing forces, whether in the number 
of ships, their efficiency, or the stores they carry. 

This painful result therefore justifies the crude ideas I have ex- 
pressed in my correspondence above referred to, upon which I insist 
no further, as I do not want to be a bore, which is always a bad thing, 

* Supra, p. 252. 



256 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

especially when addressing a superior. I therefore proceed with the 
report of our voyage. The run from the waters of Martinique to 
those of Cura9ao offered nothing worth mentioning. At 7 o'clock 
A. M. of the 14th, about five miles from Little Cura9ao, I gave orders 
to the destroyers to enter the port first; but at 8.30 I saw them off the 
entrance. The Pluton signalled: "Awaiting permission of governor." 
The squadron stopped and soon after the Pluton signalled that only two 
ships were permitted to go in. This was confirmed by the pilot, who 
arrived soon after, demanding to know the names of the ships, their 
complements and armament, and the amount of coal required. I 
selected the Teresa and Vizcaya, whose coal supply was lower than 
that of the others. I gave the information asked for, stating that each 
ship needed 700 tons, and the pilot went back. 

I gave instructions that the Furor should be recoaled from the 
Colon, and that the latter ship, together with the Oquendo and Pluton, 
should remain outside. The pilot returned, accompanied by the 
Spanish consul, who told me that the stay in the harbor must be 
limited to forty-eight hours. At 12.30 we cast anchor inside, after 
which I had an interview with the governor, who told me that this was 
a necessity imposed upon his government by both belligerents. I 
accepted the 600 tons of coal, which was all that could be had in the 
town, and ordered the purchase of provisions so as to supply each 
ship for thirty days, from the captain down to the cabin-boy. 

The reasons for going to Cura9ao are given in greater detail 
by Captain Concas: 

In the first place, it had been reported for some time that the United 
States was negotiating for the purchase of the island of St. Thomas. 
We had therefore good reasons to suppose that the enemy would have 
a station there, if only a merchant vessel, so that the squadron which 
we had been told was at San Juan would be notified of our arrival 
that very day, and as said squadron could have no other object in 
view but to await us, it was highly probable — almost certain — that 
knowing us to be to the southward, the hostile fleet would cut off our 
passage at Cape Maysi and Mole St. Nicolas or at Gibara, from 
which points the hostile squadron was 450 and 600 miles distant, 
respectively; while we, passing to the southward of Santo Domingo, 
since to the northward an encounter was certain, were 950 miles from 
Cape Maysi and still further from Gibara, without being able to 
elude an encounter with much superior forces, if we wanted to go to 
Havana through the Old Bahama Channel, which encounter would 
probably have taken place at a distance of not less than 400 miles 
from Havana. In that case, the hostile forces being overwhelmingly 
superior, our ships, if even slightly injured, were hopelessly lost, for 



CERVERA'S VOYAGE 257 

under such circumstances, and when harassed by the enemy, ships 
cannot run hundreds of miles. 

The only harbors that we could enter were, first, San Juan, which 
we had to discard altogether because, as the United States admiral has 
said with good reason, he could have taken it whenever he pleased. 
Second, Havana, which we had to suppose to be well guarded, and it 
was, indeed, since the Americans themselves have since said that 
it tvas considered highly improbable that we should attempt to enter 
Havana, and it must be understood that it was better guarded by the 
squadrons at a distance than near by, because, in spite of the block- 
ade, it would have been difficult to prevent ships, whether injured or 
not, from placing themselves under the protection of the batteries of 
the city, while an encounter at a distance from Havana meant the 
total destruction of our squadron. Third, Cienfuegos, which we also 
supposed guarded ... is a veritable rat-trap, very easy to blockade, 
and from which exit is more difficult than from any other harbor of the 
island. We knew there were torpedoes there, but no fortifications to 
amount to anything, and, moreover, the entrance is very difficult to 
defend against a serious attack from the sea. On the other hand, we 
were 1,250 miles distant from the latter harbor, while from Havana, 
or Dry Tortugas or Key West, the enemy's base of operations, they 
had to make a run of only 500 miles to cut us off. . . . Later, when 
starvation stared us in the face at Santiago, the former harbor was 
thought of as a possible solution, but not on the day of our arrival at 
Martinique. There remained as the only solution, going to Santiago 
de Cuba, the second capital of the island, which we had to suppose, 
and did suppose, well supplied with provisions and artillery, in view 
of the favorable condition of the harbor entrance. Moreover, the 
southern coast of the island offered chances of sortie on stormy days 
and an open sea for operations, after we had refilled and made re- 
pairs. But as we also supposed that the fortifications there were not 
sufficient to afford us much support in the sortie, it was not at that 
time decided to go to said harbor in the hopes of a solution which 
would permit us to force our way into Havana harbor. The distance 
from Martinique to Santiago is about 950 miles, so that the hostile 
squadron, which was at San Juan, could easily have arrived there 
ahead of us. But we never believed that it would do so, thinking that 
Admiral Sampson, though it has since come to light that he did not 
know of our arrival, would do what he actually did do, namely, to 
cover the remotest possibility, the entrance to the only fortified point, 
Havana. 

INIoreover, the government had notified us that we should find a 
collier at the island of Cura9ao, and as we were not more than 480 
miles from said island and by going there should lose only about 200 
miles on our way to Cuba, it was decided to go to Cura9ao, because if 
we had a collier with us, we could have disappeared in the Caribbean 



258 THE SPANISH-AJVIERICAN WAR 

Sea and, though at great risk, reached Havana; and our entering the 
harbor, though we might have to suffer more or less in the attempt, 
would not have been prevented by any one, provided always that the 
battle had taken place in sight of the forts.' 

The Spanish squadron lost sight of Martinique at twenty 
minutes past noon, May 12, sighted Cura9ao at 6.30 the morning 
of the 14th, and at 8 was off the port, having made the run of 
485 miles at an average speed of a little more than 11 knots. 
The Spanish admiral has already described the discouraging 
situation in his letter above of May 15,^ but the graphic words 
of Captain Concas give the more complete picture. He says: 

After lengthy and unpleasant negotiations, the governor stated that 
the conditions of neutrality permitted him to allow only two ships to 
enter and that these could not remain more than forty-eight hours; 
also, that w^e could ship only a limited quantity of coal. It was about 
2 o'clock p. M. by the time the armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa 
and Vizcaya entered the harbor, while the Colon, Oquendo, and the 
destroyers. Furor and Pliiton, remained outside.' It was with diffi- 
culty that we acquired the coal available, which, if I remember right, 
amounted to only 400 tons, and we proceeded to get it on board, 
working frantically, shipping also such provisions as we could obtain. 
Nothing can give an idea of the anxiety of that night of May 14, when 
we interpreted every noise we heard as an attack upon our comrades, 
and we could not even go to their assistance, for the harbor of Cura9ao, 
which is closed by a bridge, is completely cut off from the outside at 
sunset.^ In the meantime Ave had ascertained the sad fact that the 
anxiously looked-for collier was not there, nor was there any news for 
us; and as though ill luck were pursuing us even in the least details, 
one of those two days was a holiday and everything was strictly 
closed up, so that we could not even buy postage stamps for our 
letters, which we had to entrust to the consul to be mailed the next 
day. 

On the evening of the 15th, as daylight w^as fading, the tw^o cruisers 
went out, having to leave in the harbor launches with coal and pro- 
visions, but did not rejoin the other ships until it was quite dark, 
owing to the fact that a man of the crew of the Plutdn had fallen over- 
board, but fortunately he had been rescued. 

' Concas, 47. ' Cervera, Documents, 75, 77. 

^The Plutdn was allowed to go in later. The Terror was supplied with 
thirty-four tons from the Colon by the ship's cutters. 

* This very extraordinary harbor is entered by a narrow canal which passes 
through the town into a deep and commodious basin. 



CERVERA'S VOYAGE 



259 



Captain Concas proceeds to describe the passage to Santiago: 

"When the line had been formed again with every precaution made 
necessary by the grave situation, we proceeded at an economical 
speed on account of the Oquendo and Colon, which were short of coal. 





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and timing ourselves so as to reach Santiago de Cuba at daybreak, 
the squadron shaped its course for that harbor, which the admiral 
indicated by signals to be our destination. All the ships were in com- 
plete readiness to open fire. 

During the night of May 18, off Jamaica, we crossed two trans- 
atlantic steamers, which left us in doubt as to whether they were 



260 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

auxiliary cruisers or not. But soon one of these vessels passed within 
sight of us, making signals with the INIorse alphabet and with a search- 
light in operation. But she did not discover us, as we were proceed- 
ing without lights, with the exception of a small screened lamp at the 
stern, of such feeble light that it could not be discerned beyond a dis- 
tance of three cables, which was the distance maintained between 
our ships. 

We paid no attention to these cruisers or merchant vessels, for as 
their presence seemed to indicate that there were hostile forces at 
Santiago it was necessary for us to reach that harbor before daylight, 
whether to fight at the entrance, or whether to force our way through 
before being defeated in case the enemy was superior. The admiral 
did not have the least information as to whether there were hostile 
forces there, and if so, what they consisted of. 

At dawn of May 19 the squadron was off Santiago, without having 
seen a hostile ship. The destroyers therefore made a reconnoissance 
of the coast, while the large ships entered the harbor, where they cast 
anchor in complete security at 8 o'clock A. isi. of that day. This was 
very fortunate, as the Oqiiendo and Colon, which had not been able to 
enter Cura9ao, had very little coal left, especially the former, which 
had hardly 100 tons. ^ 

Cervera telegraphed his arrival to the minister of marine, say- 
ing that it w'as imperative to clean engines and boilers, which 
made it necessary to remain several days, and that he needed 

' Concas, 49, 50. 

At this moment the fast scout St. Louis, accompanied by the tug Wompa- 
tuck, was at Guantdnamo, but forty miles to the east of Santiago, attempting 
to cut the cables leading to the coast of Hayti . She had been on the same 
duty off Santiago the day before, where the two vessels, handled with great 
courage and ability by Captain Goodrich, and under fire of the batteries, 
with which they had a sharp engagement, had cut one cable leading thence. 
It was hazardous work for a great merchant steamer, whose crew, furthermore, 
were not even enlisted men of the navy. The affair is described by Goodrich: 

"At daylight [May 18], being then some seven miles off Santiago light and the 
Morro Castle, I steamed with this ship on various courses, gradually approach- 
ing the fortifications. The water is so deep close to, that with the meagre 
and improvised appliances at my command I was obliged to come within 
1.3 miles of the castle. I had no sooner hooked the cable in over 500 fathoms 
of water than I was fired upon from the Morro, from a new work to the west- 
ward of the harbor, and most formidable of all, from a mortar battery on 
Caspar Point. Of course, with the very modest broadside of this vessel, 
aided by the one 3-pounder of the Wompatuck, which joined me just as the 
firing began, it was impossible to do much execution on the fortifications. 
Nevertheless we silenced the one gun on the Morro, which was placing its 
ehot dangerously close, both over and short of us; the crew, as could be plainly 



CERVERA'S VOYAGE 261 

more coal than he had. Telegraphing Governor-General Blanco 
he said: " Have cast anchor in this harbor, whence whole squad- 
ron sends you greeting, desirous of co-operating in the defence 
of the country." Blanco had already, at 9 a. m., telegraphed to 
the minister of the colonies that " Our squadron has just en- 
tered Santiago de Cuba. Congratulate the admiral on his 
arrival and skilful voyage." 

As an answer to a telegram of May 18 from Blanco to the 
same minister, that the return of the squadron to Spain would 
" end enthusiasm and high spirits in the island," the minister 
of marine, before knowing of Cervera's arrival, telegraphed both 
to Santiago and Martinique cancelling the recall. 

seen, running away from their piece. Similarly our fire silenced the western 
battery. From the mortar battery above mentioned the projectiles came with 
singularly good aim, both as to direction and distance, falling close aboard, 
some not 100 feet away, and rendering our position extremely uncomfortable. 
The damage of which one of their shells is capable might have been serious, 
even to wrecking or completely crippling this fine and costly vessel. Our 
position was now extremely uncomfortable, but we held firmly on to the 
cable, firing all the time, and steamed slowly out of range, where we could 
pick up the cable at leisure. We cut out quite a length. A sample accom- 
panies this letter. It may be said with absolute exactness that we not only 
succeeded in our undertaking, but had to fight for our success in a ship en- 
tirely unsuited to fighting. 

"The action, which took place at 2,500 to 3,000 yards, lasted forty-one 
minutes. I am exceedingly happy to report no injuries to either ship and 
no casualties among the officers or men." {Report of the Bureau oj Naviga- 
tion, 1898, Appendix, 209.) 

Of the occurrences next day he says: 

" I regret to have to report my failure this morning early to cut the French 
cable at Guantdnamo. The port is guarded by a Spanish gun-boat carrying 
heavier guns than the 6-pounders of this ship; she is commanded by an officer 
who did not hesitate to attack us. Doubtless he had been informed from 
Santiago of the light nature of our batteries, and had been warned to be on 
the lookout for us. In addition was a small gun on shore. I sent the Wom- 
paiuck into the mouth of the harbor to drag for the wire while I lay just outside. 
She caught the cable just before the action. It was only after a hot engage- 
ment in which both ships took part that the necessity of abandoning my enter- 
prise in that locality was forced upon me. To have remained longer might 
have caused the loss of the ship, for she is very vulnerable, as you know." 
{Ibid., 210.) Captain Goodrich particularly praises Lieutenant Jungen in 
both actions, as also Chief Officer Segrave, whom he recommended for a 
commission in the navy. He expresses his thanks to Ensign U. S. Payne, 
U. S. N., and Lieut. A. W. Catlin, of the marine corps, for labors in preparing 
a set of raw recruits for battle, and praises their coolness and courage. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 

At 8 A. M., May 19, the hour and day that Cervera anchored 
at Santiago, Commodore Schley, with the Brooklyn, Massa- 
chusetts, Texas, and Scorpion, sailed for Cienfuegos with the 
following orders from Admiral Sampson, supplementing the 
department's telegrams of the two previous days.^ 

No. 5. U. S. F. S. New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Fla., May 19, 1898. 
Sir: — I send you a copy of a telegram received last night from 
Secretary Long, concerning a vessel which was to sail on the 15th, 
and carrying a large amount of specie, and is supposed to be going 
to land at Trinidad or to the east of Cienfuegos. This may be a 
blind, however, and the vessel may be bound for Cienfuegos, or even 
to Havana. 

The two cruisers will be sent out to-day, and with the two torpedo- 
boats following them. As soon as the loica is coaled, she will fol- 
low you. 

It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a block- 
ade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should 
be maintained as close as possible. 

Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and, 
finding you on the lookout, attempt to come around the island, either 
east or west, please send me notice by the best vessel you have for 
that purpose, as to their direction, that I may be prepared for them 
at Havana. 

I will try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal, 
in order that you may have them to send with messages to me in case 
you desire to do so. 

After I have the situation more in hand I will write you and give you 
any information that suggests itself. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S. Navy, 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 
North Atlantic Station. 
The Commanding Officer, 
Flying Squadron. 

' Supra, pp. 245-249. 
262 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 263 

The coaling of the Iowa was hurried forward with all possi- 
ble rapidity. At 1 P. M. the Marblehead, accompanied by the 
Eagle, and followed shortly by the Nashville, Hornet, Vixen, 
and collier Saturn, arrived from Cienfuegos in obedience to the 
orders of the navy department of May 14 sent thither by the 
Hornet, directing that all but the smallest blockading vessel off 
Cienfuegos return to Key West. Commander McCalla, how- 
ever, took the responsibility of withdrawing all, leaving for Key 
West the evening of the day the Hornet arrived, May 16. The 
day before, the Eagle had picked up at sea a boat with five 
Cubans who had come, in an endeavor to open communications 
with the blockading force, from an insurgent camp thirteen miles 
west of the entrance, and had been forty hours afloat. The 
men were transferred to the Marblehead. The next day the 
Eagle was sent to the Cuban camp, with which her captain com- 
municated and where four of the Cubans were landed with 6,000 
rounds of ammunition. While on board the Marblehead the 
Cubans had arranged with Commander McCalla that in case 
they wished to communicate with the force afloat they would 
show three horizontal lights at night, or three horses in line 
on the beach by day. 

The Marblehead, accompanied by the Eagle (an engine of the 
Nashville being disabled and the other vessels slow), met Com- 
modore Schley when but thirty miles west of Sand Key light.^ 

As is customary in meeting a senior officer at sea, Commander 
McCalla made the signal asking for permission to proceed, which 
was granted. McCalla, however, signalled the Eagle to "com- 
municate with Brooklyn. Acquaint him with the situation as 
we know it. Notify him with regard to the Nashville." The 
Scorpion met and took the message from the Eagle, the incident 
appearing in the Scorpion's log as follows: 

Spoke Eagle at 10.15 and reported reply of Hornet [Eagle] to 
flag-ship as follows: "Eagle sent by Captain McCalla from Cien- 
fuegos to report. Nashville following about 25 miles in rear to 
westward. Starboard high-pressure cylinder disabled. Proceed- 
ing slowly. Cincinnati and Vesuvius off Cape San Antonio about 

• On the reef bordering Key West. 



264 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

15 miles and to the northward. All blockading squadron has left 
Cienfuegos for Key West. No news of the Spaniards." ' 

Both squadrons stood on without stopping. Commander 
McCalla on arriving off the reef at Key West came on board 
the flag-ship and reported the conditions he had found at Cien- 
fuegos. The navy department had, before his arrival, tele- 
graphed : 

Commander McCalla to telegraph what force and character of 
ships would, in his opinion, be necessary for destroying the battery 
at Cienfuegos and what army force would be required to capture and 
hold entrance and make it safe for our vessels to lie inside, also what 
practicable landing for troops in immediate vicinity. 

In accordance with this McCalla prepared the following, 
which was sent both to the navy department and to Commodore 
Schley: 2 

A good landing-place for troops has been found thirteen and one- 
half miles west of Savanilla Point. The Spanish force about Cien- 
fuegos is reported, on good authority, to be between four and five 
thousand men. The Cuban force, only a small part of which is 
armed, is between two and three thousand men. The Cubans need 
arms for two thousand men, and ammunition for the whole number. 
I was informed that the Cubans had perfect knowledge of what was 
going on within Cienfuegos, and that a force of our men could be taken 
into Cienfuegos without the knowledge of the Spanish force within 
that city. About fifteen hundred men are said to be kept within the 
vicinity of the castle. The only battery which fired on the ships at 
all was made of the old guns in the castle. They have modem six 
and eight inch guns, I am told, but not mounted five days ago. An 

' Lieutenant Southerland, of the Eagle, stated later that his message to 
the Scorpion was substantially as follows: "We left Cienfuegos the night 
of the 16th, at which time, as we learned from an insurgent camp about 
thirteen miles to the westward of Cienfuegos, some of the people from which 
were in town every night, the only vessels in the harbor were the torpedo 
gun-boat Galicia, one or two gun-boats, and several canoneros. The Nash- 
ville is astern, proceeding slowly to Key West, with damaged machinery. 
The Cincinnati and Vesuvius are patrolling off Cape San Antonio." (Record 
of the Court of Inquiry in the case of Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, 1901. 
I, 314). [This will be referred to hereafter as Court of Inquiry.] 

'The delivery of this on May 22, off Cienfuegos, by the Iowa and Dupont 
(which were supposed to carry duplicate despatches), was questioned. There 
was, however, no question of the reception of a copy by the Hawk on May 23. 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 265 

emplacement for guns is being built on the hill above the castle. A 
line passing through the new emplacement and the castle leads do^\Ti 
the middle of the river to the sea. There was working a force of men 
on the ground immediately below the castle, and I was told a new 
water-battery was being erected there. It is possible that since the at- 
tempt to cut the cables, a masked battery of small calibre is being 
erected on Colorados Point. The insurgents want dynamite to de- 
stroy the railway. I asked them to devote their eflorts to cutting 
telegraphic communication between Havana and Cienfuegos. They 
report the inland wires are repaired as fast as destroyed, while the 
railroad is intact. The Cuban forces in the San Juan mountains 
control the railway between Cienfuegos and Trinidad, so provisions 
cannot be sent between these places. I have Spanish charts of Cien- 
fuegos and vicinity. Troops must be prepared for rain every day. 
No resources in the country; all destroyed. Fair road from landing- 
point to Cienfuegos. 

This was accompanied by a forwarding letter: 

No. 6. U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 

Key West, Fla., May 19, 1898. 

Sir: I enclose a copy of a memorandum from Commander Mc- 
Calla. 

2. You will take steps to prevent the enemy from continuing work 
on the new fortifications mentioned therein. 

3. There is a rumor by way of Havana that the Spanish squadron 
has put into Santiago. 

Commander McCalla had mentioned to the chief-of-staff the 
arrangement of signals with the insurgents mentioned, but, in- 
fluenced by a fear that if given out it might in some way be 
known by Spanish sympathizers in Key West, and by the fact 
that he himself expected to return at once to Cienfuegos and 
thus be the earliest possible means of communicating the ar- 
rangements to Schley, he omitted it from his memorandum.^ 

• Respecting this much-discussed omission, the writer, who was chief of 
Btaff, would say that he did not regard the question of these signals, in the 
prospect of the immediate return of the Marblehead, as of any particular im- 
portance, and in the tremendous rush of business it soon passed out of his 
mind, though it was evidently mentioned to Captain Evans of the loiva. 
(Court of Inquiry, I, 36G.) The signal, in fact, was not thought of especial 
importance so far as the Americans were concerned. It was wholly for the 
convenience and benefit of the Cubans, as McCalla's memorandum embodied 



266 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The telegram from the navy department which follows, re- 
ceived at 12.30 A. M., May 20, was so ambiguous in character 
as to cause much perplexity in the mind of the commander-in- 
chief. It read: 

Washington, May 19, 1898. 

The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might 
very well be correct, so the department strongly advises that you send 
immediately by the Iowa to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba 
with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos. 
And meanwhile the department will send the Minneapolis, now at 
St. Thomas, [and] auxiliary No. 461' [to] proceed at once off Santiago 
to join Schley, who could keep up communication via INIole, Haiti, or 
Cape Haitien, Haiti. If the Iowa has gone, send order to Schley by 
the fastest despatch-vessel. 

The department but expressed the doubt which as we now know 
was felt there at the moment. It was vital to a proper under- 
standing of such a telegram that the source of the report should 

every information necessary to enable the Americans to communicate. It 
mentioned the presence of the insurgents, the point where a landing could 
be made, and that "the Cubans had perfect knowledge of what was going 
on in Cienfuegos." Both Admiral Sampson and the chief of staff supposed, 
judging from the chart, that the hills were low enough to permit Cienfuegos 
to be observed. This supposition, as we now know, was partially correct. 
Commander (now Rear-Admiral) Dayton of the Detroit, sent to take charge 
of the Cienfuegos blockade, reported July 10, 1898, as follows: 

"During the afternoon (of June 30) I made as close an inspection as 
practicable. From aloft could detect in the inner harbor four large steamers 
flying Spanish colors — one with four masts and one smoke-stack, one with three 
masts and one smoke-stack, and two with two masts and one smoke-stack; 
also two fair-sized gun-boats, the larger being apparently of the Ensenada 
class. . . . The four-masted steamer was surrounded by lighters and appeared 
to be discharging cargo." (Appendix to Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 
219.) 

Captain Dunn, U. S. N., states the following from personal observation in 
a letter to the author: 

"If an observer at the mast-head, say over a hundred feet high, gets on a 
N. by W. line of bearing passing over Punta Pasacaballos, from a position 
a mile to the westward of the light-house, he could see a limited portion of the 
harbor where large vessels usually anchor, the distance being about six miles. 
A large portion of the N. W. bay, where any vessel could anchor (but do not 
generally), cannot be seen from outside. Small vessels could not anchor 
behind the town and could not be seen from the outside." 

Cienfuegos Bay, it should be said, is about six miles deep with excellent 
anchorage almost anywhere. It is clear that the usual anchorage, however, 
can be observed from the outside. ' *S^ Paul. 



THE IMOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 



267 



be mentioned, for the department's previous telegrams regard- 
ing the Spanish movements were so expHcit as to the reasons 
why Cervera must come within reach of Havana that Sampson 




Soundings m feet 



CIENFUEGOS BAY 



could not feel justified in setting these aside on what apparently 
was mere rumor/ He thus replied to the navy department: 

Replying to department's telegram of the 20th, [19th] considering 
the information therein contained I have decided to follow the plan 

' The first report reached the na\'y department at 4.45 p. m. May 19, through 
Mr. Martin L. Hellings, the manager of the cable station at Key West, who 
had arranged before the war for intelligence from Havana. The hour is 



268 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

already adopted to hold position Cienfuegos with Brooklyn, Massa- 
chusetts, Texas, and the Iowa, Marblehead, Castine, and Dupont and 
two auxiliaries. There remain New York, Indiana, and Monitor 
for Havana. The latter very inefficient and should not be sent from 
base. Have directed Schley to communicate with auxiliary at Santi- 
ago and direct one of them to report to department from Mole or 
Cape Haitlen. Then to return to Santiago and further report at 
Cienfuegos or Havana, as he thinks best. Plan may be changed 
when it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago. 

He also wrote Commodore Schley: 

No. 7. U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Fla., May 20, 1898. 

Dear Schley: The Iowa leaves this morning at 11 o'clock 
bound for Cienfuegos. The collier Merrimac, in company with the 
Castine, is also bound for Cienfuegos. The Marblehead and the 
Eagle will both be ready to depart to-night to join you. Enclosed 
is a copy of a telegram received at Key West, dated May 19, marked 

fixed by official documentary evidence. The news was received by Mr. 
Hellings and sent under a private code to New York, this course being taken 
to establish the reliability of the report. Rear-Admiral Crowninshield, at 
the time chief of the bureau of navigation and a member of the naval war 
board, writing April 30, 1901, says: "This information was absolutely the 
first which was received in Washington of the arrival of the Spanish Squadron 
at Santiago." A telegram " Five Spanish ships have entered the harbor of 
Santiago, have informed admiral commanding," was also sent by Captain 
(now Brigadier-General) Allen of the army signal service, in charge of the 
censorship at Key West. Mr. Charles H. Allen, then assistant secretary of 
the navy, says in his diary for May 19: " Word received at the Department 
through Signal Officer of the Army and brought in by General Greely that 
Spanish fleet had gone into the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Most important. 
President desired confirmation." Mr. Allen writing the author puts the hour 
as about five o'clock. He took the message to the war board, where were 
all three members, Admiral Sicdrd and Captains Mahan and Crowninshield. 
The admiral declared the news impossible on account of the [supposed] 
necessity of Cervera's reaching railway communication with Havana to 
deliver munitions of war, thus expressing the same doubt as was felt by 
Sampson in view of the doubting tone of the department's telegram. Mr. 
Allen continuing says: "Subsequently I called upon President McKinley 
. . . and gave him the information as received at the Department. He 
directed Captain Montgomery, Signal Officer in charge at the White House, 
to obtain confirmation." 

There is no record in the fleet files of the information which Sampson 
refers to in his No. 6 as "a rumor" and which must therefore have come 
as word requiring confirmation. No. 7 carried all documentary information 
received up to the time it was sent. 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 269 

"A."' After duly considering this telegram I have decided to make 
no change in the present plan: that is that you should hold your squad- 
ron off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago, 
they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the muni- 
tions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I am there- 
fore of the opinion that our best chance of success in capturing these 
ships will be to hold the two points — Cienfuegos and Havana — with 
all the force that we can muster. If, later, it should develop that these 
vessels are at Santiago, we can then assemble off that port the ships 
best suited for the purpose, and completely blockade it. Until we 
then receive more positive information we shall continue to hold 
Havana and Santiago.^ 

I enclose copy of a telegram received at Key West, dated May 
19, marked "B."^ With regard to this second telegram, in which 
the consul at Cape Haitien says that a telegram from Port de Paix 
on May 17 "reports two ships, etc.," is probably of no importance, 
and the vessels referred to may have been our own ships. 

The statement made by the United States minister of [to] Venezuela, 
contained in the cablegram of the same date, is probably not true, 
because these ships are reported to have left Cura9ao at 6 p. m. on 
the 16th. If they were seen on the 17th, apparently heading for the 
French West Indies, they could not possibly be at Santiago de Cuba 
as early as the 18th, as is reported. 

From the first cablegram, marked "A," it will be seen that the 
department has ordered cruisers Minneapolis and Auxiliary No. 461 
[St. Paul] to proceed for Santiago de Cuba to join you. Please 
send the Scorpion to communicate with these vessels at Santiago, and 
direct one of them to report to the department from Nicolas Mole 
off Cape Haitien the change which I have made in the plan "strongly 
advised" by the department. As soon as this vessel has communicated 
with the department, let her return to the vicinity of Santiago de 
Cuba, and learn the condition of affairs, and immediately report at 
Havana or Cienfuegos, as he may think most advantageous. 
Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral , U. S. Navy, 

Comdr. -in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 

Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. Navy, 

Commanding Flying Squadron. 

* The report given above. 

* "Santiago" was an error, of course, for "Cienfuegos." 

^ Enclosure "B": "The United States consul at Cape Haitien states that 
telegram from Port aux Paix, Hayti, on May 17, reports two Spanish ships 
cruising off Mole every night two weeks. The United States minister to 
Venezuela says that cable employee reports confidentially the Spanish men- 
of-war seen May 17 apparently heading for French West Indies." 



270 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The desire to get information as quickly as possible to Cien- 
fuegos caused a duplicate of the despatches prepared to go by 
the Iowa, which sailed at 11 a. m., May 20, to be sent also by the 
torpedo-boat Dupont, which was to be used as a part of Com- 
modore Schley's squadron, and which, leaving a half hour after 
the Iowa, reached Cienfuegos five hours earlier; the Iowa length- 
ening her course, under the admiral's instructions, in order to 
show herself off Havana. The collier Merrimac, under convoy 
of the gun-boat Castine, sailed at the same time and with the 
same destination, and the Puritan for the Havana blockade/ 

It is about 520 miles from the anchorage off Key West to 
Cienfuegos, or 47 hours in time, at 11 knots. The flying squad- 
ron, at an average speed of a little less than 9 knots, reached 
the neighborhood of Cienfuegos at midnight of May 21-22, 64 
hours from Key West, and stopped. Starting ahead again at 
5.17 A. M. of the 22d, the squadron, after a run of 12 miles, was 
at 6.34 off the entrance of Cienfuegos Bay.^ The Iowa, leaving 
a day later but taking a shorter course, though itself length- 
ened by appearing, by order of the admiral, off Havana, ran 
about 520 miles at an average speed of 10.4 knots and reached 
the position of the flying squadron off Cienfuegos about 7 
hours later than the latter. The torpedo-boat Dupont arrived 
at 9 A. M. 

' As Sampson, who had no faith in the efficiency of monitors, observed 
the Puritan leaving, he said humorously, referring to the possibility of Cer- 
vera's coming northward through the Bahama Channel: "We are pretty weak 
at this end of the line. I am afraid we have been too kind to Schley," a very 
natural thought, when it is considered that the New York was the only armored 
ship left him which was not broken down in speed. 

^ Extract from the Brooklyn's log: 

"4 to 8 A. M., May 22, 1898. At 4.50 started to round to course for 
Cienfuegos, and at 5.17 started ahead at standard speed, 10 knots, on course 
N. 37° E. . . . At 6.34 slow speed. At 6.45 slow speed, and stood for en- 
trance of Cienfuegos harbor." 

The columns of the Brooklyn's log show but 8.5 miles but the remarks 
herewith given show a speed of 10 knots for Ih. 17m., which would make 
12.8 miles; the squadron was then (6.34) slowed, and again slowed (presuma- 
bly when in position) at 6.45. 

The log of the Brooklyn of May 21 mentions: "About 4.20 [p. m.] heard the 
report of two great guns to the N'd and E'd." Cienfuegos was then distant 
about forty miles. 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 271 

Returning to the events of the 20th at Key West; a telegram 
was received from Washington: 

Send some light ships to blockade Cienfuegos if necessary. The 
department advises a couple fast unarmored cruisers to be sent to 
join Schley, going east on north side of Cuba to help against torpedo- 
destroyers. 

The day, however, brought a completely new aspect of affairs; 
Lieutenant Staunton, assistant chief of staff, while in Key West 
at the office of the commandant, had met, about 9 a. m.. Captain 
Allen, of the Army Signal Corps, who had been placed in charge 
of the censorship oflfice. Lieutenant Staunton's own account is 
given: 

He called me aside and told me that he had very important in- 
formation that he believed to be correct. He stated I must keep it 
a secret from everybody except the commander-in-chief and his staff, 
as if it were divulged the man in Havana who sent it would probably 
lose his life and the source of information would be stopped. He then 
told me that on the night ' before he had received from Havana a de- 
spatch stating that Cervera had entered the harbor of Santiago that 
morning, that is, the morning of the 19th of May, with his squadron. 
As I recollect the figures given they were three armored cruisers and 
two torpedo-boat destroyers. He said this information came from an 
employee in the telegraph office at Havana, who sent these despatches 
about 6 o'clock while the office was cleared of people, who went to 
dinner, and he could send them with safety, and that they would come 
every night. I returned to the New York, during the forenoon of the 
20th of May, and reported this to Admiral Sampson, the commander- 
in-chief. That evening, the evening of the 20th, I went on shore 
again about 6 o'clock and obtained from the signal officer the con- 
firmatory despatches which he expected.^ 

The corroboration at 6 p. m. completely satisfied Sampson that 
Cervera had entered Santiago, and a despatch was at once pre- 
pared to go by the Marhlchead directing Schley to move to Santi- 
ago. It bore the date of May 2Xt as it left the flag-ship in the 
mid watch of the night of May 20-21 to be sent to the Marble- 
head, word having come from Commander McCalla that he was 
delayed in Key West by inability to get fresh water for his boil- 
ers. The phrase, "If you are satisfied that they are not at 

>/. c, the night May 19-20. 

* Testimony, Court of Inquiry, I, 858. 



272 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Cienfuegos," was due to the admiral's belief, already mentioned, 
that the land was probably sufficiently low to see within the bay. 

No. 8. U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Florida, May 21, 1898. 

Sir: Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba — four ships 
and three torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are satisfied that they 
are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to 
Santiago de Cuba, and, if the enemy is there, blockade him in port. 
You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with 
some of the inhabitants, fishermen or others, to learn definitely that 
the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from outside. 

2. When the instructions sent by the Iowa and Dupant (duplicates) 
were written, I supposed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity 
of Jamaica, but I have since learned that they have been ordered by 
the department to get touch with the Spanish fleet on the north coast 
of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for orders at 
Nicolas Mole. 

3. Report from Nicolas Mole. 

W. T. Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 

The Commodore, 

U. S. Flying Squadron. 

The night was one of extreme activity, with a constant going 
and coming of tugs and torpedo-boats with despatches, but at 
4 a. m. (Saturday, May 21) the flag-ship got under way and stood 
for Havana, sending before sailing the following instructions to 
the naval commandant at Key West: 

No. 4. U. S. Flag-Ship Neiv York, 1st Rate, 

Key West, Florida, May 20, 1898. 

My Dear Commodore: I feel that I must take up my station on 
the Cuban blockade as soon as possible, and I will therefore leave 
here for Havana some time during the evening. 

2. I desire that all the vessels that can be spared for the purpose, 
be sent to me at Havana as fast as repairing can be completed. After 
looking into the matter I find that the monitors Terror and Amphit- 
rite will require several days to put their machinery in a service con- 
dition. Will you, therefore, hasten the repairs on the AmphiiritSf 
and send her to me as soon as completed. 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 273 

3. I believe that the department wishes some vessels to be retained 
here for the protection of Key West. You can use the Terror for that 
purpose while she is under repairs. 

4. I have directed the Niagara to discharge the coal which she still 
has on board after coaling the Indiana, and to proceed north to Lam- 
bert's Point for another cargo. 

5. The Dupont has been sent to the south side of Cuba with copies 
of recent despatches from the department regarding the movements 
of the Spanish ships; and she has been directed to remain under Com- 
modore Schlev's command, unless he finds it necessary to send her 
back with information. The Iowa has also been sent to report to 
Commodore Schley. 

6. I have given direction that the Marbleh^ad and the Eagle shall 
sail to-night for the same destination. The Merrimac and the Castine 
sailed in company this morning, also to om the squadron under 
Commodore Schley. 

7. I shall myself take station at Havana, on board the flag-ship 
New York. If you have occasion to communicate with me, I shall 
probably be found at that point. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 

Commodore George C. Remey, U. S. Navy, 

U. S. S. Suwanee, Key West, Florida. 

Before the flag-ship left, the following telegrams were received: 

Washington, May 20. — Army expect to have within a few days 
about thirty transport steamers at Tampa, Fla. Please take such 
means as you think proper for guarding them. 

From Captain Goodrich, commanding the St. Louis: 

Have destroyed (May 18) one submarine cable to Jamaica although 
it is possible both, under the fire of the battery at Santiago. If second 
cable is in working order I shall require deep-sea outfit. At Guanta- 
namo, Thursday (May 19), was driven away by superior Spanish 
force. I shall attempt the French submarine cables elsewhere, then 
proceed to Ponce, Puerto Rico. Request orders, St. Thomas, pro- 
ceed to New York for coal and stores. 

- Reply was made to this latter telegram: 

Proceed to whatever point will give greatest despatch. Report 
here. 



274 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

And Captain Wise, of the Yale, was telegraphed: 

Spanish squadron is reported at Santiago de Cuba. Flying squad- 
ron will be at Santiago the 24th. Cruise in Bahama Channel and 
join Schley at Santiago May 24. 

The New York arrived off Havana at noon and spoke the 
Dolphin, then flying the broad pennant of Commodore Watson, 
who came aboard the flag-ship. It had become evident before 
leaving Key West that the Marblehead might be delayed still 
longer than had at first been anticipated, and the admiral on the 
way across decided to ensure the earliest reception possible by 
Commodore Schley of the important information in the despatch 
placed aboard the Marblehead, by sending it also by the fastest 
ship at hand on the blockade. After some consideration the 
armed yacht Hawk, Lieutenant Hood, was selected. Picking 
up the Hawk and taking Lieutenant Hood aboard the flag-ship, 
both ships stood westward, in order that the Hawk should gain 
distance toward the object of her duty, and the following mem- 
orandum additional to a copy of the despatch was prepared as 
follows: 



Memorandum. U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Havana, Cuba, May 21, 1903. 

It is thought the enclosed instructions will reach you by 2 o'clock 
a. m., May 23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (re- 
garded very important) so that your direction may not be noticed 
and be at Santiago a. m., May 24. 

It is thought that the Spanish squadron would probably be still 
at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to 
take. 

The St. Paid and Minneapolis have been telegraphed to scout off 
Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron goes westward, one is to keep 
touch and the other go into Nicolas Mole to telegraph me at Key 
West. I shall be off Cay Frances, 200 miles east of Havana. If 
you arrive off Santiago and no scout meets you, send a vessel to call 
at Nicolas Mole and get information to be left there by scout as to 
direction taken by Spanish in case they may have left Santiago de 
Cuba. 

The Yale has been ordered to cruise in the Bahama Channel until 
May 24. It is thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your 
departure from Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there. 



THE MOVES TO L\TERCEPT CERVERA 275 

If this word does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to 
mask your real direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish 
squadron whichever direction they take. 

W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station, 

The Commodore, 

Flying Squadron. 

Lieutenant Hood was directed to impress upon Commodore 
Schley, as from the admiral, the necessity of getting off Santiago 
as quickly as possible, and in addition the following written 
orders were given him: 

U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

May 21, 1898. 

Sir: You will proceed, with the utmost despatch, with the ac- 
companying orders, which are to be delivered to Commodore Schley 
off Cienfuegos at the earliest possible moment. When this duty 
shall have been completed, return to your station off Havana. 

In case you meet with the Vesuvius in going, and she can make 
better speed than yourself, transfer the papers to her with this mem- 
orandum, with the direction that, after delivery, she is to return and 
report to the commander-in-chief off Havana. 

In case you fall in with the Vesuvius, either coming or going, an 
order to report off Havana is to be given her. 

Verbal instructions were given Lieutenant Hood to remain 
with the Hawk alone at Cienfuegos, after the flying squadron 
had left, as long as his coal would allow, in order that the block- 
ade should not be vacated until necessity should compel. 

Hood left at once, but he did not make the speed anticipated; 
he arrived off Cienfuegos and delivered his despatches at 7.30 
A. M., May 23. He had passed the Castine and her convoy, the 
collier Merrimac, also bound thither, at 5 a. m., the morning of 
his arrival. 

Admiral Sampson had determined to take position in the 
Bahama Channel, 200 miles east of Havana, where were the 
narrowest waters of the region, and it was thought impossible 
for the Spanish squadron to pass without discovery should it 
leave Santiago and attempt to reach Havana from that direction. 



276 THE SPANISH-A^IERICAN WAR 

The flag-ship thus, on the night of May 21-22, moved about 
among the ships of the blockade, signalUng them, as found: 

Join "F" (flag-ship) at early daylight to-morrow at a point ten miles 
north of Morro. Prepare to proceed 200 miles to the eastward to a 
point north-east of Cay Frances. 

The Puritan and Miantonomoh were directed to go in advance, 
and left at midnight. The many arrangements necessary, how- 
ever, delayed the leaving of the squadron, which held over until 
the next morning (May 23). A despatch-boat from Key West 
brought the following telegrams from the navy department: 

Telegraph details of coal supply taken by Schley with his vessels. 
The department has ordered four auxiliary cruisers {Yale, Harvard, 
St. Paul, and St. Louis) and the Minneapolis off Santiago de Cuba to 
keep informed of movements of Spanish fleet. The department also 
suggests for consideration possible advantages lee Cape Cruz, Cuba, 
as a coaling station and that in case Cerv'era has landed stores for 
Blanco, Cape Cruz, Cuba, would be critical point for coasters carry- 
ing them to the west. Orders are being sent placing Schley under 
your command while in the West Indies. 

The following telegram of INIay 21 has been received from the 
former American consul at San Juan, Puerto Rico, now at St. Thomas, 
West Indies: "Reliably informed that Spanish fleet is expected to 
arrive at San Juan, Puerto Rico, soon. Preparations for coaling; 
supply food is very important before attacking the Americans; coal 
is declared short. Sig. Fonna." Schley should have this informa- 
tion. If he finds that the Spanish fleet has left Santiago he should 
follow. Report is current to the effect that the Spanish destroyers 
are not at Santiago. 

Commodore Remey, at Key West, in forwarding these in- 
formed Sampson that he had already replied to the department 
that the collier Merrimac had left May 21 with 4,500 tons of coal 
for the flying squadron, and also that the New Orleans, Captain 
Folger, had arrived at 6.30 p. m. of the 21st, needing 200 tons 
of coal and some water. 

The arrival of the New Orleans was a particularly pleasant 
piece of news in view of the melancholy array of slow ships 
with which Sampson had to deal. None but the flag-ship, the 
torpedo-boats Rodgers and Foote, and some light unprotected 
cruisers, were capable of more than 10 knots; with such he 
was moving to meet an enemy each of whose ships had on 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 277 

trial steamed over twenty. The addition of a powerfully armed 
cruiser of 19 knots was in such circumstances of vital importance. 
There were guns enough in the squadron, and more than enough, 
but it takes two to make a fight and if the Spanish admiral should 
evade an action, trusting to his speed, the New York, singly, 
could not have forced one with much prospect of detaining them 
long enough to keep them within reach of the Indiana, which was 
the other main reliance. Not much was to be hoped from the 
Puritan and Miantonomoh in the rough sea of the trades. With 
a good second, however, in the New Orleans, with a fine battery 
of the newest type of 6-inch guns, the prospect was far differ- 
ent, and when she reported on May 23 matters took on a more 
cheerful aspect. 

In the morning watch of May 23 the captains of all the ships 
present came on board to receive their instructions and the 
printed Order of Cruising and Orders of Battle. These were 
as follows: 

ORDER OF CRUISING 



13 Wasp. 
1,600 yds. 

800 yards. () 1,200 yds. () 1,200 yards. () 800 yards. () 
9 Montgom- 10 Newport. 1 New York. 6 Detroit. 5 New 
ery. Orleans. 



14 Foote. 15 Rodgers. 



11 Mayflower. 2 Indiana 7 Machias. 

. 

12 Vicksburg. 3 Puritan. 8 Wilmington. 

4 Miantonomoh. 

ORDER OF BATTLE. 

U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Havana, Cuba, May 22, 1898. 
It is possible that the vessels of this squadron now off Havana will 
meet the Spanish ships, consisting of the Cristobal Colon, Vizcaya, 
Oquendo, Maria Teresa, and one torpedo-boat destroyer. These 



278 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

vessels are supposed to be now in Santiago de Cuba, where they are 
taking coal and provisions. The squadron of Commodore Schley 
will probably leave Cienfuegos to-morrow morning, bound east, in 
pursuit of the Spanish ships, and it is anticipated that they will leave 
Santiago de Cuba on the same day that Commodore Schley leaves 
Cienfuegos or reach Havana by the north coast of Cuba, in which case 
the blockading squadron off Havana will attempt to intercept them by 
going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santarem and 
Nicolas Channels. It appears to be possible that if these ships come 
toward Havana from that direction they can be intercepted and 
brought to action. 

The order of battle will be as follows, subject to such modifications 
as may appear advantageous at the time: 

Owing to the superior speed of the Spanish vessels, I have decided 
to form the ships in one column, heading to the eastward, on the as- 
sumption that the enemy will be proceeding to the westward in column. 
The New York, Indiana, Puritan, and Miantonovioh will be the four 
leading vessels. These will be followed by the cruisers of the block- 
ading squadron, the idea being that the heavy ships should first meet 
the enemy and the fire of the cruisers be brought into play after the 
damage inflicted by the larger ships. 

The armored ships, after passing the rear of the Spanish squadron, 
will return in succession by using the starboard or port helm, as the 
case may require, turning toward the enemy. It is believed that the 
fire of the cruisers, following that of the armored ships, will so em- 
barrass the Spanish vessels that the armored vessels can turn, as be- 
fore stated, and double on the enemy's rear. 

The ships designated will assemble 12 miles north-east of the Morro 
at early daylight, Monday, the 23d instant; thence they will proceed in 
three columns to the eastward in the order of cruising designated. 
(See plan I, first order of cruising.) 

The New Orleans will act as scout on the starboard hand, the 
Montgomery on the port, the Wasp ahead. 

When the enemy heaves in sight, the vessels will proceed to the 
eastward to meet them. While so doing they will be formed in column. 
(First order of battle.) 

The attention of commanding officers is called to the necessity of 
stopping these vessels. 

In the first order of battle the two torpedo-boats will take the station 
on the offside of the New Orleans, Detroit, and if there be a third, it 
will take its place on the offside of the Machias. They will take ad- 
vantage of any opportunity to torpedo an enemy's ship. 

While the Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, and Oquendo have strong pro- 
tection on barbettes and water-line, they have no protection elsewhere, 
and are vulnerable to even 6-pounders. Fire should be concentrated 
on the centre part of these ships just above water-line. In case of 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 279 

Cristohal^ Colon, her belt and barbette armor is inferior to that of the 
other ships, but her protection elsewhere extends over a larger area. 
None of this armor is face-hardened. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief. 



FIRST ORDER OF BATTLE 

Interval — 400 yards. 





1 





New York. 




2 





Indiana. 




3 





Puritan. 




4 





Miantonomoh. 




5 





New Orleans. 
Foote 14 




6 





Detroit. 

Rodgers. 15 




7 





Machias. 




8 





Wilmington. 




9 





Montgomery. 




10 





Newport. 




11 





Mayflower. 




12 





Vicksburg. 




13 





Wasp. 




SECOND ORDER OF BATTLE 






Spi 


inish Ships 


f f f 




1 1 1 ] 


Indiana. 


6 


2 


1 

1 New York. 


Miantonomoh. 





4 


3 Puritan. 


Detroit. 





6 


5 New Orleans. 


Wilmington. 





8 


7 Machias. 


Newport. 





10 


9 Montgomery. 


Vicksburg. 





12 


11 Mayflower. 









13 Wasp. 



In case the Spanish ships are found to be approaching in line, signal 
will be made to form double column, which will be done by the even- 



280 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

numbered ships obliquing to the left until the interval between columns 
is sufficient to allow the columns to pass through the second and third 
intervals between the Spanish ships, counting from the left of their line. 
After the heads of columns have passed through the Spanish line 
they will turn as follows: The head of the starboard column will turn 
with the port helm; the head of the port column will turn with the 
starboard helm; each column will thus double on the Spanish ships. 
This is indicated in the diagram where five Spanish ships are shown. 
N. B. — The following signals will be provisionally employed: 
Signal 241: Order of cruising. 
Signal 242: First order of battle. 
Signal 243: Second order of battle. 
As prescribed. 

W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S. JSfavy, 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atla7itic Station. 

Sampson calculated that the distance to which he proposed 
to go should not be such that it would be impossible to fall back 
and cover Havana in case the approach of the Spanish squadron 
by the western end of Cuba should be signalled. The latter move- 
ment was thought possible, as the broad sea to the south made 
it very possible to escape observation by Commodore Schley's 
squadron, which was supposed to be on its way to Santiago. 

At 8 A. M., May 23, the squadron, comprising the New York, 
Indiana, gun-boats Newport, Vickshurg, and Machias, armed 
yacht Mayfloivcr, and torpedo-boats Rodgcrs and Foote, started 
eastward, leaving on the blockade the Dolphin (Commander 
Lyon) with Commodore Watson's broad pennant. The New 
Orleans joined at 5 p. m., and at nightfall she and the Mayflower 
were sent ahead, the former fifty, the latter twenty-five miles, as 
scouts. 

Standing eastward very slowly during the forenoon of May 
24, the Puritan and Miantonomoh were picked up off Cruz del 
Padre light, and the store-ship Supply, which had been diverted 
by the department from her duty of provisioning the fleet to 
scouting, came up from the eastward, her captain reporting 
that he had been cruising on a north-and-south line between 
Caicos Bank and Monte Cristi, where he had met the Harvard 
and Minneapolis on Sunday, May 22, at noon. They had 
parted company with the Supply at 4, going round the east end 



THE MOVES TO LNTERCEPT CERVERA 281 

of Tortugas (off the north-west corner of Hayti). The Supply 
had been off Inagua at 10 p. m. Sunday, but during her scouting 
and while coming west, had sighted no enemy except a small 
gun-boat, which came from Cay Romano (in the Old Bahama 
Channel), but was lost in the rain-squall. 

At 1 P. M. the Montgomery, Commander Converse, with Com- 
modore Watson, who had shifted his broad pennant from the 
Dolphin, arrived with despatches from Key West. Commodore 
Watson in his call aboard the N'ew York stated that telegraphic 
information believed to be reliable had been received about 6 
o'clock or later Monday evening (May 23) that the Spanish fleet 
had not left Santiago at the time the information was sent. He 
also brought word that the Vesuvius and Cincinnati expected to 
sail at daylight Tuesday morning. May 24, the monitor Amphit- 
rite at 6, and that the monitor Terror was to come out towed by 
the Panther; the Sterling, collier, had been ordered out at once 
and the Detroit had left Monday morning, the 24th. It was a 
re-enforcement excellent in spirit, thoroughly efficient in battery, 
but all, excepting the dynamite cruiser Vesuvius and the Detroit, 
with no speed to catch any enemy who should choose to steam 
away at more than 10 knots. 

Telegrams from Washington, May 23, had been brought by 
the Montgomery, as follows: 

Notify the admiral the department leaves at his discretion the 
question of watching Yucatan Channel and Gulf of Mexico. 

The department authorizes the withdrawal of one gun-boat guard- 
ing Tampa. 

The information of the department all goes to indicate that the 
principal aim of the Spanish fleet and government is to introduce a 
supply of munitions of war and of food to Blanco by Havana and Cien- 
fuegos. This is for your information. 

The department desires you to station vessels of your squadron as 
you may consider best for the blockade of north coast of Cuba and 
for watching Yucatan Channel, if you deem the latter necessary. In- 
formation has been received a supply of corn being shi])ped from 
Mexico to Cuba. Until further instructions division under Schlev 
not to be diminished, as the Spanish division at Santiago must, if 
possible, be prevented from escaping. 



282 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

The third of these as given above indicates the continued 
conviction of the American government as to the mihtary sup- 
pHes so mistakenly supposed to be carried by Cervera's squadron, 
and would have brought renewed doubt in a more vacillating 
mind than that of Sampson, but the admiral having once weighed 
all the circumstances was convinced that Cervera would remain 
at Santiago for some days at least, and felt sure that Commodore 
Schley's squadron would reach Santiago in time to establish a 
blockade which would secure his retention there. 

The converted yacht Wasp joined about nightfall; a memo- 
randum regarding lights at night, and the Third Order of Bat- 
tle, which was also a cruising formation, were issued: 

[Memorandum No. 10, regarding lights at night.] 

U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

At Sea, May 24, 1898. 

Sir: While cruising oflF Cay Frances in expectation of meeting the 
enemy, great care will be taken to screen all lights and to see that 
none are accidentally shown. No night signals will be made unless 
unavoidable, and then only by the flag-ship and in reply to her. No 
Very's light will under any circumstances, except that of the discovery 
of the enemy, be made. 

No running lights will be used except the red oil lantern over the 
taffrail screened to show only through four points, viz., two points on 
each side from right astern. 

No whistle helm signals will be made, but as the helm is put over a 
second red light, screened like the first, will be shown astern if the 
ship's course is changed to starboard, and a white light if the course 
be changed to port, and will remain shown until the ship is steadied 
on her new course, when it will be withdrawn. 

The squadron will generally cruise to the eastward during the day- 
time, and to the westward during the night. It will change direction 
by countermarching. Vessels must therefore be on the lookout for 
this countermarch. If in double column the flag-ship will show her red 
truck light when she countermarches as a signal to the leader of the 
second division The countermarching will always be to the right. 

The formation will be column or double column at distance of 400 
yards or less. 

Commanding officers will enjoin officers of the deck to keep touch 
without fail of the next ahead. They must keep near enough to follow 
her motions with or without lights, and whether thick or clear. 

Scouts will upon the discovery of the enemy fire two red Very's 
lights in succession, and as they fall back upon the fleet will repeat 



THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA 283 



this signal at intervals until it is answered by a single red Very from 
the flag-ship. 

Should a scout be captured she will, before surrrendering, fire two 
green Verys in succession. 

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 

THIRD ORDER OF BATTLE 




Spanish () ships. 




< 1,500 yards. > 



< 1,500 yards. > 



Montgomery, 7. 
New Orleans, 8. 
Detroit, 9. 

Cincinnati, 10. 
Mayflower, 11. 



to 



3,000 yards. 



< 



> 



1. New York. 

2. Indiana. 

3. Miantonomoh. 

4. Puritan. 

5. Terror. 

6. Amphitrite. 

12. Wilmington. 

13. Machias. 

14. Vicksburg. 

15. Newport. 

16. Wasp. 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief. 
U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 
Off Cay Frances, Cuba, May 24, 1898. 



Provisional signal for third order of bat- 
tle, 244. 

Interval between columns for cruising, 
3,000 yards. 

Interval between each column and the 
enemy, 1,500 yards. 

This formation will also be used as an 
order of cruising with the same signal. 



> i. 

Q 

CO 



284 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

During the night of May 24 the squadron cruised slowly to 
the eastward, with the New Orleans and Mayflower again in 
advance as before. The squadron, now north-east of Cay Frances 
and at the entrance of the Old Bahama Channel, countermarched 
at 4 A. M. and withdrew westward slowly into Nicolas Channel. 
Though this latter was some thirty miles broad, or twice the 
breadth of the Old Bahama Channel in its narrowest part, the 
movement brought the fleet a hundred miles nearer Havana, and 
it was thought that with these two scouts advanced into the 
narrower channel, the Spanish squadron could not escape dis- 
covery should it come that way. 

At daylight on May 25, the Vesuvius and Cincinnati joined, 
the latter adding one more to the number of the broken-down 
elements of the fleet, the character of which had become so much 
a joke that its designation among the men was the "Bargain 
Counter Squadron," The Cincinnati, however, though so much 
of a lame duck, was animated by a spirit on the part of captain 
and crew which, if anything could have done so, would have offset 
her physical difficulties. She had, weeks before, been pronounced 
unfit for service, and had been ordered north, though Admiral 
Sampson had strongly urged sending workmen to do the re- 
pairs at Key West. Exigency had held her, until now, when 
surely starting northward, Captain Chester took in Nicolas 
Channel en route, determined that if his guns could help in the 
expected encounter, they should be there. The writer is happy 
to be able to make public mention of the zealous spirit which, 
while conspicuous in general throughout the fleet, was so mark- 
edly shown in this instance. The Vesuvius made an admira- 
ble despatch-boat, and in the thirst for information, that vital ele- 
ment in war, was at once sent back to Key West. At noon the 
Neiv Orleans was despatched to scout fifty miles, with instruc- 
tions to return and be off Matanzas by 10 a. m. of the next day, 
May 26, where the fleet, gradually edging toward Havana in fear 
of the impossibility, with so many broken-down ships, of being 
able to meet a movement by Cervera from the westward, was 
expected to be. The Hornet came in the afternoon with two 
telegrams of May 24, one a hint that an army movement was 
anticipated : 



THE MOVES TO LNTERCEPT CERVERA 285 

Be prepared to convoy and guard about 30,000 United States troops 
in about forty transports from Tampa, Fla. You require some 
armored vessels to attack batteries to clear landing. More details 
to-morrow. 

The other announced: 

Till further orders flying squadron is under your command ; Schley 
so informed. 

The Hornet brought word that the Amphitriie had been sent 
out in tow of the Panther instead of the Terror, as the latter was 
still repairing; and also brought a copy of instructions which 
had been sent May 24 through the commandant at Key West: 

Send following to all commanding officers south coast blockade 
and inform Sampson it has been done. If Spanish fleet bringing 
ammunition and other munitions of war for heavy guns perhaps they 
will land them at Santiago with the intention of coasting them close 
along shore around Cape Cruz and inside reef to Cienfuegos and 
thence by rail to Havana. Therefore, you are recommended to 
blockade close to the shore off Cape Cruz and to the westward espe- 
cially at night and stop the transportation. 

At 7 P. M. the Hornet was sent back to Key West with a tele- 
gram from Sampson to the navy department: 

Schley ought to have arrived at Santiago May 24. The force 
at my command occupied Bahama Channel last night, but not having 
any information from Schley, and as the Spanish squadron may have 
avoided him at Santiago and attempted to reach Havana by Cape 
San Antonio, I have moved westward to provide against this con- 
tingency. I shall attempt to cover Havana from both directions. 
I will be Thursday morning, iSlay 26, at the west end of Nicolas 
Channel, where I expect information from Schley via Key West. 
Movements greatly hampered by monitors constituting the principal 
force under my command, I cannot despatch armored vessels until 
movements Spanish squadron thoroughly known. 



CHAPTER X 
CIENFUEGOS 

During the forenoon of May 26 Sampson's squadron stood 
slowly west, the monitors Puritan and Miantonomoh having been 
sent with the collier Sterling under Cay Pi^ras to coal. At 11, 
the Vesuvius returned from Key West with the first news from 
Commodore Schley. This was in telegrams sent by Captain 
Cotton of the Harvard, who at 5.30 a. m. May 24, off Santiago, 
had communicated with the armed yacht Scorpion, which had 
left Cienfuegos at 7 P. m. May 22, with despatches from Schley. 
The telegrams were sent from Nicolas Mole early May 25. 
Cotton's own despatch to Sampson was as follows: 

Sent by Schley here with official despatches. Left at Santiago de 
Cuba May 24, Yale and St. Paul. Minneapolis left yesterday for 
Cienfuegos to report Schley. Yale reconnoitred Santiago de Cuba on 
the 21st May. He reports strongly fortified; saw nothing in harbor. I 
have not seen Spanish fleet; have not ascertained anything respecting 
recent movements Spanish fleet. Proceed for coal to Key West, May 
26. I have only 1,250 tons of coal. The Minneapolis must coal 
within the next few days. Yale early next week. Schley directs me 
to inform the department Sampson decided to have the command of 
Schley stationed at Cienfuegos and his own off Havana. Minneapolis 
reconnoitred San Juan May 21. Spanish fleet was not there. 

The following was Commodore Schley's despatch to Sampson: 

Arrived May 21 off Cienfuegos, Cuba. Standing in to-day (this 
morning) May 22, within four thousand yards entrance, found 
them busily mining; cannot say whether Spanish fleet in port or not; 
the anchorage not visible from entrance.' Iowa and torpedo-boat 
Dupont arrived to-day. Expect difficulty here will be to coal from 
colliers in the constant heavy swell. Other problems easy compared 
with this one, so far from the base. 

• As seen {supra, 2G6), this was a mistaken supposition. 
286 



CIENFUEGOS 287 

The Scorpion had also carried the following, which was de- 
livered to Captain Cotton as senior officer present off Santiago: 

U, S. Flag-Ship Brooklyn, 

Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, May 22, 1898. 

Sir: Enclosed is a copy of a telegram, marked "A," ' received at 
Key West, dated May 19. After considering this telegram, the com- 
mander-in-chief of the N. A. station informs me that he has decided 
to make no change in his present plan, i. e., to have the flying squad- 
ron, with the addition of the Iowa, Marhlehead, Castine, Hawk, and 
Merrimac, stationed off Cienfuegos and the remainder of his own 
force off Havana. 

2. Therefore, if this order is delivered to the commanding officer 
of the Harvard, he will proceed with that vessel to Nicolas Mole or 
Cape Haitien and report to the department the change which the 
commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic station has made in the 
plan "strongly advised" by the department, then return to Santiago 
de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs and immediately report at 
Havana or Cienfuegos, as may be thought more advantageous. If the 
Minneapolis be in company with the Harvard, direct her to join me 
off Cienfuegos. 

3. If either the Harvard or the Minneapolis are alone, as soon as 
you have communicated with the department return to Santiago de 
Cuba, learn the condition of affairs, and immediately report to Havana 
or Cienfuegos, as may be thought most advantageous. 

Very respectfully, 

W. S. Schley, 

Commodore, U. S. N., 

Commander-in-Chief, Flying Squadron. 

The Senior Officer Present, 
Off Santiago de Cuba. 

As the telegrams from the Harvard had been sent May 25 
from Nicolas Mole (distant 122 miles east of Santiago), it was 
clear to Sampson that either the Haivk or Marhlehead had failed 
to reach Schley early on the 23d, or if they had arrived as ex- 
pected, that Schley had not reached Santiago by the next even- 
ing. If he had done so there had been quite time to have de- 
spatched a telegram from Nicolas Mole by one of the fast scouts 
the same day the despatches had been sent by the Harvard. 

> This was the telegram from the department enclosed with No. 7, of May 
20, to Commodore Schley. 



288 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The Vesuvius, as the fastest vessel, was thus at once sent to 
Key West, leaving at 1 p. m. with a telegram to all the scouts 
supposed to be in the vicinity of eastern Cuba: 

Commanding officers Yale, Minneapolis, St. Paul, St. Nicolas 
Mole, Hayti. Spanish squadron is at Santiago. If Schley has not 
arrived there, go Cienfuegos and inform him. 

To Commodore Schley: 

Fifteen miles east of Santiago is the pier and harbor belonging to 
the Spanish- American Company; excellent fresh water obtainable and 
you can coal there from collier. 

To the United States consul at Cape Haitien: 

Keep in communication with our ships Mole St. Nicolas, informing 
them fully all news. 

It had not been supposed by Sampson that the flying squadron 
would fail to move under the orders carried by the Hawk should 
they be delivered, so that when the Dolphin arrived at 9.30 
P. M., May 26, with despatches showing that Schley's squadron 
had not left Cienfuegos, he was deeply disturbed. These had 
been received from the Hawk at 10 a. m,, May 25, off Havana, 
by the Dolphin. She had at once gone eastward in search of 
the admiral, firing a green Very signal every fifteen minutes 
and showing her running lights with great frequency during 
darkness, until 8.25 a. m. of the next day, when she was abreast 
of Paredon Grande light. She had thus gone 165 miles beyond 
the position of the fleet. It was an extraordinary illustration 
of the difficulty of discovering ships at night. She had steamed 
390 miles before reaching the admiral instead of the 90 necessary 
had the fleet at once been sighted. 

She brought the following: 

M43. Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

Sir: 1. In reply to your letter No. 8, I would state that I am by no 
means satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not in Cienfuegos. The 
large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence 
of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances it would seem 



CIENFUEGOS 289 

to me to be extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago 
de Cuba reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. 

2. I shall therefore remain off this port with this squadron, avail- 
ing myself of every opportunity for coaling and keeping it ready for 
emergency. 

3. Regarding the enclosed information from Commander McCalla, 
I would state that I went twice yesterday close in to the mouth of the 
harbor, the first time about two thousand yards and the second time 
within about fourteen hundred yards, but saw no evidence of any 
masked battery near the entrance. Well up the river across their 
torpedo mine fields, now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is 
a new battery constructed hardly within range from the mouth of the 
river. 

4. The Castine, Merrimac, and Hawk arrived this morning and I 
send the Hawk back with these despatches. 

5. Last night I sent the Scorpion east to Santiago de Cuba to com- 
municate with the scouts off that port, with instructions if they were 
not there to return at once to me here, and I expect her back day 
after to-morrow. 

6. I am further satisfied that the destination of the Spanish squad- 
ron is either Cienfuegos or Havana. This point being in communi- 
cation by railroad with Havana, would be better for their purposes if it 
was left exposed, and I think that we ought to be very careful how we 
receive information from Havana, which is no doubt sent out for the 
purpose of misleading us. 

7. The Iowa is coaling to-day, having reached this station with 
only about half her coal supply. 

Very respectfully, 

W. S. Schley, 

Commodore, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, Flying Squadron. 

TheC.-in-C. 

N. A. Station. 

M44. Off Cienfuegos, May 23, 1898. 

Sir: 1. Steamer Adula, chartered by Consul Dent with proper 
papers from U. S. State Department, to carry out neutrals from Cien- 
fuegos, was stopped off this port this morning. She had no cargo and 
was permitted to enter. 

2. She reports that she left Santiago de Cuba at 4.30 p. m. on 
Wednesday, May 18, and that night she saw the lights of seven vessels, 
seventy miles to the southward of Santiago. Next day, Thursday, 
May 19, at Kingston, cable reported Spanish fleet at Santiago. Fri- 
day, May 20, the fleet was reported to have left Santiago. 



290 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

3. Now, on Saturday, May 21, when about forty miles south- 
west of this port, I heard from the bridge of this vessel, firing of guns 
toward Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish 
fleet and the news this morning by the Adula convinces me that the 
fleet is here. 

4. Latest war bulletin from Jamaica, received this morning, as- 
serts that the fleet had left Santiago. I think I have them here al- 
most to a certainty. 

Very respectfully, W. S. Schley, 

Commodore, U. S. N., C.-in-C, etc. 
The C.-in-C, 

N. A. Station. 

A copy of notes taken by Lieutenant Hood on board the 
Brookbjn on the return of Lieutenant Simpson, the boarding 
officer from the Adula, was as follows: 

May 23, 1898, off Cienfuegos. — Boarded British steamship Adula 
of Atlas Line, Captain W. Walker, bound from Kingston, Jamaica, 
to Cienfuegos under orders of United States Consul Louis A. Dent, at 
Kingston, to bring away Hoff ren, a seaman of the Niagara, in hospital 
with a broken leg, and such other Americans and neutrals as wish to 
leave. 

The original letter, dated May 7, 1898, in first trip made, leaving 
Cienfuegos ]\Iay 10, 1898, with 327 passengers — 4 Americans and 
323 neutrals. 

This trip being made under countersign of original orders, dated 
May 21, by Consul Dent. 

In original letter Lombard, clerk in the consulate, was mentioned, 
but he had left before Adula arrived at Cienfuegos. 

Left Kingston ]\Iay 21 and came here direct, having seen nothing 
en route. On last trip from here stopped at Santiago. While there 
two American men-of-war came off the port and were bombarded 
by the forts from 12 noon until 1.30 p. m. Could not learn if these 
ships were hit. City rumor that they had been driven off. 

When Adula left Santiago the same afternooon she saw nothing of 
the American ships, nor marks of shells on the forts. She don't know 
the ships, as they were never in sight from the inner harbor. 

At midnight on the 18th sighted the lights of seven ships about 
seventy miles south one-half west off Santiago. The next afternoon, 
the 19th, while at Kingston, it was reported there that the Spanish 
fleet had arrived at Santiago. 

Information: Santiago is mined with twenty-one electric mines 
to be fired from a small thatched house on west side of entrance well 
inside (about 300 yards) the entrance. 



CIENFUEGOS 291 

Know of no contact mines. 

Harbor of Cienfuegos is mined. Electric mines were put down, 
but did not work, so they have been changed to contact mines. Don't 
know the number or situation of mines. 

When last in Cienfuegos, i\Iay 10, 1898, there were two little gun- 
boats and one torpedo gun-boat in port. The fonner are a little 
larger than tugs, and not very formidable. The latter is the one the 
Eagle had to fight with, hitting one of her smoke-pipes. She has two 
smoke-pipes, two masts, and is painted lead color. 

Note: The Adula has a passenger, a British subject, P. H. Baxter, 
who represents the Atlas Line and is interpreter. 

There was also handed in from the Dolphin a memorandum 
dated May 25 : 

The Hawk has just reported from Cienfuegos with despatches from 
Commodore Schley. Hood says a good number of officers do not 
believe the Spaniards are there at all, although they can only sur- 
mise. 

The situation was one to bring great complexity to the mind 
of the commander-in-chief. The first thing was to reiterate his 
instructions in language of no doubtful import. The armed 
yacht Wasp, reported the fastest vessel present, was at once 
called alongside and despatched to Cienfuegos with orders to 
Commodore Schley: 

No. 10. U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

St. Nicolas Channel, May 27, 1898. 

Sir: Every report, and particularly daily confidential reports re- 
ceived at Key West from Havana, state Spanish squadron has been 
in Santiago de Cuba from the 19th to the 25th instant, inclusive, the 
25th being the date of the last report received. 

2. You will please proceed, with all possible despatch, to Santiago 
to blockade that port. If, on arrival there, you receive positive in- 
formation of the Spanish ships having left, you will follow them in 
pursuit. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear- Admiral, U. S. Navy, 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 
North Atlantic Statio7i. 
Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. Navy, 

Commanding Flying Squadron, South Coast, Cuba. 



292 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The orders to the TFo.syj were as follows : 

Sir: Proceed off Cienfuegos with greatest possible despatch via 
Cape Antonio. 

2. If you find Commodore Schley off that port, deliver to him the 
enclosed despatch and return to Key West. 

3. Return to Key West at once in case you assure yourself that he 
is not in that vicinity. 

The Dolphin was immediately after sent into Key West with 
a despatch to the navy department: 

Have received information from Schley via Cape San Antonio, 
Cuba, dated May 23, stating he is not satisfied the Spanish squadron 
is not in Cienfuegos, Cuba. He has no apparent good reasons for 
his opinion and states he will remain off Cienfuegos, keeping squadron 
all ready for an emergency. He reports the steamer Adula entered into 
Cienfuegos May 23. He probably learned from her as she left if the 
Spanish squadron was in port. I think that he has probably gone to 
Santiago. To assure this I sent the Wasp to Cienfuegos to-night. If 
he has not left this will enable him to reach Santiago de Cuba before 
I could do so. 

Word having now been received of the arrival of the Oregon 
at Key West on May 26, the Dolphin also bore a letter to Com- 
modore Remey to hasten her departure for Sampson's squadron, 
and informing him that upon her arrival the monitors would be 
returned to Havana and Key W^est. The weather at this time 
was fine, and the monitors were coaling from the collier with- 
out difficulty. 

At 1 P. M., May 27, the Vesuvius arrived from Key W^est with 
despatches; one from the Harvard, dated May 26, at Mole St. 
Nicolas : 

The department instructs me to communicate immediately with 
Schley. I leave immediately. 

Copies of other telegrams to the naval commandant at Key 
West were brought, one directing a convoy to Santiago for the 
cable steamer Adria (chartered by the war department) and also 
directing the senior officer off Santiago to furnish Captain Allen 
of the Army Signal Corps, under whose direction she was, all 



CIENFUEGOS 293 

assistance practicable; another to be forwarded to Commodore 
Schley to send the Minneapolis to Lambert's Point (Norfolk, 
Va.) for coal upon the arrival of the auxiliary cruiser Yankee, 
Commander Brownson. 

But information of much greater moment was conveyed in 
copies of telegrams sent by Commodore Schley in the Dupont, 
which had left Cienfuegos at 7.08 p. m., May 24, for transmis- 
sion from Key West to the navy department, and which were 
sent thence May 26. These two telegrams were as follows, the 
first said: 

Coaling off Cienfuegos, Cuba, is very uncertain. One collier not 
sufficient for the work, when it is possible to coal. In great need of 
two more for this squadron, thoroughly equipped with hoisting engines, 
buckets, etc., for utmost despatch. The Sterling, not having hoisting 
engine, would not be useful. Recommend that she discharge cargo 
at Key West? I would suggest quality must equal best Pocahontas 
coal for this work. Every collier should carry several thousand gal- 
lons of oil, also three or four compressed bales as fenders, to prevent 
accidents. I have communicated with insurgents to-day and have 
supplied ammunition and dynamite, also clothing. The Marblehead, 
Vixen, and Eagle arrived to-day. Have ascertained that the Span- 
ish fleet is not here and I will move eastward to-morrow communicat- 
ing with you from Nicolas Mole. On account of short coal supply 
in ships, cannot blockade them if in Santiago. 

The second was: 

I shall proceed to-morrow (25th) off Santiago, being embarrassed, 
however, by the Texas' short coal supply, and her inability to coal in 
the open sea. I shall not be able to remain off that port on account 
of general short coal supply of squadron, so will proceed to the vicin- 
ity of Nicolas Mole, where the water is smooth and I can coal Texas 
and other ships [with] what may remain in collier. Will communicate 
with you from Nicolas Mole. 

Sampson's views of the possibility of blockading Santiago, 
under the circumstances of coal supply which he felt should exist 
in the flying squadron, were in disaccord with those expressed 
in the telegrams just received. It was known that the Brooklyn 
had left with about 1,400 tons, the Massachusetts with 1,100, 
the Texas with 800, and the Iowa with about 1,000. These 



294 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

were the important ships. Any others, however serviceable in 
general, w^ere not expected to render efficient aid against the 
armored ships of the enemy. While convinced that all the heavy 
ships except the Texas would have ample coal to maintain a 
blockade for a considerable period at Santiago, he had no doubt 
whatever of ability to coal the ships at sea. It was done daily 
in his own squadron outside the reef at Key West as well as fre- 
quently elsewhere, and he could see no reason why it should not 
be done on the south side, as was in fact demonstrated by the 
experience both at Cienfuegos and Santiago. He at once made 
up his mind to go himself to Santiago unless matters should take 
another aspect. So far as the writer knows, he had previously 
had no thought of taking direct charge of operations in that 
vicinity. The importance of an immediate blockade of Santiago 
was the paramount consideration in determining this action. 

Commodore Watson and Commander Converse, the captain 
of Watson's flag-ship, the Montgomery, as also Captain Folger 
of the New Orleans, were called aboard the New York for con- 
sultation. The question of blocking the entrance to Santiago 
harbor, which from its extreme narrowness lent itself admirably 
for such action, had already been somewhat discussed, and 
when these officers arrived was continued. The question of 
means was decided by a suggestion from Commander Con- 
verse of using the Merrimac, which, with her great length and 
heavy cargo of coal, would, if properly placed, make an abso- 
lute barrier to the egress of the Spanish squadron for the rest of 
the war. The criticisms of the action, which were chiefly the 
product of afterthought founded on very different bases from 
those of the moment, will be dealt with later. 

It was decided to send the Neiv Orleans at once, accompanied 
by the collier Sterling, to Santiago, with orders as follows: 

St. Nicolas Channel, 

May 27, 1898. 

Sir: You will proceed to Santiago de Cuba to convoy the collier 
Sterling. 

2. You will communicate with Commodore Schley and direct him 
to remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, assuming that 
the Spanish vessels are in that port. 



CIENFUEGOS 295 

3. Tell him that I desire that he should use the collier Sterling^ to 
obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into this harbor. 
Inform him that I believe that it would be perfectly practicable to 
steam this vessel into position and drop all her anchors, allow her 
to swing across the channel, then sink her, either by opening the 
valves, or whatever means may be best in his judgment. 

4. Inform Commodore Schley that the details of this plan are left 
to his judgment. In the meantime he must exercise the utmost care 
that none of the vessels already in the port are allowed to escape ; and 
say to the commodore that I have the utmost confidence in his ability 
to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wish him 
good-luck. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 

Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Aila7itic Station. 

Commanding Officer, 

U. S. S. New Orleans. 



Captain Folger was also given personal directions to allow 
the Sterling, which was to replace the Merrimac, to make her 
own way after rounding Cape Maysi, he himself to proceed 
thence at full speed and deliver the orders which he carried 
to Commodore Schley, who by this time was supposed to be 
at least in the vicinity of Santiago. 

The two ships left at 6.55 p. m., May 27, and the flag-ship at 
once left for Key West in order to get a thorough understanding 
of the situation as soon as possible, the admiral having, as men- 
tioned, made up his mind to go himself to Santiago unless the 
situation there should be found more satisfactory than the pre- 
vious advices gave reason to believe. 

The New York arrived at the reef off Key West at 2 a. m., 
May 28, and Sampson at once sent the following telegram to 
St. Nicolas Mole for Commodore Schley: 

The New Orleans will meet you off Santiago May 29 with im- 
portant despatches. The Spanish squadron must be blockaded at 
all hazards. Immediate communication with persons on shore must 
be entered upon. You must be sure of the Spanish squadron being 

* This was an accidental error for Merrimac. 



296 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

in port. I suggest communicating with the Spanish American Com- 
pany pier at Daiquiri Bay, at a distance of fifteen miles east of Santi- 
ago de Cuba. One collier for you left yesterday; shall send as soon 
as possible another. If Spanish squadron has left Santiago immediate 
pursuit must be made. 



CHAPTER XI 
THE MOVEMENTS OF THE FLYING SQUADRON 

To turn to the events of the week on the south side of Cuba: 

Any question of further delay at Cienfuegos on the supposi- 
tion that Cervera was there was settled on the arrival at 8 a. m... 
May 24, of the Marblehead, Eagle, and Vixen, which had left 
Key West at 4 p. m., May 21. 

Commander McCalla, on going aboard the Brooklyn to re- 
port, informed Commodore Schley "that the Spanish force 
under Cervera had been reported authoritatively in Santiago 
the preceding Thursday, which was the 19th of May, and that 
when I sailed on the afternoon of the 21st of May the Spanish 
squadron was still reported to be at Santiago." ^ McCalla con- 
tinued: "Admiral Schley told me that he thought the Spanish 
squadron was in Cienfuegos, that he received a Kingston news- 
paper from the steamer Adula some days previous, and that one 
of the newspapers contained a cable despatch from Santiago, 
and that from that he gathered that the Spanish force under 
Cervera might have sailed from Santiago in time to reach Cien- 
fuegos just before the arrival of the force under his command. 
I said that I had on board arms, ammunition, and dynamite 
for the Cuban camp to the westward, and that if he would let 
me go I would at once find out whether the Spanish fleet was 
in Cienfuegos. He immediately assented." 

Taking the Eagle with him, as her commander knew the ex- 
act place from previous communication, the two ships went to 
the point mentioned in the memorandum, thirteen miles west 
of the Cienfuegos entrance, arriving about noon, and found a 
force of Cuban insurgents on the beach; from whom it was at 
once found that the Spanish squadron was not in Cienfuegos. 
The dynamite, arms, and ammunition taken from the prizes 

' Court of Inquiry, 278. 
297 



298 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

at Key West were landed, some clothing and food furnished, 
and the Eagle ordered back, as the faster vessel at the moment 
to carry the information to Commodore Schley. 

This report, which was supplemented by a conversation^ with 
Captain McCalla, removed any reason, under the orders which 
had been received, for remaining off Cienfuegos. Being satis- 
fied that the enemy was not there, the order to " proceed with all 
despatch but cautiously to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy 
is there, blockade him in port," was now unqualified. 

Commander McCalla returned to his ship at 5.30 and at 6 p. M, 
(May 24) the Brooklyn signalled to form column at slow speed, 
course south by east. At 7 the squadron was stopped. At 7.10 
signal was made, " We are bound to Santiago. In case of separa- 
tion rendezvous off Gonaives Bay, Hayti, outside marine limit," ^ 
and at 8.20 the squadron started ahead again in column, the 
Marhlehead, Vixen, and Eagle on the right flank, the Merrimac on 
the left, on a south-easterly course. The squadron steamed at 
speeds varying from 7 to 9 knots, which during the forenoon of 
the next day was reduced through the bow compartment of the 
Eagle getting full of water, which, as there were no other appli- 
ances aboard, had to be bailed out with buckets.^ But 13 knots 
in all were made in the four hours of the forenoon watch, and 
the average of but 6.6 knots from noon of the 25th to mid- 
night. The squadron thus did not reach the longitude of San- 
tiago until the afternoon of May 26, having been forty-four 
hours in covering the distance of 315 miles at an average of 
about 7 knots. 

At 4.30 p. M., the flying squadron was 22 miles south by west 
of Santiago entrance, and with the course signalled at 2 p. M., 
"East." The loiva now signalled, "Two of our cruisers, St. 
Louis and Yale, bearing N. N. W." * The flying squadron stood 

* Court of Inquiry, I, 280. * Official Record of Signals. 

* "This," says Lieutenant (now Rear Admiral) Southerland, "took a long 
time. When this was done and the water was out of the vessel she was in 
good condition to make pood speed." {Court of Inquiry, I, 321.) "A little 
after 1 o'clock of the 2Gth " she was ordered to Port Antonio, Jamaica, to 
coal and return thence to Key West. 

* Official Record of Signals. The signal was in error as to one of the ships 
being the St. Louis. 



THE FLYING SQUADRON 299 

toward them at 5/ the flag-ship signalling at 5.20 to " Clear for 
action." Nine minutes later, ships' numbers having been ex- 
changed with the Minneapolis, the signal was made to "Dis- 
continue present exercise," and at 5.38 to stop.^ 

The Yale, cruising in Bahama Channel, had been met on the 
night of May 19-20 by the St. Paul, which had left Key West the 
evening of May 18 under orders to proceed to Cape Haitien, di- 
recting the Yale thither also if she should be spoken. Both ships 
arrived at Cape Haitien about noon on May 20. " There," says 
Captain Sigsbee, " I received telegraphic orders from the depart- 
ment which had been received at Cape Haitien at 10.45 p. m. of 
the 19th, to proceed to Santiago de Cuba and communicate 
occasionally, and was informed that Commodore Schley was 
ordered to proceed to the same place. My orders stated that 
the Spanish fleet had been reported at Santiago. I left Port 
Haitien without anchoring and arrived off Santiago the follow- 
ing day, Saturday, the 21st, at 9.30 A. M., and engaged in target 
practice some five or six miles from the fortifications at the en- 
trance to the port." ^ 

The Yale had remained at Cape Haitien after the St. Paul 
had left. At midnight (of May 20-21) the American consul 
came on board with a despatch sent by the navy department 
to his care: 

The Spanish squadron arrived on the 19th at Santiago. Proceed 
off that port, get in touch with the enemy and communicate occa- 
sionally. Wait for another despatch.^ 

Two hours later (2 a. m., May 21) the second came: 

Inform every vessel off Santiago de Cuba flying squadron is off 
Cienfuegos and that orders have been sent to it to proceed with all 
possible despatch off Santiago de Cuba. 

In a few hours the Yale was on her way to Santiago, 215 miles 
distant. She arrived off Santiago at 10.54 p. m.. May 21, but 

' Brooklyn's log. * Official Record of Signals. 

' Appendix to Report of Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 410. 
* This is the form of the despatch as given by Captain Wise. (Court of 
Inquiry^ I, 212.) 



300 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

neither Captain Wise nor Captain Sigsbee (also now there) saw- 
any ships of the Spanish squadron, the narrow and twisting 
canon of the entrance and the high bluff bordering it, forbidding 
any view of the harbor beyond the river-like reaches stretching 
in for about a mile, with several turns before opening into a 
beautiful bay three and a half miles long and nearly a mile in 
its broadest part. 

On the high eastern bluff, a precipice two hundred feet high, 
which extends without a break in its vertical face three miles 
to Aguadores, is the picturesque castle of the Morro, just east of 
which was a battery newly built of five 6.2-inch muzzle-loading 
rifles converted from old bronze smooth-bores; on the west the 
hills though steep were not so high, and on the summit of these, 
the Socapa, were three S-inch muzzle-loading howitzers and two 
6.2-inch rifles, the latter taken from the cruiser Rema Mercedes, 
long stationed in the harbor and useless through broken-down 
boilers. 

Lower down the hill and near the water were one 57-milli- 
metre, four 37, and one 11-millimetre Hotchkiss guns for the 
defence of the mine field. Nothing, however, as just said, could 
be seen by the Yale and *S^. Paul of the Spanish squadron in the 
inner harbor, though the former w^as near enough to the entrance 
for a close inspection. They cruised, the St. Paul east, the Yale 
west, of the port, awaiting the expected arrival of the flying 
squadron, and without interference from the batteries. 

The Plarvard and Miiineapolis had met and parted company 
at 6 in the evening of May 18 off Puerto Rico. The Minne- 
apolis stood for St. Thomas, where she arrived at 11.30 the 
next morning and began to coal. On the 20th Captain Jewell 
received the following telegram from Washington, dated May 19: 

Minneapolis, St. Thomas: 

Proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba; the Spanish fleet reported 
there; Schley ordered there; find Harvard, if practicable, she is some- 
where off the north coast of Puerto Rico; proceed with off Santiago; 
her orders same as yours; keep touch with Spanish fleet; communicate 
occasionally. 

The Minneapolis was under way at 10 p. m. and at daylight 
the next morning, May 21, off Cape San Juan, captured the 



THE FLYING SQUADRON 301 

Spanish bark Maria Dolorosa with coal for the port of San Juan. 
Putting a prize crew of an officer and six men aboard with arms 
and provisions/ she again stood westward, picked up the Harvard 
at 3.20 A. M., delivered the despatch to Captain Cotton, and with 
her stood for Santiago, where both arrived the morning of the 
23d. 

Four out of the six large and fast scouts were thus present 
together May 23 off Santiago. At 5.30 a. m.. May 24, the day 
after his arrival, Captain Cotton of the Harvard, as senior offi- 
cer, received the order sent in the Scorpion, May 22, from Cien- 
fuegos by Commodore Schley in accord with Sampson's letter 
No. 7 of May 20, and left at once for St. Nicolas Mole with the 
despatches brought by the Scorpion? 

The Minneapolis, obeying also the order brought by the Scor- 
pion on May 24, started at 12.30 p. m. for Cienfuegos in search 
of the flying squadron, and at 11.25 a. m.. May 25, ofi' Cienfuegos, 
spoke the Castine (the only ship besides the Minneapolis now 
present), and was informed of Commodore Schley's departure 
eastward. She returned at once off Santiago, where she arrived 
again at 10 a. m.. May 26, without sighting the squadron. 

At 6 A. M., May 26, the St. Paul captured the British collier 
Rostermel as she was nearing the entrance of Santiago harbor. 
Her captain stated that he had touched at Puerto Rico May 16 
and had left the same day, under orders for Cura9ao, where he 
arrived May 19. He had been ordered thence to Santiago to 
discharge,^ a fact of moment when taken in connection with the 
numerous specific reports that Cervera's squadron were in that 
port. 

On the 26th, at 10 a. m., the St. Paid met the British steamer 
Jason, from Kingston to New York, which had diverted her 
route to bring two Cubans, sent to Commodore Schley, under 
direction of the department of state, by Mr. L. A. Dent, the 
American consul at Kingston. Both had been in the employ 
of the American consulate at Kingston; one, Eduardo Nunez, 
as a pilot, the other, Senior Reval, as interpreter. 

• The Maria Dolorosa was sent into Key West and adjudged prize. 

2 These despatches are given on pages 28G, 287. 

^ Court of Inquiry, I, 414, where appear full details of capture. 



302 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

About 5 p. M, the smoke of a number of ships was seen to the 
southward and eastward, and all three ships present, the Yale, 
St. Paul, and Minneaj)olis, stood in its direction in the expec- 
tancy, as it was now known to have left Cienfuegos, that it would 
prove to be Commodore Schley's command, thus leaving the 
port wholly unguarded. The smoke of the scouts had been seen 
at the same time by the squadron, and the latter's course was 
changed to meet them. At 6 the two forces joined and Captain 
Sigsbee, signalling the flag-ship that he had a pilot aboard, was 
ordered aboard the flag-ship. 

Captain Sigsbee carried with him a letter which had been 
written to Captain Jewell of the Minneapolis, but which he now 
addressed to Commodore Schley: 

U. S. S. St. Paul, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, May 26, 1898. 

Sir: This morning I boarded the British steamer Jason, bound 
for New York, She transferred to me a colored pilot named Eduardo 
Nunez, recently employed by the Spanish navy at Santiago de Cuba. 
Also a Cuban recently employed as clerk in the United States consulate 
at Santiago de Cuba. I send you two letters from the United States 
consul at Kingston, Jamaica, bearing upon the matter. 

Captain W. C. Wise, senior officer here, directed me to transfer 
these men to the Minneapolis, and later he revoked the order. I note 
that the consul's letters have not the consular seal attached. Still, I 
assume that they are genuine. 

I had 1,200 tons of coal on board at noon. 

Yesterday I captured as prize the British steamer Restormel, of 
Cardiff, She had touched at Puerto Rico and Cura9ao. I send you 
a "memo" copy of a letter I wrote to the navy department and the 
prize commissioner at Key West, Fla., where I sent the prize. The 
captain and crew seemed to be glad to be captured. She had 2,400 
tons of coal on board. I captured her very close to the Morro off 
Santiago de Cuba in broad daylight. 

No news here. I have seen absolutely nothing of the Spanish fleet. 
Very respectfully, 

C. D, Sigsbee, 
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding. 
Commodore W. S. Schley, U. S. N.' 

Neither of the captains of the scouts had any knowledge of 
the whereabouts of the Spanish ships beyond what had been 

* Court of Inquiry, I, 413. 



THE FLYING SQUADRON 303 

telegraphed from the navy department, though the Colon had 
moved down to Gaspar Bay and taken position the day before, 
but a mile from the entrance; they had (for reasons which will 
be explained later) seen nothing except the masts of a small 
vessel in the entering reaches of the bay, and nothing had come 
or gone except the two British steamers mentioned. Captain 
Sigsbee, the only officer called aboard the fiag-ship, could give 
nothing new regarding the Spanish ships. 

The Merrimac at 6.15 signalling, "Intermediate valve stem 
broken short off. It will take two or three hours to repair it," 
the Yale was ordered to take her in tow. Captain Jewell re- 
ported the Minneapolis short of coal and with her machinery in 
bad condition. He was signalled asking if he had enough to go 
to Key West and replied, "Just enough." He was ordered to 
take position on the port beam of the Iowa, the Yale with her 
tow on the starboard, and the St. Paul on the port beam of the 
flag-ship. 

A litde later (at 7.45) signal was made to the squadron: 
"Destination Key West via south of Cuba and Yucatan Chan- 
nel as soon as collier is ready. Speed 9 knots." 

The Yale at 8.50 reported, "All ready with tow," and signal 
was made to form column, and the squadron started back toward 
Key West. 

The signal record herewith, in part, gives best the course of 
events to noon of the next day: 

MAY 26 

9.45 p. M. 5roo/c/i/n to 7a/e:" What speed can you make with tow?" 
9.50 " Yale to Brooklyn: "With tow we can make 10 knots, but 
will use up too much coal, and our coal supply is small." 
9.55 " Brooklyn to Yale: " Can you get to Key West on 9 knots ?" 
10.00 " Yale to Brooklyn: "Yes." 
11.20 " Yale to Brooklyn: "Hawser is parted." 
11.25 " Brooklyn to squadron: "Stop." 

11.30 " Yale to Brooklyn: "We are getting our steel hawser out. 
It will take four hours before we are able to go ahead 
again." 
11.35 " Brooklyn to Yale: "Is the collier repaired enough to 

steam herself?" 
11.40 " Fa/e to -Broo%n; "No, her engines are not repaired." 



304 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

MAY 27 

12.15 A. M. Brooklyn to Minneapolis: "Keep Yale and collier in 

sight and do not lose the fleet." 
7.35 " Yale to Brooklyn: " Alerrimac let hawser go. Bad work." 
8.00 " Brooklyn to St. Paul: "Did Scorpion communicate with 

you off Santiago a day or two ago?" 
8.00 " St. Paul to Brooklyn: "No; Yale or Harvard." 
8.05 " Brooklyn to Minneapolis: "Did you communicate with 

the Scorpion off Santiago?" 
8.15 " Minneapolis to Brooklyn: "Haven't seen her. Harvard 

said she was off Santiago the 24th." 
8.30 " Minyieapolis and Marblehead to Brooklyn: "Strange 

vessel bearing N. E. ^ E." 
9.15 " Brooklyn to Iowa: "Repeat signals." 
9.15 " "Exchanged numbers with Harvard." 

9.30 " Brooklyn to Harvard: "From where are you?" 
9.30 " Harvard to Brooklyn: "Nicolas Mole." 
9.30 " Brooklyn to Harvard: "I have despatches for C.-in-C." 
10.30 " Yale to Brooklyn: "I am ready to go ahead." 
10.45 " Brooklyn to squadron: "Can you fetch Key West with 

coal remaining?" 
11.00 " Brooklyn to Yale: "Proceed; steam at 7 knots." 
11.05 " Squadron to Brooklyn: Marblehead, Iowa, Texas, Massa- 
chusetts, St. Paul, and Minneapolis answered affirma- 
tive. 

The Harvard, Captain Cotton, had arrived at St. Nicolas 
Mole early May 25, and sent the despatches brought for trans- 
mission from the Scorpion the day before off Santiago.^ At 
10.30 A. M. the captain received a despatch from Admiral Samp- 
son: 

The Spanish squadron at Santiago. If previous to May 19, scout 
off Santiago. Communicate with Schley if he (they) move west. 
Schley is expected May 24 at Santiago from Cienfuegos, Cuba. Tele- 
graph me from Nicolas Mole to Key West if he (they) move east, 
and leave letter for Schley, then go off Santiago to meet him. I shall 
be Cay Frances with squadron. If two scouts are available, one 
should keep touch with the Spanish squadron. 

Captain Cotton awaited reply from the navy department to 
the despatch forwarded by him from Commodore Schley, and at 
8.30 A. M., May 26, received the following: 
» Supra, pp. 94, 95. 



THE FLYING SQUADRON 305 

Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the senior officer pres- 
ent off Santiago, as follows: All department's information indicates 
Spanish division still at Santiago. The department looks to you to 
ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave with- 
out a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that there 
are landing-places five or six nautical miles west from the mouth of 
the harbor, and that there insurgents probably will be found, and not 
the Spanish. From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in 
port. As soon as ascertained, notify the department whether enemy 
is there. Could not squadron and also the Harvard coal from Merri- 
mac leeward of Cape Cruz, Cuba; Gonaives, Hayti Channel, or Mole, 
Hayti ? The department will send coal immediately to Mole, Hayti. 
Report without delay situation at Santiago de Cuba. 

The time taken to decipher the despatch and other matters 
delayed the Harvard until 1.47 p. m., when she left the Mole 
for Santiago, telegraphing Admiral Sampson: 

The department instructs me to communicate immediately with 
Schley. I leave immediately. 

The Harvard was sighted by the Brooklyn to the northward 
and eastward at 9 a. m., May 27, and at 10 Captain Cotton de- 
livered the despatches to Commodore Schley, w^hose squadron 
through the preceding night had, as mentioned, been waiting for 
the Yale taking the Merrimac in tow,^ which may be taken as 
summarizing the situation until 3.40 P. m. of that day. 

At the same time he delivered the despatches, Captain Cotton 
mentioned the request made to him by Lieutenant Beale to be 
allowed to go ashore and ascertain if the Spanish ships were in 
Santiago harbor.^^ Beale, charged with the duty of decipher- 
ing and putting into cipher all despatches received and sent 
by the Harvard, had seen the opportunity offered and pressed 
upon his captain his desire to make the attempt. On Captain 
Cotton's return from the Brooklyn he w^as informed that his 
offer was declined.^ 

The Harvard was despatched to Kingston, Jamaica,* wMth a 
telegram from Commodore Schley in answer to that from the 

1 Brooklyn's log 12 to 4 A. M., May 27. 

» Court of Inquiry, I, 202. ' Court of Inquiry, I, 909. 

*The Harvard arrived at Kingston at 9 a. m. the next morning (May 28) and 
was allowed sufficient coal (700 tons) to take her to Key "West, the nearest 



306 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

navy department, which was received by the latter on May 28. 
It was as follows: 

Received despatch May 26 delivered by Harvard oflF Santiago 
de Cuba. Merrimacs engine is disabled, and she is helpless; am 
obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely un- 
able to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, and Brooklyn from col- 
lier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving 
Key West. Brooklyn is the only one in squadron having more than 
sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago 
in present state of coal account of the squadron. Not possible to 
coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer owing to south-west winds. 
Harvard just reports to me she has only coal enough to reach Jamaica, 
and she will proceed to Port Royal. Also reports only small vessels 
could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Hayti. Minneapolis has only enough 
coal to reach Key West, and same of Yale, which will tow Merrimac. 
It is also regretted that the department's orders cannot be obeyed, 

American port. She also took water and provisions, her time being extended 
beyond the usual limit on account of the slowness of coaling. She left at 
3.18 p. M., May 30, and arrived off Santiago at 7 a. m. next day. She remained 
there until June 2, when she was ordered by Admiral Sampson to Hampton 
Roads. 

' Mr. John D. Long (ex-secretary of the navy) commenting upon this tele- 
gram says {The New American Navy, I, 276-277): "The situation of his 
command appeared at the Schley Court of Inquiry in 1901 not to have been 
as Schley reported it. At noon on May 27 his vessels had coal enough to 
have remained on blockade duty off Santiago de Cuba — the Brooklyn for 26 
days, the Iowa for 16 days, the Massachusetts for 20 days, the Texas for 10 
days, the Marblehead for 5 days and the Vixe/i for 23 days, and they then 
would have had sufficient fuel to reach Gonaives or Cape Cruz, where they could 
have refilled their bunkers from the Merrimac, which contained 4,350 tons of 
coal. The amount of coal required to completely supply these ships was 
2,750 tons. Schley must have known when he sent his despatch that the 
Iowa, Castiyie, and Dupont had coaled at Cienfuegos on May 23 and the 
Massachusetts and Castine on May 24. Permission had been asked by the 
Texas on May 23 to coal but she was refused, and ordered to coal on the 
following day. This order was subsequently revoked. Indeed the Texas 
and Marblehead did actually coal from the Merrimac at sea off Santiago on 
the evening of May 27 and the morning of May 28 and the Massachusetts 
and Vixen on May 29, the Brooklyn and Iowa on May 30, and the Brooklyn, 
Texas and Marbleliead on May 31. Thus there were but two days — the 25th 
and 26th — when no coal was transferred from the collier to the men-of-war, 
and the failure to take fuel on these days was not due wholly to rough seas 
and boisterous weather or to the helplessness of the Merrimac, but to the 
fact that the squadron was under way." 



THE FLYING SQUADRON 307 

earnestly as we have all striven to that end, I am forced to return 
to Key West via Yucatan Passage for coal. Can ascertain nothing 
certain concerning enemy. Was obliged to send Eagle to Port An- 
tonio, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only twenty-seven tons of coal 
on board. Will leave St. Paul here. Will require 9,500 tons of coal 
at Key West. 



CHAPTER XII 
THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO 

At this critical moment it is well to turn to the squadron 
whose arrival in Santiago harbor at 8 a. m., May 19, had been 
received with so much rejoicing both in Spain and Cuba. Cer- 
vera was fully alive to the difficulties of his situation. He wanted 
coal and provisions; his engines must be repaired and boilers 
cleaned. Santiago itself was short of food and, said Cervera, 
"if it does not receive any, must succumb; if we are blockaded 
before we finish taking coal, which is scarce, we shall succumb 
with the city." ^ He was kept well informed by the governor- 
general in Havana, whose sources of information were evidently 
excellent, of the movements of the American ships and of the 
colliers to be expected, among which was the Restormcl, so soon 
to be captured. General Blanco had telegraphed the minister 
of war, Correa: 

Havana, May 20, 1898. 

As I notified your Excellency, Cervera's squadron arrived at Santi- 
ago minus Terror, which was left at Martinique with Alicante, both 
blockaded by hostile ships. Squadron without provisions and coal. 
Taking coal at Santiago, where it cannot remain long; danger of 
being blockaded and entirely cut off; resources of place limited. If 
Pelayo, Carlos V, and torpedo-boat flotilla had come with them might 
attempt some action and lend powerful assistance in defence of islands. 
But reduced as it is, squadron must elude encounter and confine itself 
to manoeuvres which will not compromise it and which cannot have 
great results. Has brought no transports with coal and provisions 
which would have helped so much, nor weapons and ammunition. 

It is extremely doubtful, however, if Blanco fully appreciated 
the situation; he seemed, by a telegram of May 21 to General 
Linares, the army commander at Santiago, to expect free in- 

* Cervera, Documents, 80, 83. 
308 



THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO 309 

gress and egress for some time to come, saying: "Tell Admiral 
Cervera that English ship with coal has left Cura9ao to-day for 
Santiago. You can afterward use said vessel for provisions." 

Telegrams passed with great frequency. On May 21, the 
minister of marine (now Admiral Aunon) asked if Cervera had 
sufficient coal and whether he had news of the Terror. The an- 
swer to the first of these questions has just been mentioned; 
coal was scarce, and later Cervera says that there was not enough 
to fill the bunkers; to the second inquiry he replied that he had 
received word on May 20 that the Terror's boilers were repaired, 
and that he had instructed her to go to Puerto Rico if oppor- 
tunity occurred. 

Admiral Manterola, commanding the naval station of the 
Antilles, sent Cervera three telegrams on May 21: 

Guantdnamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe 
have Bustamante torpedoes; latter place doubtful; Cienfuegos and 
Havana, electric torpedoes. 

Cienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this 
capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow. 

The hostile forces are composed of eight cruisers, namely: Brooklyn, 
Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Columbia, New York, Indiana, Iowa, and 
Oregon. Two of 6,000 tons, Texas and Puritan, expected in the near 
future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six 
torpedo-boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted 
off Havana and Cienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and trans- 
ports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number reported to 
exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm. 

At present there are off the harbor cruisers New York, Indiana, 
Puritan, and five other cruisers, six gun-boats, and two despatch-boats. 
Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5 inch guns, twenty-five rounds 
for 11-inch, three boxes fuses for Vizcaya. On April 1 I reported to 
minister in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty-five vessels composing this 
fleet thirty-two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for 
police service on the coast, being intended only for service against fili- 
bustering expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless. 

"Engines of Alfonso XII totally disabled. Reina Mercedes, seven 
of the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of Marques de la 
Ensenada, Isabel II, and Venadito, the latter is the only one in con- 
dition to put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. 
Magallanes cannot light fires, either. Gun-boats converted into 



310 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

cruisers, for which purpose they were not constructed, have lost their 
speed, which constitutes their principal defence. Transport Legazpi, 
highest speed 7 knots. Of the small English gun-boats I believe I 
need say nothing." 

A look at the Reina Mercedes will give an idea of what my forces 
are. Infanta Isabel and Marques de la Ensenada will soon be ready. 
Torpedo gun-boats Martin A. Pinzon, Nueva Espafia, Marques de 
Molins, and Vicente Y. Pinzon can be used, or at least are able to 
move. Provisions for two months for this fleet and the one under 
your Excellency's command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on 
private stores probably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival 
with your squadron and numerous convoy of provisions and stores 
of every kind, and torpedo-boat flotilla. 

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for 
me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are 
coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have, 
we may agree with your Excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have 
in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have 
not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor 
private, and the fastest one we have, the Santo Domingo, is in dock. 
I await your answer. 

Cervera answered this last: 

Have received your cipher telegram advising me of pitiful condi- 
tion of your naval forces. Believe no more can come from Spain, 
as none were available except Carlos V, Alfonso XIII, and a few de- 
stroyers and torpedo-boats. Pelaijo has not, I believe, her secondary 
battery installed. Possibly some of the transatlantics purchased may 
come with stores. I believe there are four; speed good. My coming 
here has been somewhat fortuitous; according to instructions I was 
to go to Puerto Rico. Do not believe convoys have been thought of at 
all, since I have always been told that I should find everything here. 
These ideas may perhaps have changed with ministerial crisis. 

Cervera now, May 22, received word from the Alicante, at 
Fort de France, Martinique: 

Marquis Comillas tells me to go to Santiago and leave coal. Cap- 
tain of destroyer advises me on part of your Excellency that hostile 
ships are stationed to capture me. Beg that you will give me instruc- 
tions. 

Cervera answered the same day: "Do not go out for the pres- 
ent." 



THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO 311 

Word came from San Juan that the English steamer Restormel 
with coal had left Cura9ao on May 21 for Santiago, "speed 7 
knots." 

The following came from Minister Aunon: 

M.ujRiD, May 23, 1898. 

I approve increase of firemen.^ Coal left San Juan for Santiago. 
There are 3,000 tons at Cienfuegos. Hostile squadron, Admiral 
Schley, left Key West for south Cuba on night 20th, and afterward 
Sampson's. It is believed [4] monitors and several cruisers watching 
Yucatan Channel. If transatlantic Alfonso XIII, armed, arrives with 
coal and provisions, you may, if desired, incorporate her in squadron. 
I notify commandant-general of navy yard. If impossible to pass 
through channels, may go roundabout way or create diversion on 
hostile coast, but not considered necessary. 

During May 23 four telegrams regarding the movements of 
the American ships came from General Blanco at Havana: 
one that twelve were off Cienfuegos, another that since 10 a. m. 
of that day almost the entire horizon was free of hostile ships, 
"only four insignificant gun-boats remaining to windward. 
The others have gone with course to windward." ^ 

The news received moved the admiral to action. He called 
a council of war on May 24 at which were present the second 
in command (Paredes), all the captains of the armored cruisers, 
the chief of staff, and the commander of the torpedo-boat division; 
the result was given in a telegram to Minister Aunon the same 
day: 

Squadron being ready to leave anchorage in search of stores it 
needs, have assembled captains of ships, who are unanimously of 
following opinion: In view maximum speed this squadron reduced 
to 14 knots, account of Vizcaya bottom fouled, lack of coal, location 
of hostile fleets, and condition of harbor, certain danger of sortie 
greater than advantages gained by reaching San Juan, only harbor 
where we could go. Proceedings drawn up signed by me. Shall 
await more favorable opportunity. Meanwhile will get all possible 
supplies, and in conjunction with commander-in-chief of army di- 
vision aid in defence of harbor and city. To supply city, necessary 
to run blockade with fast vessels 20 knots at night, after agreeing on 

* Cervera had reported necessity of shipping firemen at Santiago. 
' Cervera, Documents, 87. 



312 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

day and hour to send out of harbor pilot and keep channel clear. 
Have instructed transatlantic steamers Havana and Martinique not 
to go out because would certainly be captured. 

This decision was so momentous in every point of view, and 
had so weighty a bearing upon later events, that the telegram 
should be supplemented by the actual record of proceedings now 
given : 

The admiral acquainted the officers present with the information 
received since the preceding evening, from the governor-general of 
the island, the commandant-general of the navy yard, and her Majes- 
ty's government, to the effect that Admiral Schley's fleet had left 
Key West on the 20th instant, bound for the south of the island of 
Cuba, and that Admiral Sampson's fleet had been sighted off Cien- 
fuegos yesterday. As these forces are each far superior to this squad- 
ron, and as the truth of such information was confirmed by the fact 
that four ships remained in front of the harbor entrance all day yester- 
day, the admiral desired to hear the opinions of said officers as to 
what was best to be done by the squadron under the circumstances. 

It had been decided yesterday that the best plan Avas to start at day- 
break for San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the necessary telegrams had 
been sent to detain there the collier and the transatlantic steamer 
Alfonso XIII, which the government had, by telegraph, placed at the 
disposal of the squadron. 

Owing to the location of the hostile forces and their number and 
strength, it was unanimously considered impossible to carry out said 
plan, as the maximum speed of this squadron is calculated to be 14 
knots, which is the speed of the Vizcaya as the result of the fouled 
condition of her bottom. Taking into consideration that the ships 
had not been able to get more than one-third of their coal supply, 
that the conditions of the harbor make it necessary for the sortie to 
be effected by the ships one by one, at slow speed, which might make 
it necessary for the first ship, or ships, that go out to return, though 
only for the purpose of reconnoitring, with a consequent loss of moral 
strength, all the officers present were of opinion that the certain 
danger of the squadron was much greater than the few advantages 
which might be derived from reaching the harbor of San Juan de 
Puerto Rico, and that it was therefore necessary to abandon this plan 
and remain at Santiago, refit as far as possible from the stores to be 
had here, and take advantage of the first good opportunity for leav- 
ing the harbor, at present blockaded by superior forces. 

All the officers present were also of opinion that the present situa- 
tion of the squadron compels it to remain in this harbor.* 

* Cervera, Documents, 88. The signatures to this document appear as 
follows: Pascual Cervera, Jos^ de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Victor M. Con- 



THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO 313 

On the same day General Blanco telegraphed to Santiago: 

Oregon has reached Key West. Flying squadron proceeding to 
Santiago, where Sampson also intends to arrive to-morrow, unless 
notified of departure of Cervera's squadron. If latter does not go 
out, may be closed in. 

Also: 

Private telegrams from the United States say it is intended to close 
in squadron Santiago. Entrance should be watched to prevent car- 
rying out of this plan. 

So fully was Cervera convinced by General Blanco's telegram 
and by the presence of the Minneapolis and the auxiliary cruisers 
Harvard, Yale, and *S^. Paul that he was now blockaded, that 
he sent next day (May 25), to the minister of marine, a despair- 
ing telegram: 

We are blockaded. I qualified our coming here as disastrous for 
interests of country. Events begin to show I was right. With dis- 
parity of forces any effective operations absolutely impossible. We 
have provisions for one month.' 

The same day (May 25), already regretful of the decision of 
the day before, he wrote General Linares, the general in com- 
mand of the eastern department of the province of Santiago, 
and whose headquarters were in the city: 

Honored Sir: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of 
your two official and confidential letters on the movements of the hos- 
tile fleets, for which I thank you very much. It is much to be regret- 
ted that the squadron did not go out yesterday while it had all the 
fires lighted. But information received from the government con- 
firmed the report that Schley's fleet had started for Santiago on the 
night of the 20th and that Sampson was following with his fleet, and 
for that reason all the captains of this squadron were unanimously 
of opinion that the sortie was impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity 
of our coal, I ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out. 

cas, Fernando Villaamil, Joaquin Bustamante, Antonio Eulate, Emilio Diaz 
Moreu. Paredes was a commodore with hia pennant in the Col6n; Busta- 
mante was chief of staff. 
* Cervera, Documents, 91. 



314 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

As these ships require a number of hours to get up steam, they 
would not be ready before night, and that would be too late, especially 
in view of the rapid consumption of coal. For these reasons there is 
no other course open at present but to take up positions, as we agreed 
yesterday, to defend the harbor and city in case an attempt should 
be made to force the entrance. The Colon is already at her post and 
the Teresa will be there shortly, the others will not be there until to- 
night or to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If 
another opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and take advantage 
of it, but as I cannot hope with these scant forces to attempt any 
definite operations, it will only be a matter of changing this harbor 
for another where we would also be blockaded. 

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this harbor, which 
is so short of everything we need, and I had chosen it in preference 
because, not having been blockaded, I supposed it to be well supplied 
with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Although I always 
thought that it would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could 
keep the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the only 
effective service that can be expected of this small and poorly equipped 
squadron. I beg that you will transmit these explanations to his Ex- 
cellency the captain-general, as the highest representative of the na- 
tion in this island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent 
inaction. 

The disposition of the ships, referred to by Cervera, was to 
moor the Colon in Gaspar Bay, three-quarters of a mile within 
the entrance and broadside to it, with lines running from the 
stern to trees on the east bank. She could thus haul herself 
into a position commanding a full view seaward. Another 
three-quarters of a mile north of the Colon, off Cojimas Bay, 
was the Vizcaya. Still another mile within, south of Cay Ra- 
tones, were the Maria Teresa and Oquendo. The partially dis- 
armed Reina Mercedes, some of whose guns had gone to re-en- 
force the batteries, was in the narrow passage between Puntilla 
and Cay Smith. 

The succeeding day, May 26, the same day on the evening of 
which Commodore Schley arrived some twenty-two miles south 
of Santiago and started for Key West, Cervera held a second 
council and there was a second change of mind, in which it 
was unanimously decided to leave for San Juan, Puerto Rico, 
and orders were given to spread fires and be ready at 5 o'clock 
p. M. But at 2 o'clock the semaphore signalled the presence of 



THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO 315 

three hostile ships^ and doubt again came over his soul. The 
officers were again convened, with, as Cervera reported, the fol- 
lowing results: 

Doubts as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the going 
out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the meeting 
m the morning. To settle this question Pilot IMiguel was called, 
who had piloted the flag-ship in, and who, in the opinion of the cap- 
tain of the harbor, is the most intelligent of the pilots (with the ex- 
ception of the chief pilot, who is ill). Miguel stated that with the 
weather prevailing there would be no trouble whatever about taking 
out the Teresa, Vizcaya, and Oquendo, any time, day or night, their 
draft being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, but that the going out of the 
Colon, whose draft is 24.9 feet, might present difficulties on account 
of a flat rock in the water off Point Morrillo, where the water is only 
21\ English feet deep. 

The pilot was sent to the harbor entrance to form a more exact opin- 
ion on the state of the sea, and returned, saying that he thought it very 
probable that, owing to the swell, the Colon might touch bottom on 
the flat rock referred to. Under these circumstances the admiral 
propounded the following question, on the assumption that the whole 
squadron should go out together, leaving only the torpedo-boat de- 
stroyers in the harbor: Is it expedient to risk the Colon being injured, 
or should the sortie not be effected, awaiting more favorable circum- 
stances ? 

The question being put in this form. Captains Concas and Busta- 
mante were in favor of the sortie, for reasons hereinafter set forth, and 
all the other officers were in favor of not going out, with the exception 
of the admiral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions the 
foregoing proceedings were dra-w-n up. 

Jose de Paredes. 

Antonio Eulate. 

Juan B. Lazaga. 

Emilio Diaz Moreu. 

Fernando Villaamil.^ 

Captains Bustamante and Concas, as Cervera mentions, were 
of sounder opinion. Both dissented from the proceeding, Busta- 
mante expressing himself as follows: 

My reasons for expressing the opinion that the squadron should go 
out immediately, in spite of the statement of Pilot Miguel, are as fol- 

* The three scouts, Minneapolis, Yale, and St. Paul. 

* Cervera, Documents, 95, 96. 



316 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

lows: My impression on the probable situation of the hostile squad- 
rons is the same as that formulated by the admiral. To-day we are 
certain that they are not off this harbor; they are almost sure to be 
there to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe well founded, I 
reason as follows: Our squadron, blockaded by far superior forces, 
has very little prospect of going out united by forcing the blockade. 
For each ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practicable 
in my opinion and would expose us to the loss of one or more ships. 

To go out openly and accept battle seems to me almost inhuman, 
because our defeat would be certain, and unwise, because it would be 
preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems 
to me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city when, in a 
month from now or little more, we shall find ourselves without provi- 
sions, since we are completely cut off by land and sea. This last solu- 
tion is to my mind even more inadmissible than any of the former. 

This is, in my opinion, the situation of the squadron at the present 
time, and in view of its terrible gravity, I am in favor of saving three 
of the ships, even at the risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe 
such loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of safety, 
and so do hydrographers. The Colon's draft, according to her cap- 
tain, is 7.60 metres, that is to say, 24.93 English feet. The rock, ac- 
cording to the pilot, has 27.50 feet of water and is of very little extent 
(he says considerably less than the width of the admiral's cabin). 
Hence there would be a margin of 2^ English feet, and the swell did 
not seem excessive to me this morning, when I was at the mouth of 
the harbor and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. More- 
over, the Colon might pass over the rock without being struck by any 
sea, and even if she should be struck it would not be at all certain that 
the resulting injury would disable her from continuing the voyage. 

Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, I believe it 
preferable for the Colon (which, in my mind, should be the last to go 
out) to remain disabled at the harbor entrance than for us to await 
what I fear is in store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope 
that I may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, and I can 
not hold it back. Joaquin Bustamante. 

Captain Concas concurred entirely with Captain Bustamante, 
but the admiral sided with the more apprehensive of his officers 
and made the following endorsement of the proceedings: 

I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to make it neces- 
sary to risk the loss of the Colon at the rock where the Gerona, of less 
draft than the former, lost part of her false keel, and in hopes that 
the sea will calm dowTi and that another opportunity will present 
itself the sortie is deferred. 



THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO 317 

His decision was fatal. After May 28 no further opportunity 
occurred. 

It is one of the curiosities of history that the appearance of 
the three scouts which brought trepidation, should have been 
followed so quickly by the disappearance of all three to the 
southward in pursuit of the smoke of Commodore Schley's 
squadron, which had been sighted by them at the very hour, 5 
p. M., which, in the afternoon, had been set by Cervera as that 
at which to be ready for leaving port. Had he gone, as intended, 
he could have only regarded their sudden disappearance as provi- 
dential, leaving the way absolutely clear for him to proceed with- 
out hindrance or even detection. His ships would probably, 
with the delays incident in such cases, not have cleared the port 
before 6 p. m., an hour which in that latitude and on that day 
was within thirty-four minutes of sunset. The rapid fall of the 
tropic night would have covered his direction; there was, long 
before 6 o'clock, no ship of the hostile force in sight, the three set 
to watch for him being by that hour twenty-two miles away 
with the flying squadron, which was about turning for Key 
West. It was not until two days later (May 28) that it headed 
for Santiago and next morning looked into the harbor entrance. 
Before this time Cervera would have been in San Juan. 

Had Cervera's leaving been unobserved and his destination 
not been revealed from Havana, there could have been no move- 
ment toward San Juan until his arrival there had been generally 
noised abroad, as no doubt it would have been. Even had his 
departure from Santiago been at once made known next day 
through the Havana telegraph office, Sampson, on his way to 
Key West with the intention of coaling and going to Santiago, 
could not have known it until his arrival there on the 28th. He 
then would have had available but the Neiv York and Oregoji as 
the only two heavy ships, and but one cruiser, the New Orleans^ 
and a few slight auxiliaries, which could have maintained any 
considerable speed. Under the best of circumstances, even with 
this moderate force, he could not have been off San Juan before 
May 31. 

The chances of Cervera's escape were thus fair; the order to 
return to Spain, which failed to reach him at Martinique, would 



318 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

no doubt have been repeated at San Juan, and had he coaled 
quickly and sailed, the American fleet would have had to look 
for him on the Spanish coast. 

We can see now, however, that such expedition was not part 
of the temperamental equipment of the officers in command, and 
the chances are very large that however great the delay of the 
American fleet, it would have found the enemy still at San Juan 
and it would have been attacked in harbor instead of, as happened 
later, at sea. War has seldom furnished a more extraordinary 
incident than the situation which might have been produced 
and which was so happily escaped through the vacillation of 
Cervera and his officers. 

The Junta for land and sea defence of the city was composed 
of General of Division Jose Toral, the military governor of the 
city; Captain Pelayo Pedemonte, of the navy; Colonel Florencio 
Caula, of the engineers of the army; Lieutenant-Colonel Luis 
Melgar, the chief of artillery, and Lieutenant Jos^ Muller y 
Tejeiro, of the navy, temporary chief of submarine defences. 

It was unanimously held that the only defence to be relied 
upon against sea attack was torpedoes, and as early as April 2, 
preparations for laying them were begun. The torpedo firing 
stations were removed from the Morro and the Estrella and Cata- 
lina batteries and were placed in better-sheltered positions on 
the bay. On April 14 the work of laying torpedoes was turned 
over to Lieutenant Mauricio Aranco, the commander of the small 
gun-boat Alvarado. The first row of seven, with firing stations 
at Estrella Point and Socapa, were finished April 21, and the 
second, of six, with stations at Socapa and Cay Smith, on April 
27. A commission of three officers went to Guantdnamo April 
21 to select locations to be mined, and on April 23 the gun-boat 
Sandoval was sent to lay them, remaining there for the rest of 
the war. 

The only available material for batteries was the armament 
of the Reina Mercedes (lying in the harbor with machinery in 
such disrepair as to be helpless), a small number of modern guns 
of light calibre, and some thirty-four guns of ancient pattern, ten 
of which were muzzle-loading howitzers; the others were muzzle- 
loading eighteenth-century bronze guns rifled with three grooves 



THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO 319 

and of very little efficiency. Six of the howitzers had been re- 
ceived about April 18 from Havana, at which time, so impossible 
was it to prevent the American press from giving out information, 
also came word of Sampson's fitting the Mangrove for cutting 
the Santiago cables. 

About 210 yards east of the Morro was the light-house on the 
vertical cliff some 200 feet high, which continues thus without 
a break for the three miles to the Aguadores. A hundred yards 
east of this was built a new battery in which were placed, by 
May 28, five of the 6.3-inch muzzle-loading rifled bronze guns 
and two 8-inch muzzle-loading howitzers. The parapet con- 
sisted of wooden boxes filled with cement, on top of which bar- 
rels, also filled with cement, were placed. The distance between 
the guns was twenty feet and the spaces between partially filled 
with cement and sand. Thirty feet back of the battery was a 
trench five feet deep and two wide parallel with the front of 
the battery. From this trench small zig-zag trenches led to the 
guns, which made them a most difficult mark for ships. A near 
approach only increased this difficulty, as the edge of the lofty 
cliff became itself a protection. Four hundred and fifty men 
were stationed here as a support. 

On the Socapa, about 430 yards from the Morro, on the west 
side of the entrance was a battery of three 8-inch muzzle-load- 
ing howitzers and two 16-centimetre (16.3-inch) Hontoria guns, 
with 1-inch shields, taken from the Reina Mercedes, all of which 
were in position and ready to fire by May 28. The guns were 
separated from the howitzers by a wide traverse. About twenty 
yards back of the guns was the ammunition magazine, a tin- 
covered building. East of this battery, and lower down the hill, 
was another, intended for the defence of the submarine mines, 
composed of one 57-millimetre gun, four 37-millimetre Hotchkiss 
guns, and one 11-millimetre machine-gun. All the guns on the 
Socapa were manned by men taken from the Rcina Mercedes, 
under command of officers of the ship. A supporting force of 
400 men was entrenched near by. 

A battery was begun on Punta Gorda, a mile within the en- 
trance, where were later to be mounted two 6.3-inch guns 
from the Reina Mercedes, two 6-inch breech-loading howitzers, 



320 THE SPANISH-AIVIERICAN WAR 

and two 3.5-inch Krupp guns. As everything had to be done, 
from building a pier to land the guns and a road carried to the 
top of the hill where they were to be placed, the first of the 
6.3-inch was not mounted until June 3, and the second not until 
June 17. The remainder of the available guns were mounted 
later at various interior points in the neighborhood of the city.^ 

' These guns were as follows: 
June 12. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun and two short 8-cm. rifled bronze 
guns at Fort San Antonio. 
One short r2-cm. rifled bronze gun at Santa Ines. 
June 1.3. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun and one short 12-cm. rifled bronze 

gun at the road from El Caney. 
June 14. One 16-cm. rifled bronze, one short 12-cm. rifled bronze, and two 

short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at El Sueno. 
June 16. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun and two short 8-cm. rifled bronze 

guns at St. Ursula. 
June 17. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun at Canadas. 
June 25. One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Homo. 
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Nuevo. 
After the battle of July 1 were mounted : 

Two long 12-cm. bronze guns at Santa Ursula. 
Two of the same at road from El Caney. 

One long 8-cm. bronze gun (old) at Santa Ines (the breech-piece was 
mi.ssing). 
General Escario's column brought two 8-cm. (3.15-inch) guns, but they 
were never fired. 



CHAPTER XIII 

SAMPSON LEAVES FOR SANTIAGO; SCHLEY BEGINS 
BLOCKADE 

It is necessary to return to affairs as seen by the commander- 
in-chief, who, as mentioned, had reached Key West at 2 a. m,, 
May 28, with the intention of proceeding himself to Santiago, 
should the outlook not improve. On arriving he received copies 
of telegrams which had passed between the navy department 
and Commodore Remey on May 26, as follows: 

Telegram of May 24 from Schley conveys no information. What 
vessel brought it ? What vessel took orders from Sampson to Schley • 
on night of May 20, or morning of May 21, directing him to proceed 
Santiago de Cuba? Direct commander of vessel that brought tele- 
gram just received to report intentions of Schley so far as known, 
stating definitely whether Schley had gone to Santiago de Cuba or 
intended to go there, and when. 

To which Commodore Remey replied: 

Vessel referred to is Dupont in both cases. The commander was 
not informed of the intentions of Schley. From a letter of Schley of 
May 24 I am informed that Schley would proceed from Cienfuegos 
to Santiago de Cuba on May 25. He would not be able to remain 
off that port, on account of general short coal supply. Would pro- 
ceed to vicinity of [St. Nicolas] Mole, Hayti, to coal in smooth water 
and communicate. 

On receiving these Admiral Sampson sent a telegram answering 
the inquiry more explicitly: 

Orders to go Santiago if satisfied Spanish squadron was not in 
port, were sent in Marhlehead, and duplicate, with explanatory memo- 
randum later on 21st by Ilatvk, to make sure of early arrival; copies 
of these despatches are forwarded by mail. Schley, not being satis- 

321 



322 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

fied that Spanish squadron was not in port, did not go. The de- 
partment has his despatch dated INIay 24, sent through Remey, stat- 
ing his intention of leaving May 25. I do not understand this delay 
until next day. Cipher message will follow. 

At 8 A. M. came the following: 

If the Spanish division is proved to be in Santiago de Cuba, it is 
the intention of the department to make descent immediately upon 
that port with 10,000 men, United States troops, landing eight nautical 
miles east of that port. You will be expected to convoy transports, 
probably 15 or 20, going in person and taking with you the Neio York 
and Indiana and the Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good 
batteries as can possibly be gathered, to guard against possible at- 
tack by Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers, etc. The blockade oflF Ha- 
vana will be sufficiently provided for during the movement with the 
monitors and some small vessels. After arrival off Santiago de Cuba 
every small vessel that can be spared will be returned to north coast 
of Cuba. This early notice enables you to prepare details at once 
for immediate execution when order is issued. At the request of the 
war department, and by approval of this department, movement will 
be on the north side of Cuba, and Windward Passage. 

At 4 P. M. Sampson sent the cipher message which he had men- 
tioned in his previous telegram: 

I received yesterday, ]\Iay 27, at 2 p. m., a copy of a despatch from 
Schley dated May 24 to department, reporting his movements. I 
despatched immediately the New Orleans to convoy collier Sterling 
through Bahama Channel and then, leaving collier, go with all despatch 
to Santiago with orders to Schley to blockade Spanish squadron at 
all hazards and take every action necessary to prevent their egress. 
Shall send immediately another collier. Have advised Schley to use 
Spanish-American Company's property as coaling station. Not- 
withstanding apparent uncertainty of Schley's movements, I believed 
Spanish squadron still in port, and I came here immediately to be in 
better communication, and telegraphed Schley to St. Nicolas Mole 
same orders conveyed by New Orleans, hoping to reach him earlier. 
He undoubtedly has sufficient coal aboard ship to still keep the sea 
some time, as all except lorca left here full. JNIy orders to Schley by 
New Orleans included sinking of the Sterling ' collier across the en- 
trance to Santiago. The channel is but 300 feet broad, and if this 
be properly done the port will be closed until steamer is raised. The 
details of the operation were left to Schley, with verbal explanation, 

* Should be Merrimac. 



BEGINNING OF SANTIAGO BLOCKADE 323 

through Captain Folger, of my own views. It is for this reason addi- 
tional coal has been sent. The importance of absolutely preventing 
the escape of the Spanish squadron is so paramount that the promptest 
and most efhcient use of every means is demanded. 

At midnight, May 28-29, came from the navy department 
the following: 

Schley telegraphs from Santiago de Cuba he goes to Key West 
with his squadron for coal, though he has 4,000 tons of coal with him 
in a broken-down collier. How soon after arrival of Schley at Key 
West could you reach Santiago de Cuba with the New York and the 
Oregon, the Indiana, and some lighter vessels, and how long could 
you blockade there, sending your vessels singly to coal from our col- 
liers at Gonaives, Hayti; Channel; Mole, Hayti; Nipe Port, Cuba, or 
elsewhere? There is one collier en route to Mole, Hayti, from Nor- 
folk and another one has been ordered there from Key West, and 
others will be sent immediately. Consider if you could seize Guantd- 
namo and occupy as coaling station. Schley has not ascertained 
whether Spanish division is at Santiago. All information here seems 
to show that it is there. 

It took some time to decipher the telegram, but as soon as 
its contents w^ere known there was no hesitancy in Sampson's 
action, and at 3 a. m. (Sunday, May 29) he telegraphed the navy 
department: 

Answering first question, three days. I can blockade indefinitely. 
Think that can occupy Guantanamo. Would like to start at once 
with the New York and Oregon, arriving in two days. Do not quite 
understand as to the necessity of waiting the arrival of Schley, but 
would propose meeting and turning back the princii)al part of the 
force under his command if he has left. Try to hold him by tele- 
graph. Watson will be in charge of everything afloat. Does depart- 
ment approve proposed action ? 

Nine hours passed without reply and at noon a second tele- 
gram pressing for a reply was sent: 

Referring to my telegram of this date I urge immediate reply to 
my last paragraph. Failure of Schley to continue blockade must be 
remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of 
Spanish squadron at Santiago. 



324 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

Two hours later was received a despatch from Commodore 
Schley, carried from the Brooklyn, May 28, by the Yale to Port 
Antonio, Jamaica, of more cheerful import than the preceding; 
a telegram came also from the navy department containing the 
substance of this: 

Collier now having been temporarily repaired and able to make 
six knots or seven will endeavor to coal Texas and Marblehead in 
open sea and hold position off Santiago until coal supply of larger 
ships is reduced to lowest safe limit. Will then go to Gonaives or 
coast near or in vicinity of Port-au-Prince to coal. Good oppor- 
tunity occurring yesterday, took a quantity of coal on board of Texas 
and Marblehead about twenty-five miles west of Santiago, which en- 
ables me to hold that place until coal is reduced so much as to force 
me over to Hayti coast to replenish. Two more colliers, well fitted, to 
report at Gonaives, urgently needed to hastily coal all vessels when 
chances occur. Need also another auxiliary for picket work and for 
communication. I send Yale and Minneapolis Key West. St. Paul 
still off Santiago. Repairs to Merrimac's machinery being completed 
on board flag-ship. Sigsbee on 27th captured British collier bound in 
with coal evidently for fleet; also had touched previously at San Juan 
and Cura9ao. 

Sampson immediately telegraphed the navy department: 

Telegram just received from Schley shows he is to-day blockading 
off Santiago de Cuba and will continue to do so until coal supply has 
been reduced to safe limit for large ships. Yesterday Auxiliary No. 
557 {St. Paul) captured collier bound to Santiago de Cuba, cargo of 
coal. The Indiana and the Minneapolis and Auxiliary No. 591 will 
arrive at Key West for coal. The Neio York is ready to start to San- 
tiago as soon as authorized to do so by the department. 

Sampson also sent the following to both Port Antonio and 
St. Nicolas Mole, Hayti, in order to surely reach Commodore 
Schley at the earliest opportunity: 

Congratulate you on success. Maintain close blockade at all 
hazards, especially at night; very little to fear from torjjedo-boat 
destroyers. Coal in open sea whenever conditions permit. Send a 
ship to examine Guantanamo with view to occupying it as base, coal- 
ing one heavy ship at a time. Appraise captured coal, use it if de- 
sired, and afterward send ship in as prize. 



BEGINNING OF SANTIAGO BLOCKADE 325 

At 5 p. M. (still May 29), the authority to go to Santiago ar- 
rived : 

Your telegram May 29 received. Department thinks it very de- 
sirable that you carry out recommendations to go yourself with two 
ships to Santiago de Cuba. Act at your discretion with the object 
of blockading Spanish division as soon as possible. Goodrich re- 
ports Guantanamo, Cuba, very weak. The seizure immediately is 
recommended. *S^. Paul is now off Santiago de Cuba and Yankee 
starts to-day and St. Louis to-morrow afternoon from New York 
for Santiago, touching St. Nicolas Mole. 

At 11 P. M., May 29, the New York left for the squadron east 
of Havana, arriving at 7 a. m.. May 30. At 9.07, after confer- 
ring with Commodore Watson, who was now left in command 
on the north side of Cuba, signal was made to the Oregon, 
Mayflower, Commander McKenzie, and the torpedo-boat Porter, 
Lieutenant Fremont, to form column, and the squadron of four 
ships stood eastward for Santiago, 550 miles distant. The flag- 
ship signalled the Orecjon, "Can you keep up thirteen knots?" 
to which Captain Clark answered, " Yes, fourteen if you wish." 
As, however, the former speed would bring the ships sufficiently 
early in the morning off Santiago, it w^as maintained. At 1.30 
P. M. the armed tug Osceola, convoying the merchant steamer 
Florida under the war department, was met, standing west after 
having, as mentioned, successfully landed without incident a 
body of Cubans with stores and arms for General Gomez at 
Port Banes. 

At 7 P. M. the Yale and St. Paul were also met, en route for 
Key West for coal, and their captains ordered aboard the flag- 
ship to report as to the situation at Santiago. Captain Sigsbee 
had left Santiago at 10.30 A. m.. May 29, for St. Nicolas Mole, 
carrying, as mentioned, a despatch from Schley to navy depart- 
ment and to Sampson, which was sent at 7 P. m. the same day. 
This telegram was as follows: 

Off Santiago de Cuba, 10 A. m., May 29. 

Enemy in port; recognized Cristobal Colon and Infanta Maria 
Teresa and two torpedo-boats moored inside Morro behind point. 
Doubtless the others are here. We are short of coal, using every effort 



326 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

to get coal in. Vixen blew out manhole gasket ; have sent boilermaker 
on board to repair. Collier's repaired machinery being put together. 
Have about 3,000 tons of coal in collier but not easy to get on board 
here. If no engagement in next two or three days Sampson's squad- 
ron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity of Port-au- 
Prince. Hasten me despatch-boats for picket work. Brooklyn, Iowa, 
Massachxisetts, Texas, Marhlehead, Vixen, and colliers compose 
squadron here. [Following additional sentence to department.] 
Am sending St. Paul to communicate with Sampson.* 

Captain Sigsbee had deciphered and left for the next arriving 
ship the following telegrams from the navy department to Com- 
modore Schley: 

Received at St. Nicolas Mole, May 27. 

The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether 
the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba harbor, as if so immediate 
movement against it and the town will be made by the navy and 
division of about 10,000 men the American troops which are ready to 
embark. You must surmount difficulty regarding coaling by your 
ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time J the depart- 
ment relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence 
of Cervera ... to be ready for concerted action with the army. 
Two colliers have been ordered INIole, Hayti. Your vessels may coal 
singly there or in Gonaives, Hayti Channel, or leeward Cape Cruz, 
Cuba. Sampson coming around by Windward Passage. Orders 
have been issued to the commander of the Yankee |.?] to report to 
you and the Minneapolis will go north. Cervera must not be allowed 
to escape. 

Received at Nicolas Mole, May 29. 

It is your duty to ascertain immediately the Spanish fleet if they 
be at Santiago de Cuba and report. Would be discreditable to the 
navy if that fact was not ascertained immediately. All naval and 
military movements depend on that point.* 

At 5 P. M. the next afternoon (May 31) the torpedo-boat 
Porter was sent into Nicolas Mole with a despatch from Sampson 
to the navy department: 

• Court of Inquiry, II, 1371. 

^ These two telegrams were also sent to Port Antonio, Jamaica. The 
former as translated both aboard the St. Paul and the Brooklyn differ some- 
what in phraseology from the original (Appen. Rep. Bu. of Nav. 1898, 397), 
but there is no important change of sense. It was received by Commodore 
Schley by the press boat Dandy on May 31; the eecond by tug Triton on 
June 1. 



BEGINNING OF SANTIAGO BLOCKADE 327 

Shall arrive Santiago 4 a. m., June 1, with New York, Oregon, 
Mayflower, and Porter. Last night met St. Paul and Yale. Ordered 
St. Paul to New York and Yale to Hampton Roads for coal. Please 
have preparations made for coaling immediately.' Will telegraph 
situation at Santiago on arrival. 

Returning to Commodore Schley's squadron : This, as already 
has been seen, was, during the morning and forenoon of May 
27, "laying to, waiting for [the] Yale to get collier Merrimac in 
tow." ^ At noon the St. Paul was signalled, "Remain where 
you are two or three days," and the following conversation by 
signal ensued: 

St. Paw7.— Then where? 

Brooklyn.. — Follow instructions of department. 
St. Paul. — Instructions come meet you here. 

Brooklyn. — ^When coal supply remaining suffices reach Eey West 
proceed there^ 

The St. Paid, ordered at 1.35 to overhaul a strange vessel, 
reported her at 3.15 as a press boat which had left Key W'est 
Monday, May 23, and as going to Jamaica for coal. The im- 
portant but inaccurate information was added: "Sampson had 
sailed. Boat had missed him in heavy weather." It was, how- 
ever, evidently'taken as meaning that he was probably on his 
way to Santiago, as twenty minutes later (3.35 p. m.), having 
just before signalled, "Form column in natural order. Course 
west," the Brooklyn signalled the *S^. Paul, " If Sampson comes 
here tell him^half the squadron out of coal and collier's engine 
broken down." 

The information that Sampson was on his way very naturally 
may have had influence in the decision, shortly reached, to turn 
for Santiago. After standing west at 7 knots for several hours 
(the Merrimac now using her own engines), the Brooklyn, at 
7 o'clock, signalled the Texas: "If collier is cast oflF do you think 
you could coal to-night?" The Texas said: "W^e can try." 

* The destination of these ships was changed to New York by Admiral 
Sampson on account of the large depletion of the coal supply at Key West 
which their coa" ng there would occasion. 

' Brooklyn's log. Court of Inquiry, 2, App. 216. 



328 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The same inquiry of the Marblchead at 7.05 brought the reply: 
"Yes, if colHer stops." The signal was then made by the flag- 
ship at 7.10: "Stop." 

At 8.05 the next morning, May 28, the Texas by this time need- 
ing but 175 tons to fill up, the Brooklyn signalled the Minneapolis: 
*' We are going to hold on here as long as coal lasts. Proceed to 
Key West and coal." Signal was made at 11.35: "Fleet will 
rendezvous in case of separation or disaster at . . . latitude 
19° 24' N., longitude 73° 04' W." (Gonaives Bay, Hayti), and at 
1.20 P. M., "Course E. ^ N. Speed 6 knots." The squadron, 
at the moment 37 miles west of the harbor entrance, turned tow- 
ard Santiago, and at 2 p. m. was informed: "No news. Have 
requested more coal sent Gonaives Bay. Will try to remain 
off Santiago as long as coal holds out, leaving safe allowance to 
reach coast of Hayti," and "W'hile off Santiago the general 
meeting-place will be twenty-five miles south of that place." 

At 8 P. M. the squadron was stopped ten miles south of Santi- 
ago's entrance^ and the Marblehead sent inshore as a vidette. 

At 5.50 the next morning, May 29, the Massachusetts sig- 
nalled: "A vessel inside of harbor looks like a man-of-war." 
The St. Paul, which, cruising off Santiago, had been led away 
by frequent chases of strange steamers which turned out to be 
press boats, had stood in again the morning of the 29th and in 
passing the entrance at 8 A. m., standing west, also sighted and 
reported "in the entrance, apparently coming out, two men-of- 
war resembling armored cruisers with flags at each mast-head, 
also two smaller vessels." 

There could no longer be any question in the mind of any one 
present as to the whereabouts of the Spanish squadron. The 
ship nearest the entrance was clearly the Cristobal Colon, her 
single mast differentiating her from all her consorts, and the 
neighboring ship, one of her armored companions.^ 

' Position on official chart. 

= The following extract from the log of the Coldn describes her position: 
" Shifted anchorage in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba on the morning of 
May 25, 1898; draft forward 7 m. 50, aft 6 m. 45. At 6 engines ready and, 
with the pilot on board, weighed anchor, which was soon catted; cast to port. 
Under direction of the commanding officer passed between Ratones Cay and 
Julias Point and proceeded in the channel to a point to the northward of 



BEGINNING OF SANTIAGO BLOCKADE 329 

At 8.30 commanding oflScers were called aboard the flag-ship 
and a consultation was held, Commodore Schley explaining that 
in case the ships came out he wished to concentrate the batteries 
of all the ships on a portion of those of the enemy/ 

The forenoon passed with the squadron moving slowly east 
and west in face of the harbor at a distance of about six miles,^ 
but at 11.50 it steamed toward the Merrimac, from which the 
Massachusetts and Vixen coaled during the day, leaving the 
Marhlehead off the entrance of the port on patrol. The St. 
Paul had left at 10 a. m. for Key West,^ with a telegram to be 
sent from Mole St. Nicolas to the navy department and to Ad- 
miral Sampson, announcing the discovery of the enemy in port 
and the recognition of the Cristobal Coldn, the Maria Teresa, and 
a torpedo-boat. 

At 6 P. M., after having laid to during the afternoon and send- 
ing the Merrimac some fifteen miles to the southward for the 

Smith Cay and at mouth of Gaspar Bay, where we anchored at 7 a. m. in 20 m. 
of water with the port anchor, mud bottom. At this time the vessels {Yale 
and St. Paul] of the enemy were discovered off the mouth of the harbor; 
Morro made signal to begin firing; orders were given to man the main battery; 
but in a short time it was seen that it would be obstructed, as an English 
steamer [the Restormel] was about to enter the harbor. Got out stream cable 
from port quarter to the south beach of the bay (Gaspar) and veered and 
hauled chain until another was gotten from starboard to the opposite shore 
and then secured both. Head S. 57° W. with 75 fathoms of chain outside 
and moored on the following bearings: — Gorda Point, N. 19° W.; Cuaren- 
tina Point, Smith Cay, S. 48° E.; and Morro Point, S. 5° E. 8.40 a. m. to 
noon got out a second mooring to starboard and made fast until we had 
secured the buoy on the same quarter which had been placed as a mark. 
Got out steel hawser on starboard side, and sent crew to breakfast." 

Admiral Sigsbee has explained why the Col6?i was not observed by any of 
the scouts, although, as he stated, " during the day of the 26th [of May] I 
went in four miles, or perhaps a little less, from the harbor." Answering the 
question, "Can you account for how it was that you did not see her on that 
day?" he replied: "I think she warped ahead afterward [i.e., after mooring]. 
I have no doubt that she was lying in that entrance on this day, but unless 
she warped into sight I could not have seen her in there. There is plenty of 
room for her there. You will see that the log shows that she did shift her 
fasts — did shorten them in at different times." {Court of Inquiry, I, 422.) 

* Log of Marhlehead, May 29, 1898. ^ Log of Brooklyn. 

^ The St. Paul, Yale, and Minneapolis were necessarily obliged to coal 
elsewhere than with the squadron on account of the large quantities (3,G00 
tons each, the Minneapolis 1,900) required to fill them; nor was their presence 
longer of moment, as the two first were not in the category of fighting ships; 
nor was the third suitable to be pitted against armored vessels. 



330 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

night/ column was formed and the squadron, at "speed as slow 
as possible"^ and at double distance, stood back and forth 
on east and west courses of five miles each across the harbor 
entrance, the Marhlehead and Vixen being closer inshore as 
videttes. At 8.53 the Vixen, sighting a rapidly moving white 
light east of the entrance, showed a signal of alarm for a tor- 
pedo-boat, and shots were fired from the secondary batteries 
of several of the ships before it was concluded by die captain 
of the Marhlehead that the light was from a locomotive of the 
mineral railway bordering the shore from Aguadores to Siboney 
and at 11, reported the alarm a mistake. 

At 9.30 A. M., IMay 30, H. B. M. ship Indefatigable arrived from 
Jamaica, and though authority was asked and granted to enter 
the port, she left for Jamaica again at 10.30 without availing 
herself of the permission. The New Orleans, with the despatch 
previously mentioned, regarding the use of the Merrimac in 
closing the entrance, with the collier Sterling and tug Triton, 
arrived at 1.30. 

The day and the following night were without event. The 
weather, of a character typical of that which in general was 
experienced for a month to come, and the situation, are de- 
scribed in the terse history of the log as " Cloudy and pleasant. 
Light breeze from S. E. and light airs from north. Sea smooth. 
Bright moonlight until 1.30 when the moon set behind the clouds. 
Squadron in column double distance. Steaming over a course 
east and west five miles in length and about six miles south of 
Santiago. The Vixe7i and Marhlehead inshore and the Merri- 
mac and Sterling ofi'shore from the squadron. Average revo- 
lutions 18."^ 

At 6.25 in the morning of May 31 the Harvard arrived from 
Kingston, Jamaica, with telegrams from Washington of May 28, 
29, and 30. 

May 28: Following must be delivered to Schley as soon as possi- 
ble; utmost urgency. Unless it is unsafe for your squadron depart- 

' From this time onward the ships were coaled regularly off Santiago from 
colliers, until after the occupancy of Guantdnamo; it then became more con- 
venient to send most of them there. ^ Brooklyn's signal record. 

' Brooklyn's log, midnight to 4 a. m., May 31, 1898. 



BEGINNING OF SANTIAGO BLOCKADE 331 

merit wishes you to remain off Santiago, so can not you take possession 
of Guantdnamo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave, 
are authorized to sink collier in the mouth of the harbor if you can 
obstruct thereby, but if not so used and not necessary to you, it would 
be desirable to leave her Nicolas Mole or vicinity. You must not 
leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe your squad- 
ron, or unless Spanish division is not there. 

May 29: Deliver Schley following: Where are the other two 
armored cruisers, Spanish fleet? When discovered please report 
promptly. Commander-in-chief North Atlantic station has started 
to join you. 

May 29: Return to Schley with this message: Hold on at all hazards. 
New York, Oregon, and New Orleans are on the way. St. Louis and 
Yankee just leaving New York for Santiago, via Nicolas Mole. Two 
more colliers en route. Torpedo-boat destroyer at San Juan said to 
be damaged. 

May 30: Deliver following to Schley: Sagua, twenty-five miles east 
Santiago, is reported a good place for landing, and that the insur- 
gents have entire possession of this vicinity, and some horses of their 
cavalry are kept about a mile inland. From thence it has been re- 
ported easy to reach the heights in the rear of Santiago, commanding 
view of the whole harbor, without any probability of meeting with 
the Spanish forces. For miles the road is mountainous, and after 
this very fair. 

At 9.55 A. M. Commodore Schley, having determined the pre- 
vious afternoon to attack the Colon, which was still at anchor in 
sight, went wdth his personal staff aboard the Vixen and at 10.30 
hoisted his broad pennant in the Massachusetts. At 11.10 sig- 
nal was made: 

The Massachusetts, New Orleans, and Iowa will go in after dinner 
to a distance of 7,000 yards and fire at the Cristobal Colon with 8, 
12, and 13 inch guns. Speed about 10 knots. 

At 1.25, the Massachusetts, followed at double distance (800 
yards) by the New Orleans and Iowa, stood in, heading about 
east by north, at 10 knots. The Massachusetts began firing when 
the Coldn came into view at 1.50, followed by the New Orleans 
at 1.51 and the Iowa at 1.56. At 2.05 the Massachusetts turned 
with port helm and standing west reopened at 2.10, hauling off 



332 THE SPANISH-A^IERICAN WAR 

at 2.13. At 2.30 the commodore left the Massachusetts, went 
aboard the Vixen, and returned to the Brooklyn. 

The Harvard was sent the same evening to Nicolas Mole 
with the following: 

Made reconnaissance this afternoon. May 31, with the Massa- 
chusetts, Iowa, New Orleans, to develop fortifications, with their 
character. The range was 7000 yards. Reconnaissance was in- 
tended [to] principally injure [or] destroy Colon. Fire was returned 
without delay by heavy batteries to the east and west [of] entrance, 
large calibre and long range. Reconnaissance developed satisfac- 
torily the presence of Spanish squadron lying beyond island, near in- 
ner forts, as they fired over the hill at random. Quite satisfied the 
Spanish fleet is there. I shall send pilot to-morrow morning in Vixen 
to ascertain fully and I shall report. 

In great need of smaller vessels for picket duty. I would suggest 
that it is most important to send with collier a large number of coal- 
ing bags holding about 600 pounds, as all coaling must be done in 
such a manner. Can you send Solace here in order to give relief to 
exhausted and injured in any operation ? Owing to extreme heat the 
suffering of all hands is great particularly [in the] engineer's depart- 
ment. We are coaling squadron in face of the enemy every good 
day. United States ships were not struck this afternoon. ^ 

* The logs of the three ships engaged are as follows: Meridian to 4 p. m., 
May 31, 1898: 

Massachusetts: Cloudy weather. Light southerly airs. At 1.30 this ship 
with the New Orleans and Iowa steamed in to 8,000 yards and at ten knots speed 
heading eastward opened fire with the 13-inch and 8-inch guns on the Cristdhal 
Coldn (the New Orleans on the batteries), countermarching to the westward at 
2.05 and engaging with the starboard battery at 2.10 as we passed the en- 
trance, hauling off at 2.13, total time of firing 7 minutes, 35 seconds. The 
forts and the Cristobal Coldn returned the fire without damage to the fleet. 
The commander-in-chief transferred his flag to the Vixen at 2.30 en route to 
the flag-ship Brooklyn. Expended in ordnance nine 8-inch common shell, 
nine 8-inch full charges, five 13-inch common shell, five 13-inch full charges, 
fifteen electric primers, and five percussion primers. 

Iowa: Warm. Light airs from south. At 12.45, in obedience to signal 
from the flag-ship, began to clear ship for action. At 1.15 went to general 
quarters. The Massachusetts (carrying the broad pennant of Commodore 
Schley) led the attacking force, followed in column at double distance by 
the New Orleans and Iowa and heading about east by north. Began steam- 
ing in column at about 10 knots. When the Cristdhal Coldn came into view 
the Massachusetts opened fire (time 1.50). The New Orleans opened at 1.51 
and the Iowa at 1.56. The range at which our guns fired was 8,500 yards, 
but the shots fell short. The range (setting of the sights) was gradually in- 
creased to nine thousand yards during this run. At 2.01 the Iowa ceased firing. 





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DAILY POSITIONS OF FLEET IN OPERATIONS AGAINST 
SPANISH SQUADRON UNDER ADMIRAL CERVERA 



Nonh Atlantic Reel, 

Flying Squadron 

Spanliii Squadron 



! 




BEGINNING OF SANTIAGO BLOCKADE 333 

the other Spanish ship (one of the Vizcaya class) being no longer visible. 
The Massachusetts had already turned with a port helm and headed about 
west. At 2.05 the Massachusetts reopened fire, followed by the N^ew 
Orleans at 2.06 and the Iowa at 2.08. During the second passage the speed 
was decreased. The sights were set first at 9,500 yards, gradually increased 
to 11,000. Nearly all shots fell slightly short, but as they all appeared to 
burst on graze it is likely that the enemy was struck by many fragments and 
possibly by some shell. At 2.16 the Iowa ceased firing. The flag-ship stopped 
before this vessel was out of range and several shell fell near us after we 
stopped firing, one close aboard. At 2.50 secured the battery. At same time 
Commodore Schley transferred his flag to the Vixe7i and thence to the Brooklyn. 
At 3.10 the vessels and forts of the enemy ceased firing. Expended eleven 8- 
inch full charges (one broken); ten 8-inch common shell, nine 12-inch full 
charges, nine 12-inch Semi-AC shell. Secondary battery did not fire, the 
crews of the guns being kept below. , . . Average revolutions 31.8. 

New Orleans: Cloudy and warm. Light airs from S.S.E. till last hour, 
when shifted to light breeze from N.E. Barometer steady first two hours, 
then broken during action. At 12.48 in obedience to flag-ship Massachusetts, 
signalled to New Orleans and Iowa to "Clear for action," sounded to general 
quarters and cleared for action. At 1.00 started ahead both engines, Massa- 
chusetts leading the column and followed by the New Orleans and Iowa in 
order named. At 1.08 Massachusetts hoisted ensign at truck and the New 
Orleans and Iowa hoisted their ensigns at main truck. At 1.10 Massachusetts 
headed in shoreward. At 1.15 ported our helm and stood in toward shore, 
heading E.N.E. At 1.50 following Massachusetts we opened fire on forts at 
entrance to Santiago Channel, and when opportunity offered, fired at Spanish 
cruiser Cristdbal Coldn. At 2.05 ceased firing. At 2.10 again commenced 
firing. At 2.25 ceased firing. Fired at ranges varying from 7,000 to 10,000 
yards. Our fire was returned by fire from forts on both sides of Santiago 
Channel, and occasionally by Spanish cruiser. No vessel of our column 
was struck, and the fire of the Spaniards was generally wild though occasional 
shots passed quite near our vessels. The Spaniards kept up a hap-hazard 
fire some time after the main action had ceased and at this time their shell 
generally fell very short. Some of the shots from this ship fell short, but 
others apparently struck the ridges on which the shore batteries were situated 
and observers in the tops reported that a shell from our 6-inch No. 1 smashed 
off one corner of Morro Castle. The shots from our battle-ships appeared to 
fall generally short. It further appeared to us that a conflagration had been 
started behind the hills at the entrance on the left hand back of the channel. 

The Coldn's log reports having fired 62 rounds from the 5.9-inch guns and 
14 from the 4.7-inch. " An enemy's shell exploded near the stern making 
dents in the side and cracking some bowls in the round-house." 

For Commodore Schley's report of the operations of the flying squadron, 
see Appendix. 



CHAPTER XIV 
THE BLOCKADE AND THE SINKING OF THE " MERRDL\C " 

Sampson arrived off Santiago at 6.30 a. m., June 1, and found 
Commodore Schley's squadron steaming in column on an east 
and west line in face of the port/ 

As the Neiv York steamed toward the entrance a shot was 
fired, apparently from the Morro, which fell far short; the Colon 
and a mast of another ship were observed within, but even while 
the flag-ship was communicating with the flying squadron they 
hauled out of sight.- 

' Log of the Vixen, June 1. — Light airs from east. Patrolling inshore to 
westward off Morro. Marblehead patrolling to eastward. Fleet about eight 
miles off shore. 

^ The log of the Coldn states: "At 10.20 a. m., by order of the commandant 
general of the squadron, cast off the springs. At 10.35 a. m. got under way, 
and under direction of the commanding officer cast to starboard and under 
slow speed passed between Punta Gorda and the bow of the Oquendo. Di- 
rected our course into the inner harbor until 11.50 a. m., at which time we 
came to anchor in 9.5 m. of water, with 15 fathoms on port chain; bearings 
at anchor Ratones Cay, S. 36° W.; Yarey Pier, N. 11° W.; and Compadres 
Rock, S. 30° E." There was, however, no difficulty in disappearing from 
view, by handling the fasts. She had but to move her length to disappear 
from view as mentioned by Captain Sigsbee. Her disappearance on Sampn 
eon's arrival, and her getting under way at 10.30, are thus not in disaccord, 
as some have supposed. In fact, she must have occupied a position in which 
she could not be observed from the outside for the greater part of her stay 
in Caspar Bay, as she was not observed by the Yale, St. Paul, Harvard, or 
Minneapolis, all of which were off the port; the Yale continuously from 
May 22 to May 26. The St. Paul had captured the Restormel May 25 near 
the entrance after the Coldn had anchored in Caspar Bay. None of these 
ships had observed the Coldn, though the usual distance off land is mentioned 
as but six miles, and frequently much nearer. 

The Xew York had stopped at 6.30 in a convenient position for communi- 
cating with the ships already there, "the harbor entrance [to quote from the 
log] bearing north, distant seven to eight miles." The log of the succeeding 
watch (8 A. -M. to meridian) says: "At 9 went ahead N. W. by W. and stopped 
at 9.15. Mustered at quarters at 9.30, followed by fire quarters. At 9.45 

334 



THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC" 335 

At 8 Commodore Schley visited the New York and reported 
the situation. The ships present besides the squadron just 
arrived were the Brooklyn (broad pennant), loioa, Massachu- 
setts, Texas, New Orleans, Marblchead, and Harvard, with the 
Sterling and Merrimac, colhers, from which the Massachusetts 
and New Orleans were coaling. 

The New York, at 9 o'clock, stood in north-west by west 
for a quarter of an hour,^ a course which would bring her nearer 
the shore. As the flag-ship stood past the entrance, a steam launch 
had been lowered, in which, at his request. Assistant Naval 
Constructor Hobson went inshore to observe more closely the 
several points of the entrance with a view to sinking the Merrimac 
the following night. At 9.45, discovering a vessel close inshore to 
the westward, she stood along shore and found the Vixen in the 
bight four miles west of Santiago (in which later the Spanish tor- 
pedo-boat destroyers were sunk), the Vixen having returned 
from Aserraderos, a small village sixteen miles west of Santiago, 
landing a pilot there in the endeavor to communicate with 
the insurgents. Having stood down and spoken the Vixen, 
which had been at first taken for a suspicious vessel, the flag-ship 
turned for the Merrimac, picking up the launch on the way, and 
preparations were at once begun by the removal of the 6-pounder 
guns with which she was armed, the ammunition and other easily 
portable property; the coaling of the Massachusetts, which was 
alongside, in the meanwhile continuing. 

The torpedo-boat Porter had arrived from St. Nicolas Mole 
at 11, bringing the following telegrams from Washington; the 
first being somewhat belated orders: 

May 30, 1898. 

Schley has seen and recognized two armored cruisers and two 
torpedo-boat destroyers the Spanish division at Santiago de Cuba. 

sighted a vessel inshore to W. N. W., stood toward her and went to general 
quarters. The vessel was the Vixen. After communicating with her stood 
to the S. Ed. to rejoin fleet." As will be seen in the text, the New York had 
sent Assistant Constructor Hobson in, on his own request, to observe more 
closely the entrance with reference to sinkmg the Merrimac. Of course, 
this would not have been done had the Colon still appeared in the passage. 
Mr. Hobson in a letter to the author entirely agrees as to the Coldn not being 
visible at this time. 
' Log of New York. 



336 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

Proceed to Santiago with the New York and Oregon and such other 
vessels you may desire, leave orders concerning army convoy senior 
officer present. The Spanish torpedo-destroyer Terror reported at 
San Juan, Puerto Rico, damaged. 

Maij 30, 1898. 

General Miles states if you can communicate with Cuban insur- 
gents request Garcia to assemble his force at (or in) the rear of Santi- 
ago de Cuba, and our army division will take with them to Santiago 
de Cuba five thousand stands of arms and ammunition for Cubans. 

May 31. 

It has been suggested that an alternative line of communication 
could be opened with General Garcia as follows: Landing Maceo 
Inlet about thirty nautical miles west of Santiago de Cuba, not far 
from Jucaro anchorage, a message would find the neighboring country 
in possession of insurgents, and Garcia would probably be found 
at Bairc, thirty-three miles to the northward over the mountains. An 
outpost of Garcia's force would probably be found at the northern 
foot of the mountains and about half-way from the sea to Baire, The 
highest point on the road is Naranjo, from where there are two paths 
on to Matias, Auras, Fors, Negros; the other by Banos Calientes and 
Oja de Agua. Our army wishes Garcia to close down on the land 
side of Santiago de Cuba, as previously telegraphed.' 

May 31, 1898. 

It is essential to know if all the four Spanish armored cruisers at 
Santiago de Cuba, as our military expedition must wait for informa- 
tion out of [thence]. Report as soon as possible. 

The army now embarking at Tampa, Fla., estimated 25,000 men 
to proceed to Santiago de Cuba as soon as you inform me whole Span- 
ish fleet in harbor; will be accompanied by cavalry, siege-guns, mortars. 
It is suggested that you select places suitable for landing infantry as 
near as possible to Santiago de Cuba and be prepared to advise re- 
garding landing guns and cavalry. Of first importance to secure bridge 
San Juan River, the pier at Daiquiri, and others. Department ex- 
pects you will assist of course landing the army to utmost of your power 
but desires you shall not risk by operation on shore or in landing 
crews of the armored vessels or those needed in case of a naval engage- 
ment. "Will not Guantanamo, Cuba, be best place for landing cavalry ? 
St. Louis and Yankee must be available for calling at St. Nicolas 
Mole, Hayti. Several colliers on way to Mole. 

* Thi? and the preceding telegram were sent to Key West and thence for- 
warded; the second was also sent to Commodore Schley. 



THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC" 337 

At 5 P.M. the Danish cable steamer Adria, chartered by the army 
signal corps, arrived, convoyed by the despatch-vessel Dolphin} 

The port watch of the Neiv York had been sent aboard the 
Merrimac in the early afternoon to hasten the work of prepara- 
tion. Mr. Hobson had, when the question was first bruited, 
been called upon to give a professional opinion as naval con- 
structor as to the means to be devised to sink the ship in the quick- 
est time, this being, of course, an important element in success, 
unless the ship's bow beaching at exactly the right place, would 
enable her to swing across the channel at this point and ground 
at both stem and stern. Improvised torpedoes of reduced 
powder charges of 78 pounds for 8-inch guns in their cylindrical 
copper tanks, to be fired by electric primers, were decided upon, 
and ten of these were fixed in place on the port side of the ship 
about twelve feet below water. The anchors were to be slung, 
one at the bow and one at the stern, the lashings to be cut with 

* The Adria had a very anomalous status. She was a chartered ship under 
Danish colors, and was fitted with the cable gear of the Mexican Telegraph 
Co. She left Key West May 29 under convoy of the Dolphin and arrived 
off Santiago June 1. The men aboard refused to go in sufficiently near the 
shore to offer any prospect of success in grappling, the water in the vicinity 
deepening with extraordinary rapidity to 900 and 1,000 fathoms. The 
Texas and Oregon, however, were placed between the Adria and the batteries, 
while the latter was at work. On June 5, at 6 p. m. a cable was caught in 1,044 
fathoms and with aid from men of the Texas was lifted and cut. It was, how- 
ever, but one of several old ends. The Adria cut no live one. In the bom- 
bardment of June 6 several shells from the batteries passed over the Adria 
and the men refused any longer to work, on the ground that the Adria was 
a neutral ship and that their government would not protect them in cutting 
international cables. By arrangement made with the French company by 
the chief signal officer, in Washington, Captain Allen was supplied with in- 
struments from the office at St. Nicolas Mole. The cable was lifted at Guanta- 
namo and repaired, and on June 20, the day of the arrival of the army off 
Santiago, the Guantanamo office was again in operation with the cable com- 
pany's employees as operators. On June 25 the cable from Guantanamo to 
Santiago was repaired and, had the commanders permitted, communication 
open to Santiago. On June 29 the cable was cut near Aguadores and an office 
established at Siboney. As a telephone service had been established by this 
date between Siboney and the army advance. General Shafter was now in 
direct communication with Washington. The difficult cipher of the navy de- 
partment, however, came and went from this office so mutilated by the em- 
ployees, unaccustomed to such work, that many of the naval despatches were 
still sent to and from Guantanamo, forty miles distant, to ensure accuracy. 
(For Cable Cutting, see Goodrich, Proceedings Nav. Ins. No. 93, 157,) 



338 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

an axe; the crew was to be reduced to six, one at the wheel, 
one to assist with the torpedoes, one each in the engine and fire 
rooms, and one at each anchor. 

The work was pushed with feverish activity, as the moon 
set this night at a most favorable hour (3.05) for the work, 
being between 2 and 3 o'clock high enough to light the sea 
and cliffs sufficiently to assure perfect direction but not to light 
the sea so generally as to make the approach of the ship dis- 
tinguishable too soon. 

The final question as to command had arisen during the after- 
noon. Sampson recognized the claim of the commanding 
officer, Commander James M. Miller, who protested against 
being displaced by any one. Hobson had energetically urged 
his own claim as being more thoroughly conversant with the prep- 
arations than any one else. Several young officers persistently 
asked to go, but Sampson finally concluded that Hobson, as 
having done the main work of preparation and being perfectly 
conversant with it, should as a matter of fairness be given prefer- 
ence. The question in his mind was wholly one of fairness. 
Hobson had been an officer of the line and had as such served 
at sea; he had left the military branch to enter the construction 
corps so that the propriety of the choice from the stand-point of 
his ability to handle a ship could not well be gainsaid. There 
was much feeling over the decision, and most urgent requests 
were advanced by various officers, but the admiral's view, em- 
bodied in the remark, "Hobson has done the work," should be 
allowed full weight.^ Nor was there any question of a crew; 

' Sampson wrote the following kindly letter to Commander Miller. He 
fully appreciated the latter's feelings: 

U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 1, 1898. 

Sir: 1. Preparations have been made for the use of the collier Merrimac 
to be sunk in the channel leading into Santiago. As these plans have been 
in the course of preparation for several days, and as the details have been 
worked out by Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson, I am convinced that 
they can be carried out more effectually by the officer who has given the sub- 
ject careful attention than by turning over to you those details at the last 
moment before execution. 

2. It is without prejudice to your claim, as the Commanding Officer of 
this vessel, that I have reached this decision. I recognize your claim to take 
this vessel into Santiago channel, and I believe that, under ordinary circum- 



THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC" 339 

practically all the men of the fleet were volunteers for the service 
and the ship had to be searched and stowaways removed before 
she started in/ 

The night, though there was nearly a full moon, was much 
overcast with the heavy cumulus clouds of the trade winds, and 
the flag-ship thus had difficulty in keeping touch with the Merri- 
mac, drifting with the strong current which sets along the coast 
with the tides; no lights were allowed, and with the large num- 
ber of ships scattered over many miles of sea the picking up of any 
particular one was, of course, in the circumstances very diflScult. 
There were still a large number of men at work on board the 
Merrimac, as the work of preparation was far from complete at 
nightfall. It had been arranged that those who were not on the 
detail to go in the ship were to be taken off by the steam launch 
of the New York when the admiral should go aboard to make 
a final inspection, about 1 A. M. This, through the separation 
of the Merrimac from the flag-ship, despite all endeavors to keep 
near her, did not occur until nearly 3. Further detention was 
caused by fouling the propeller of the steam cutter in one of the 
Merrimac's lines as the cutter was leaving the ship. Start was 

stances, the expedition could not be entrusted to a more competent person, 
but, owing to the great amount of detail which is involved and which must 
be thoroughly observed in order that it may reach a successful conclusion, 
I trust that you will agree with me in the decision which I have reached in 
entrusting this execution to the officer who has worked out the detail with 
so much care during the past few days when it was impossible for me to con- 
sult you, or acquaint you with the amount of work involved. 

3. You will therefore go on board the Harvard to-morrow morning and 
proceed north in that ship, report to the Department by letter and transmit 
a copy of these orders. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 
North Atlantic Station. 
CoMMANDKR J. M. MiLLER, U . S. Navy, 
U. S. Collier Merrimac. 
* Those aboard besides Hobson were Assistant Engineer Crank (who be- 
longed to the Merrimac) ; Boatswain Mullen, of the Nevo York; D. Montague, 
chief master at arms; George Charette, gunner's mate, third class; R. Clausen, 
coxswain (these three of the New York); machinists, first-class, G. F. Phillips 
and Water-Tender F. Kelly, both of the Merrimac, and Coxswain J. E. Murphy, 
of the Iowa. Crank and Mullen finally were not allowed to go. 



340 THE SP.\NISH-AMERICAN WAR 

thus not made until after 4 o'clock. The ship was farther out 
than Hobson had calculated upon being, and before she got a 
fourth of the distance shoreward day was breaking; it was clear 
that she would not reach the entrance until it was full dawn. 
Under such circumstances she offered a target which could 
scarcely be missed by any of the batteries, and certainly not by 
the lioht truns known to line the sides of the entrance. It was 
thus decided to recall her, and the torpedo-boat Porter was sent 
with the message. She returned, saying that Hobson wished to 
ffo in anv case, and was sure he could do so. He did not slacken 
speed, hoping that four red lights might be shown from the New 
York to express the admiral's consent, as he had requested by 
the Porter might be done. The Porter, however, was sent again 
to reiterate the order, and the Mcrrimac turned.^ 

The delay, of course, had at least the advantage of enabling 
an overhauling of material. A relief crew was sent aboard to 
take charge, the men of the Merrimac being taken on board the 
New York to give chance for a rest, which, however, the nervous 
strain of the night before scarcely permitted. It was arranged 
that the ship should go in in the last hour of the moon (which 
set about 3.50), and it was understood that if the light was too 
dim, Hobson should await the break of day, without danger of 
recall. 

The day was without incident, except that at 7 a. m. a strange 
steamer was sighted to the westward heading shoreward; the 
Neio York stood down to speak her, when she turned and gave 
an unlooked-for chase of about three hours, when she was brought 
to by a couple of S-inch shells fired at a distance of over four 

' Hobson, in his excellent and accurate account, regrets his recall, being of the 
opinion that it was better to take all risks then than to suffer the reaction 
which necessarily came in waiting. I now think that he was right and that 
it would have been better that he should have proceeded. Sampson hiniself 
in the first offgo was of this opinion, and I am pleased to make this amend 
for any share I had in influencing his recall. 

In the light of fuller knowledge of all of the circumstances I am now also 
of the opinion that the best plan would have been to send the Merrimac in at 
early dawn and to have feigned a pursuit, thus giving her the character of 
one of the chartered British colliers, two of which were wandering about the 
Caribbean. The appearance of pursuit would almost certainly have pre- 
vented her being fired upon, and she could have been grounded deliber- 
ately. Fortunately we failed. F. E. G. 



THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC" 341 

miles. She proved to be the steamer Hampstead from St. Vincent 
to Mobile, and had come in from curiosity. Views were ex- 
pressed to the master somewhat forcibly, as there was no reason 
why he should not have communicated at once. 

At 3.30 A. M. (June 3) the Merrimac stood in. It was still 
clear moonlight and the ship got well up to the entrance before 
firing began. The cliffs were illuminated with flashes of guns 
and musketry of an intensity which boded ill for the brave crew, 
whose escape under such a hail appeared impossible.^ 

The idea had been to so steer that the bow of the Merrimac 
should take the shoal which lies on the east side of the channel 
just before reaching the Estrella battery. This she was to do 
by holding a perfectly straight course about N. E., which was 
the direction in entering of the first reach of the channel. The 
channel there turned due north, so that on the bows taking 
the ground, the ship would naturally lie athwart the tide now 
running flood and the stern would be swept against the opposite 
bank. The contingency of the stern's not taking the ground 
(which it appeared from the chart it would certainly do) was to 
be met by having a stern anchor which was to be let go in any case. 

As is well known, the Merrimac failed to reach her proper 
point through the cutting of the steering gear by shot. She thus 
drifted, before sinking, to a point within the entrance where the 
channel was deep and comparatively broad, and where her 
presence offered no serious obstacle to entry or departure. 

The firing gradually died away, the customary silence of the 
night fell over batteries and fleet, and all waited until dawn for 
the result. A steam cutter of the New York, one of the picket 
launches for the night, under Ensign Powell, had been ordered to 
wait close at hand to pick up any who might succeed in escaping 
from the ship by the catamaran carried for the purpose. She did 
not return, but was seen in the morning close under the land, just 
west of the harbor entrance, undergoing a severe musketry fire. 
Her brave young commander had stuck to his post until broad 

* The firing from opposite sides of the narrow channel not unnaturally caused 
a number of casualties among the Spanish soldiers; a private stating to one 
of Hobson's men that fourteen hail been killed and thirty-seven wounded. 
(Hobson, The Sinking of the Merrimac, IGO.) 



342 



THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 



daylight with the hope of rescuing some of the party, and only 
left when to stay longer would clearly be a useless sacrifice. 

The masts of the Merrimac could be seen, very evidently so 
far up channel and so much in line with it as to show that her 




HARBOR ENTRANCE 
eANTIAGO, CUBA 



mission had not been completely successful, bu,* how far short 
of being so could not at the moment be known The natural 
question uppermost in every one's mind was the f; of her heroic 
crew. This was settled by the coming out at 3 p. i. of the Span- 
ish tug Colon with a flag of truce. She was mc t by the Vixen, 



THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC" 343 

and Captain Bustamante, chief of staff to Admiral Cervera, came 
aboard the flag-ship. He brought a most kindly note from the 
admiral announcing the safety of her crew and expressing his 
admiration of their conduct.^ 

Admiral Cervera had himself made the rescue, coming down the 
bay in his steam barge and finding Hobson and his crew in the 
water, clinging to the catamaran, prepared to attempt the capture 
of any boat which should approach. This bold design was, 
however, thwarted by the presence with Cervera of an armed 
force which could not be resisted, and the little party, shivering 
with cold from their long immersion, was taken on board the 
Reina Mercedes, moored in the reach between Socapa and Smith 
Key, and whe "; they met with every courtesy and kind treatment 
which could ' ' offered by gallant and chivalrous men.^ 

Admiral Cv era telegraphed to the Spanish minister of marine: 

,)) Santiago de Cuba, June 3, 1898. 

Early this morning a battle-ship and merchant steamer tried to 
force harbor entrance. Destroyers and scouts which are at mouth 
of harbor opened fire, followed by Reina Mercedes and batteries of 
Socapa where ;uns of said vessel have been mounted. Merchant 
steamer was sui ;>; battle-ship repulsed. A lieutenant and six sailors 
taken prisoners:i^:j No casualties on our side from hostile fire; slight 
injuries to instaJ 4tions of 2.95-inch guns of destroyers.^ 

^ This letter unfortunately disappeared, so that the text cannot be given. 
It remains, however, sufficiently in memory for me to say that Admiral 
Sampson was dei}ply touched by its noble and chivalrous tone. Captain 
Bustamante remained aboard some little time answering Sampson's ques- 
tions regarding tfe prisoners and awaiting the preparation of packages to go 
to them. He s; ^ilingly remarked during the conversation, " You have made 
it much more difficult for us to come out." He was the foremost torpedo 
expert of the Spanish service. He was a handsome man of much dignity, was 
universally esteemed, and when he died of a wound received ashore July 2 
was regretted by Spaniard and American alike. 

^ Later in the day, the prisoners, by orders of General Linares (who had 
general command), were transferred to the Morro, much to the regret of the 
Spanish naval officers, who throughout were kindness itself. The kindly cap- 
tain of the Reinnjiler cedes, Emilio J. de Acosta y Eyermann, who had treated 
the captives wi^ . the utmost kindness and consideration, was unfortunately 
killed in the b'' 'iDardment by the fleet, three days later. The reader is re- 
ferred to Hobs /s excellent account in his Sinking of the Mcrrimac for 
complete details ,^ his gallant attempt, and later experiences while a pris- 
oner. " 'Documents, 100. 



344 THE SPANISH-A^IERICAN WAR 

Admiral Sampson telegraphed the navy department: 

Succeeded in sinking auxiliary Merrimac in the channel of Santiago 
de Cuba to-day, 4 a. m., June 3. This was carried out most gallantly 
under the command Naval Constructor Hobson and seven men. _ By 
flag of truce from the Spanish admiral Cervera, sent in recognition 
of their bravery, am informed all are prisoners of war, two slightly 
wounded. Request authority to arrange exchange, if possible, be- 
tween these and prisoners Atlanta. Beg troops move with all possible 
celerity; of paramount importance. Six ships Spanish squadron in 
the harbor of Santiago unable to avoid being captured or destroyed. 

Sampson sent the same day the following despatch: 

No. 113.] U. S. Flag-Ship Neic York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 3, 1898. 

Sir: Permit me to call your especial attention to the brave conduct 
of Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson. As stated in a recent tele- 
gram before coming here, I decided to make the harbor entrance se- 
cure against the possibility of egress of the Spanish ships by obstruct- 
ing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a collier at that point. 
Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his professional opinion as to a sure 
method of sinking the ship, he manifested a most lively interest in the 
problem. After several days' consideration he presented a solution 
which he considered would ensure the immediate sinking of the ship 
when she had reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we 
prepared for before we reached Santiago. This plan included ten 
electric torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each of 78 pounds of gun- 
powder, sinking the ship partially before going in, cutting the sea 
valves, and opening the cargo ports. The plan contemplated a crew 
of only seven men and Mr. Hobson, who begged that it might be 
entrusted to him. The anchor chains were ranged upon deck for both 
the anchors, forward and aft, the plan including the anchoring of the 
ship almost automatically. 

As soon as I reached Santiago and had the collier to work upon, the 
details were commenced and diligently prosecuted, hoping to complete 
them in one day, as the moon and tide served best the first night after 
our arrival. Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of 4 o'clock in the 
morning arrived and the preparations were scarcely completed.^ After 
a careful inspection of the final preparations I was forced to relinquish 
the plan for that morning, as dawn was breaking. jNIr, Hobson begged 
to try it at all hazards. 

This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could be 
made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. \Ve waited 
impatiently after the firing by the Spaniards had ceased. ^Yhen they 



THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC" 345 

did not reappear from the harbor at 6 o'clock I feared they had all per- 
ished. A steam launch, which had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet 
Powell to rescue the men, appeared at this time, coming out under a 
persistent fire from the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A 
careful inspection of the harbor from this ship showed that the Merri- 
mac had been sunk in the channel somewhat farther in than had been 
intended. 

This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cerv'era came out 
under a flag of truce with a letter from the admiral extolling the bravery 
of the crew in an unusual manner. 

I cannot myself too earnestly express my appreciation of the con- 
duct of jNIr. Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more 
brave and daring thing has not been done since Gushing blew up the 
Albemarle. 

Referring to the inspiring letter which you addressed to the officers 
at the beginning of the war, I am sure you will offer a suitable pro- 
fessional reward to Mr. Hobson and his companions. 

I must add that Gommander J. M. jNIiller relinquished his command 
with the very greatest reluctance, believing he should retain his com- 
mand under all circumstances. He was, however, finally convinced 
that the attempt of another person to carry out the multitude of de- 
tails which had been in preparation by Mr. Hobson might endanger 
its proper execution. I therefore took the liberty to relieve him for 
this reason only. There were hundreds of volunteers in the squadron 
who were anxious to participate. There were 150 from the loiva, 
nearly as many from this ship, and large numbers from all the other 
ships, officers and men alike. 

Very respectfully, 

W. T. Sampson, 

Rear- Admiral, U. S. iV., 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

North Atlantic Station. 

The Secretary of the Navy, 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

There has, of course, been criticism of this attempt to close 
the harbor in this manner and later events made it fortunate 
that it was not so closed, but from the point of view of the time 
it was wise. Our army's first objective was Havana; Santiago 
only assumed importance by the presence of this squadron; it 
was expected (and Admiral Sampson was so informed) that 
Gervera was shortly to be re-enforced by the Carlos V and Pclaijo: 
there was always imminent the danger of loss of one or more 



346 THE SPANISH-MIERICAN WAR 

battle-ships by torpedo-boat attack; the season of hurricanes was 
approaching, when the fleet might be driven from its post; the 
escape of the squadron inside was thus (until Sampson's unprec- 
edented use of battle-ships' search-lights) always possible. Had 
the attempt with the Merrimac been successful, it would have 
been as securely bottled up as if in the docks of Liverpool, and the 
whole of the American fleet (practically) would have been avail- 
able for any other purposes then deemed advisable. That, from 
the point of view of the moment, it was wise, was to have 
marked support six years later, when in 1904 the Japanese 
made heroic efforts at Port Arthur to neutralize in the same way 
the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. It was sound strategy. 

Toward midnight the Mayflower left for Key West, via Mole 
St. Nicolas, taking the following telegrams: 
To the secretary of the navy: 

Succeeded in sinking auxiliary Merrimac in the channel of Santiago 
de Cuba to-day, 4 a. m., June 3. This was carried out most gallantly 
under the command Naval Constructor Hobson and seven men. ^ By 
flag of truce from the Spanish admiral Cervera, sent in recognition 
of their bravery, am informed all are prisoners of war, two slightly 
wounded. Request authority to arrange exchange, if possible, be- 
tween these and prisoners Atlanta. Beg troops move with all possi- 
ble celerity; of paramount importance. Six ships Spanish squadron 
in the harbor of Santiago unable to avoid being captured or de- 
stroyed. 

Some observations made to-day by a reliable Cuban, in accord- 
ance with my instructions, makes four Spanish armored vessels and 
two Spanish' torpedo-destroyers in Santiago at that time. Repairs 
and more coal needed by them. 

Have received reliable information from Cuban officers the Spanish 
force in this vicinity of Santiago consists of 7,000 men, entrenched in 
Juraguacito and Daiquiri; 5,000 men in Santiago de Cuba; in Morro 
de Cuba, 400 men; at other points in the bay, 100 men, with small 
rapid-fire guns and submarine mines at various points. With supe- 
rior force and insurgent force, which is ready, though mostly needing 
arms, Santiago de Cuba must fall, with ships in port, which cannot be 
entered against obstructions and mines. 



THE SINKING OF THE "IVIERRIMAC" 347 

To Commodore Watson, commanding off Havana: 

Channel to Santiago obstructed by auxiliary Merrimac this morning; 
all Spanish ships inside. I am sending Mayflower to Key West for 
repairs and Dolphin for blockade. I will return north side as soon 
as I leam intentions of army. 



I 



CHAPTER XV 
THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 

On June 2 an order was issued which divided the fleet pres- 
ent into two squadrons. This also defined Sampson's views 
as to action in general, and more specifically in regard to con- 
duct should the Spanish squadron emerge. It covered the 
conduct of commanding officers on the eventful 3d of July, a 
month later. 

U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898. 

The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the opera- 
tions against that port and the Spanish squadron as follows: 

First squadron (under the personal command of the commander-in- 
chief). — New York, loiva, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter. 

Second squadron (Commodore Schley). — Brooklyn, Massachusetts, 
Texas, Marblehecul, Vixen. 

Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the commander- 
in-chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keep- 
ing about 6 miles from the INIorro in the daytime, and closing in at 
night, the lighter vessels well inshore. The first squadron will block- 
ade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west 
side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage 
as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to 
run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore bat- 
teries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battle- 
ships. 

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn 
to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either 
side will cover the angle thus left vacant. 

348 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 



349 



DAY AND NIGHT FORMATION 

[To accompany order of battle, dated June 2, 1898] 

U. S. Flag-Ship New York, 1st Rate, 
Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898. 



Morro. 




■^^ Mass. 



^ Mass, 



Oregon. W^ 



(The distance was changed later to four miles.) 

Early in the morning of Friday, June 3, the scout St. Louis, 
the armored auxiliary Yankee, and the collier JuMin arrived, the 
St. Louis bringing the following telegrams, the first dated June 
1, the others June 2: 

General Shafter wires expects to start from Tampa, Fla., on June 
4 with 18,000 or 20,000 men, including ten batteries of artillery- and 
some cavalry. Commodore Remey will attend to convoy. 

Spanish torpedo-destroyer Terror is reported greatly damaged at 
San Juan, Puerto Rico. It is suggested you have her carefully watched 
by a sufficient force to prevent possible interference with convoy in 
transit. 

Cable house is reported at the point of Cape Cruz, Cuba, presuma- 
bly near the water, and a branch from the loop connecting Manza- 



350 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

nillo to Santiago de Cuba comes ashore there, also a branch from the 
cable connecting Cienfuegos to Santiago. This report is from a per- 
son who states he helped to lay the cable on the south side of Cuba. 
The Resolute sailed May 31, Mole, Hayti, eti route to squadron. 

The United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica, telegraphs June 1: 
Am informed that Purissima Concepcion (a Cuban mail steamer) 
going Cape Cruz, west of Santiago, and will coast inside keys, making 
either Manzanillo, Trinidad, Cienfuegos, or go direct to Batabano. 
Has objected to colonial government. 

On June 4 was issued the following: 

The Texas, Massachusetts, Iowa, and the Oregon will take posi- 
tions 4,000 yards from Estrella Point and opposite the entrance to 
the port of Santiago in the order named from west to east in such 
position as to be able to observe the wreck of the Merrimac and will 
fire upon any parties which may be seen working about it. If the 
fire be opened by the batteries it will be returned and an endeavor 
made to destroy them. 

The senior officer of the above-named ships will have charge of 
carrying out these instructions. 

In case of opening fire upon the batteries, the Brooklyn, Marblehead, 
and the Vixen will take an enfilading position 4,000 yards to the west- 
ward of the entrance and well inshore, and the New York, New Or- 
leans, and the Yankee a similar position to the eastward and will en- 
gage the batteries at the same time with the battle-ships. 

Firing directly upon Morro Castle will be avoided, as our men from 
the Merrimac are confined there. 

The battle-ships will take the above positions when signalled to do 
so by the commander-in-chief and will occupy them until signalled 
to withdraw, when blockading stations will be resumed. 

Next day, June 5, an order of battle was issued to engage the 
batteries on Monday morning, June 6, at 7 o'clock. The men 
were to be given their breakfast at 5.30, and the divisions to be 
ready to form at 6 o'clock. 

On the same day, the Resolute arrived from Norfolk, Va., 
with fifty-six mines. She had touched St. Nicolas Mole and 
brought telegrams directing that vessels sent there for the pur- 
pose of telegraphing should aw'ait reply unless the admiral 
should have directed otherwise, as it took but half an hour for 
Washington to communicate with that point. The St. Louis 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 351 

was despatched thither with telegrams informing the navy de- 
partment that the ships had enough men; requesting that fresh 
provisions be sent by the Harvard, St. Paul, and Yale whenever 
they should leave the northern ports, and also asking to be in- 
formed at once when the army expedition should sail, and its 
numbers. Commodore Remey at Key West was directed to send 
4- and 5-inch rapid-fire ammunition, and the dynamite cruiser 
Vesuvius; and also to have the battalion of marines ready to 
embark in the Resolute, which left this same day for Key West. 

In accord with the order of the day before, the fleet at 6.30 
A. M., June 6, formed in two columns and stood in. At 7.41 the 
flag-ship opened fire, which was followed by the other ships, the 
opening distance being about 6,000 yards, but gradually approach- 
ing until the flag-ship was within about 1,900 yards of the Morro, 
within which distance it was difficult to elevate the guns against 
the battery on the cliffs, some 200 feet high. General firing was 
discontinued at 8.05, but a slow and deliberate fire was kept up 
until 9.40. The batteries had long before ceased to return the 
fire. At 10.08 signal was made to resume blockading stations.^ 

The attack developed the weakness of the batteries; it seemed 
apparent they could easily be carried by a force ashore, supported 
by the fleet. This caused Sampson the same day to send the 
following telegram: 

Bombarded forts at Santiago to-day, 7.30 to 10 a. m., June 6, 
and have silenced works quickly without injury of any kind, though 
stationary within 2,000 yards. If 10,000 men were here, city and 

' The following is Admiral Cervera's report of the action to the Spanish 
minister of marine: 

"Santiago de Cuba, June 6, 1898. 

"Hostile squadron, 10 ships strong, has bombarded this harbor for three 
hours, being answered by batteries at mouth of harbor, among which are 
guns of Reina Mercedes. Our casualties: Killed, executive officer Reina Mer- 
cedes and 5 other (sailors); wounded. Ensign Molins and 11 other (sailors), 
and 5 bruised. Army has 1 dead; wounded, a colonel of artillery, 4 officers, 
and 17 privates. I do not know loss of enemy. Reina Mercedes has suffered 
much. Vizcaya received two shells, Ftiror one shell (in the) bunker without 
serious injury. Works of defence have suffered slight injuries of no military 
importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bombarded other points on coast." 
{Documents, 101.) 



352 THE SPANISH-AJVIERICAN WAR 

fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration 
demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be de- 
fended more strongly by guns taken from fleet. 

This last, in the circumstances of despair which Cervera de- 
scribed in his Documents, was that which the Spanish admiral 
should have attempted. There were available in his squadron 
forty 6- and 5.5-inch rapid-fire guns; forty-eight from 4.7-inch 
to C-pounders, and seventy-six l-pounder and machine guns, 
enough to have established an excellent defence both by sea 
and land. No particular difficulties had been experienced in 
placing on the Socapa and Punta Gorda the four 6.3-inch guns 
of the Reina Mercedes. There were some 2,000 men of the ships' 
companies accustomed to the movement of heavy weights who 
could have been used for the emplacement of the guns, and a 
large percentage of these were fitted to serve them after they 
should be in position. Such a use of these ships' guns would 
have made of Santiago a fortified place of no mean character, 
which would have made attack by land a matter of most serious 
difficulty; would have forced the American fleet to have kept 
beyond range by day, and have prevented the near use of search- 
lights. Large possibilities were involved in such procedure, such 
as the escape by night of some of the ships themselves although 
without armament. 

Such an efi'ort at fortification might, and no doubt would, 
have been in vain, so far as the capture of Santiago was concerned, 
even through the want of food, which, though the extent of this 
want was unknown to the American commander, was already be- 
coming serious. But notwithstanding, it would have been better 
to have attempted it rather than to have remained passive and 
allow Cervera's squadron to go to the certain destruction which 
its admiral foresaw a sortie by day must bring. But Spanish 
energy and initiative were not equal to the eft'ort. 

The status of the Spanish governmental mind at this moment 
is exemplified by the following amazing telegram from the min- 
ister of war, Correa, to Governor-General Blanco: 

IMadrid, June 3, 1898. 
Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships 
and re-cnforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope 



THE BLOCIvADE OF SANTIAGO 353 

with hostile squadron at INIanila it will be indispensable to send an 
equally strong fleet there. At present only two war-ships there and 
one of them I believe cannot pass through canal. The only thing we 
can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out 
of Santiago. But before deciding, the government wishes to know 
your opinion as to efl'cct the withdrawal of Cervera's fleet might pro- 
duce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon 
as object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to 
Cuba without loss of time and strongly re-enforced.' 

To this Blanco replied: 

Havana, June 4, 1898. 

I would be failing in my duty if I concealed from your Excellency 
that departure of Cervera's squadron at this time would be of fatal 
effect on public opinion. Doubt whether the situation that would 
surely result could be controlled. Volunteers already much exer- 
cised over inadequacy Cervera's squadron, and only kept up from one 
moment to another by hope arrival second squadron. Would rise 
in body upon learning that instead of re-enforcements the few ships 
here are withdrawing. The repression would necessarily be bloody. 
Attitude of army in that case doubtful. Loss of island certain, in 
view of horrible conflagration it would kindle here.^ 

Nothing could show more clearly the incapacity of the Span- 
ish authorities. To suggest that Cervera's squadron, blockaded 
already, as w^as well known to its government, by Sampson's 
powerful force, should be ordered, without provisions, with- 
out even enough coal to fill its bunkers, across the Atlantic 
and thence to the Philippines, to dispose of Admiral Dewey's 
squadron and return without loss of time to Cuba, is one of the 
most amazing propositions ever made by a minister of state. 
It illustrates painfully the want of practicality of the Spanish 
authorities, such as would not be believed were there not the 
surest documentary evidence. But had Santiago been fortified, 
as was possible; had Cervera's ships escaped, as might then 
have been possible; had they returned to Spain and rearmed, 
as might have been possible, Spain would have had a fleet in 
being which would have deferred peace and might have saved 
to her the Philippines. 

> Cervera, Documents, 100. ^ Ihid-, 100. 



354 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Sampson, after the failure of the Merrimac, had in view at 
no time any other action than obtaining possession of the batter- 
ies at the entrance, and once obtained, of taking up the mines 
understood to exist and going into the bay with the fleet. The 
channel, in any case, was one of extreme difficulty for the large 
ships of Sampson's fleet, all of which except the Texas much ex- 
ceeded in size and draft of water the ships of Cervera's squadron. 
It was at its narrower parts litde more than three breadths of 
a battle-ship such as the Indiana, and with an angle off the Es- 
trella battery at its narrowest point making necessary a change 
of course of twenty-five degrees. To attempt to force the squad- 
ron in until the mines should be removed was madness. Even if 
there had been no mines, and no disturbing infantry or rapid- 
fire small guns on the flanks of the entrance, there was great 
danger of one of the ships grounding and thus entirely blocking 
the channel to the rest. Had the first ship not grounded in the 
smoke and excitement of action, the second might have done so, 
leaving a single ship to cope unsupported with the six vessels in- 
side. The misfortune of such a situation need not be dwelt upon. 
With the mines removed, however, and the adjacent heights 
occupied, this was a risk to be taken. But with mines still in 
place, known to have been placed under the superintendence 
of the best mine expert of the Spanish navy,^ it was an impossi- 
ble proposition both to Sampson and the navy department. 

At 10.30 p. M., June 6, the St. Louis arrived from St. Nicolas 
Mole with telegrams from Washington approving Sampson's 
action in regard to the Merrimac and her crew and stating that 
every attention would be given to his recommendation regarding 
action by the army. He was informed that a Spanish lieuten- 
ant, a sergeant, and six privates had been sent to Key W'est for 
exchange for Hobson and his party; and also that the British 
steamer Tunckenham with 4,000 tons of coal, consigned to the 
Spanish consul, had been refused discharge at Martinique and 
had sailed for Jamaica. 

The important step was now taken of securing Guantdnamo 
Bay, one of the finest of Cuban harbors, which, as mentioned, 
was only forty miles east of Santiago, as a base, by despatching 
' Captain Bustamante, chief of staff to Cervera. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 



355 



at midnight of June 6 the Marblchead and Yankee. The lower 
part of the bay was wholly undefended from naval attack except 
by a battery of smooth-bore guns in an ancient fort midway up 
the bay, and by a small gun-boat, the Sandoval, commanded by 




GUANTANAMO 



an energetic and capable lieutenant, Don Pablo Scandella, which 
was armed with one Nordenfelt and one Hotchkiss gun of 57 mm. 
Four miles from the lower part of the bay was Fort Toro, 
mounting a half dozen antique smooth-bore bronze guns. The 
fort commanded the narrow passage (known to be mined) 



» 



356 THE SPANISH-AINIERICAN WAR 

leading to the village of Caimanera, the port of Guantdnamo, 
a town of some 8,000 inhabitants twelve miles inland and the 
centre of the sugar and coffee industry of eastern Cuba, There 
was here a Spanish division of 6,000 men under General Pareja, 
completely isolated by the insurgents from communication with 
Santiago. 

The Marhlchead and Yankee, with orders to take and hold 
the lower bay for the accommodation of our ships, but not to 
attempt to enter the upper shallow bay, for which we had no 
use, arrived at daylight of the 7th and found the St. Louis, which 
had been sent ahead, prepared to sweep for the cables leading 
east and west from the small cable-house on Fisherman's Point 
on the east side of the bay near the entrance/ 

A guard in the block-house here was driven off, and the Sando- 
val, which had boldly stood down and opened fire, was driven 
for refuge up the bay. The cables were cut by the *S^. Louis 
in both directions, and the Marblehead and Yankee at 5 p. m. 
left for the fleet off Santiago. Before leaving, Commander 
McCalla opened relations with General Perez, commanding the 
insurgents, who were in some force on the west side of the bay 
and who had complete control of the region between Guantd- 
namo and Santiago. On the 9th, Commander McCalla was sent 
to Guantanamo with orders to take charge, and thenceforward 
the bay was held, in the words of General Pareja, in a letter to 
General Linares at Santiago of June 10, 1898, "as if for a 
harbor of rest, they having anchored as if in one of their own 
ports." 2 

From now on, Guantanamo was the general base of the fleet 
on the south side of Cuba. While an occasional collier served 
to coal some of the ships off Santiago, the New York, for ex- 
ample, coaling only at sea during the blockade of Cervera's 

' For the previous effort of the St. Louis, see supra. 

2 This letter (in full in Appendix, Report of the Bureau of Navigation, 
1898, 451) gives a melancholy account of the condition of the Spanish 
forces. The general says: " I continue serving out half-rations of everything, 
and in that way I expect to reach only the end of the month, above all in 
bread, as I have no flour of any kind and no way of getting any." His situ- 
ation was one of such complete isolation that he knew nothing of events 
at Manila or at Santiago until after hostilities had ceased. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 357 

squadron, most of the ships were sent from time to time to Guan- 
tdnamo, leaving their station off Santiago one day and returning 
the next. 

On June 7 was issued by the admiral the following memoran- 
dum (No. 13): 

After careful consideration of the various schemes of maintaining 
an effective blockade of Santiago de Cuba at night, which have been 
advanced, I have decided upon the following, which will be main- 
tained until further orders: 

The weather permitting, three (3) picket launches, detailed from 
the ships of the squadron each evening, will occupy positions one mile 
from the Morro, one to the eastward, one to the westward, and one 
south of the harbor entrance. On a circle drawn with a radius of 
two miles from the Morro will be stationed three vessels, the Vixen 
to the westward, from one-half mile to one mile from the shore, the 
Suwanee south of Morro, and the Dolphin to the eastward, between 
one-half mile and one mile from the shore. The remaining vessels 
will retain the positions already occupied; but they will take especial 
care to keep within a four-mile circle. 

All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable, to keep them 
in readiness for immediate use, and while so doing, may turn in a small 
circle, but without losing proper bearing or distance. 

The signal for an enemy will be two (2) red Very lights fired in 
rapid succession. If the enemy is a torpedo-boat, these two red lights 
will be followed by a green light. 

I again call attention to the absolute necessity of a close blockade 
of this port — especially at night and in bad weather. In the daytime, 
if clear, the distance shall not be greater than six miles. At night, or 
in thick weather, not more than four miles. The end to be attained 
justifies the risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be taken. The 
escape of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow 
to our prestige, and to a speedy end of the war. 

Attention is called to the provisional signals established by General 
Order No. 9. 

On this same date the collier Kingior arrived bringing the fol- 
lowing despatch from St. Nicolas Mole, dated at Washington, 
June 6: 

The prisoners of war at Atlanta are First Lieutenant Pina Giner 
Gastaminza, Sixth Battalion, Lower Peninsula, seven second lieuten- 



358 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ants, a sergeant, and nine privates. You are authorized to make such 
arrangements with Admiral Cervera as may be necessary to secure our 
officer and men now prisoners at Santiago. 

A flag of truce was sent in during the afternoon (after 4 p. m.) 
with propositions to the Spanish authorities based upon this 
telegram. Sampson's letter was as follows: 

U. S. Flag-Ship New York, June 7, 1898. 

The Commander-in-Chief, Spanish Squadron of Instruction, Santi- 
ago de Cuba. 

Dear Sir: Following a suggestion made during my interview 
with your chief of staff on June 3, I have communicated with my 
government and have obtained the requisite authority to offer the 
following special exchange of prisoners, which I now have the honor 
to transmit to you. 

For Mr. Hobson and his seven men I will exchange First Lieutenant 
Pina Giner Gastaminza, of the Sixth Battalion, Lower Peninsula, 
one second lieutenant of the Spanish army (name not known), one 
sergeant, and five private soldiers. 

I am aware that it is unusual to arrange any exchange of officers 
except grade for grade. First Lieutenant Gastaminza is, according 
to our organization, of the same grade as Mr. Hobson; but for the 
second lieutenant whom I offer in exchange there is no correspond- 
ing officer among your prisoners. All of Mr. Hobson's men, however, 
are rated men, corresponding to non-commissioned officers, and as I 
am able to offer only one sergeant of the Spanish army, the only way 
appears to be to equalize grades by offering for these seven men one 
commissioned officer, one non-commissioned officer, and five privates. 

I hope this proposition will be acceptable to your Excellency. 

Should this exchange be effected, the Spanish prisoners will be de- 
livered at Havana or at Santiago de Cuba, as you may elect, and I 
will receive the American prisoners at this place. 

With assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be, 
Very respectfully yours, 

W. T. Sampson, 

United States Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, 

N. A. Station. 

On June 8 the armed yacht Gloucesfer, Lieutenant-Com- 
mander Wainwright, and the collier Abarenda arrived. The 
latter brought the following despatch from St. Nicolas Mole: 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 359 

Washington, June 6. 

The U. S. consul St. Thomas states 500 tons of coal belonging to 
the government on dock and 1,000 tons in lighters. Coal may be ob- 
tained at short notice. No change at Puerto Rico. Thirty-five 
thousand troops of all kinds, many well drilled. Fortifications 
strengthened daily. Inform Allen Greely says cable from Guan- 
tanamo was working Sunday night. The army expects to leave 
Wednesday. The U. S. consul Kingston, Jamaica, instructed, invite 
attention of the British authorities to the fact that the French authori- 
ties forbade the delivery of Ttnckcnham's coal to the Spanish consul 
at INIartinique. Celtic leaves New York this week for Santiago 300,- 
000 pounds fresh provisions the squadron. Issue this vessel such 
orders as you deem necessary, directing when empty to return to 
New York for further supplies. 

The following copies of telegrams received by Commodore 
Remey, bearing upon the subject of the army expedition to 
Santiago, were brought by the Gloucester: 

Washington, June 1. — Notify Watson when convoy is about to 
start and direct to scour blockaded coast most diligently to prevent 
interference by Spanish gun- vessels with our convoy. 

June 1. — Deliver following to Captain H. C. Taylor [of the Indiana], 
commander of convoy: The following scheme has been discussed 
somewhat but what action the war department proposes to take, if 
any, is unknown. Railroad bridge over San Juan River about two 
nautical miles east of jMorro of Santiago de Cuba, and probably shel- 
tered from its fire, is close to the sea, spans a deep ravine, and its pos- 
session would facilitate the operation of our army; but it is said to 
be mined and guarded by about thirty Spanish soldiers. It has been 
suggested to send a detachment of troops some hours before the main 
body to land daybreak near bridge and carry by surprise, holding 
position until supported from the main body. The landing near bridge 
is said to be good for boats, and water in the vicinity good for light 
vessels, though we have not absolute knowledge on these points. 
If the attempt is to be made by the army it will probably ask you to 
assist the landing with the boats of your convoy and to cover the at- 
tempt with some of your small vessels, which may be done exercis- 
ing due caution, but the department has declined to use the seamen 
of the fleet to make the attack on shore. If the attempt is to be made 
send a vessel ahead to inform the commander-in-chief of naval force 
on N. A. station. 






3G0 THE SPANISH-AJVIERICAN WAR 

June 1. — Inform commanding officer of convoy, New York Herald 
June 1 says that there are in the bay of Port Nipe, Cuba, gun-ves- 
sels Jorqe Juan and Ligera; there are others in other coast ports. 
Keep a lookout for them. 

June 2. — General Shafter wires war department, June 1, he was 
progressing rapidly with loading transports and expects to be able 
to start Saturday morning. Some American troops to join from 
Mobile, making in all about 18,000 or 20,000 men. He does not 
state the number of transports. Inform Captain Taylor, co-operate 
with army, adding such vessels to the convoy as you see fit. 

You are directed to prevent any press boat leaving Key West to 
accompany the expedition about to leave Tampa. If necessary you 
will place marine guard on board to insure compliance. You will 
also give the commander of convoy an order, directing him, if any such 
boats succeed in accompanying the fleet, to take possession of and jr 

compel them to remain in his company throughout the voyage and .■ 

until such time as the senior officer present off Santiago de Cuba shall " 

direct release. 

Tampa, June 1. — Boat capacity of transports average about 110 
persons. No steam launches. General Shafter informed me that 
two large steam lighters are to be taken along. Gun-boats here have 
steam launches and four boats each. Convoy ships should bring 
all their boats. Navy expected to assist. Army will not embark 
before Sunday [the 5th]. 

Memorandum from Commodore Remey: The Annapolis, Helena, 
Castine, and Hornet have been at Tampa several days. The com- 
manding officer of the Annapolis has had instructions about organiz- 
ing the transport fleet. When all are ready the fleet will proceed to 
a rendezvous to westward of Dry Tortugas. Information will be 
received here when the fleet is to arrive off Tortugas. The follow- 
ing vessels will then proceed to the rendezvous, and the commanding 
officer of the Indiana will take charge, viz.: Indiana, Detroit, Bancroft, 
Vesuvius, Osceola, Wompatuck, Wasp, Scorpion, and Manning. The 
Eagle has gone with despatches to Commodore Watson. She has 
orders to report to commanding officer of convoy for duty. This will 
make fourteen vessels in the convoy — all ready June 4. It is not known 
yet what day the transports will be ready to start. The Indiana has 
six or seven divers at work, which will continue until the fleet is 
ready to move. It is thought she will then be in good condition. The 
Minneapolis was to have gone with convoy but will not be ready in 
time. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 361 

The following letter, dated June 6, was received from the 
United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica: 

The department of state having been informed that a steamer of 
the French line, a sister ship of the Lafayette, was bringing over a cargo 
of Canet quick-firing guns, directed me to report the arrival of such 
vessel at this port. I have accordingly just reported the arrival of 
the Versailles, which comes from Coruna via St. Thomas, with 128 
passengers and 1,000 tons cargo. Up to the sending of this letter I 
have been unable to ascertain contents of her cargo, but I take op- 
portunity to notify you of these facts for such use as you may deem 
proper. The vessel leaves here to-morrow morning at 8 o'clock, 
clearing for her regular port of Vera Cruz. [A similar despatch was 
received the day before from Washington, which advised also watch- 
ing the vicinity of the Isle of Pines and Cape Cruz for this steamer.] 

The Yankee w^as sent into St. Nicolas Mole with the following 
despatches to the secretary of the navy, the first of which, after 
announcing the occupation of Guantanamo Bay, continued: 

The crew of cable steamer Adria spent several days searching for 
Jamaica cable from Santiago and destroyed second cable, St. Louis 
having cut first. But the crew of the Adria has refused to do any more 
work on grounds that work required of them is illegal. Therefore 
cable from Santiago to Cienfuegos has not been cut but all communi- 
cation between Cuba and outside world has been cut off. As there 
is some doubt that both Jamaica cables have been cut, suggest that 
department make inquiry into this subject. I suggest, further, that 
as the crew of the Adria has failed in their contract they should not 
receive compensation after the time at which they refused to do duty. 
As soon as possible I hope to have communication by telegraph be- 
tween Guantanamo and the United States through French cables 
and will inform the department as soon as it has been established. 
Under these circumstances again I urge upon the department to ex- 
pedite arrival of troops for Santiago de Cuba, the difficulty of block- 
ading the Spanish ships daily increasing, and as dark and stormy 
nights approach difficulty must be increased greatly. Army should 
be here now. The Spanish force on north side of Cuba is insignifi- 
cant absolutely and can offer no impediment whatever. One cruiser 
could look after the whole. Yankee will wait imtil 1 for answers. 
The Marblehead will remain at Guantanamo. 

Request that you send Vesuvius at once to Santiago. 



362 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

During the forenoon of the 8th the Vixcfi was sent in near 
the harbor entrance to meet a Spanish flag of truce, which 
brought Admiral Cervera's reply to Admiral Sampson's letter 
of the 7th regarding an exchange of prisoners, stating that he 
could not act, as Hobson and his men had been turned over 
to General Linares, and that the latter had reported the case to 
General Blanco at Havana, to whom the matter should be re- 
ferred. Sampson thus requested the navy department to deal 
with the governor-general as the quickest course.^ 

On June 8 was issued memorandum No. 14, which was to 
have so decisive an effect upon Admiral Cervera's course of 
action: 

During the dark hours of the night search-lights will be used as 
follows: 

The Iowa, Oregon, and the Massachusetts will take turns of two 
hours each, i. e., from dark to 8 P. M., from 8 P. M. to 10 p. M., etc., in 
keeping one search-light directly on the harbor entrance, maintain- 
ing carefully during that time their blockading positions. Should a 
vessel's lights fail, the next in order will at once take up the duty. 

The picket launch and vidette, stationed south of the INIorro, will 
move to one side or the other sufficiently to get clear of the beam of light. 

The vessels on each flank, the Brooklyn and the Texas on the western 
side, the New York and New Orleans on the eastern side, will take 
two-hour turns in using one search-light from time to time on the coast 
line, swinging it toward the Morro, but avoiding the illumination 
of the flanking videttes on the inside line. The light should never be 
turned off more than five minutes at a time. From time to time the 
horizon outside will be swept. 

Attention is called to bad and careless handling of search-lights. 
Last night some of the lights were kept high in the air, and were again 
swept rapidly from side to side. Under such circumstances a search- 
light is worse than useless. 

The beams must be directed to the horizon, and must be moved 
very steadily and slowly. Not less than three minutes should be 
employed in sweeping through an arc of 90 degrees. 

The best way to discover a torpedo-boat is by its smoke, and even 
this will not be seen unless the light is very well handled. 

The first night's trial was unsuccessful; the intentions of the 
admiral were not clearly understood; the lights were used fit- 

* Nothing came of this; as will be seen, Hobson was exchanged Jiily 6, for 
some prisoners taken by General Shafter's force. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 363 

fully and also interfered with by those of other ships, which kept 
on searching the shore line as usual; complaints, too, were made 
by the officers commanding the larger videttes that they were 
so illuminated by these casual lights that the fire of the infantry 
ashore was drawn upon them, and that they were thus not able 
to stay as close inshore as desired. The admiral, ignoring all 
objections, issued a peremptory order which left no doubt as to 
his own intentions. Personal directions were given at the same 
time to the captains of the ships not employed on search-light 
duty to refrain from using their lights, and to the commanding 
officers of the videttes to remain in position out of the beam 
instead of patrolling as they had been doing. The order was as 
follows : 

The use of the search-lights during the dark hours of last night 
clearly indicates that the lights can be used with the greatest efficiency 
if sufficient care is taken for this purpose. It is absolutely necessary 
that the beam of light should be held steadily up the channel into the 
harbor. 

Under these circumstances it is believed to be practically impossible 
for a vessel to escape detection in any attempt to come out. I there- 
fore enjoin the commanding officers of the io^m, the Oregon, and the 
Massachusetts to move forward into their positions, not more than 
two miles from the entrance, with the entrance bearing north by 
east; the Iowa arriving first— at 7.30, and will_ place her light 
squarely up the entrance into the harbor and hold it steadily, except 
during the time required to change from one search-light to another, 
as may be required. At the end of two hours from 7.30 P. m. she will 
be relieved by the Oregon, and in turn she will be relieved by the Massa- 
chusetts, each of these vessels going back to her blockading position 
— three miles from the entrance. 

It is most important that the lights should be held as nearly station- 
ary as possible, and that no discrimination be left to the person 
manipulating the light. It is believed that this method of using the 
search-light will prove to be all that is necessary or advantageous 
in blockading the harbor. 

This order was among the most important of the war; to 
it more than to any other one circumstance is due the capt- 
ure of the Spanish squadron. It made it, in the opinion of 
the Spanish commander, out of the question for the ships to 
leave the harbor at night with the entrance lighted so brilliantly 



364 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

that it was impossible for any movement to be made in it which 
would not be noticed. This action removed, too, any fear what- 
ever of torpedo attack. Up to this time the moon had done good 
service, but it was now on the wane; the darkness at times made 
by the heavy cloud masses of the trades without the moon was 
intense, and there should have been no difficulty in a torpedo- 
boat sortie, had not the search-light been thus used. The moon 
to this time had been looked upon as an excellent friend; here- 
after it was not only of no importance but rather the subject of 
objurgation, the search-light differentiating its path so much 
more brilliantly without it. The torpedo-boat henceforth was 
entirely ignored as a danger. 

The situation in Santiago harbor shows the opportuneness of 
Sampson's action, which put an entirely new face upon what at 
this moment was there under discussion: 

On the 8th day of June the admiral convened in his cabin the cap- 
tains of the squadron to hear their opinions relative to the situation of 
said squadron. Being requested to express their opinions, they did so 
in the following order and manner: 

Bustamante, taking into account all the circumstances of the ex- 
istence of provisions, error in superiority of hostile forces, etc., is of 
opinion that the squadron should take advantage of the present dark 
of the moon and resolutely effect the sortie, and as the situation of the 
hostile fleet at night and the difficulties of the sortie make it impossi- 
ble for the squadron to go out in a body, the sortie should be effected 
as follows: The torpedo-boat destroyers should go out first, shaping 
their course to the south and passing at their utmost speed by the 
Texas and the three large battle-ships. 

Shortly after, the Colon, the fastest of the four ships, should go out 
with a west-south-westerly course, heading straight for the Brooklyn, 
whose position is usually in that wing of the blockading line. Then 
should follow the Teresa to the east-south-east, and finally the Vizcaya 
and Oquendo. He believes that this would create confusion in the 
hostile fleet and permit us to save at least 50 per cent of our squadron, 
which solution, in his opinion, is vastly preferable to that other solu- 
tion which he foresees and which he does not wish to admit as possi- 
ble, namely, of the fleet being compelled to surrender from lack of 
provisions. 

He is also of opinion that the squadron should prepare for this step 
by resting a few days, especially the destroyers, upon whose crews 
such severe demands are being made night after night that it is a 
wonder they withstand the fatigues of their service. He also deems it 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 365 

of advantage from every point of view (one of them being to wear out 
the enemy) to keep firing, especially on the search-lights, which explore 
the vicinity of the harbor entrance during the hours of darkness.' And 
finally, not being conversant with the means adopted by the admiral, 
he is of opinion that, before attempting the extreme step which he sug- 
gests, the government should be given an accurate idea of the very 
serious situation of the squadron. In view of the manner in which 
the ships would go out, he believes that the point of rendezvous should 
be Havana rather than San Juan, which latter point he would prefer 
if the squadron went out in a body. 

Captain Concas is of opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, 
Brooklyn or New York, should at any time disappear, the sortie 
should be attempted immediately; if not it should be attempted about 
the time of the new moon ; but in that event with the whole squadron 
united and all the ships following the same course provided the nucleus 
of hostile forces is stationed, as at the present time, 5 or 6 miles from 
the harbor entrance. 

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the Colon, 
Oquendo, and Vizcaya, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat 
division, in view of the impunity with which the blockading fleet 
approaches to within a mile of the harbor entrance, counting on 
the inadequate defences of the harbor, and in view of the present 
conditions of the harbor, the sortie having been rendered more diffi- 
cult by the position of the Merrimac, so that it would require a cer- 
tain length of time to effect it, thus giving the enemy an opportunity 
to concentrate still superior forces off the entrance, even if they should 
not discover the going out of the first ship that undertook the sortie, 
are of opinion that the sortie should not be attempted as long as the 
present situation continues, and in the meantime every military means 
should be used to re-enforce the defences at the harbor entrance, so as 
to guard against an attack of torpedo-boats and small craft which 
might appear in the entrance protected by one or more battle-ships, 
the squadron in this harbor making the best possible resistance, keep- 
ing in front of it the greater part of the hostile naval forces, this being 
the most important service the squadron can render toward the gen- 
eral defence of the island. 

They also deem it expedient to shelter the torpedo-boat destroy- 
ers, not only to permit them to rest their crews, but to prevent 
their being boarded by a coup de main in a night attack by small 
craft.2 

1 This council was held on the day of issuance of Sampson's order; the 
search-lights previous to the order were, as just mentioned, used at random 
and were of but slight service. 

' Signed by Jos^ de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Victor M. Concas, Emilio 
Diaz Moreu, Antonio Eulate, Fernando Villaamil, Joaquin Bustamante. 



366 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR 

Much surprise was expressed in the American squadron at 
the fact that the search-light ships were not fired upon. The 
following correspondence between Admiral Cervera and General 
Linares explains this. Cervera writes, June 11: 

Honored Sir: Last evening I made personal observation from the 
high battery of the Socapa on the position of the hostile squadron and 
have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for 
the squadron under my command to go out without being seen, taking 
advantage of the darkness of the night, as long as the coast defences 
do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as 
they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their elec- 
tric search-lights. 

Santiago de Cuba, June 11, 1898. 

Yours, etc., Pascual Cervera. 

General Linares replied to this: 

Honored Sir: Since you made personal observations last night on 
the position of the hostile squadron, and have come to the conclusion 
that it will be absolutely impossible for your squadron to leave the 
harbor without being seen by the enemy, as long as the coast defences 
do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as 
they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their search- 
lights, I beg that you will advise me whether you deem the fire of the 
6.3-inch Hontoria guns, which have the longest range of all the guns 
installed in the coast batteries, suitable for the purpose stated, so that 
I may give the necessary instructions to the captain of the high bat- 
tery of the Socapa, 

13 ut as it is not advisable to cause unnecessary alarm in the city 
and to waste ammunition, nor to let our enemies see how limited are 
our means of defence and attack in case we should not succeed in 
facilitating the sortie of the squadron, I beg to represent to your Ex- 
cellency, in order that you may take this fact into account, if you deem 
proper, that the rays of the search-lights are clearly seen over the city, 
and it would therefore be necessary to add to the distance at which the 
United States vessels are usually stationed at least the distance which 
separates the city of Santiago from the coast, namely, 4.35 or 4.97 
miles, the total being the distance to which the squadron would have 
to retreat in order that its search-lights may no longer illuminate 
the harbor entrance. 

Arsenic Linares. 

Santiago de Cuba, June 11, 1S9S. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO 367 

The admiral's energy and decision in the short time in which he 
had been before Santiago well deserved the eulogium of the head 
of the navy department. He says: 

Sampson lifted a heavy burden upon his shoulders when he as- 
sumed command at Santiago. He sank the Merrimac, occupied 
Guantanamo Bay for use as a coaling base, organized his command 
and assigned his vessels in the two squadrons into which he divided 
it. He prepared and promulgated plans for the naval battle that 
was sure to come, supervised the movements of the more than a 
hundred vessels within the range of his command, and was charged 
with the blockade of the whole Cuban coast, with co-operation with 
the army, and with the landing of its troops. His correspondence 
with the fleet and with the department was large and constant. No 
other naval officer had such an engrossing variety of duties. On the 
2d of June he issued his general order providing for the most thorough 
precautions to prevent Cervera's escape and for battling and destroy- 
ing his fleet in case he attempted to escape. Under it our fleet line 
was kept in an enclosing semicircle day and night before the harbor 
closely vigilant. Every night the faithful search-light guarded against 
the enemy's escape or torpedo attack. Under the following clause 
of that order: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and 
engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force 
them to run ashore," the later famous battle of July 3 was actually 
fought, and the great victory won in accordance with the plan of 
the commander-in-chief, to whom is due the credit that is always 
given to the man on whom is the responsibility of the command and 
of the preparation of the plans for execution by those under him/ 

^ Long, The New American Navy, I, 7, 8. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO: THE ARMY MOVEMENT 

On June 9 at 1 p. m., the Dolphin arrived from Mole St. 
Nicolas with a surprising telegram, dated Key West, June 8: 

Tuesday, 9 p. m., 15 nautical miles north, one-half east Bahia 
de Cadiz light. Eagle sighted north-north-west. Signals exchanged 
among them. Pursued about 3 nautical miles without bringing ves- 
sels in sight. At 9.45 p. m. sighted stern light armored cruiser N. ^ E. 
Showed private signal twice. Armored cruiser flashed truck light. 
Protected vessel, two torpedo-destroyers, fleet formation answered. 
Eagle scouted abreast until character Spanish vessels was ascertained. 
Communicated immediately with Lebanon, at Piedras Cay, suggest- 
ing to her captain to send this news to fleet off Havana. Eagle then 
proceeded with all despatch to Key West. One deep-sea torpedo- 
vessel chased Eagle for a short time. Except stern light and occasional 
signal, four vessels total darkness. Panther left last night to join 
Yosemite, off Havana, for convoy. Nashville, with Watson, left here 
about same time; supposed they know the news. Resolute confirms it. 

This extraordinary incident which held back the Fifteenth 
Army Corps a week was the natural result of the diflficulties of 
the sea at night. It is impossible to judge the size of a ship, 
even if made out, and the sighting of ships at all is uncertain 
beyond the comprehension of those not accustomed to sea life, 
and even to many who are, as the following well illustrates. In 
the early morning of the next day (June 10), the Yankee, a 7,000- 
ton ship, arrived from Mole St. Nicolas, where she had gone 
with despatches. Her captain, one of the ablest and most com- 
petent men of the navy, on coming aboard reported that he had 
sighted eight or possibly nine ships which seemed to him to be of 
a suspicious character. One was a battle-ship with a single mast 
such as the Indiana's. He had seen flashes which he at first 

368 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 369 

thought were those of guns and he supposed them to be firing 
at him. He later concluded they were signalling with the search- 
lights. At from 7 to 8 A. m. the ships sighted arrived. They 
were five. One, the armed yacht Scorpion, which had one mast, 
was the supposed battle-ship. The others were the Yosemite, 
Panther (a transport with the marine battalion aboard), the 
Armeria, a light-house supply steamer with ammunition, and 
the Supply, a store-ship. These ships, the Scorpion, Armeria, 
and Supply in one squadron and the Yosemite and Panther in 
another, had met and had stood west together after rounding 
Cape Maysi (the eastern extremity of Cuba). They had sighted 
the Yankee and had fired at her, as she did not make her night 
signal, mistaking her for a torpedo-boat. In the melee the Panther 
had run into the stern of the Scorpion, rolling up her steel tafF- 
rail in a most extraordinary shape, and narrowly escaping sink- 
ing her. Commander Marix, of the Scorpion, on reporting 
aboard the flag-ship stated that he had sighted the British cruiser 
Talbot the previous morning standing east. The mystery of the 
four ships was in Sampson's mind at once solved. He sent for 
the Scorpion's log-book, and working back to the date and time 
of sighting the four ships reported by the Eagle it was clear that 
they were the Talbot (very similar in appearance to the Spanish 
armored cruisers) and the Scorpion and her two consorts.^ 

The Yankee had brought the following despatch supplementing 
the previous report: 

Washington, June 8. — The Spanish armored cruiser first-class, 
torpedo-destroyers are reported by Eagle and Resolute yesterday and 
last night and therefore the army expedition is stopped temporarily; 
convoy is distributed to scour the strait and re-enforce the blockade of 
Cuba; send two of your fastest armored vessels to search through 

' The writer, on his request, was kindly furnished by the British Admiralty 
with a copy of the Talbot's log of that date. This showed that she unques- 
tionably was one of the ships sighted. It is not extraordinary that the Eagle's 
signals were not answered. Eyes must be fixed in the direction of these at 
the moment, to discover them. The fact is recalled that the Dolphin, bear- 
ing important despatches, had steamed through the supposed position of 
the fleet in Nicolas Channel, in search of the admiral; had gone 165 miles 
east, signalling at short intervals, and then returning, only found the fleet, 
covering miles of sea, next evening, having steamed 390 miles. 



370 THE SPANISH-AISIERICAN WAR 

Nicolas Channel, ... at Key West and thence re-enforce convoy 
to we mean to start this as soon as convoy is strong enough, the delay 
being only temporary. Are you sure all four of Spanish armored 
cruisers are at Santiago ? Six hundred marines Panther started for you 
last evening convoyed by Yosemite.^ 

The admiral at once sent the Yankee back to St. Nicolas 
Mole with the word: 

Have no confidence in the report of Eagle as to nationality or char- 
acter of the vessels, and consider very unwise to suspend operations 
on this account, but even if it is found correct there is sufficient force 
to furnish convoy. Armored vessel was probably Talbot, which was 
sighted Thursday 9 a. m. by the Scorpion standing to the east. Am 
confident no large ship could have escaped from here; am endeavor- 
ing to obtain information from Santiago as to what vessels are in- 
side to-day; delay seems to me most unfortunate. Marine battalion 
arrived this morning and will land at Guantanamo to-day. 

On the same day that the above was sent, Sampson received 
the following: 

Washington, June 9. — It is expected that two armored vessels 
despatching to re-enforce convoy will arrive Sunday morning, June 
12, at Key West and will be coaled immediately. Commodore 
Remey is ordered to have convoy ready for sea at the same time; the 
army will be notified and expedition get away without reference to 
Spanish. 

Washington, June 9. — The Vesuvius is now seeing through de- 
sign stranger. Shall send to Santiago as soon as possible. 

The admiral took no action toward diverting any of the ships 
off Santiago for the search mentioned, being convinced that the 
department would accept the views of his telegram, but although 
sure of the presence in Santiago of all the Spanish ships, from 
reports of the various insurgent officers of the vicinity, who had 
come aboard the flag-ship, he took at once steps to satisfy the 
authorities at Washington that all of Cervera's ships were still 

'This telegram is given as it was deciphered. As sent, it began "Spanish 
armored cruiser, Spanish second class cruiser, Spanish torpedo boat de- 
stroyer." The words omitted as undecipherable were "then to coal." The 
first words of the next line were: "for we mean to start this expedition." 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO-^CONTINUED 371 

at Santiago. He thus sent Lieutenant Victor Blue, of the 5w- 
wanee, who gallantly volunteered for the duty, and, being landed 
June 11 at Aserraderos, the day after the receipt of the tele- 
gram expressing the doubt in Washington, at once proceeded, 
loyally aided by the Cuban general Rabi, on his perilous 
journey. 

On June 11 the St. Louis arrived with the British steamer 
Twickenham, which she had captured off Jamaica, with a cargo 
of coal consigned to the Spanish squadron. The Twickenham 
with the fleet mail was sent to Key West as prize, and the St. 
Louis to Mole St. Nicolas with the following despatches for 
Washington : 

The following is a resume of a letter from General Garcia to Miles, 
which I send thus as the only means of its reaching him. Miles's 
letter received through Colonel Hernandez on June 6. Garcia regards 
his wishes and suggestions as orders, and will immediately take meas- 
ures to concentrate forces at the point indicated, but cannot do so as 
early as desired on account of his expedition to Port Banes, Cuba, but 
he will march without delay. All his subordinates are ordered to assist 
to disembark the United States troops and to place themselves under 
orders. Santiago well fortified with advanced entrenchments, but he 
believes positions for artillery can be taken as Miles desires, approxi- 
mately, 12,000 regulars and 3,000 militia, between Santiago and Guan- 
tanamo. He has sent forces in order to prevent aid getting to Santi- 
ago from Holguin. Repeats every assurance of good will and desire 
to second plans. 

The vessels seen by the Eagle were the Armeria, Scorpion, and 
Supply. They were in just that position at time named. The number 
is unimportant, as the Yankee, coming from Mole, Hayti, Thursday 
at 11 p. M., mistook the five vessels arriving yesterday for eight or 
nine vessels under convoy battle-ship. In the morning the battle- 
ship resolved itself into the Scorjnon. General Rabi at Aserraderos 
with 500 men; Garcia expected there to-day. 

I understand that Resformel has been released and only cargo 
condemned. I protest in the name of captors against this decision. 
The vessel clearly .is a prize as not only as carrying contraband of 
war but as carrying coal to assist definite military operation. If a 
neutral is released under such circumstances he can undertake at 
any time with impunity the service of enemy. The St. Louis has 
captured Twickenfiam under similar circumstances. 



372 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The manner of the employment of the search-light on the 
harbor entrance was still unsatisfactory, and the admiral issued 
the following memorandum on this date: 

Until further orders the battle-ships Iowa, Oregon, and the Massa- 
chusetts will employ their search-lights in the manner so successfully 
employed during the last two nights. Care will be taken, however, 
to go in close enough to make the light wholly effective for the purpose 
desired. The picket boats report that the lights at times are too weak 
because of the distance of the ships. The lights will be employed 
from 7.30 till daylight as follows: 

The sequence of ships will be Iowa, Oregon, Massachusetts. To- 
night, June 11, the Massachusetts will begin at 7,30 and continue 
until 9.30, the Iowa from 9.30 to 11.30, the Oregon from 11.30 to 
1.30, the Massachusetts from 1.30 to 3.30, and the Iowa from 3.30 
to daylight. 

On June 12 the loiva will begin at 7.30, on June 13 the Oregon, 
and on June 14 the Massachusetts again, and so on. 

The vessel using the light shall keep the entrance of the harbor 
bearing north by east. The instructions of my memorandum No. 
15 of June 10, 1898, will be followed. 

Regard must be had for the state of the atmosphere. If it is hazy 
an efl'ective illumination of the harbor entrance will require a closer 
approach. 

The following note was now received from Mr. Sylvester 
Seovel, correspondent of the New York World: 

Yesterday the captain of H. M. S. Pallas at Port Antonio received 
cipher despatch from admiral of fleet at Port Royal, Jamaica, an- 
nouncing as fact that Spanish fleet actually has left for this side of 
Atlantic. Pallas commander ordered shorten crew's shore leave to 
six hours and be in constant readiness put to sea. Also, as you prob- 
ably know, 26,000 troops sailed from Tampa Wednesday noon for 
Santiago; twelve regiments regulars, sixteen of volunteers, four troops 
cavalry, two batteries heavy artillery, four light artillery, battalion of 
engineers. 

A telegram, dated Kingston, Jamaica, June 9, was enclosed in 
Mr. Scovel's note: 

Merriwether [correspondent! wishes repeated you following news 
cable published here: "London, June 9. — Washington correspond- 
ent Daily Chronicle, with approval General Greely, cables follow- 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 373 

ing. The army sailed from Tampa noon to-day, Wednesday. Force 
numbers 27,000 men, composed of infantry, cavalry, artillery corps. 
Infantry consists 28 regiments, 16 regular, 12 volunteers; total in- 
fantry force 21,600 men; in addition there are battalion engineers, 
5 squadrons cavalry, 4 batteries light artillery, 2 batteries heavy. 
General Shafter chief command. Force convoyed by battle-ship 
Indiana, gun-boat . . . with Baiicroft as General Shafter's floating 
home. The transports are due Santiago Friday night or Saturday 
morning and landing will be attempted Saturday." 

In the afternoon of June 12 the torpedo-boat Porter arrived 
from Guantdnamo bringing a report from Commander McCalla, 
written the same morning, that 

Yesterday afternoon a scouting party of one sergeant and two 
privates from the marine camp were killed and their remains muti- 
lated by a party of regular Spanish soldiery or guerillas in their employ. 

The names of those killed are Sergeant Smith, Privates Dunphy 
and McColgan. Dr. Gibbs was killed about 1 a. m. this mornmg in 
the camp; and Corporal Glass accidentally shot himself through the 
hand. 

2. It is possible that Dr. Gibbs may have been killed accidentally 
by one of our o^^^l men during the fire which took place about that 
time. . . . 

4. I venture to suggest for your consideration the practicability 
of re-enforcing Colonel Huntington with 100 marines from the fleet, 
with such tents and camp gear as may be on the ships. . . . 

Happily the report of mutilations was incorrect, the apparent 
mutilation being the result of the upsetting, after long flight, 
of the slender projectile used in the modern type of rifle. ^ 

The camp occupied by the marines on what is now known as 
McCalla Hill, so named from the officer in command of the 
American forces in the bay, was in a faulty position, being com- 
manded by a ridge some 1,200 yards distant, scattered over 
which, in the thick and almost impenetrable brush, were some 
300 Spanish infantry. These opened a desultory fire on the 
afternoon of the 11th, killing, as mentioned. Privates McColgan 
and Dunphy on outpost duty. 

* This projectile, at moderate ranges, makes a very small wound, which 
if not at once fatal, easily heala. If, however, it does not strike head fore- 
most but enters the body crosswise it may take an erratic course, making a 
terrible mutilation. The report was soon corrected. 



374 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

About 1 A. M. Acting Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs was 
killed, a loss much mourned. On the morning of the 12th Ser- 
geant C. H. Smith was killed and Corporal Glass and Privates 
McGowan and Dalton wounded. The camp was then moved 
to the west side of the hill under the crest, but Sergeant-Major 
Henry Good, a most excellent man, was killed during the night 
of the 12th. The Spanish fire was continued at long range during 
the 13th and 14th without further damage; but on this last day a 
force under Captain Elliott^ of 160 men of Companies " C and D," 
commanded by Captain Spicer and First Lieutenant Lucas, and 
50 Cubans under Lieutenant-Colonel Tomas, was sent against 
the enemy. Colonel Laborde of the Cuban army was also 
present, but without command. The final objective was the 
Cuzco well, some six miles distant, and the only water supply 
on the east side of Guantdnamo Bay; this destroyed, occupancy 
of the region in any force was impossible. The despatch-boat 
Dolphin was sent along shore to assist with her fire, and an out- 
post of fifty men of Company A, under Second Lieutenant 
Magill, later, of his own motion, came to the aid of the main 
body, being attracted by the heavy fire to which it was sub- 
jected. Action began at 11 A. m., resulting by 3 P. m., after a 
steady advance over an extraordinarily difficult and rugged 
region, thickly covered with brush, in a complete rout of the 
Spanish forces with a loss to these of some sixty men killed and 
wounded, and two officers and eighteen men prisoners. The well 
and a heliograph outfit were destroyed, and the American force 
back in camp at 8 p. m. with one man wounded and twelve over- 
come by the heat. While destroying the well the Cubans, placed 
up the valley from which the enemy retreated, began a hot fight 
with a force not yet dislodged, and lost two killed and two wound- 
ed, killing five of the enemy; two other Cubans were wounded 
earlier in the advance.^ 

From henceforward the eastern side of the bay was wholly 
deserted by the enemy. W^hile the east was thus freed of Span- 
ish troops, small detachments came down at times from Cai- 
manera on the west and annoyed boats which went close inshore. 

* Now major-general and commandant of the marine corps. 
^ Report of Captain G. F. Elliott. 



I 



i 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 375 

The large force of 6,000 men under General Pareja was thence- 
forth passive. His instructions had been to hold Guantdnamo 
until the last moment. These were founded upon the idea that 
the bay would be used as an army base, as had been done by 
the English in 1741, whence the army would advance overland 
upon Santiago. Such a view, though held by some in Wash- 
ington, was entirely foreign to Admiral Sampson's mind, which 
favored always direct and immediate attack. After the action 
at Cuzco, Pareja established fifty-three more block-houses be- 
tween Caimanera and Guantanamo, a distance of twelve miles. 
He entrenched strong positions at Dos Caminos and Caimanera 
and threw up extensive works at the town of Guantdnamo; all 
to ward off an attack never for a moment contemplated, nor 
which under ordinary strategic operations could have been. 
When Santiago should fall, he would naturally have to yield 
with it. It was there, where he could have given effective sup- 
port, that he should have been. At Guantanamo, absolutely 
isolated and wholly without information of any kind, this very 
considerable army was as ineffective as if in Spain. 

From now on Guantanamo Bay was the general base of the 
fleet for coaling and repairs, the Vulcan, repair steamer, soon 
being added to the command and rendering most efficient 
service. 

The warlike operations of the vicinity, except for a reconnais- 
sance in force ten days later, of the west shore of the bay, which 
developed the fact of the total withdrawal thence of Spanish 
troops, were ended by an attack on June 15 on the small and 
antiquated fort commanding the approach to Caimanera, by 
the Texas, sent to Guantdnamo for the purpose, aided by the 
Marblehcad and Suwance. The chief result of this attack, 
the fort itself offering no real resistance, was to bring to the sur- 
face two heavy contact mines, one being picked up by the star- 
board screw of the Marblehcad, the other broken adrift by the 
propeller of the Texas, the explosion of which would have de- 
stroyed or greatly injured these ships. Search had been made for 
mines on the 11th by a steam launch with grapnels, but none 
had been discovered. In the interval of fifty-one days since 
their placing on April 25 the marine growth had been sufficient 



376 THE SPAXISH-A^IERICAN WAR 

to prevent the effective working of the exterior levers, the strik- 
ing of which should have caused their detonation.^ 

On June 13, the St. Paul arrived from New York and the 
Vesuvius from scouting in the Old Bahama Channel, and at 
11 A. M. came the St. Louis with the following despatches: 

Washington, June 10. — On account of the army expedition it is 
most essential to know positively if all of Cervera's armored vessels 
are actually at Santiago de Cuba. Inform the department as soon as 
possible. 

After you have a suitable base on shore could we authorize to al- 
low the repair and operation of the French cable between your base 
and Mole, Hayti? Inform Colonel Greeley if this is done. 

About 15,000 tons of coal in colliers have recently been despatched 
to Santiago de Cuba. About 5,000 now loading on collier Alexander. 
Where do you want it ? 

The department considers you should have a cruiser off San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, to observe the port. 

June 11. — May 14 Mr. says that inna\ngable harbor 

Guantdnamo [the upper part of the bay] protected seventeen mine 

1 The following from Captain McCalla, written February 11, 1902, is valu- 
able as explaining the situation at this point: 

"... I was very pleased while at Havana to recognize the exertions of 
the 1,000 Cuban troops stationed about three sides of the Spanish force of 
7,000 in Guantdnamo; and to pay Vieta and the Cubans under General Perez 
their deserved compliment in capturing every courier sent by land and one 
by water, fifteen in all, who were endeavoring to establish communication 
between the Spanish in Guantanamo and those in Santiago, after the 7th day 
of June, 1898, when all cable communication between Guantanamo and the 
outside world was severed. 

" Immediately prior to the cutting of the cables here, the Spanish general 
Pareja had received instructions to hold Guantanamo to the last moment. 
This was because of the fact that the Spanish senior officers could not have 
anticipated, before the arrival of our army before Santiago, that we should 
land at Daiquiri. They all expected that the expedition would establish 
a base here at Guantdnamo Bay, and march overland to Santiago, via Guan- 
tanamo City, as the English had done a centurj' and a half ago. As Pareja 
never received any instructions other than to hold Guantanamo, he was en- 
tirely averse to giving up his position, being entirely ignorant of what was 
taking place outside of his immediate command. I am told, however, that 
had the naval force here in Guantilnamo pushed him in any way he would 
have marched with his whole force upon Santiago. This indicates the wis- 
dom of the naval policy in Guantilnamo Bay. What Pareja did after the 
action near the well of Cuzco, was to establish fifty-three more block-houses 
between Caimanera and Guantdnamo; to entrench a strong position at Dos 
Caminos at the junction of the road from Baracoa, and one on the west side 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 377 

fields floating about two metres below surface. Conversation over- 
heard at Philadelphia states Morro cliffs Santiago were so mined as 
to be blown at will toward our vessels that may be passing in the 
channel. This seems improbable and probably impracticable. 

June 12. — Army expedition starts this afternoon from Tampa, 
Fla., for Santiago de Cuba. 

Sampson, however, had already, as mentioned, acted upon the 
navy department's wishes and was able on June 15 to give a 
definite and wholly satisfactory reply to its inquiry regarding 
Cervera's squadron, in a telegram which he sent to St. Nicolas 
Mole by the St. Louis: 

Lieutenant Blue has just returned after a detour of seventy miles, 
to obsen-e inside Santiago harbor; reports Spanish squadron all 
there. Spanish made vigorous attack on Guantanamo camp. An 
outpost of four marines killed and their bodies were most barba- 
rously mutilated. Surgeon Gibbs killed, apparently accidentally by 
our own men.' 

of the Bay of Joa leading to Guantdnamo City; to entrench a strong position 
behind the town of Caimanera; and to build extensive works and trenches 
about the city of Guantanamo; because he was always expecting to be at- 
tacked by the force from Guantdnamo Bay. 

"A Spanish colonel offered to take 250 cavalry and make an attempt to 
open communication with Santiago; but Pareja said that that was too small 
a force to make the attempt. He appears to have been torn by conflicting 
desires, the natural one perhaps to use his whole force in an effort to open 
communication with Santiago; the other to hold Guantiinamo in obedience 
to his last instructions. Now much has been said about the condition of 
the Spanish troops; but the truth is that while the civilians were starving in 
Guantanamo the Spanish officers were well fed; and the troops were not yet 
out of provisions, although they had been without quinine for weeks and fif- 
teen or twenty of them were dying every day. On the 17th of July, 1898, 
the Spanish soldiers were still receiving one small box of sardines every other 
day. I mention this to show that the Spanish army hereabouts would still 
have been able to make the march to Santiago, between thirty and forty miles 
distant, over a road which was said by Vieta to be a good one when the sub- 
ject of the movement of our army from Guantitnamo Bay was discussed. 

"When one knows what the Cuban soldiers really accomplished about Guan- 
tdnamo, the praise they deserve for holding 7,000 Spanish troops from Shaf- 
ter's rear must continually increase. . . ." It should be said that Com- 
mander McCalla was mistaken in regard to the distance from Guantdnamo 
to Santiago by land. It was nearer double the greater of the distances 
mentioned. 

' The report of mutilation was fortunately soon to be corrected. 



378 THE SPANISH-AIMERICAN WAR > 

The story of Blue's adventurous journey (which he was to 
repeat on June 25) is best told by his own report, made through 
his commanding officer. 

Sir: In obedience to your verbal order of the 11th instant, I left the 
ship off Aserraderos Point' and proceeded to the camp of the insur- 
gent forces about one mile inland, finding General Rabi in command. 
On explaining to him that I was under orders from you to proceed to 
a good point of observation near the bay of Santiago de Cuba for the 
purpose of observing unmistakably the enemy's fleet, he gladly fur- 
nished me with a trustworthy guide and a good mule. In company 
with the guide, JNIajor Francisco H. Masaba y Reyes, I left the camp 
about 10.30 A. M, of the 11th instant, and taking generally a northerly 
course, arrived late in the afternoon at a Cuban outpost, about fifteen 
or twenty miles to the northward and westward of Santiago. The 
commander of this outpost furnished me with three additional guides 
to take me through the Spanish lines. After going through the Span- 
ish lines and travelling an hour after nightfall, the guides concluded 
that it was dangerous to proceed any farther until next morning, where- 
upon we camped at the house of a Cuban sympathizer. The next 
morning we proceeded about twelve miles farther to a point on a hill- 
top a little to the westward of the north end of the bay and about three 
miles distant from it. From this point I had an almost unobstructed 
view of the entire bay except the part south of Smith Cay. In the 
bay I counted five large vessels that were unmistakably men-of-war. 
Three of these answered the descriptions of vessels of Admiral Cer- 
vera's squadron. One could not be seen sufficiently well to describe 
definitely anything more about her than that she was a large vessel 
and had one smoke-pipe. The fifth was a large white vessel anchored 
near the city and was said by the Cubans to be old and useless. An- 
other large vessel was anchored near the city, but whether a man-of- 
war or merchant vessel I was unable to make out on account of the 
poor background. 

Anchored near the city were also three smaller men-of-war, one of 
about 1,500 tons displacement, one of about 800, and the last was 
what I made out to be a small gun-boat. 

Near the entrance to the bay was a vessel under way which, judging 
from her relative dimensions, I took to be a destroyer. Two other 
vessels resembled torpedo-boats, but I am unable to state positively 
their character. 

Two launches and a larger vessel were in the channel near the posi- 
tion of the Merrimac. 

The relative positions of all these vessels were included in my sketch 
which I submitted to you and the admiral immediately after my return. 

^ Eighteen nautical miles west of Santiago. 



J 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 379 

I remained at the place of observation about an hour and a half 
and then started back on the return trip. I was fully satisfied from 
my own knowledge that the vessels I saw were those of Cervera's 
squadron. 

The point of observation was in plain view of a Spanish garrison 
about 1,000 to 1,200 yards away. On our return, Cuban sympa- 
thizers informed us that the road we passed over the day before was 
occupied by the Spanish troops. This necessitated our taking another 
route. Different people along the road would inform us how to pro- 
ceed to keep clear of the Spaniards. 

On the 11th considerable firing could be heard at various places 
along the route, and the smoke at Spanish camps could occasionally 
be seen a mile or two away. 

I arrived at the headquarters of General Rabi on the night of the 
12th instant, and joined the ship off Aserraderos Point the next morn- 
ing.' 

On this day was issued to the ships of the fleet the first of a 
series of daily bulletins giving a rdsum^ of events as known aboard 
the flag-ship, which was naturally the centre of news. Few 
who have not undergone the experience can appreciate the 
monotony and isolation felt by the crews of the blockading 
fleet. Though near to one another, the ships, but for signals 
sent, and but for what is in actual sight, are separated worlds. 
To wearily look day after day at the Santiago cliffs, to know 
that important things were happening of which they could know 
nothing, was a trying situation. The bulletins printed and dis- 
tributed daily by one of the smaller vessels from now on were a 
great relief to all and did much toward the contentment of 
oflacers and men. Soon all the printing paper of the flag-ship 
was exhausted and scraps of every sort were used. Recourse 
was finally had to a quantity of Spanish telegraph forms which 
had been found and seized, the backs of which fortunately were 
plain, and the bulletins were printed upon them until a supply 
of paper was received from the United States. 

The Vesuvius, for which several urgent requests had been 
made, the last on the 13th itself, was sent in the same night 
and fired three shells loaded with 200 pounds of gun-cotton, 
which were returned by two shots from Socapa. Her arma- 

* Lieutenant Blue wore his uniform and side arms to avoid any question 
of being treated as a spy if captured. 



380 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ment enabled these three to be fired quickly in succession; the 
reloading and firing again required more time than the admiral 
thought advisable to keep her in so exposed a position, so that 
on no night were more than this number fired. These shells 
exploded with terrific shocks and had at least the effect of caus- 
ing the withdrawal of the torpedo-boat destroyers, which were 
l}nng behind the Socapa, near Smith Key, further into the harbor, 
one of them barely escaping destruction. Thenceforward the 
Vesuvius kept up nearly nightly practice. That more damage 
was not done was certainly not the fault of her able commander, 
Pillsbury, or of want of efficiency in the shells. The batteries 
were small marks and a hit was largely a matter of chance. 
Her firing was ineffective in the sense that a 13-inch shell from 
the fleet might be ineffective; that is, it might not happen to 
strike just at the point desired.^ 

The testimony of the Spanish themselves is the best tribute 
to her work. Says one Spanish officer: 

One of the projectiles which fell on the northern slope of Socapa 
tore up trees right and left for a distance of about twenty metres. 
From a certain distance, as I could see the day I went to the Mercedes, 
it looked as though a road had been opened across the mountain. 
Another which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, 
made an excavation not very deep but very wide; I was told that 
it would hold twenty horses. . . . Still another dropped in the water, 
but close to one of the destroyers, which was violently shaken, as also 
the Mercedes, anchored at a short distance.^ 

On June 14, just after daylight, the New Orleans was di- 
rected to engage alone the western (Socapa) battery, being se- 
lected by the admiral on account of her very effective battery of 
6-inch guns, which were 50 calibres in length and with the latest 

• The writer was in the habit of occupying the chart-room near the fore- 
mast of the New York, at night. When the first shell was fired by the Ve- 
suvius he was lying asleep upon the transom. He was awakened by a heavy 
thud against the ear upon which he was lying. This thud had come through 
the earth and water (at the point the ship was lying nearly a mile deep), a 
distance of about three miles. If the energy thus transmitted was so great, 
the shock to those near by must have been of a tremendous character. 

^Muller y Tejeiro, Battles and Cajiitukition of Santiago de Cuba, 82; Trans- 
lation, Office of Naval Intelligence. 1899. 



i 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 381 

Elswick mounts, from which establishment the ship had only 
just been received/ 

Commander Folger took his ship, in the coolest manner, within 
2,000 yards of the battery, and opened vigorously. The battery 
during his firing did not reply, but when after twenty minutes the 
ship was ordered to withdraw and the well-merited signal " Well 
done" was hoisted from the flag-ship, the battery opened with 
a sustained fire, the shells bursting over and around the New 
Orleans with a frequency which appeared to the onlookers to 
make at least some damage a certainty. The ship offered an 
admirable mark, but though in easy range for a considerable 
period, was not struck. 

Authority was now received from the navy department to 
allow the Austrian armored cruiser, Maria Theresa, to enter 
blockaded ports, with a warning as to the similarity of the Aus- 
trian and Spanish flags, a similarity which, as will be seen later, 
caused a somewhat serious misunderstanding.^ 

Orders were received from Washington to convoy a French 
cable ship from St. Nicolas Mole to Guantdnamo Bay and aid 
in the re-establishment of the cable service, to be operated by 
a French staff under the censorship of the chief army signal 
officer at that point. Colonel Allen. 

On the 15th the admiral found it necessary to issue a memo- 
randum on account of insufficient care in maintaining blockading 
positions, the close maintenance of which, it must be said, was 
a matter of much difficulty. A tidal current of from one to tW'O 
miles, and sometimes more, swept along shore. A close atten- 
tion to bearings and a not infrequent use of the engines were 
thus necessary to hold the places assigned. A certain latitude had 
to be allowed to prevent the too frequent use of steam, but in- 
stances occurred of ships drifting nearly hull down from the 

* Built by Elswick for the Brazilian government and purchased from the 
latter. The accidental breaking of the ship's steam steering gear a few days 
after the action noted, made it necessary to send the New Orleans to Key 
West for repairs. She left June 28 and was thus unfortunately absent from 
the battle of July 3. 

^ Though no record can be found of a memorandum to the fleet regarding 
the expected arrival, it is difficult to suppose that it could have been over- 
looked. 



382 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

flag-ship, which, though with all care taken, was perhaps itself 
not always wholly blameless. As even under normal conditions 
the line of blockade was fully eight miles long, it can well be 
understood how greatly was increased the difficulty of signalling, 
difficult as this was with every ship in place, over such an ex- 
tended line. The memorandum read: 

The commander-in-chief desires again to call the attention of the 
commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading 
fleet, especially during the daytime, and it is now directed that all 
ships keep within a distance to the entrance of Santiago of four miles, 
and this distance must not be exceeded. 

2. If the vessel is coaling, or is otherwise restricted in her move- 
ments, she must nevertheless keep within this distance. 

3. If, at any time, the flag-ship makes signal which is not visible 
to any vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flag-ship or re- 
peating vessel, to a point where she can read the signal. 

4. Disregard of the directions which have already been given on 
this head has led to endless confusion. ]\Iany times, during the day, 
the fleet is so scattered that it would be perfectly possible for the en- 
emy to come out of the harbor and meet with very little opposition. 

5. The commander-in-chief hopes that strict attention will be given 
this order. 

On the 16th action against the batteries was taken in accord 
with a battle order of the preceding day. The batteries were 
soon silenced and after firing half an hour, apparently with great 
accuracy, the squadron resumed blockading stations, the batter- 
ies remaining silent. 

Though evidently weak, the batteries were always a danger 
to the battle-ships lighting the entrance at night; they were not 
regarded as in any sense an obstacle to entering the harbor, 
the only obstacle being, as already said, the mines, to the use 
of which the narrow channel lent itself so effectively. But the 
bombardments, besides the chance of injury to the guns of the 
batteries, or to the ships inside, near which fell many of the pro- 
jectiles, fired necessarily at a high elevation, gave a confidence 
and coolness to the men which no ordinary target-firing could 
give. It served a good purpose later. 

On the 16th the torpedo-boat Porfer communicated with 
La Sigua (near Bacanao, a little east of Daiquiri) and brought 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 383 

on board the flag-ship the Cuban general Castillo and colonel 
Veraunes. They reported some 600 Cubans near La Sigua, 
some of whom needed arms, and all needed provisions. Two 
hundred and eighty rifles and equipments were sent from the 
fleet, and provisions for one week from the flag-ship. 

General Rabi with several officers also came from Aserra- 
deros, announcing the expected arrival there of General Garcia 
with 3,000 men, leaving behind him 4,000 to observe the Spanish 
force of over 8,000 at Holguin. Rabi reported Garcia's force 
now well armed and supplied through the successful landing 
by the Florida, at Banes, the 1st of June, of 7,800 rifles with a 
million and a half of cartridges and a large quantity of stores and 
provisions. Rabi also brought the report that General Pando 
was en route to Santiago by way of Manzanillo, with a consid- 
erable force. In consequence of General Castillo's visit the fol- 
lowing memorandum (No. 21) was issued: 

Vessels will observe in passing Bacanao (about half-way between 
Santiago and Guantanamo) if a fire be shown and a Cuban flag 
hoisted; if so, they should communicate. This signal is arranged 
with General Castillo's forces. 

Early in the morning of June 17 a reconnaissance of Cabanas 
Bay was attempted with the idea of utilizing it as a landing- 
place for an attack upon the western side of the harbor entrance. 
The bay is a beautiful little bottle-shaped pocket of water, a 
miniature of so many of the Cuban harbors. The force con- 
sisted of two steam cutters, one from the New York in charge of 
Naval Cadet Powell, the other from the Massachusetts in charge 
of Naval Cadet Hart, both under command of Lieutenant 
Harlow, executive officer of the Vixen. The cutters at 3.30 
left the picket line where they had been stationed during the night 
and reporting alongside the Vixen took on board Lieutenant 
Harlow, and started into the bay at 4.45. Almost immediately 
after passing the small ancient fort at the entrance, they were 
fired upon so heavily and at such short range that they were 
obliged to retreat. The Texas and Vixen going in to the sup- 
port of the cutters and opening a vigorous fire at short range, 
dispersed the enemy. Much of the firing was, on account of 



384 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the narrowness of the entrance, from within fifty yards. The 
two cutters were struck seventeen times; the smoke-pipe of the 
New York's cutter had in it seven shot holes, but, extraordinary 
to say, no one was injured. The attempt, though unsuccessful, 
deserves high praise for the coolness and courage shown by all 
aboard. Lieutenant Harlow praised particularly the conduct 
of young Powell and Hart, Coxswain O'Donnell, and Seaman 
Blom. 

On June 17 the following telegrams were received via St. 
Nicolas Mole: 

Key West, J^ine 14th. — Army to leave Dry Tortugas, Fla., on 
June 15th, morning. Two or more first-class torpedo-boats and 
Resolute with ammunition accompanying expedition. Vessels with 
provisions for three months sent from New York. 

Washington, June 14th. — From very reliable source is learned 
that five small Spanish unprotected vessels and one armed transport 
at San Juan, Puerto Rico. No more amiy supplies. Are nearly out 
of provisions. Twenty-two thousand tons of coal there and only 
three hours' supply of shell at their forts, but would be well not to 
trust too much statement about shell. Department advises you 
blockade at once cruiser and transport at San Juan, and prevent es- 
cape. Is Terror one of them? Our army and convoy are leaving 
Tampa, Fla. 

June 14th. — Department attaches utmost importance to main- 
tain full strength of the blockade of Cuba and desires you send there 
at once some aiLxiliaries and other cruisers, unless you can't possibly 
spare them. This matter is very important, in view of probably 
hostile report Austrian vessel. 

June 1.5th. — The American consul, Kingston, Jamaica, telegraphs: 
"Spanish troops and battery removing from Manzanillo to Cienfue- 
gos, coasting vessels carrying on Saturday weekly." If the Spanish 
fort^see defeat at Santiago they may attempt to withdraw part of the 
garrison and field artillery by above route. 

June 15th. — The Spanish general Pando, chief of operations, left 
Havana to-day for Santiago de Cuba. He will probably go by rail 
to the south coast and thence by small coastwise steamer inside reef 
and key to Manzanillo, Cuba. More clothing goes to you by Newark 
and Yale, to sail shortly. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 385 

June 15th. — Universal horror barbarous mutilation American dead. 
American people watching your operations anxiously but with greatest 
confidence. Having troops soon relieve. Kindly acknowledge. 

June 15th. — The American consul at Kingston, Jamaica, sends 
the following: Will you permit me to urge unobserved blockade 
well-armed auxiliary to cover channel key leading to Manzanillo, 
Cuba, and channel westward of Isle of Pines, West Indies. At least 
eight vessels preparing to take cargo of provisions for Cuba. Puris- 
sima Concepcion gets the British flag but questions granting clearance 
referred to X/ondon, England. Strenuously working for the principle 
involved, uhe vessel comparatively unimportant consideration. 

The following telegram was sent via Mole St. Nicolas by the 
Scorpion: 

Bombarded the batteries on June 16th for forty-three minutes; 
firing very accurate; the batteries were silenced completely. Fleet 
not injured. We are providing Cubans as far as possible with cloth- 
ing, food, arms. These and supplies of all kinds are much needed 
by fleet. Cubans much assistance at Guantanamo, where everything 
is now reported quiet. Intercepted letter from Guantanamo to 
Spanish commanding army officer at Santiago reports there is only 
a small quantity food not more than sufficient for this month half 
rations. Deserter from the Rcina Mercedes states Mcrrimac does 
not block up channel, she is too far in the harbor. There is no possi- 
bility, however, of anything coming out without our knowledge; 
a battle-ship is every night at a distance of one mile from entrance, 
illuminating the channel most clearly. I again urge earnestly army 
move with all possible celerity. Fine weather may end any day. 

On June 18 Sampson sent a telegram: 

Recommend that Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson be ad- 
vanced five numbers in his corps for gallantry. I would recommend 
him for more had effort succeeded, but he carried vessel beyond point 
arranged, leaving free egress for vessels, and the failure of the effort 
must be taken into consideration. 

The flag-ship left the blockade and went to Guantdnamo Bay, 
forty miles distant, to look into affairs and for the purpose of 
observing the Spanish positions at the several points along the 
coast. A close look was taken at Daiquiri (their last post to 
the eastward) for the purpose of possibly using it for landing 



386 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

a part of the expected army. The ship returned to the blockade 
in the afternoon, being at Guantdnamo about an hour, and hav- 
ing anchored for the first time since leaving Key West reef, on 
May 30. 

On June 19 the following despatches were received via St. 
Nicolas Mole: 

From Commodore Watson: 

On 14th sent Captain Ludlow in Maple under flag of truce with 
full power to negotiate exchange of Hobson and the seven petty offi- 
cers. Chief of staff answered by letter that after reference to Madrid 
captain-general will communicate by flag of truce. Ludlow will, 
if possible, have exchange made as desired and soon. Commodore 
Remey will be advised immediately an agreement is reached. 

Jtme 16. — Spanish steamer Purissima Concepcion, recently ostensi- 
bly transferred to the British flag, will leave about June 16 from 
Kingston, Jamaica, for Manzanillo, Cuba, or Batabano, Cuba, with 
supplies. Capture vessel if possible if you have code. 

June 16. — The American consul at Vera Cruz, Mexico, telegraphs 
the Spanish steamer Villaverde sailed June 17 from Vera Cruz, Mex- 
ico, cleared for San Domingo City, San Domingo, took two boxes of 
rifles, thirty men, and two guns. 

Washington, Jime 17. — Convoy consists of the Indiana, Detroit, 
Bancroft, Helena, Annapolis, Wasp, Eagle, Hornet Osceola, Manning, 
and torpedo-boat Ericsson. As soon as possible after their arrival 
you will send every vessel that can be spared from the operations 
at Santiago to re-enforce the blockade, which is suffering for want 
of vessels. It is the intention of the president to establish block- 
ade to cover the ports of Cuba [from] Batabano to Cape Cruz, as 
soon as can be maintained effectively. Notify the department what 
date will be ready with your force to enforce it in order the procla- 
mation may be issued. Department depends upon you solely from 
that time for the blockade, but you may entrust to Commodore Howell 
particular disposition of the vessels on any part of the blockade that 
you order. 

June 18. — Detail Iowa, Oregon, and Brooklyn full of coal and ammu- 
nition. They will be sent to coast of Spain in the event of Cadiz 
division passing Suez, Egypt, and Harvard, Yale, Yosemite, Dixie 
same service. If, in your opinion, these armored vessels are not in 
repair to make the above-mentioned cruise, which should you recom- 
mend? 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 387 

The following telegrams were sent: 

Cienfuegos blockaded already by Yankee, Cape Cruz and vicinity 
by Dixie; when some of the light-draft vessels promised according 
to your letter of Jime 6 arrive they will be sent to cruise in the vi- 
cinity of Manzanillo, Cuba, and Isle of Pines. The president may 
declare immediately the blockade of the whole southern coast. St. 
Paul and Yosemife are on the way to blockade San Juan, P. R. Will 
send back to north coast of Cuba all vessels constituting convoy 
as soon as they arrive; a part will go by Cape Maysi and part Cape 
San Antonio so as to temporarily blockade the whole coast of Cuba. 
Rifles enough. Recpiest 500,000 rounds of Springfield rifle ammuni- 
tion, 45 calibre. All foreign cables have been cut by Goodrich, last 
one on 18th. Recommend that isolation be made complete between 
Key West and Havana. Any communication sure to furnish Blanco 
information. 

The admiral was mistaken in supposing all the cables cut. 
There was one more to Jamaica than was supposed. It escaped 
being grappled through the great depth of water, and there was 
thus, during the whole period of the war, no time in which the 
beleaguered force at Santiago was not in touch with Spain by 
way of Jamaica. 

The chief of staff went in the Vixen on the 19th to Aserra- 
deros (fifteen miles west), to examine the points where it might 
be possible to land troops, and to see General Calixto Garcia. 
He returned, bringing the general and several officers of his 
staff to the flag-ship. General Garcia corroborated the report 
of General Rabi as to the disposition of his forces, excepting 
that he had brought with him 4,000 men instead of 3,000 as 
mentioned by Rabi, leaving the latter number to observe the 
Spanish force at Holguin. 

Garcia made a most favorable impression. He was a large, 
kindly-faced man, with an extraordinary deep vertical furrow 
in the forehead made by a pistol bullet in an attempted suicide 
while captured and in prison. He inspired much confidence 
in Sampson, who was usually slow to make up his mind to such 
trust. The general unfortunately suffered much from the 
motion of the ship, and during most of his stay aboard, which 
would have been prolonged but for this, was lying stretched 
upon a sofa in the cabin. Sampson mentioned the possibility 



388 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

of an attack by the Spaniards upon Garcia's force. Lifting 
himself at once upon his elbow Garcia replied with great im- 
pressiveness, "The Spaniards never attack; they never attack," 
giving in this one short statement the true reason of their failure 
to re-establish their authority in Cuba. 

Next day, June 20, the army expedition arrived. The story 
of the combined movement of the succeeding fortnight belongs 
to another chapter. In the meantime affairs in the broad field 
of naval events in the Atlantic which, while focussed at Santiago, 
covered the whole of the Cuban coast and were now about to 
reach out toward Spain and the East. The following series of 
telegrams is thus given here as bearing intimately upon what 
was soon to come, and in order not to break the continuity of the 
story later. 

Telegraphic communication having now, as mentioned, been 
established at Guantdnamo, telegrams were sent through that 
point, thus saving a hundred miles of steaming each way. 

The following was received from Key West: 

Captain-general states Spanish government refuses to exchange 
prisoners. 



Watson. 



From Washington; 



The U. S. consul Guadeloupe states Norwegian steamer Marie, 
Martin, master, 1,256 tons, has one ordinary smoke-stack, two masts, 
black, 3,000 tons of coal, arrived to-day consigned Spanish consul; 
is out of order; alleged cause stoppage believe seeking further in- 
structions. Destination unknown. The U. S. consul at Kingston, 
Jamaica, reports Hungarian for Puerto Rico. 

You are authorized to ascertain from the Spanish authorities at 
Santiago whether Hobson with his men are imprisoned in the Morro 
or other fort exposed to your fire, and if so inform Cervera and com- 
manding army officer he shall be held responsible by the govern- 
ment (U. S.) for the personal safety of our officers and men above 
mentioned, and that you hold equal number Spanish prisoners sub- 
ject to same treatment. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 389 

When the Spanish give up hope at Santiago they may attempt to 
escape via Manzanillo, Cuba, as understood here they receive suppHes 
now via Manzanillo. 

It is proposed to proclaim the blockade on the south side from 
Cape Cruz to Cape Frances. When will you be ready ? 

From Commodore Remey at Key West: 

Armeria arrived — request you send all cruisers, auxiliaries, and 
despatch-vessels you can dispense with for the blockade. 

The telegram from Washington regarding readiness to ex- 
tend the blockade was replied to on June 23: 

I have sent to their blockading stations via Cape Antonio the Cas- 
tine, Eagle, Wasp; via Cape Maysi, the Dolphin, Annapolis, Ban- 
croft, Hornet, Manning, Wompaiuck. I am holding on southern 
blockade the Helena and Osceola and retaining temporarily at Santi- 
ago the Detroit, Indiana, and torpedo-boats. 

But while the navy department was making its inquiry it 
was telegraphing a request of the war department for convoy 
for returning transports. To this Sampson demurred. He 
telegraphed : 

Such convoys will occur frequently and so reduce the available 
ships for blockade as to make it quite impossible to maintain strict 
blockade of the whole of Cuba. Vessels running blockade are smaller 
in size but greatly increased in number. I request most urgently 
such vessels as the Newark, Prairie, Columbia, and Minneapolis be 
sent here for duty with the blockade. 

Another telegram of the same day reported: 

Under flag of truce I learned to-day Hobson and his men all well 
and now confined in the city of Santiago at a distance of four miles 
from Morro. 

The following was received: 

The following received from correspondent abroad: "Steamer Moni- 
serrat loading at Cadiz for Cuba; considerable coal going from Cadiz 
presumably to Canary Islands; Spanish fleet at Cartagena, Spain; 



390 THE SPAXISH-A:\IERICAN WAR 

movement probably made to satisfy people." This information 
probably reliable. The French steamer Versailles at Kingston, 
Jamaica, receiving pistols and cartridges, is bound to St. Thomas to 
Corunna, Spain, probably expects touch at Puerto Rico. It is re- 
ported from Cardiff, Wales, Spanish steamer, under convoy cruiser, 
is due about June 23 at Cuba. Commodore Watson has been in- 
formed. 

Next day came further intimation of demand for convoy: 

Have received definite information an expedition about 25,000 
men to be directed soon to Puerto Rico, and as you will be probably 
called upon for co-operation and more or less convoy it, it is desirable 
that you telegraph if you shall need any more coal and suppHes 
accumulated to the east, and if so in what place and what quantity. 

The following, received June 24, again expresses the navy 
department's anxiety regarding the blockade: 

The U. S. consul at Kingston, Jamaica, says that under-secretary 
of the Captain-General of Cuba, Spanish naval officer Virgilio Lopez 
Chaves, came aboard Adula with, it is supposed, $250,000 to pur- 
chase provisions to be taken to Manzanillo for Cervera. Chaves 
is going to Manzanillo to negotiate with Masso; extensive prepara- 
tions being made for shipping provisions to Cuba. 

Reports constantly received of provisions reaching Spanish forces 
via southern ports of Cuba and of preparations in Mexico and Ja- 
maica to forward further supplies; therefore the department desires 
greatly to keep all blockade effective, to establish blockade from Cape 
Cruz to Cape Frances. When shall you be ready for the latter to be 
proclaimed ? 

This was answered on June 25: 

The Detroit, Hornet, and Yankton ordered to proceed for the block- 
ade between Cape Cruz and Cape Frances. The Helena and Osceola 
will sail immediately after coaling. 

On this day a force was sent by Commander McCalla to de- 
termine whether the enemy still occupied the extremities of 
Punta del Jicacal in Guantdnamo Bay. This force, which was 
under Colonel Pluntington, U. S. M. C, consisted of two com- 
panies of marines and two-thirds of the force of Cubans under 
Colonel Thomas, in all about 240 men. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 391 

The landing flotilla consisted of boats from the various ships, 
towed by the steam launches of the Helena, Annapolis, and 
Bancroft, which left their ships at 2 a. m. for the marine camp, 
under the command of Commander Eaton. The Eagle took sta- 
tion for the night off Jicacal Point, and at 4 a. m. the Marblehead 
and Helena moved into position close to the beach to south and 
westward of highlands of Jicacal Point, to cover the landing. 
The boats advanced in three columns and the troops were landed 
quietly and quickly, and a thorough reconnaissance was made of 
the point. The enemy was not seen. The men re-embarked 
about 8. 

A picket line of Spaniards was seen from the ships, one or 
two men at a time, across the dry lagoon a couple of miles to 
north and westward. 

The Marblehead then proceeded to the channel between 
Jicacal and Cayo del Hospital to drag for mines. Four mines 
were found and successfully raised, making thirteen mines in 
all raised in the channel. 

The navy department in a telegram received June 25 returned 
to the subject of the blockade: 

The department finds blockade of some parts is very weak; Bahia 
Honda, Mariel, and Cabanas have only Hamilton; Matanzas and 
Cardenas only Pompey and Mangrove; no monitor off Havana. You 
must strengthen blockade or claim not effective enough will be made 
from abroad. 

On June 25 came the word: 

Have the Oregon, Yosemite, Iowa, Yankee, and Dixie full of coal 
and ammunition and hold them for speedy orders the coast of Spain. 
Camara's fleet was sighted off Pantellaria Island, Mediterranean, 
standing to the east. Spanish collier passed Suez, Egypt, bound for 
Perim Island, India. Department expects to send you from Commo- 
dore Howell more vessels to replace any cruiser that may be taken 
from you for Spain and East. 

This was accented by another telegram, directing that the 
colliers Abarenda, Scindia, and Alexander should be sent north 
whether empty or not, and if either should not be with the fleet, to 
send the largest and fastest present. " They go with our squadron 



392 THE SPANISH-AJMERICAN WAR 

to Spain and to the East." The loss of these was to be made 
good by the Lebanon, on her way to Guant^namo carrying 1,200 
tons of coal and towing a schooner with 3,000. All three of the 
colliers mentioned were at Guantdnamo and were despatched, 
though the Alexander had discharged but 400 tons of a large cargo. 
Replying to an inquiry Sampson telegraphed that he had no 
changes to recommend in the ships proposed to be sent to Spain, 
but advised that the Iowa should certainly be docked before pro- 
ceeding on such a cruise. He added to this telegram that after 
careful examination, the reported mutilation of bodies at Guan- 
tdnamo was a mistake, the apparent mutilation being due to 
the bullets. He ended: "I withdraw the charge that the bodies 
of these men had been mutilated." 

Sampson was concerned as to the immediate loss, in the crisis 
which was now imminent, of so many ships, and particularly 
as to the withdrawal of two of the heaviest batde-ships. While 
confident that what remained were ample, should all be present, 
to deal with Cervera's squadron, the frequent withdrawals for 
coaling, and the possibility of break-downs which could not be 
foreseen, might prevent the absolute annihilation to which he 
confidently looked, should Cervera come out. He thus tele- 
graphed on the next day (June 26): 

As the department may not fully understand the situation here, I 
send the following: Nine vessels of convoying squadron are coaling 
at Guantanamo, the New York off Santiago, and the others must be 
coaled. Yankee is at Cienfuegos. The Dixie is at Cape Cruz. The 
Helena and Hornet left yesterday for these stations. The Detroit 
and Aux. No. 440 follow. The St. Paul and Yosemife are at San Juan, 
Puerto Rico. In smooth water ships can coal off Santiago with some 
difficulty. I regard it essential not to reduce this force too much for 
some few days in view of the fact that the weather may compel us 
to coal at Guantanamo. Channel was not obstructed by Merrimac 
and we must be prepared to meet the Spanish fleet if they attempt to 
escape. I am preparing torpedo attack in order to hasten their de- 
struction. Regret to resort to this method because of its difficulties 
and small chance of success, torpedo-boats being subject to small 
arms and rapid-fire guns from the shore for a long distance. I should 
not do this were present force to be kept here, as it now ensures a 
capture which I believe will terminate the war. Shall ships named, 
the Oregon, Yankee, etc., be collected here for the proposed move. 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— CONTINUED 393 

Not only did the order propose taking away two of the most 
important elements of the battle force off Santiago, but it swept 
away the possibilities of the efficient blockade for which the de- 
partment had been so insistent. Following close, too, upon the 
heels of the former telegram came the following despatch, June 26, 
remarkable in that the sale mentioned was impossible unless 
followed by most serious complications with Chile; it called for 
still another fast and well-armed ship: 

Have learned, May 25th, armored cruiser 0'7:ri^5rm5 sold to Spain; 
therefore add Brooklyn to ships kept coaled and prepared to go to 
Spain and to the East. 

Sampson's protest, mild as it was, had its effect. On June 
28 came: 

You are authorized to detain the Oregon and the Iowa until the 
other armored vessels are coaled fully, so as to be able to hold out 
position at Santiago de Cuba, but you will hurry this to the utmost 
possible as the department desires to get these vessels to the East 
via Spain. Watson with Newark leaves to-day to join you to com- 
mand division for Spain. Assemble at same time Yosemite, Dixie, 
and Yankee and coal them for same service. 

This was followed by a telegram directing to utilize this period 
in seeing that ships designated for Commodore Watson were 
provisioned for four months. Sampson had received the day 
before a telegram from Commodore Watson stating that he had 
transferred his broad pennant from the Montgomery to the 
Newark on June 26, and would leave June 30 for Santiago. 
Watson had already received his orders to command the de- 
tached force in a telegram from Washington of June 26, which 
read: 

As soon as Sampson gives the order, you shall sail with the Iowa 
and the Oregon, the Newark, Yosemite, Yankee, and Dixie for St. 
Michael, Azores, for orders, en route to Tangiers, Morocco. Colliers 
ordered to join you Saint Michael. If they have not arrived when 
you have reached there, leave a cruiser to convoy them and to follow. 
Shift your flag to Iowa. 

This, of which a copy had been sent to Sampson, was accom- 
panied by another telegram, stating that Commodore Howell 



394 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

had been ordered to report with the northern patrol squadron, 
which in some degree would compensate for the vessels to be 
withdrawn from the blockade for the Eastern expedition. The 
telegram directed that Howell's ships be distributed upon the 
blockade, and that the commodore take over the command which 
had been held by Watson. Steps were at once taken to carry 
out the instructions of the navy department as fully as possible. 
In the meantime numerous reports came from Washington 
of vessels preparing to run the blockade ; among them even one 
was mentioned from New York — the steamer Ardenbru, which 
sailed June 28, with a large cargo of jerked beef, for Kingston, 
Jamaica, but with Cuba as its probable destination. 

Telegrams came June 29, both from Washington and Ja- 
maica, that the British steamer Adula would leave next day for 
Santiago and Guantdnamo, ostensibly to bring back refugees, 
but undoubtedly carrying an important Spanish mission. The 
question of the blockade became more and more urgent. Word 
came that several light-draft steamers and small torpedo-boats 
were being sent to Key W^est for service in the intricate waters 
about the Isle of Pines and Bataban6. " Would it not be well," 
said a Washington telegram of June 29, "to designate a senior 
officer for the whole ground Cienfuegos to Cape Frances?" 
The consul at Martinique reported a steamer flying the British 
flag, but with a Spanish crew and carrying coal and provisions, 
had attempted to supply the two Spanish ships, but that the gov- 
ernor had refused to permit it to be done. Reports came also 
from Venezuela via Washington, June 29, saying: 

Urgent. According to telegram of June 28, the American minister 
to Venezuela states have reason for thinking the Spanish fleet ex- 
pected in this vicinity and that provisions and coal to be taken at small 
island off Cura(^ao; a great many telegrams passing between the Span- 
ish minister, Madrid, and the Spanish consul at Cura9ao, look as if 
Cervera might be contemplating sortie. 

Following this was another telegram stating the loading of a 
vessel in a Venezuelan port with provisions, " undoubtedly for 
Spanish fleet, Cuba or Puerto Rico. The American minister 
may prevent sailing." 



THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO— COxNTINUED 395 

In the light of later knowledge we know that Cervera had no 
intention of going southward, and that the suppositions, though 
very natural, were foundationless. 

It was, however, clear that Cuba was being fairly constantly 
supplied. Word came from Washington on June 29: 

General Garcia received letter that states the French ship, 2,000,000 
rations, had just arrived June 21 at Nuevitas, the port of Puerto 
Principe; a tow-boat is running constantly from Nuevitas to Gibara, 
Cuba, the port of Holguin; why not capture any vessels running from 
Nuevitas to Gibara and destroy Spanish shipping in these ports? 
The Norwegian bark Mizpah leaves to-day from Barbados for Puerto 
Rico Island, probable destination San Juan, Puerto Rico. 

Also: 

Telegram of June 29 from U. S. minister to Honduras states Spanish 
transport Guillervio coaled at Belize, Honduras, yesterday; thence to 
Jamaica and Cuba with provisions; sixteen knots; has thirty Spanish 
refugees aboard. 

On July 1: 

The war department gives the following information: during week 
ending June 29 six vessels brought supplies to Cuba, namely, Cris- 
tina and schooner to Cienfuegos; Purissiina Conccpcion at Casilda; 
Arturo and Alberto to Batabano; government reserving all supplies 
for troops so army will have enough for two months. They are ex- 
pecting Santo Domingo and Montevideo which left last week for re- 
turn with loads of provisions consigned to Blanco. 

However, the admiral was conscious of having done all that 
could be done with his very limited resources, and even at the 
moment the navy department was pressing in the question of 
Watson's departure, saying in a telegram of July 1 : 

The prospective advance of Camara to the East makes it much 
to be desired Watson's squadron should commence to move. Tele- 
graph when you can send it, having regard to your necessities at San- 
tiago. His cruisers and armored vessels should be full of coal. The 
department does not wish to weaken you, but diversion favorable for 
Dewey by operations positive is necessary. 



APPENDIX A 

SHIPS IN COMMISSION DURING THE WAR 

Asiatic Station 



ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 



COMMANDERS 



SHIP 

Baltimore . 

Boston 

Brutus . 

Charleston 

Concord 

McCulloch 

Monadnock 

Monocacy 

Monterey 

Nanshan 

Nero 

Olympia 

Petrel . 
Raleigh 
Zafiro . 

The * signifies that the officer in question was, subsequently, relieved by f. 
parentheses shows date of relief. 



DATE attached' 



Captain N. M. Dyer From beginning 

Captain Frank Wildes " " 

Lieutenant V. L. Cottman Aug. 4 

Captain Henry Glass June 30 

Commander Asa Walker From beginning 

Captain D. B. Hodgson, R.C.S. ..." 

Captain W. H. Whiting Aug. 16 

Commander O. W. Farenholt .... From beginning 

Commander E. H. C. Leutze .... Aug. 4 

Lieutenant W. B. Hodges From beginning 

Commander Charles Belknap .... Aug. 16 

/ *Captain C. V. Gridley From beginning 

\ fCaptain B. P. Lamberton (May 25) . 

Commander E. P. Wood 

Captain J. B. Coghlan " " 

Lieutenant W. McLean " " 



Date in 



Pacific Station 



rear-admiral J. N. miller, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 



SHIP 
Albatross . 

Bennington 

Corvnn 
Grant . 
Perry . 
Rush . 
Mohican 
MoTuidnock 



commanders 
f *Lieutenant-Commander J. F. Moser 
I tLieut.-Com. C. K. Curtis (July 14) 
[ JLieut.-Com. J. F. Moser (Aug. 1) 

!*Commander H. E. Nichols . . 
tLieut.-Com. J. F. Moser (July 14) 
jCommander E. D. Taussig (Aug. 1) 
Captain W. J. Herring, R.C.S. 
Captain J. A. Slamm, R.C.S. 
Captain W. J. Kilgore, R.C.S 
Captain W. H. Roberts, R.C.S 
Commander G. M. Book 
Captain W. H. Whiting 



DATE attached 

From beginning 



' The Dates, generally, are those of arrival at station for service. 

397 



398 



APPENDIX 



SHIP COMMANDERS DATE ATTACHED 

i*Captain C. E. Clark From beginning 
tLieut.-Com. J. W. Carlin (March 15) 
JCommander E. H. C. Leutze . . . 

Philadelphia . . Captain G. H. Wadleigh July 8 

Wheeling . . . Commander Uriel Sebree From beginning 

The * signifies that officer in question was, later on, relieved by t, and then t by t- 
Date in parentheses shows date of relief. 



North Atlantic Station 
rear-admiral william t. sampson, commander-in-chief, 
commodore john a. howell. 

(Rear- Admiral August 10, 1898.) In independent command of Northern Patrol Squadron 
from April 20 to July 1. Commanding First Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet, from 
July 1. 

COMMODORE GEORGE C. REMEY 
Commanding Naval Base, Key West, from May 7. 

COMMODORE JOHN C. WATSON 
Commanding Blockading Squadron from May 6 to June 21; First Sqiiadron, North 
Atlantic Fleet, from June 21 to June 27; Eastern Squadron from July 7 to Sep- 
tember 20, 1898. 

COMMODORE WINFIELD S. SCHLEY 
(Rear-Admiral August 10, 1898.) Commanding Flying Squadron to May 24 indepen- 
dently, then under Commander-in-Chief; commanding Second Squadron. North 
Atlantic Fleet, from June 21 to close of hostilities. 



SHIP 

Abarenda 

Alexander 

Amphitrite 

A nnapolis 

Apache 

Armeria 

Accomac 

Badger 

Bancroft 

Brooklyn 

CcEsar . 

Calumet 

Castine 

Celtic . 

Cincinnati 

Columbia 

Cushing 

Detroit 

Dixie . 



COMMANDERS 

Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Buford . 
Commander W. T. Burwell .... 

Captain C. J. Barclay 

Commander J. J. Hunker 

Lieutenant G. C. Hanus 

Commander L. C. Logan 

f *Ensign W. S. Crosley 

\ fBoatswain J. W. Angus (May 6) 

Commander A. S. Snow 

Commander R. Clover 

Captain F. A. Cook 

Lieutenant-Commander A. B. Speyers . 
First Lieutenant W. H. Cushing, R.C.S. 

Commander R. M. Berry 

Commander H. B. Mansfield .... 

Captain C. M. Chester 

Captain J. H. Sands 

Lieutenant Albert Gleaves .... 

Commander J. H. Dayton 

Commander C. H. Davis 



DATE ATTACHED 

June 7 

June 19 

From beginning 

April 25 

Aug. 4 

June 4 

From beginning 

July 1 

May 8 

May 24 

June 7 

July 21 

From beginning 

June 18 

From beginning 

July 1 

From beginning 

Cl It 

May 6 



' Monterey was detached June 7; Monadnock June 23, and sent to Asia. 



APPENDIX 



399 



SHIP 

Dolphin 
Dorothea 

Dupont 
Eagle . 
Ericsson 

Fern 

Fish Hawk 
Foote . 
Frolic . 
Glacier 
Gloucester 
Gwin . 
Hamilton 
Hannibal 
Harvard 
Hawk . 
Helena 
Hist . 
Hornet . 
Hudson 
Indiana 
Iowa 

Justin . 

Lancaster 

Lebanon 

Leonidas 

Leyden 

Machias 

Manning 

Mangrove 

Maple 

Marblehead 

Marietta 

Mayflower 

Massachusetts 

McKee 

McLane 

Merrimac 

Miantonomoh 

Minneapolis 

Montgomery . 

Morrill . . 

Morris . . . 



COMMANDERS DATE ATTACHED 

Commander H. W. Lyon From beginning 

f *Lieut. -Commander W. J. Barnette . July 1 

\ fLieut.-Com. N. T. Houston (Aug. 19) 

Lieutenant S. S. Wood From beginning 

Lieutenant W. H. H. Southerland . . " " 

Lieutenant N. R. Usher " " 

f *Lieut.-Commander W. S. Cowles . " " 

\ fLieut.-Com. H. Winslow (April 27) . 

Lieut. -Commander F. H. Delano . . July 25 

Lieutenant Wni. L. Rodgers .... From beginning 

Commander E. H. Gheen July 31 

Commander J. P. Merrell July 22 

Lieutenant-Commander R. Wainwright June 3 

Lieutenant C. S. Williams July 8 

Captain W. D. Roath, R.C.S. . . . May 1 

Commander H. G. O. Colby .... July 1 

Captain C. S. Cotton April 30 

Lieutenant J. Hood From beginning 

Commander W. T. Swinburne ... " " 

Lieutenant Lucien Young June 24 

Lieutenant J. M. Helm April 22 

First Lieut. F. H. Newcomb, R.C.S. . . May 1 

Captain H. C. Taylor From beginning 

Captain R. D. Evans " " 

f *Commander G. E. Ide June 2 

\ fCommander W. L. Field (July 10) . 

Commander Thomas Perry .... May 31 

Lieutenant-Commander C. T. Forse . . May 26 

Commander W. 1. Moore June 11 

f *Boatswain J. W. Angus .... From beginning 

1 fEnsign W. S. Crosley (May 6) . . 

f *Commander J. F. Merry .... " " 

\ fCommander W. W. Mead (June 27) 

Captain F. M. Munger, R.C.S. . . . May 7 

*Lieut. -Commander W. H. Everett . From beginning 
f Lieut-.Com. D. D. V. Stuart (June 7) 

Lieutenant-Commander W. Kellogg . May 15 

Captain B. H. McCalla From beginning 

Commander F. M. Symonds .... " " 

Commander M. R. S. Mackenzie ... " " 

Captain F. J. Higginson " " 

Lieutenant C. M. Knepper July 25 

First Lieut. W. E. Reynolds, R.C.S. . . From beginning 

Commander J. M. Miller May 5 

Captain M. L. Johnson May 5 

Captain T. F. Jewell From beginning 

Commander G. A. Converse .... " " 

Captain H. D. Smith, R.C.S April 26 

Lieutenant C. E. Fox July 12 



400 



APPENDIX 



SHIP 

Nashville . 

Newark 

New Orleans 
Newport . 
New York 

Niagara 

Oneida 

Oregon . 

Osceola 

Panther 

Peoria . 

Piscataqua 

Pompey 

Porter . 

Potomac 

Powhatan 

Prairie 

Princeton 

Puritan 

Resolute 
Rodgers 
St. Louis 
St. Paul 
San Franci 

Saturn . 

Scindia 

Scorpion 

Sioux . 

Siren . 

Solace . 

Southery 

Sterling 

Stranger 

Supply 

Suwanee 

Sylvia . 

Talbot . 

Tecumseh 

Terror . 

Texas . 

Topeka 

Uncas . 

Vesuidus 

Vicksburg 



COMMANDERS DATE ATTACHED 

Commander Washburn Maynard . . . From beginning 

f *Captain A. S. Barker June 25 

\ tCaptain C. F. Goodrich (Aug. 8) . 

Captain W. M. Folger May 8 

Commander B. F. Tilley From beginning 

Captain French E. Chadwick .... " " 

f *Commander G. A. Bicknell . . . May 3 

\ fLieut.-Com. E. S. Prime (May 30) . 

Lieutenant W. G. Miller June 2 

f *Captain C. E. Clark May 26 (arrival 

\ fCaptain A. S. Barker (Aug. 6) . . Key West) 

Lieutenant J. L. Purcell April 27 

Commander G. C. Reiter April 30 

Lieutenant T. W. Ryan June 21 

Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Nilea . July 21 

Commander J. M. Miller June 7 

Lieutenant J. C. Fremont 

Lieutenant G. P. Blow July 13 

Lieutenant F. M. Russell June 11 

Commander G. J. Train May 18 

Commander C. H. West July 27 

f *Captain P. F. Harrington .... From beginning 

\ fCaptain Fred'k Rodgers (June 18) . 

Commander J. G. Eaton " " 

Lieutenant J. L. Jayne " " 

Captain C. F. Goodrich (Newark, Aug. 8) April 30 

Captain C. D. Sigsbee May 5 

Captain R. P. Leary May 2 

f *Commander S. W. Very .... From beginning 

\ fCommander G. A. Bicknell (June 4) 

Commander E. W. Watson .... June 10 

Lieut. -Commander Adolph Marix . . May 24 

Ensign W. R. Gherardi May 1 

Lieutenant J. M. Robinson .... July 25 

Commander A. Dunlap May 11 

Commander Walton Goodwin .... July 1 

Commander R. E. Impey May 24 

Lieutenant G. L. Dyer July 21 

Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Ingersoll May 26 

Lieutenant-Commander D. Delehanty . May 15 

Lieutenant G. H. Peters Aug. 2 

Lieutenant W. R. Shoemaker .... July 10 

Lieutenant G. R. Evans April 23 

Captain Nicoll Ludlow From beginning 

Captain J. W. Philip " 

Commander W. S. Cowles July 6 

Lieutenant F. R. Brainard April 23 

Lieutenant-Commander J. E. Pillsbury From beginning 

Commander A. B. H. Lillie .... From beginning 



APPENDIX 401 

SHIP COMMANDERS DATE ATTACHED 

Viking .... Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Wilson . July 22 

Vixen .... Lieutenant A. Sharp, Jr May 12 

Vulcan . . . Lieutenant-Commander L Harris . . July 1 

Wasp .... Lieutenant A. Ward May 1 

Wilmington . . Commander C. C. Todd From beginning 

Windom . . . Captain S. E. Maguire, R.C.S. . . . May 5 

Window . . . Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou .... " " 

Wompatuck . . Lieutenant C. W. Jungen April 26 

Woodbury . . Captain H. B. Rodgers, R.C.S. . . . May 8 

Yale .... Captain W. C. Wise May 2 

Yankee . . . Commander W. H. Brownson .... May 12 

Yankton . . . Lieutenant-Commander J. D. Adams . June 25 

Yosemite . . . Commander W. H. Emory May 17 

The * signifies that the officer in questson was, subsequently, relieved by f. Date in 
parentheses shows the date of relief. 

Note. — The Brooklyn (flag-ship), Columbia, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, and Texas 
(from the beginning of the war), the Merrimac (from April 9 to April 29), the New Or- 
leans (from May 8), the Scorpion and Sterling (from May 1), the Saturn (from April 
21 to April 29) were in the Flying Squadron under command of Commodore Schley 
which came under the command of Admiral Sampson May 24. The San Francisco 
(flag-ship), Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, Yosemite, Columbia, Badger, and Southery, were in 
the Northern Patrol Squadron, under command of Commodore Howell; the Yankee 
was detached to the North Atlantic Fleet on May 29, the Yosemite on May 30, the 
Dixie on June 13. Commodore Howell's squadron became part of the North Atlantic 
fleet on July 1. 

The Kainhdin (ram). Captain G. F. F. Wilde, was part of the Flying Squadron until 
April 16, and was thereafter on detached service. The Si. Louis, St. Paul, Harvard, 
and Yale were, later in the war, much on detached service in connection with the trans- 
port of prisoners and troops. 

AUXILIARY NAVAL FORCE 

REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY ERBEN (RETIRED) IN CHARGE. 
Headquarters Ashore at New York. 

Aileen Lieutenant A. Gartley. 

Arctic Lieutenant G. C. Stout. 

Catskill (monitor) Lieutenant M. E. Hall. 

Choctaw Lieutenant W. O. Hulme. 

Elfrida Lieutenant M. A. Orlopp. 

Enquirer Lieutenant W. H. Stayton. 

Free Lance Lieutenant T. C. Zerega. 

Huntress Lieutenant Felton Parker. 

Inca Lieutenant W. E. McKay. 

Jason (monitor) Lieutenant H. F. Fickbohm. 

Lehigh (monitor) Lieutenant R. G. Peck. 

Montauk (monitor) Lieutenant L. L. Reamey. 

Nahant (monitor) Lieutenant C. S. Richman. 

Nantucket (monitor) Lieutenant C. B. T. Moore. 

Passaic (monitor) Lieutenant F. H. Sherman. 

Restless Lieutenant A. H. Day. 

Wyandotte (monitor) Lieutenant T. L Madge. 



402 APPENDIX 

VESSELS PURCHASED BY THE UNITED STATES 



NAME BEFORE 




DATE OF 






RENAMED 






PREVIOUS OWNERS 


PURCHASE 




PURCHASE 




Columbia 


Wasp 


Mar. 


26, 1898 


J. H. Ladew. 


Alicia 


Hornet 

Eagle 

Hawk 


Apr. 
Apr. 


6. 1898 
2, 1898 


Henry M. Flagler. 
Frederick Gallatin. 
Henry L. Pierce estate. 


Almy 


Herinione 


D. C. Ivans. . . . 


Nezinscot.. . 


Mar. 


25, 1898 


Moran <t Co. 


P. H. Wise 


Sioux 


Mar. 


26, 1898 


" 


Winthrop 


Osceola 


Mar. 


31, 1898 


Staples Coal Co. 


El Tore 


Accomac . . . 


Mar. 


26, 1898 


Southern Pacific Line. 


Wilmot 


Potomac 


Apr. 


14. 1898 


Ocean Towing and Wrecking Co. 


EdwardLucken- 


Tecumseh . . 


Apr. 


2, 1898 


Luckenback & Co. 


back 










Walter A. Luck- 


Uncas 




" 


" 


enback 










Atlas 


Wampatuck 


Apr. 


4. 1898 


Standard Oil Co. 


Josephine 


Vixen 


Apr. 


0, 1898 


P. A. B. Widener. 


Mayflower 


Mayflower. . 


Mar. 


19, 1898 


Ogden Goelet estate. 


Sovereign 


Scorpion.. . . 


Apr. 


7, 1898 


M. C. D. Borden. 


Creole 


Solace 

Topeka 


Apr. 


2, 1898 


Cromwell S. S. Line. 

Thames Iron Works (London). 


Diogenes 


(Not named). . . 


Manly 


Apr. 


13, 1898 


Chas. R. Flint. 





Somers 


Mar. 


26, 1898 


Schichau Works, Elbing, Germany. 


Saturn 


Saturn 

Lebanon. . . . 


Apr. 
Apr. 


2, 1898 
6, 1898 


The Boston Towboat Co. 
Philadelphia and Reading R. R. Co. 


Lebanon 


El Norte 


Yankee 




" 


Southern Pacific Co. 


El Rio 


Dixie 

Prairie 

Yosemite. . . 


Apr. 
Apr. 


15, 1898 
6, 1898 


,, 


EI Sol 


El Sud 


Nictheroy 


Buflalo 


July 


11. 1898 


Brazilian Government. 


Amazonas 


New Orleans 


Mar. 


16, 1898 


" 


Almirante Abru 


Albany 




" 


•• 


Merrimac 


Merrimac. . . 


Apr. 


12. 1898 


Hogan Line. 


Niagara 


Niagara. . . 


Apr. 


11, 189S 


Ward Line S. S. Co. 


Sterling 


Sterling. . . . 


Apr. 


16, 1898 


Black Diamond Transportation Co. 


Enterprise 


Modoc 


Apr. 


29, 1898 


American Towing Co. 


No. 18 


No. 18 


Apr. 


18. 1898 


Philadelphia Transportation and 
Lightering Co. 




Nashan 


Nashan 


Apr. 


6. 1898 


Frank Smythe. 


Zafiro 


Zafiro 

Alice 

St. Paul.. ] 


Apr. 
Mar. 


9. 1898 
26. 1898 


China and Manila S. S. Co. 

John M. Worth. 

' International Navigation Co. 


Alice 


St. Paul 


St. Louis 

New York 


St. Louis. 1 
Harvard.. ( 


Chartered. 


.. 




Yale J 

Choctaw — 


Apr. 


19, 1898 


W. G. Coyle. 


C. G. Coyle... . 


Penwood 


Powhatan. . 


Apr. 


8, 1898 


Walsh <fe Doran. 


Fearless 


Iroquois 


Apr. 


18, 1898 


J. D. Spreckels Bros. Co. 


Vigilant 


Vigilant. . . . 


Apr. 


19, 1898 


" 


Active 


Active 

Hercules 


Apr. 
Apr. 


18, 1898 
26, 1898 


Standard Oil Co. 


Hercules 


Southery 


Southery. . . 


Apr. 


16, 1898 


Edward Luckenback. 


Venezuela 


Panther 


Apr. 


19, 1898 


Red D Line S. S. Co. 


Yumuri 


Badger 




" 


Ward Line S. S. Co. 


Yorktown 


Resolute 


Apr. 


21. 1898 


Old Dominion S. S. Co. 


T. P. Fowler. . . 


Mohawk . . . 


Apr. 


23, 1898 


Cornell Steamboat Co. 


Thespia 


HLst 


Apr. 


22, 1898 


Davis Dows, Jr. 


Restless 


Restless. . . . 




" 


Hiram W. Sidley. 


lUawara 


Oneida 


May 


31, 1898 


Eugene Tompkins. 



A 



APPENDIX 

VESSELS PURCHASED BY THE UNITED STATES 



403 



NAME BEFORE 
PURCHASE 



Viking 

Chatham 

Penelope 

Right Arm. . . . 
Philadelphia . . 

Corsair 

Menemsha. . . . 

Free Lance 

John Dwight. . . 

Justin 

Hortense 

Aileen 

Scindia 

Comanche 

Illinois 

Kingston 

Dorothea 

Gov. Russell . . 
East Boston . . 
W. H. Brown.. 
J. D. Jones . . . 

Celtic King 

RhfPtia 

A. W. Booth. . 
Joseph Holland 
No. 3 (ice boat) 
Atala 

Eliz. Holland. 

Harlech 

Abarenda 

(Not known). 
Peter Jebsen. . 
No. 55 

Whitgift 

Norse King. . . 

Enquirer 

Inca 

Huntress 

Stranger 

Kate Jones . . . 

Bristol 

Eugenia 

Elfrida 

No. 295 

Shearwater 

Sylvia 

Hercules 

Confidence. . . . 

Kanawha 

Pedro 

Port Chalmers. 

Titania 

Culgoa 

Lucilene 



RENAMED 



Viking. . . . 
Vulcan. . . . 
Yankton.. . 
Pontiac. . . 

Peoria 

Gloucester. 

Iris 

Free Lance 

Pawnee 

Justin 

Takoma. . . 

Aileen 

Scindia.. . . 

Frolic 

Supply 

Cfpsar 

Dorothea. . 
Gov. Russell 
East Boston 
Piscataqua.. 
Apache.. . . 

Celtic 

Cassius. . . . 
Massasoit.. 
Hannibal. . 

Arctic 

Alexander. 

Leonidas. . 
Porapey. . . 
Abarenda . 

Scipio 

Brutus. . . 
Water Barge 
No. 1 . . . 

Nero 

Rainbow. . . 
Enquirer. . . 

Inca 

Huntress. . . 
Stranger.. . . 
Seminole. . . 
Cheyenne. . . 

Siren 

Elfrida 

Sylph 

Shearwater . 

Sylvia 

Chicka.saw. . 

Waban 

Kanawha. . . 

Hector 

Glacier 

Marcellus. . . 
(Not on file) 
Arethusa. . . 



DATE OF 
PURCHASE 



Apr. 


22, 


1898 


May 


2, 


189S 


May 


20, 


1898 


Apr. 


23, 


1898 


May 


23, 


1898 


Apr. 


23, 


1898 


May 


25, 


1898 


May 


6, 


1898 


Apr. 


23, 


1898 


Apr. 


30, 


1898 


May 


2, 


1898 


May 


12, 


1898 


May 


28, 


1898 


Apr. 


30, 


1898 


Apr. 


21, 


1898 


May 


21, 


1898 


May 


11, 


1898 


June 


2, 


1898 


May 


11, 


1898 


May 


24, 


1898 


May 


14, 


1898 


May 


24, 


1898 


Apr. 


25, 


1898 


Apr. 


16, 


1898 


May 


21, 


1898 


Apr. 


25, 


1898 


Apr. 


16, 


1898 


Apr. 


19, 


1898 


May 


5, 


1898 


June 


3, 


1898 


May 


25, 


1898 


June 


30, 


1898 


June 


29, 


1898 


June 


13, 


1898 


June 


7, 


1898 


June 


9, 


1898 


June 


6, 


1898 


July 


8, 


1898 


June 


9, 


1898 


June 


15, 


1898 


June 


— , 


1898 


May 


9, 


1898 


June 


13, 


1898 


June 


25, 


1898 


June 


7, 


1898 


June 


— , 


1898 


July 


— , 


1898 


June 


13. 


1898 


June 


4, 


1898 


Aug. 


12, 


1898 



PREVIOUS OWNERS 



Horace A. Hutchlns. 
Merchants and Miners' Line. 
H. E. Converse. 
Merritt & Chapman. 
Philadelphia Pilot Association. 
Pierpont Morgan. 
Miami Steamship Co. 
F. Augustus Schermerhorn. 
Geo. T. Moon. 
Bowring & Archibald. 
O'Connor & Smoot. 
Richard Stevens. 
Henderson Bros. 
H. M. Hanna. 

International Navigation Co. 
John Holman & Sons. 
Thos. McKean Estate. 
City of Boston. 

W. H. Brown. 

Merritt <t Chapman Wrecking Co. 
Federal Line (London) 
William Lamb. 
Moran Towing Co. 
Francis Stanley Holland (London). 
City of Philadelphia (leased). 
New Star Blue Line Steamers (Lon- 
don). 
Francis Stanley Holland (London). 
Jas. <fe Chas. Harrison (London). 
J. Graham. 
Geo. P. Walford. 
L. F. Chapman & Co. 
Standard Oil Co. 

McCondray & Co. 
Thomas Ronaldson. 
W. J. Conners. 
Frank B. McQuesten. 

F. C. Fowler. 
Mrs. Mary I-ewis. 
Boston Towboat Co. 
J. J. Cummings. 

J. G. Cassatt. 
Dr. Seward Webb. 
John Roach & Co. 
Henry R. Wolcott. 
Edward M. Brown. 
M. Revel. 

John P. Duncan. 

(Prize.) 

Federal Line (London). 

William Lamb. 

G. F. Walford (chartered only). 
Thos. S. Hopkins. 



404 



APPENDIX 





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APPENDIX 



405 



CONVERTED YACHTS 



Aileen 

Buccaneer. 
Dorothea.. 

Eagle 



Elfrida 

Enquirer. . . 
P'ree Lance. 

Frolic 



Gloucester. 

Hawk 

Hist 



Hornet. 



Huntress . . 
Kanawha . 

Inca 

Mayflower. 

Oneida 



Restless. 



Scorpion. . 

Shearwater 
Siren 



Stranger . . 
Sylph 



Tons 
192 



594 



434 

173 
136 
197 

607 



786 
375 
472 

425 

81.76 
175 



2,690 

150 

137 
850 

315 
546 
152 



14 



15 



15.5 

10.5 

20 

16.5 

11 



17 

14.5 

14.5 

15 

14 
14 

14 

16.8 

12 

12 
17.85 

13 
14 
15 



o K S 
" O O 
g 53 B. 



500 



1.558 



*850 

*200 

1.035 

800 

550 



2,000 
1,000 
*500 

*800 



400 
4.700 

350 

*500 
2,800 



550 



Tonfi 
45 



90 



85 

23 

18 
22 

100 



70 
60 

65 

17 
20 

25 

684 

20 

16 
200 

45 
50 
47 



COMPLE- 
MENT 



1 3-pdr 

2 6-mm 

2 1-pdr 

4 6-pdr 

2 3-pdr 

4 1-pdr 

4 6-pdr 

2 Colts 

2 37-mm .... 

2 1-pdr 

2 Catlings. . . 

2 3-pdr 

2 47-mm. R.C. 

4 6-pdr 

4 3-pdr 

2 Colts 

2 6-pdr 

1-pdr 

2 Colts 

1 3-pdr 

4 1-pdr 

1 Colt 

'3 6-pdr 

2 1-pdr 

2 6-mm. Colts 
2 37-mm. R.C. 

2 Colts 

1 3-pdr 

3 1-pdr 

2 6-mm. Colts 
1 1-pdr 

1 Catling 

2 5" R. F. G . 

12 6-pdr 

2 6-mm. Colts 
1 6-pdr 

4 1-pdr 

1 6-mm. Gat- 
ling 

6 6-pdr 

2 6-mm. Colts 
6 6-pdr 

2 6-mm. Colts 

3 3-pdr 

1 3-pdr 

3 1-pdr 

1 14-pdr 

2 6-pdr 

2 1-pdr 

6 6-pdr 

2 3-pdr 



OFFI- 
CERS 



30 



63 



85 



40 



FIRST COM- 
MISSION IN 
U. S. NAVY 



May 14, 1898 

June 1, 1898 

Mar. 26, 1898 

June 30, 1898 
June 22, 1898 
May 11, 1898 

July 6. 1898 
May 20, 1898 

Apr. 5. 1898 

May 13. 1898 

Apr. 12. 1898 

July 1, 1898 
July 26, 1898 

Aug. 1. 1898 



Apr. 30. 1898 

May 14, 1898 
Apr. 11,1898 

June 24, 1898 
June 30, 1898 



* Nominal horse-power. 



406 



APPENDIX 



CONVERTED YACHTS 



Sylvia. .. 

Viking. . . 

Vixen 

Wasp 

Yankton. 



Tons 
302 

218 
806 
630 
975 



9 

11.75 
16 
16.5 
14 



420 
1,250 
1,800 

750 






Tons 
60 

40 
190 
108 
170 



3 3-pdr 

1 1-pdr 

2 6-mm. Colts 

1 3-pdr 

3 6-mm. Colts 

4 6-pdr 

4 1-pdr 

4 6-pdf 

2 Colts 

6 3-pdr 

2 Colts 



COMPLE- 
MENT 



OFFI- 
CERS 



FIRST COM- 
MISSION IN 
U. 8. NAVY 



June 29. 1898 

May 11. 1898 
Apr. 11. 1898 
-\pr. 11, 1898 
May 16, 1898 



APPENDIX 



407 



CONVERTED TUG-BOATS 



Accomac. 

Active. . . 

Alice .... 

Apache. . 

Cheyenne 
Chickasaw 

Choctaw . . 
Hercules . . 



Iroquois. . . 

Massasoit . 
Modoc. . . . 
Mohawk . . 



Nezinscot . . 

Osceola . . . . 

Pawnee. . . . 
Piscataqua. 

Pontiac. . . . 

Potomac. . . 

Powhatan. 

Seminole. . , 



Sioux 

Takoma. . 
Tecumseh. 

Uncas .... 



Vigilant. . . 



Waban 

Wompatuck 






Tons 
187 

296 
356 
650 



198 



702 

202 
240 
420 

156 



571 

275 
631 

401 

677 

194 



155 

214 
441 

300 



462 



10 

12 

10 

10 

11 
10 

10 

12 

13.25 

10 
12 

10 

14 

10 
14 

10.5 

18 

13 



10 
12 
11 

12 
12 



13 



o o 



250 

600 
250 
550 



188 



1,000 



400 
400 



*250 
1.600 

425 

2,000 

397 



290 

*500 
*750 

450 



650 






Tons 
35 

80 

15 

120 

20 
70 

40 

205 

34 

40 
32 

40 

150 

16 

300 

45 

260 

57 

42 

45 
30 
40 

120 
75 



130 



( 1 6-pdr. R. F. 
) 1 6-mm. Colt 

i 1 Catling 

^ 2 3' B. L. R. 
( 2 37-mm. R.C. 
2 6-pdr. R. F. 
(2 4" R. F 

< 2 3-pdr. R. F. 
(2 Catling 

1 S'B. L. R. 
( 1 3-pdr. R. F. 

< 1 1-pdr. R. F. 
( 1 37-mm. R.C. 

1 3-pdr 

1 1-pdr. R. F. 
1 37-mm. R.C. 
4 3" B. L. R . 

1 Catling. .. . 

2 37-mm. R.C. 
1 1-pdr 

1 6-pdr 

1 Colt 

2 6-pdr 

1 47-mm 

1 Catling 

2 9-pdr 

2 37-mm. R.C. 
2 6-pdr 

1 1-pdr 

2 6-pdr 

2 1-pdr 

1 3-pdr 

1 37-mm 

1 3-pdr 

2 6-mm. Colt. 

1 6-pdr 

1 Colt 

1 6-pdr 

1 1-pdr 

1 Catling 

1 37-mm. R.C. 

1 Catling 

2 3' B. L. R. 

1 Catling 

2 47-mm. R.C. 
1 3" B. L. R 

( 1 3-pdr 

I 1 Catling... 



COMPLE- 
MENT 



OFFI- 
CERS 



Y 



3 


16 


1 


3 




22 


2 


13 


2 


26 


2 


30 



30 



FIRST COM- 
MISSION IN 
U. B. NAVY 



Apr. 2. 1898 

July 6, 1898 
Apr. 6, 1898 
June 11. 1898 



Apr. 19. 1898 



July 6. 1898 

June 21. 1898 

Apr. 23. 1898 
Apr. 2. 1898 



Apr. 27, 1898 
June 18, 1898 

Apr. 2, 1898 

Apr. 5, 1898 

July 23, 1898 
Apr. 9, 1898 

Apr. 6, 1898 
Apr. 6. 1898 

Apr. 6. 1898 
Apr. 6, 1898 



* Nominal horse-power. 



APPENDIX B 

TABLE SHOWING STATIONS OF REGULAR TROOPS PREVIOUS TO THE 
WAR, AND THEIR ASSIGNMENTS ON MOBILIZATION 



First U. S. Cavalry 

Second U. S. Cavalry 

Third U. S. Cavalry 

Sixth U. S. Cavalry 

Ninth U. S. Cavalry 

Tenth U. S. Cavalry 

Light Battery E. First U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery K, First U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery A, Second U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery F, Second U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery C, Third U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery F, Third U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery B, Fourth U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery F. Fourth U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery D, Fifth U. S. 

Artillery. 
Light Battery F, Fifth U. S. 

Artillery. 

First U. S. Infantry 

Second U. S. Infantry 

Third U. S. Infantry 

Fourth U. S. Infantry 

Fiftli U. S. Infantry 

Sixth U. S. Infantry 

Seventh U. S. Infantry 

Eighth U. S. Infantry 

Ninth U. S. Infantry 

Tenth U. S. Infantry 

Eleventh U. S. Infantry 

Twelfth U. S. Infantry 

Thirteenth U. S. Infantry 

Sixteenth U. S. Infantry 

Seventeenth U. S. Infantry... 
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry... . 

Nineteenth U. S. Infantry 

Twentieth U. S. Infantry 

Twenty-first U. S. Infantry... 
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry 
Twenty-third U. S. Infantry.. 
Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry 
Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry. . 
Company E, Engineers 



Kansas, Arizona, Oklahoma, 
and Illinois 

New Mexico, Colorado, and 
Kansas 

Vermont and Missouri 

Virginia, Kansas, and Ne- 
braska 

Nebraska, Utah, and Wy- 
oming 

Montana 

District of Columbia 

Texas 

Illinois 

Rhode Island 

California 

Louisiana 

Virginia 

New York 

Georgia 

California 

Montana and North Dakota 

Minnesota 

Illinois 

Georgia 

Kentucky 

Colorado 

Wyoming 

New York 

Oklahoma 

Missouri and Arkansas 

Nebraska 

New York 

Idaho and Washington 

Ohio 

Texas 

Michigan 

Kansas 

New York 

Nebraska 

Texas 

Utah 

Montana 

West Point 

408 



Chickamauga Park. 



New Orleans, La. 
Chickamauga Park. 
Mobile, Ala. 
Tampa, Fla. 



Chickamauga Park. 

Tampa, Fla. 

Mobile, Ala. 
Chickamauga Park. 
Tampa, Fla. 
Chickamauga Park. 
Tampa, Fla. 
New Orleans, La. 
Mobile, Ala. 

Tampa, Fla. 

New Orleans, La. 
Chickamauga Park. 

Tampa, Fla. 



I 



APPENDIX C 

Flying Squadron, U. S. Flag-Ship Brooklyn, 

Off Santiago de Cuba, May 30, 1898. 

Sir: I have the honor to report that the squadron sailed from Key 
West on the morning of the 19th instant for Cienfuegos, Cuba, in obe- 
dience to orders from Rear-Admiral Sampson. In company with the 
flag-ship were the Massachiisetts, Texas, and Scorpion. En route, 
passed the Marblehead, Nashville, and Wasp, communicating with 
the last-named vessel. Off Cape San Antonio communicated with 
the Cincinnati and Vesuvius, scouting. 

2. On the morning of the 22d instant the squadron stood in for the 
entrance of Cienfuegos Harbor to reconnoitre, and later in the day 
passed the entrance twice close in. As I had heard the firing of guns 
on the previous afternoon in the direction of the port, and as there was 
considerable smoke observed in the harbor, I was led to believe that 
the Spanish squadron might have arrived there. That day the Dupont 
joined me with dispatches from Admiral Sampson, directing that the 
blockade of Cienfuegos be preserved and that the Scorpion^ be sent to 
communicate with the Minneapolis and Harvard, off Santiago. Also 
on this day the Iowa joined the squadron, 

3. A line of blockade was established about 4 miles offshore, and at 
night an inshore line was maintained, consisting variously of the Scor- 
pion, Dupont, and Castine, the last-named vessel arriving on the 23d, 
convoying the Merrimac. 

4. Also, on the 23d instant, the Hawk arrived with dispatches from 
Admiral Sampson, directing me to move eastward with the squadron 
to Santiago, if satisfied that the enemy's vessels were not in Cienfuegos. 
Not being satisfied at this time that they were not there, I held my 
position, being further strengthened in my opinion by the fact that I 
was informed by the captain of the British steamer Adula, that when 
he left Kingston a cablegram had been received, on the Thursday pre- 
ceding my arrival off Cienfuegos, stating that the Spanish squadron 
had sailed from Santiago. 

5. The Iowa, Castine, and Dupont took coal from the collier on that 
day, the Iowa particularly needing coal, as she had j ailed from Key 
West to join this squadron before completely coaling, and consequently 
was considerablv short. 

6. On the 24th instant the Marblehead, Vixen, and Eagle jomed the 
squadron, and the Marblehead and Eagle were immediately sent to com- 

409 



410 APPENDIX 

municate with the insurgents to the westward of Cienfuegos, and to 
furnish them with ammunition, clothing, and dynamite. Upon Com- 
mander McCalla's return, in the course of the afternoon, he reported to 
me that he had obtained information that the Spanish squadron was not 
in Cienfuegos. Dispatches were at once sent by the Dupojit to Admiral 
Sampson and to Commodore Remey for the department indicating that 
this squadron would move toward Santiago de Cuba. 

7. Great difficulty has been experienced in coaling the Texas, on 
account of her projecting sponsons, in any seaway whatever, and only 
under the most favorable conditions can she go alongside a collier. In 
anything more unfavorable than absolutely smooth water there is great 
danger of injury either to the Texas herself or to the collier. In this 
connection the advantage of a tumblehome to the side is very marked, 
insuring great freedom from accidents due to projections on the ship's 
side. 

8. After dark on the evening of the 24th, the squadron stood to sea, 
to the eastward, with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, loiva, and the Texas 
in column natural order; the Marblehead, Vixen, and Eagle on the 
outer flank and the collier inshore of the battle-ships. The Castine 
was left at Cienfuegos to notify the Scorpion on her return, should she 
not be sighted by us, to proceed to Key West in company. 

9. The run to Santiago was marked by rain and rough weather to 
such an extent that the Eagle was unable to keep up a speed of 7.5 to 
8.5 knots and fell behind so much as to seriously delay the squadron, 
which was forced to slow to a speed of from 4 to 5 knots for her to 
regain and hold her position. As this rough head sea continued with 
no apparent prospect of abating, and as the Eagle's coal supply was 
becoming dangerously low, she was sent to Port Antonio, Jamaica, 
for coal, with directions to make the best of her way back to Key 
West. 

10. On arriving off Santiago de Cuba, the collier Merrimac was dis- 
abled by the breaking of her intermediate pressure valve stem and the 
cracking of the stuffing box. This served as a further embarrassment 
to the s(|uadron and a source of considerable anxiety, as, with the 
weather conditions that had prevailed since leaving Cienfuegos, it 
appeared absolutely necessary to abandon the position off Santiago 
and seek a place where the vessels could be coaled and the collier's 
machinery repaired. 

11. Off Santiago the St. Paid, Yale, and Minneapolis were sighted 
and communicated with. The Minneapolis reported that she only had 
sufficient coal to reach Key West, and that her machinery was in bad 
condition. The coal supply of the other two scouts was also much 
reduced. Arrangements were at once made whereby the Yale was to 
tow the collier, and, as the prosj)ect did not seem favorable for replen- 
ishing the meagre coal supply of the other vessels, the squadron stood 
to the westward, towing the collier. The operation of taking the col- 



I 



APPENDIX 411 

Her in tow proved to be quite difficult, owing to the size and weight of 
the two ships and the repeated parting of the tow hues. Finally, how- 
ever, after twenty-four hours' unremitting exertions, the collier's chain 
cable was gotten to the Yale and the scjuadron proceeded. The St. 
Paul was ordered to remain off Santiago until her coal supply would 
no longer permit of further delay. 

12. After standing to the westward for about three hours, or about 
twenty-five miles, the conditions became less unfavorable and the 
squadron stopped. The Texas and Marblehead were sent alongside 
the collier, whose injury had been temporarily repaired, and coaled 
during the night. 

13. Inasmuch as it was kno-^-n that, in case the Spanish squadron 
had reached Santiago, Admiral Sampson was able to block any move- 
ment of the enemy through the Bahama Channel, my intention in 
standing to the westward was, should it become necessary, to bar any 
effort of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the Yucatan 
Passage. 

14. On the 28th instant continued coaling the Texas and Marble- 
head, and later the Vixen. In the afternoon, having managed to get 
sufficient coal into these vessels to enable them to remain with the 
squadron, shaped course for Santiago, off which port we arrived about 
dusk. Established an inner picket line consisting of the Vixen and 
Marblehead, the remainder of the squadron lying to off the entrance 
of the port, about four or five miles out. 

15. The next morning, 29th instant, steamed in to examine the 
entrance to the harbor, and sighted the Cristobal Colon apparently 
moored, head and stem, across the western channel around Cay Smith ; 
also one of the vessels of the Vizcaya or Infanta Maria Teresa class 
moored in the eastern channel, and two small torpedo-boats. Later in 
the day made out the military tops of a third vessel farther up the 
harbor. 

16. A close blockade of the harbor has been maintained, and no ves- 
sels have entered or left since our arrival. Yesterday morning H. M. S. 
Indefatigable came up to the line of blockade and made signal "Re- 
quest permission to communicate with the commodore," which was of 
course granted. A boarding officer came on board the flag-ship with 
a letter from the commanding officer, Capt. L. A. Primrose, requesting 
permission for his vessel to pass the line of blockade in order to com- 
municate with H. M. consul at this port. INIy reply was that there 
could not be the slightest objection to his doing so. Instead, however, 
of availing himself of the permission the Indefatigable at once steamed 
off in the direction from whence she came, signalling "No harm done 
for courtesy." It may have been that his learning that the Spanish 
fleet was in this port was of more importance than H. M. consul, and 
he may have desired first to communicate with his government from 
Jamaica. 



412 APPENDIX 

17. On the 30th instant the New Orleans arrived, convoying the 
collier Sterling. 

18. Concerning the coaling of a large fleet of vessels I would partic- 
ularly call the department's attention to the necessity for heavy bags 
holding about eight hundred pounds, in addition to buckets, which 
have not proved of much use. They should also be provided with at 
least six cotton bales or heavy wooden camels six to eight feet broad 
to be used as fenders to take the thrust of the ships and to permit coal- 
ing in rougher weather than is now possible with the means at our 
disposal. At present we are coaling on all favorable occasions in 
plain sight of the enemy's fleet. 

Very respectfully, m 

W. S. Schley, T 

Commodore, U. S. N., 
Commander-in-Chief Flying Squadron. 



31^77-2 



fli 

1! 



